Filed 5/10/17 P. v. Bernal CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----




THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER ERIC BERNAL,

Defendant and Appellant.
C082100

(Super. Ct. No. 14F00805)





A jury found defendant Christopher Eric Bernal guilty of first degree murder. During deliberation, one of the jurors was excused and an alternate juror was seated. The reconstituted jury quickly reached a verdict. Defendant later moved for a new trial, or alternatively to unseal juror information in order to investigate potential jury misconduct. The trial court denied both requests.
On appeal, defendant challenges the denials. He argues the record shows the reconstituted jury did not follow instructions to begin deliberations anew, an assertion the trial court rejected. We, too, reject defendant’s claims of error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged with first degree murder. We omit recitation of the facts surrounding his crime, as they are not necessary to our determination of his claims on appeal. It suffices to say that his case was tried before a jury, beginning on May 19 and ending on June 3, 2015. After closing arguments, the jury began deliberating at 2:40 p.m. on June 1. At 4:10 p.m., the trial court received a request for testimony of three witnesses to be read back. The court told the jury the testimony would be read the following morning. The jurors adjourned at 4:30 p.m.
The second day of deliberation, read back began at 9:00 a.m., with the jurors taking a break at 11:10 a.m. and again for lunch at noon. Read back resumed at 1:00 p.m. and concluded at 1:54 p.m. From then until 4:30 p.m., the jurors deliberated.
The third day of deliberation began at 9:00 a.m. Ten minutes in, the trial court received a substitution request. A juror explained: “I don’t feel good. It’s making me sick. It is stressing me out. I can’t do it.” Counsel stipulated to excusing the juror and substituting an alternate juror.
Before the reconstituted jury began deliberating, the trial court instructed the jurors that the newly seated juror “must participate fully in the deliberations that lead to a verdict. . . . Therefore, you must set aside and disregard all past deliberations and begin your deliberations all over again. Each of you must disregard the earlier deliberations and decide this case as if those earlier deliberations had not taken place.”
The court continued: “You have to start anew because the law says all of you have to deliberate. And since we have a new juror that didn’t take part in the previous deliberations, that’s why you have to start anew. [¶] So please return to the jury room and start your deliberations from the beginning.”
At 10:02 a.m., the alternate juror was sworn in. At 10:48 a.m., the reconstituted jury requested clarification of the verdict form. At 11:25 a.m., the court received a communication that verdicts were reached. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and found he had used a firearm in committing the offense.
After trial, before a different judge, defendant moved for a new trial, or alternatively to unseal juror information in order to investigate possible juror misconduct. Counsel argued the original jurors had deliberated for more than two days, but the reconstituted jury voted to convict in only 47 minutes, which included selecting a new foreperson. Counsel argued the reconstituted jury spent an “extraordinarily unreasonable time” deliberating.
The trial court denied both motions. Reviewing the timeline of the original jury’s deliberation and the reconstituted jury’s deliberation, it explained any suggestion the jury did not follow instruction to begin deliberations anew was “at best speculative.” It noted the length of deliberation is not an indication of misconduct, and jurors are generally presumed to follow the court’s instructions. The court observed that the jurors here in fact appeared to have begun deliberations anew insofar as they had selected a new foreperson for the reconstituted jury.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motions for a new trial and to unseal jury information, in order to investigate jury misconduct. He argues defense counsel had made a prima facie showing of good cause that the jury had failed to follow instructions. Only 11 members of the reconstituted jury heard readbacks of three of the most significant witnesses. He adds: “Only the alternate juror did not have the opportunity to hear this evidence a second time, while the other [11] had been of the opinion that hearing this testimony again was necessary for their decision-making.” He argues that the jury was not told how to handle the effect of the rereading of the testimony. We see no error.
A defendant may “petition the court for access to personal juror identifying information . . . for the purpose of developing a motion for new trial or any other lawful purpose.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 206, subd. (g).) But “[a]bsent a showing of good cause for the release of the information, the public interest in the integrity of the jury system and the jurors’ right to privacy outweighs the defendant’s interest in disclosure.” (People v. McNally (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1430.) Good cause requires “ ‘a sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred . . . .’ ” (People v. Cook (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 341, 345-346.) “Good cause does not exist where the allegations of jury misconduct are speculative, conclusory, vague, or unsupported. (Id. at p. 346.)
We review the denial of a petition for disclosure for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Cook, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 346.)
Here, defendant’s showing fell short of good cause. The duration of the reconstituted jury’s deliberation, as compared to the original jury’s deliberation, does not itself constitute good cause. Indeed, the deliberation timeline (which we have set forth, ante) reflects that most of the original jury’s time was spent listening to readbacks.
Moreover, the requirement that the jury begin deliberations anew does not require that the jury follow the same process as the original jury. (See People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1280 [a newly constituted jury is not required to deliberate for the same length of time as the original jury or review the same evidence].) The reconstituted jury need not request read back merely because the original jury did so. Indeed, if the newly seated juror wished to rehear testimony, that juror could have requested readbacks. Further, the excused juror could have been the only juror who felt the need to hear readbacks. (See People v. Vallejo (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042 [a single juror has the right to a read back of testimony].)
Nothing on the record before us indicates the reconstituted jury did anything but follow the instruction to begin deliberations anew. Accordingly good cause to unseal records has not been shown. (See People v. Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1280 [“When. . . .there are no indications to the contrary, we assume that the jurors followed the trial court’s instructions and started afresh”].) For the same reasons, good cause did not exist to order a new trial. (See People v. Engstrom (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 174, 182 [“ ‘When a party seeks a new trial based upon jury misconduct, a court must undertake a three-step inquiry,’ ” which includes considering “ ‘whether the facts establish misconduct’ ”].)
Defendant also asserts that several of the prosecutor’s statements at the hearing were false. But even assuming for the sake of argument that this is so, it would not confer good cause upon defendant’s motion.
The trial court, therefore, acted well within its discretion in denying defendant’s motions for a new trial and to unseal juror information.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.




/s/
Duarte, J.



We concur:



/s/
Hull, Acting P. J.





/s/
Robie, J.