Filed 5/3/17 P. v. Wilkins CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR


THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
KEENAN GEORGE WILKINS,
Defendant and Appellant.

A140684

(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 11301662)


At the initial arraignment on a felony complaint, defendant Keenan George Wilkins requested permission to represent himself. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).) He completed and signed a form entitled “Advisement and Waiver of Right to Counsel (Faretta Waiver)” advising him of the risks of self-representation. After unsuccessfully attempting to discourage defendant against self-representation, the court allowed defendant to represent himself. After pleading no contest to one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) and admitting a prior strike conviction (§§ 667.5, subd. (a), 1170.12), as well as a state prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), the trial court sentenced defendant to a seven-year sentence, to be served concurrently with the 114-year sentence he received in an Alameda County case.
On appeal, defendant contends the court failed to adequately advise him of the dangers of self-representation. He also contends the court erred in refusing to hear his motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
By second amended complaint, the People charged defendant with two counts of kidnapping for robbery (§ 209, subd. (b) [counts one & two]); two counts of second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c) [counts three & four]); three counts of simple kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a) [counts five, six & seven]); and one count of attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664, 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) [count eight].) The complaint also alleged that defendant had personally used a firearm in committing counts one through seven (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), had previously been convicted of several offenses that qualified as serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and strikes (§§ 1170.12, 667, subds. (b) - (i)), and had previously served a prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
A. The Initial Arraignment on February 19, 2013
Before the Honorable Michael Ballachey, on February 19, 2013, defendant was arraigned on a multi-count felony complaint. At the start of the hearing, the public defender advised the court that defendant wanted to represent himself. The following colloquy ensued:
“THE COURT: . . . [Y]ou want to represent yourself?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“THE COURT: I can’t talk you out of it, huh?
“THE DEFENDANT: No.
“THE COURT: You know what Lincoln said, Abraham Lincoln, the president? He was a lawyer.
“THE DEFENDANT: A person who represents himself has a fool for a lawyer.
“THE COURT: Fool for a client. You’re way over your head.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“THE COURT: I’m not trying to demean you. I’m telling you that this is a very, very serious case. These charges are about as serious as they can get.
“[THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Your honor, we do have a form if the Court would want him to fill out the form to represent himself before making a final decision . . . .
“THE COURT: I used to deal with these. [PDs] make good lawyers. You don’t want to talk about it?
“THE DEFENDANT: No. Terrible things happened here in 2001 under the representation of the Public Defender’s Office, and I would rather represent myself in this case.
“THE COURT: All right. I’m going to ask you to fill out this form . . . to represent yourself . . . .”
Defendant completed and signed the form entitled “Advisement and Waiver of Right to Counsel (Faretta Waiver).” By initialing each line and signing the form at the bottom, defendant certified he waived his right to counsel and that he had been advised as to a number of consequences and disadvantages of waiving that right, including: (1) that it is unwise to represent oneself in a criminal case (2) that the court will not give a self-represented defendant special consideration; (3) that an experienced prosecutor will oppose defendant; (4) the defendant must comply with all the rules of criminal procedure and evidence; and (5) that he will also have to represent himself at the sentencing hearing in the event of conviction.
Defendant also noted on the form that he was able to read and write, was a high school graduate, that he had one year of college, and that he also had one year of legal education. After defendant completed the form, the following colloquy occurred:
“THE COURT: . . . You look like an intelligent person, well-spoken.
“THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
“THE COURT: Why would you want to do such a dumb thing to yourself? Would you be willing to go through a Marsden process and accept the results? You know what a Marsden process is?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I’m prepared to represent myself, your Honor. I want to protect all my rights.
“THE COURT: All right. I give up. You’re on your own. Have you filled out the form?”
The trial court did not ask any further questions about the waiver form, but clarified the charged offenses with defendant. The court also advised defendant that if he were convicted of the charged offenses, he would be exposing himself to a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole. Defendant waived the right to a speedy trial, and the matter was then continued for discovery and preliminary hearing.
B. The February 26, 2013 Hearing
At the February 26, 2013 pretrial hearing, before the Honorable William M. Kolin, defendant confirmed that he had been representing himself since his arraignment. The trial court gave defendant the following advisement: “Just so you understand, it’s not a good idea to represent yourself. And the reason is you do have a right to represent yourself, but you’re going to be held to the same standard as an attorney when you represent yourself, so unless you have legal training or experience, or if you’ve represented yourself in the past, you’re going to be held to the standard of an attorney, and you’re going to be up against an attorney, a District Attorney, who is aware of all the rules and procedures, whereby you might not be. So as I say, I do this every such case where somebody wants to represent themselves. I tell them the same thing. Not a good idea. But if you, nevertheless, do not want the services of an attorney, want to represent yourself, then we’ll set the matter for a preliminary [hearing]. [¶] Is that what you want to do?” Defendant confirmed that he wanted to represent himself. He had also filed ex parte requests for appointment of an investigator and a legal runner, which the court later granted.
Defendant then waived his 60-day right to a preliminary hearing. The matter was then continued to May 24, 2013 for a readiness conference, with the preliminary hearing tentatively set for May 28, 2013.
C. The September 25, 2013 Plea Hearing
Prior to the preliminary hearing, defendant filed numerous discovery motions and requests for continuance. He also filed a Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1 challenge against the Honorable John Laettner for alleged prejudicial delay in hearing his motions. Following various continuances granted at defendant’s request, defendant entered a no contest plea on September 25, 2013 before the Honorable Claire M. Maier. The following colloquy ensued:
“THE COURT: All right . . .[W]ould [the People] recite the terms of the [section] 1192.5 disposition?
“[THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: . . . The defendant will be pleading to Count 3, a violation of Penal Code section 211/212.5 (c), a felony. He will be sentenced to the midterm of three years. He will be admitting a strike to double that to six years and will also be admitting the 667.5 (b) for one additional year for a total of seven years.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wilkins has completed the plea form?
“[THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: He has, your honor.
“THE COURT: Mr. Wilkins, I have before me a two-page plea form. Are these your initials and signature on the form?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: Did you read it and did you understand it?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: Did you have any questions about the form which could not be answered that I could answer right now?
“THE DEFENDANT: No.
“THE COURT: I will not review the whole form because you did understand it; but I like to emphasize some of the rights you are giving up today, which are: [¶] You have the right to a trial, the right to confront and cross examine witnesses, the right to remain silent. You also have the right to testify. You have the right to call your own witnesses using this Court’s subpoena power. Do you understand these rights?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“THE COURT: . . . Do you understand that you are pleading to yet another strike?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: And you also understand that your maximum–just to the charges to which you are pleading–is 11 years in state prison? You understand that that’s the legal maximum?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
“THE COURT: Having those rights and your potential consequences in mind, sir, how do you plead to Count 3, a violation of Penal Code Section 211/212.5 (c), second degree robbery, which you committed March 6, 2007 at San Ramon in Contra Costa County?
“THE DEFENDANT: I have a question about something you said. When you said my maximum is 11 years, what are you saying? I am going–there’s a chance I’ll get that?
“THE COURT: No; this is called a plea agreement. I will sentence you exactly as [the District Attorney] and you agreed to.
“THE DEFENDANT: All right.
“THE COURT: Back to the plea. How do you plead to Count 3 as recited?
“THE DEFENDANT: No contest.
“THE COURT: Are you aware that this Court treats your no contest plea as guilty?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: Did you in fact on that day commit a robbery?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: All right. I am finding a factual basis for the plea and I find that Mr. Wilkins knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily has waived his rights and entered his plea.”
Thereafter, defendant waived time for sentencing, but did not agree to an Arbuckle waiver.
D. The October 9, 2013 Sentencing Hearing
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court asked defendant if he was prepared to proceed with sentencing. The following colloquy ensured:
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes. But I am a little confused. I wanted to say something. I don’t understand a couple things.
“THE COURT: All right.
“THE DEFENDANT: It was my understanding that I was allowed to make a no contest plea. I didn’t want to admit to these charges because I don’t remember them–and going back seven years . . . And I am ready to resolve it, but I thought I was doing a no contest plea.
“THE COURT: Mr. Wilkins, you did make your no contest plea on September 25th. I am prepared to proceed with sentencing. Do you waive arraignment for judgment and sentence?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
“THE COURT: Is there any legal reason why judgment should not now be pronounced?
“THE DEFENDANT: I just want to make sure the agreement is what I was informed of.
“THE COURT: The agreement was that the seven years of state prison is concurrent to your sentence in Alameda County, for which you were sentenced to 114 years in state prison.
“THE DEFENDANT: That’s not accurate; but okay.
“THE COURT: I am not finding legal cause why judgment should not now be pronounced . . . I am imposing sentence as follows: [¶] As to Count 3 I am imposing the midterm of three years state prison. [¶] As to the admitted strike I am doubling that base principal term to six years. [¶] As to the one 667.5 (b) state prison prior, I am imposing an additional and consecutive one year to be served in the Department of Corrections. [¶] You are sentenced to a total term of seven years to be served in the Department of Corrections. You shall receive 237 actual days. I have added 14 days to your original calculation that I made two weeks ago. You are entitled to 236 conduct credit. You are entitled to day-for-day credit.
“THE DEFENDANT: That’s not accurate on what my agreement was, your Honor.”
As the court continued with the hearing, defendant again objected to the court’s recitation of the plea. The court advised defendant that these matters were “specifically discussed” at the September 25, 2013 hearing and he “agreed to this disposition.” Defendant again objected, stating that this was not what he was “told by the District Attorney.” Defendant then asked to withdraw his plea. The court told defendant that he needed to file a noticed motion to withdraw his plea and that this was the improper time and place to do so. Defendant professed that he had his motion with him and there was “legal cause.” Defendant also claimed that he had never been arraigned and had never entered a plea in this case.
As the court continued with sentencing, defendant again interjected that he had been told by the District Attorney that his sentence “would be time served.” The court assured defendant any additional credits would be determined by the department of corrections. Defendant replied: “I know. What I am asking for is the PC 2900.5 credits that I am entitled to [] because I was held on $9 million bail.” After defendant again claimed that he had never been arraigned, the following colloquy occurred:
“THE DEFENDANT: I don’t understand what is going on; and I didn’t take my medication to try to understand. The other day I was on narcotic medication. Today I didn’t take them so that I could understand. [¶] What was promised to me–and [the District Attorney] left a message on September 30th that I was going to be time served, your Honor. We have that recording. You are not sentencing me to what the agreement is.
“THE COURT: Mr. Wilkins, I need to let [the District Attorney] speak . . . .
“[THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Mr. Wilkins, you have the right to appeal this conviction and sentence including any rulings on any motions heard prior to the entry of your plea. Do you understand these appellate rights?
“THE DEFENDANT: No. I do not understand what is going on right here, right now.”
The court then obtained an appellate waiver from the District Attorney and remanded defendant to custody of the Sheriff to transported to the Department of Corrections. After the court dismissed the remainder of the amended complaint, defendant expressed his discontentment with the proceedings:
“THE DEFENDANT: I can’t file my motion and withdraw my plea? [¶] I will report your dumb ass bitch to the Judicial Commission. Stupid bitch.”
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the judgment must be reversed for two reasons: he was inadequately advised about the dangers of self-representation; and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to hear his motion to withdraw his plea, resulting in a violation of his due process rights.
A. The Waiver of the Right to Counsel
Defendant argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the trial court (1) failed to adequately advise him of the consequences of his Faretta waiver; (2) failed to provide a renewed Faretta warning at sentencing; and (3) did not appoint counsel at sentencing.
1. Defendant Knowingly and Intelligently Waived His Right to Counsel
Defendant maintains the trial court inadequately advised him about the significance and consequences of the decision to represent himself. “A criminal defendant has a right, under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, to conduct his own defense, provided that he knowingly and intelligently waives his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. [Citations.] A defendant seeking to represent himself ‘should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” [Citation].’ [Citation.] ‘No particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to waive counsel and elect self-representation.’ [Citation.] Rather, ‘the test is whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 708 (Blair), overruled on another point in People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919.)
“The failure to give a particular set of advisements does not, of itself, show that a Faretta waiver was inadequate. Instead, ‘[t]he burden is on appellant to demonstrate that he did not intelligently and knowingly waive his right to counsel. . . . [T]his burden is not satisfied by simply pointing out that certain advisements were not given.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Weber (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1058-1059 (Weber); People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 545.) We independently examine the entire record to determine whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. (People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 241; People v. Conners (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 443, 454.)
The record in this case demonstrates that defendant did understand the disadvantages of representing himself, and that he chose to do so voluntarily. Specifically, the “record as a whole” in this case included the Faretta waiver form and defendant’s confirmation at the February 19, 2013 initial arraignment that he filled out the form and was prepared to represent himself. That form set forth most, if not all, of the significant consequences and disadvantages of self-representation. By initialing each line and signing the form at the bottom, defendant certified he waived his right to counsel and that he had been advised as to a number of consequences and disadvantages of waiving that right, including: (1) that it is unwise to represent oneself in a criminal case; (2) that the court considered it a mistake for him to represent himself; (3) that the court will not give a self-represented defendant special consideration; (4) that an experienced prosecutor will oppose defendant; (5) the defendant must comply with the all the rules of criminal procedure and evidence; and (6) he will also have to represent himself at the sentencing hearing in the event of conviction. Defendant also noted on the form that he was able to read and write, was a high school graduate, that he had one year of college, and had independently studied law for one year.
Defendant now complains that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary because the court neither questioned defendant nor warned defendant of “the risks involved in self-representation, including no advisement that the waiver of the right to counsel extended to, and included, the sentencing hearing.” According to defendant, the trial court limited “its entire Faretta inquiry to asking [him] to read and fill out a form.” “While it is preferable to question a defendant about his responses to a written waiver form, the failure to do so does not necessarily invalidate a waiver where there is no indication the defendant did not understand what he was reading and signing. [Citation.]” (People v. Miranda (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 978, 986, citing Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 709.) Although we agree that there was little meaningful dialog, at the initial arraignment, between the judge and defendant, regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, this is not a case based solely on the waiver form.
Before defendant completed the waiver, Judge Ballachey attempted to dissuade defendant from self-representation, reminding him of the old adage that a person who represents himself has a fool for a client. The court further advised defendant that he was in “way over” his head, as this was a “very, very serious case” and he was facing charges that were “about as serious as they can get.” The court encouraged defendant to at least talk to a public defender. Defendant, however, was quite clear in his desire to represent himself, in part, due to the “[the] terrible things” that happened when he was represented by the Public Defender’s Office in 2001. Defendant advised the court that the Public Defender’s Officer “allowed” him to be convicted despite a violation of his section 1381 right to a speedy trial.
After defendant signed the form, Judge Ballachey again tried to discourage defendant from waiving his right to counsel, asking him why “an intelligent, well-spoken” person like himself would want to do such a “dumb thing” to represent yourself? The court inquired whether defendant would be willing to go through the Marsden process to substitute counsel. Defendant said that he knew about Marsden motions, but repeated his desire for self-representation, stating “I’m prepared to represent myself, your Honor. I want to protect all my rights.” After confirming that defendant had completed the waiver form, the court advised defendant of the charges against him, and further admonished that if defendant were convicted he faced a sentence of life in prison, with the possibility of parole.
Additionally, at the pretrial hearing on September 26, 2013, Judge Kolin engaged in a more thorough warning. Judge Kolin began the hearing with the following advisement: “Just so you understand, it’s not a good idea to represent yourself. And the reason is you do have a right to represent yourself, but you’re going to be held to the same standard as an attorney when you represent yourself, so unless you have legal training or experience, or if you’ve represented yourself in the past, you’re going to be held to the standard of an attorney, and you’re going to be up against an attorney, a District Attorney, who is aware of all the rules and procedures, whereby you might not be. So as I say, I do this every such case where somebody wants to represent themselves. I tell them the same thing. Not a good idea. But if you, nevertheless, do not want the services of an attorney, want to represent yourself, then we’ll set the matter for a preliminary [hearing]. [¶] Is that what you want to do?” Defendant again confirmed that he wanted to represent himself.
That neither judge expressly warned defendant that the waiver extended to and included sentencing does not alter our conclusion. (See Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 708; Weber, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1058-1059.) Defendant initialed the box on the waiver form that specifically advised him of the need to represent himself at the sentencing hearing in the event of conviction. We have reviewed the entire record and find no indication defendant did not understand what he was reading and signing when he completed the Faretta form. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 24 [trial court’s failure “to conduct a full and complete inquiry regarding a defendant’s assertion of the right of self-representation” did not necessarily demonstrate waiver of counsel was not knowing and voluntary].) Indications that defendant fully understood the dangers of self-representation include his prior experience with the criminal justice system, a demonstrated ability to read and write pro se filings, and the judge’s observation that defendant appeared to be “intelligent” and “well spoken.” Further, defendant stated on the waiver form that he had graduated from high school, had completed one year of college, and had studied law on his own for a year. Defendant also filed numerous discovery motions, as well as requests for an investigator and legal runner, and a challenge for cause against a superior court judge.
Nevertheless, defendant insists that his waiver was invalid because the trial court did not determine whether he had the “mental capacity” to waive his constitutional right to counsel. We are not persuaded. As an initial matter, although the trial court did not ask defendant questions related to mental capacity, nothing occurred during the proceedings that would have caused concern about defendant’s competency. (People v. Teron (1978) 23 Cal.3d 103, 114 [no abuse of discretion in failing to order pretrial psychiatric exam where no factual basis to doubt defendant’s mental capacity] disapproved on other grounds in People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 750, fn. 7; People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568, 573 [if there is any question in the court’s mind, a rather careful inquiry into mental capacity should be made].) On the contrary, the record demonstrates that defendant was intelligent, literate, and articulate. Defendant also displayed substantial legal acumen for a nonlawyer. The record shows that defendant generally called motions by their proper legal names, referred to appropriate authorities, and clearly and consistently sought discovery to establish his case. (See People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 107.)
Defendant’s stated confusion at the sentencing hearing was insufficient to raise a doubt about his capacity to make a voluntary, knowing and intelligent choice with regard to his representation. Rather, this confusion appears to be due to defendant’s prior use of narcotic medication, which may have clouded his memory about the sequencing of his plea. In any case, defendant stated that he was not presently on that medication, so that he “could understand.” Defendant robustly challenged the imposition of his sentence. He demonstrated his understanding regarding the different types of credits that could be awarded and the effect on the length of his sentence. The record demonstrates convincingly that he knew exactly what he was doing. Under these circumstances, the trial court was not obligated to inquire into defendant’s mental capacity. (People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 530 [trial court need not routinely inquire into the mental competence except in instances where court is considering denying self-representation due to doubts about defendant’s competence].
Accordingly, we conclude “the record shows [defendant] wanted to waive counsel, understood the essential risks of doing so, and chose to do so.” (Weber, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060.)
2. Any Error in Failing to Readvise Defendant of His Right to Counsel at the Sentencing Hearing Was Harmless
Finding that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel, we next address his claim that the trial court prejudicially erred when it failed to determine whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel at the sentencing hearing. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346 (Crayton) does not assist him. In referencing the decision in Crayton, defendant notes that there, unlike in the instant case, the trial court advised Crayton that “ ‘if you should be convicted, [self-representation] would require you to prepare your own requests such as they may be with regard to your sentencing.’ ” (Crayton, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 352-353.) By comparing this case with Crayton, defendant implies that the error here was of greater magnitude than the error in Crayton, such that the harmless error rule in Crayton should not apply, and that per se reversal is required. However, we disagree with defendant’s premise that this case involves an error similar to the error in Crayton.
In Crayton, the relevant proceedings occurred prior to the unification of the municipal and superior courts. (Crayton, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 350, fn. 1.) The issue before the California Supreme Court was a trial court’s failure to readvise the defendant and obtain a new waiver of the right to be represented by counsel at the defendant’s arraignment in the superior court. (Crayton, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 360.) The defendant in Crayton had already been arraigned in the municipal court. (Ibid.) Pursuant to statute, the trial court was required to readvise and obtain a new waiver at the defendant’s arraignment in the superior court. (Ibid.) “[T]he governing statutes provided . . . that a defendant in felony proceedings shall be advised of the right to counsel on at least two distinct occasions prior to trial: first, when the defendant is brought before a magistrate and advised of the filing of the complaint (§ 859), and second, after the preliminary examination, when the defendant is arraigned in superior court on the information (§ 987).” (Crayton, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 360.)
The Crayton court determined that a trial court’s failure to readvise pursuant to statute did not require per se reversal. (Crayton, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 364.) The court held that the prejudicial effect of such an error is to be evaluated under the Watson harmless error test. (Ibid.) This is because the Supreme Court specifically determined that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel does not require that the superior court readvise a defendant of his right to counsel and obtain a waiver at superior court proceedings that occur after the initial arraignment in municipal court. Rather, the requirement that the trial court readvise the defendant and obtain a waiver at the time of the arraignment in superior court derives from statute. (Id. at pp. 364-365.)
In the instant case, defendant entered his plea before the preliminary hearing and, as such, there was no occasion to arraign defendant on an information. We are unaware of any statute or case authority requiring readvisement in this particular situation. In any event, we conclude that, if there was demonstrable error, such error here was harmless under any standard. (See People v. Bush (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 457, 477 [applying Chapman standard and finding any failure to advise defendant of maximum fine on conviction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].)
The record as a whole convinces us beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew what he was doing in requesting self-representation, made his choice with eyes open, and would have done the same even if court provided a renewed Faretta warning at the time of sentencing. Each time defendant was presented with an opportunity to be represented by counsel, he steadfastly asserted his right to represent himself. He expressed distrust in the capabilities of the Public Defender’s Office to adequately represent him, and averred that he wanted to protect “all [his] rights.” Moreover, as charged, defendant was exposed to a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. However, defendant, while representing himself, deftly negotiated a plea bargain, wherein he pleaded no contest to a single count of robbery, one strike, and one prison prior. In exchange, he received a dismissal of all remaining counts and allegations, and a prison sentence of just seven years, to run concurrently with his 114-year sentence imposed in Alameda County. At sentencing, defendant continued to vigorously represent himself, challenging the calculation of his pre-sentence credits.
We conclude that because a renewed Faretta warning at sentencing would not have altered his decision to represent himself, and because defendant would not have achieved a more favorable outcome with counsel, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Declining to Sua Sponte Appoint Counsel at Sentencing
Finally, defendant’s claim that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel were denied when the trial court failed to appoint counsel to represent him at the sentencing hearing is without merit. Defendant represented himself throughout the proceedings. At sentencing, he never requested to be relieved from self-represented status or to have a court-appointed attorney or time to retain counsel. Instead, the record shows defendant vigorously challenged the imposition of sentence and argued for additional credits. Throughout the proceedings, defendant exhibited no more difficulty in conducting his defense than does the typical self-represented individual. Moreover, he was cooperative with the court and prosecutor, never engaging in significant disruptive behavior. We are aware of no case, and defendant cites none, which establishes a sua sponte obligation on the trial court to appoint counsel in these circumstances. (See People v. Poplawski (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 881, 889.)
B. Motion to Withdraw Plea
Defendant argues he was denied his right to due process when the court failed to consider his motion to withdraw his plea. He contends this erroneous failure to consider his motion constituted structural error and is reversible per se. We disagree. Although there are some errors that are not susceptible to a harmless error analysis “they are the exception and not the rule. [Citation.]” (Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 578-579, overruled on other grounds in Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 619, 630, 646.) This case is not one of them. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the trial court’s failure to consider his motion to withdraw his plea was not akin to a directed verdict, resulting in complete denial of his Sixth Amendment rights.
Similarly, there is nothing in the trial court’s handling of defendant’s motion to withdraw that resulted in a complete breakdown in the trial process, rendering the sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair. Rather, to the extent the trial court erred in failing to address his motion, we conclude that any such error was harmless under any recognized legal standard for prejudice. (People v. Valdez (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1633, 1639-1640 [where trial court errs in disposing of a motion to withdraw plea, “[a] defendant suffers no prejudice where there are no legal grounds for withdrawal of the plea.”) Preliminarily, it does not appear from the record that defendant had properly filed a noticed motion to withdraw prior to sentencing. Moreover, a trial court’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed unless the defendant shows a clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254-1255.)
“Section 1018 permits a trial court to allow a criminal defendant to withdraw his guilty plea ‘for a good cause shown.’ . . . It is the defendant’s burden to produce evidence of good cause by clear and convincing evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 585.) This standard of proof requires the defendant to make a strong enough showing of good cause to leave no substantial doubt. (Lillian F. v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 314, 320.) “To establish good cause, it must be shown that defendant was operating under mistake, ignorance, or any other factor overcoming the exercise of his free judgment. [Citations.] Other factors overcoming defendant’s free judgment include inadvertence, fraud or duress. [Citations.]” (People v. Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208.) The defendant must also show prejudice in that he or she would not have accepted the plea bargain had it not been for the mistake. (In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 352.)
The gist of defendant’s motion to withdraw was that he was under the impression that he had enough pre-sentence credits from his Alameda County case that in the present case he would not have to serve any actual time in custody. According to defendant, the prosecutor left a voice message for his legal runner that he would get credit for “time served.” There is no evidence whatsoever in the record supporting this assertion. Defendant submits neither the recording nor an affidavit from the legal runner to authenticate this claim. Defendant’s argument ignores the obvious, the alleged voicemail message, promising seven years of credit for time served, occurred after he entered his plea. Thus, defendant cannot establish that his no contest plea was made in reliance on the voicemail.
Moreover, there is no evidence anywhere in the record, and certainly not clear and convincing evidence, that presentence custody credits was a material term of the plea bargain. There is no indication that defendant would not have accepted the plea had he known that he would not get credit for time served in his Alameda County case. Defendant faced a potential life sentence with the possibility of parole for the Contra Costa charges. At the time of sentencing, he was serving a 114-year term for his Alameda County offenses. As a result of the plea, he received a mere seven-year term to run concurrently with his 114-year sentence.
On this record, we conclude that any failure of the trial court in not considering defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea was harmless under any standard.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.


 



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REARDON, ACTING P. J.


We concur:


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RIVERA, J.


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STREETER, J.


























People v. Wilkins A140684