Filed 4/27/17 P. v. Chaires CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE


THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MAURICE CHAIRES,
Defendant and Appellant.

A148622

(Solano County
Super. Ct. No. VCR224677)


Maurice Chaires was convicted by jury of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)), vehicle theft (id., § 666.5), and evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)). Assigned counsel has submitted a Wende brief, certifying that counsel was unable to identify any issues for appellate review. Counsel also submitted a declaration confirming that Chaires was advised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief raising any points which he wishes to call to the court’s attention. No supplemental brief has been submitted. As required, we have independently reviewed the record. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109–110.) We find no arguable issues and therefore affirm.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 18, 2013, at about 3:00 a.m., Mercedes McDaniels and Tenisha Jenkins went to the home of Detrick Phillips in Vallejo to shoot dice with Phillips’s housemates. Sometime after their arrival, Phillips went to her car to retrieve her laptop computer. At the car she heard a man say something and saw a pistol pointed at her head. The man went through Phillips’s pockets and took her cellphone and car keys. Phillips ran away. As she ran, she heard, then saw, her car being driven away. Phillips returned to her house and called police, who arrived shortly thereafter.
Vallejo police broadcast a description of Phillips’s stolen Dodge Dart. The car was observed shortly after the broadcast, and officers attempted to stop the car. The driver initially pulled to the shoulder of Interstate 80, but drove away as the officers got out of their cars. A vehicle pursuit at speeds in excess of 80 miles per hour ended after the Dart hit a curb and slid into the center divide of the roadway. The driver of the car, whom officers identified as Chaires, got out and ran. Chaires was apprehended after a brief foot chase. McDaniels and Jenkins were passengers in the Dart. In a field identification, Phillips identified Chaires as the person who robbed her. Her car keys, cellphone, and laptop were recovered from the vehicle. A loaded semi-automatic pistol was found about 9:30 a.m. on the shoulder of an off-ramp from Interstate 80, along the path of the vehicle pursuit.
Chaires was charged by information with carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)); robbery (id., § 211); evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)); theft of a vehicle, with a prior vehicle theft conviction (Pen. Code, § 666.5); and possession of a firearm by a felon (id., § 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The information further alleged that Chaires personally used a firearm in the commission of the carjacking and robbery (id., §§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)), and that he had prior convictions that would enhance sentencing.
After the second day of trial, Juror No. 10 advised the court that at the end of the previous session the jurors were followed out of the courtroom by two men who said they were Chaires’s “cousins.” With agreement of counsel, the court questioned Juror No. 10, two alternate jurors, and Juror No. 5. Juror No. 10 said he did not feel threatened by the communication, and the two men were “respectful, and considerate and friendly.” He believed other jurors may have been uncomfortable with the situation. When asked if the incident would have any impact on his fairness as a juror, he repeatedly said it would not. The other jurors questioned reported no recollection of the incident, and the court specifically found Juror Nos. 5 and 10 to be “forthcoming and honest.” Defense counsel requested an admonition to the jury and submitted a proposed form. The court agreed to give the admonition except as to readvisement on the burden of proof. Following the admonition, the court asked all jurors if any of them had concerns about their ability to give both sides a fair trial, and whether they were comfortable with the oath they had taken as jurors. No juror indicated they would have any difficulty. The following day, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing the jury had been “tainted.” The court denied the motion, concluding that nothing described by the jurors “rose to a level that is undermining anyone’s right to a fair trial.”
Phillips initially failed to appear when subpoenaed as a witness for trial. A bench warrant was issued for her arrest. She appeared for trial in custody, after previously refusing to testify and having been granted immunity. Phillips said she failed to appear because she “didn’t want to be involved.” Phillips also testified she was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the robbery; she did not see the robber’s face; and, when transported by police officers to make an identification, “was very shook up, so [she] might have agreed to anything.” She acknowledged identifying Chaires to police as the person who took her car.
Phillips was placed in a witness relocation program and was provided with a hotel room, cash, and gift cards. She was terminated from the program before trial began. The court denied a defense request to impeach Phillips with an allegedly fraudulent loan application submitted when purchasing the Dodge Dart, finding that the proffered evidence was “tangential” and “unduly prejudicial, and really doesn’t add anything.”
Over defense objection, recordings of jail telephone calls by Chaires to third parties were admitted in evidence and played for the jury. Neither the recordings nor their transcripts are included in the record before us, but the prosecution’s closing argument cites statements in the recordings by Chaires that could be understood as requests to put pressure on Phillips, McDaniels, and Jenkins to recant their statements to police, and to offer them compensation to do so.
The jury found Chaires guilty of carjacking, evading an officer, and vehicle theft with a prior vehicle theft conviction. The jury found Chaires not guilty of robbery and of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the firearm enhancement allegation was found to be not true. Chaires waived jury trial on the prior conviction allegations, and the court found that Chaires had suffered a prior “strike” conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subd. (a), 667, subd. (b)), a serious felony conviction (id., § 667, subd. (a)(1)), and one “prison prior” conviction (id., § 667.5).
At sentencing, the court denied Chaires’s motion to dismiss the strike prior. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 16 years and eight months—the midterm of five years, doubled pursuant to Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b)–(i) and 1170.12, for the carjacking conviction; a consecutive eight-month term for the evading a police officer conviction; and consecutive five- and one-year terms imposed pursuant to Penal Code sections 667, subdivision (a)(1) and 667.5, subdivision (b), respectively. Sentence on the vehicle theft charge was stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
Chaires filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
We find no arguable issues in the court’s denial of a mistrial. The court properly investigated the possibility of juror misconduct to ensure that Juror Nos. 5 and 10 (and the alternate jurors) remained able to perform their duties, and to determine whether cause existed to replace any juror. (See People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 532 [court’s duty to investigate allegation of juror misconduct].) “ ‘Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.’ ” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 211.) The incident described by Juror No. 10 was relatively innocuous, and the juror insisted it would not prejudice him against Chaires. Juror No. 5 and the two alternate jurors reported no recollection of the incident, and the court found the seated jurors credible and forthcoming. Nothing indicated either alternate juror was ever seated or participated in deliberations. Chaires does not demonstrate prejudice, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.
We also find no arguable issue in the exclusion of Chaires’s proffered impeachment evidence. “ ‘Although we recognize that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value in his favor [citations], “[t]his does not mean that an unlimited inquiry may be made into collateral matters; the proffered evidence must have more than ‘slight-relevancy’ to the issues presented.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘Moreover, this court will not disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 unless it is shown the trial court exercised its discretion “ ‘in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 865.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the impeachment evidence proffered by Chaires was tangential, of marginal relevance, and unduly prejudicial. Nor did it abuse its discretion in admission of Chaires’s statements in his jailhouse telephone calls that could reasonably be interpreted as efforts to dissuade or suborn witnesses against him.
Substantial evidence supports the convictions, and Chaires fails to demonstrate the court abused its discretion in its sentencing choices.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. 



_________________________
BRUINIERS, J.


WE CONCUR:


_________________________
JONES, P. J.


_________________________
NEEDHAM, J.


























A148622