Filed 4/28/17 In re Angelica I. CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re ANGELICA I., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ANGELICA I.,
Defendant and Appellant.
G053215
(Super. Ct. No. 15DL0068)
O P I N I O N
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Lewis W.
Clapp, Judge. Affirmed.
Reed Webb, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and
Chirstopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
2
Angelica I. appeals from the juvenile court’s true finding of a petition in
which she was alleged to have falsely identified herself to a deputy sheriff and delayed
the performance of his duties. The petition arose from an incident where a deputy found
Angelica in the company of a probationer, known to be a gang member, during a
probation check. On appeal, Angelica challenges the juvenile court’s denial of her
motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that her detention was unlawful, rendering
the evidence insufficient to sustain the petition.
1
We disagree the detention was improper
and therefore affirm the judgment.
I
FACTS
One evening in November 2015, Orange County Deputy Sheriff Nabi and
Probation Officer Fuentes conducted a compliance check on a minor Fuentes was
supervising named Anthony S. Anthony was a member of a gang called the Family Mob
and was on probation with gang terms. Those terms required him to submit to searches
by probation officers and not to associate with members of his gang.
Fuentes and Nabi did not find Anthony at his home in Aliso Viejo. They
went to a corner that was known to Nabi as a point where Family Mob members
congregated. They saw Anthony, and Angelica was with him. Nabi conducted a search
of Anthony. Nabi then began speaking with Angelica and asked for her name and
identification. Nabi’s reasoning was that it was 10:00 p.m., Angelica seemed as if she
might be a minor, they were in a known gang area, and she was in the company of a gang
member. Nabi wanted to be sure that Angelica had no warrants, and was not a gang
member herself.
Nabi was also aware that Anthony, based on his experience with him, had
used girls to carry drugs for him in the past, and those girls had committed crimes such as

1
As we shall discuss, given the facts, this was essentially the same as a motion to
suppress the evidence that arose from her detention.
3
possession of alcohol with him. He had arrested other minors who had possessed guns
and other weapons while with Anthony. The area where he and Fuentes found Anthony
and Angelica was known for tagging and vehicle burglaries.
Angelica told Nabi her name was Jessica Fernandez and her date of birth
was May 27, 1997.
2
Nabi instructed Angelica to write this information down on the back
side of a business card. When Angelica asked why, Nabi said it was because she was
with a probationer. Nabi used the information to conduct a records check, but did not
find a Jessica Fernandez with that date of birth. Angelica told Nabi she had a suspended
driver’s license, but Nabi was unable to locate a computer record of it.
Nabi believed Angelica was lying, based both on the information she was
providing and her demeanor, and asked her for her real name at least three times. Nabi
then asked Angelica to provide contact information for her parents. Angelica provided
two phone numbers, neither of which were answered when called. Angelica then called
her father herself and put him on speakerphone. Her father verified her true name and
date of birth. She was, indeed, a minor. Nabi then ran a records check, which revealed
an outstanding no-bail warrant. Angelica tried to run when Nabi told her to stand up, but
he took her into custody.
The Orange County District Attorney filed a petition which alleged
Angelica unlawfully delayed a peace officer in the discharge of his duties (Pen. Code,
§148, subd. (a)(1)) and that she falsely identified herself to a police officer upon a lawful
detention (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a)). Angelica moved to dismiss the petition (Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 700.1) on the ground that her detention was unlawful under the Fourth
Amendment. The juvenile court denied the motion, and eventually the court also
sustained the allegations in the petition. Angelica, who had previously been declared a

2
Based on the date of the incident, this would have meant, if true, that Angelica was 18
years old.
4
ward of the court, was given a 64-day commitment to a juvenile facility with credit for 64
days and continued her previous probation. She now appeals.
II
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review and Relevant Law
Angelica did not directly move to suppress the evidence that came to light
as a result of her detention. Instead, she moved to dismiss under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 701.1, arguing that because her detention was unlawful, there was
insufficient evidence from which to conclude she resisted an officer in the scope of his
lawful duties or failed to identify herself upon a lawful detention or arrest. Both counts
require the officer to be acting lawfully; therefore, if the court found an unlawful
detention had taken place, there would be insufficient evidence to sustain either
allegation. Accordingly, the standard of review and legal issues are the same as they
would be in a motion to suppress evidence arising from an illegal detention.
A review of a motion to suppress is a mixed question of fact and law.
(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182-185.) “The standard of appellate review of
a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial
court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In
determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]” (People v.
Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
The Fourth Amendment prohibits seizures of persons, including temporary
detentions, when they are unreasonable. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 17, 20-21.)
However, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise
level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders
and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that
5
it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response.” (Adams v.
Williams (1972) 407 U.S. 143, 145.)
Thus, an officer may stop and briefly detain a person for questioning based
on circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest. (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392
U.S. at pp. 21-22.) A temporary detention is reasonable when the “officer can point to
specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances,
provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in
criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) Reasonable suspicion is
“simply . . . ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of
criminal activity.” (Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696.) In determining
whether a temporary detention is justified, “the totality of the circumstances—the whole
picture—must be taken into account.” (United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411,
417.)
Reasonable Suspicion
In her opening brief, Angelica argues that “[m]erely sitting next to a
probationer does not justify a detention.” (Original bolding omitted.) We agree, and we
also agree with Angelica that this was a detention rather than a consensual encounter.
Thus, we must examine the “totality of the circumstances” (United States
v. Cortez, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 417) to determine whether Angelica’s detention was
permissible. Nabi pointed to a number of reasons to briefly detain Angelica to ascertain
her identity: the lateness of the hour, that she appeared to be a minor, her presence in a
gang area with a history of tagging and vehicle burglaries, and the fact that her
companion, Anthony, was a known gang member on probation. Anthony had, in the
past, used girls to carry drugs for him and had been arrested in the company of minors
who were in possession of guns and other weapons. Nabi was also aware that Angelica
could be a gang member herself, a runaway, or have a warrant.
6
Angelica dismisses these facts as “speculation,” but we disagree. Taken
together, they provided reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief stop to ascertain
Angelica’s identity. We also reject Angelica’s contention that the inquiry ends with
Nabi’s testimony that when he first contacted Angelica, he did not suspect she had
committed a crime. He testified subsequently that he suspected she and Anthony were
potentially preparing to engage in criminal activity.
Angelica relies on People v. Rodriguez (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 232, 239, a
case in which an officer detained a defendant based on department policy to stop
individuals who may be involved in a gang. She also relies on People v. Castaneda
(1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1072, in which the police officer relied on a racial profile to
justify his detention of a suspect.
3
Those cases, however, are distinguishable. In Rodriguez, there was no
indicia of criminal activity at all, merely social activity. In Castaneda, there were no
individualized facts, merely a racial profile. Here, there were articulate facts leading
Nabi to believe Angelica might be a minor who was involved in criminal activity with
Anthony, given his past history, the hour, and their location. Taken together, these were
more than a hunch – these facts constitute the reasonable suspicion the law requires.
Given our conclusion that reasonable suspicion was present, we need not
address, in any great detail, respondent’s alternate argument that Anthony’s status as a
juvenile on gang probation terms justified Angelica’s brief detention. Angelica, we note,
does not address it either. Had we not found reasonable suspicion, this principle would
have sufficiently justified a brief detention of Angelica to ascertain her identity. (People

3
In her reply brief, Angelica cites Utah v. Strieff (2016) 579 U.S. __ [136 S.Ct. 2056],
which was decided after her opening brief was submitted. That case concerned whether
the attenuation between an initial, unlawful stop and a later search justified suppressing
the evidence. That case is not directly relevant here, however, because the Supreme
Court “assume[d] without deciding” that the initial stop was illegal. (Id. at p. __ [136
S.Ct. at p. 2062].) Whether the initial detention was legal is the entire issue here.
7
v. Rios (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 584, 595; People v. Matelski (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 837,
849 [the proper test in such situations is a balancing of “the extent of the intrusion against
the government interests justifying it”].)
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
ARONSON, J.
THOMPSON, J.