Filed 5/10/17 In re Brad O. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO


In re BRAD O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
BRAD O.,
Defendant and Appellant.




A149588

(Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. 38367J)


The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the juvenile court erred in determining that the minor ward in this case, Brad O., did not “satisfactorily complete[]” the terms and conditions of his probation and, therefore, erred in declining to order the record of the wardship proceedings sealed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, subdivision (a). We find no error and affirm the juvenile court decision.
BACKGROUND
I.
The 602 Petition
Brad, then sixteen years old, was detained in September 2015 after putting his mother in a choke hold, kicking holes in his bedroom walls and throwing tools at the walls and into the bathroom of their home. He was detained in juvenile hall. The Sonoma County District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to section 602 based on the incident alleging that Brad had committed battery and misdemeanor vandalism. Brad admitted to misdemeanor vandalism and the court sustained that allegation. The battery charge was dismissed with a “Jimmy P. waiver,” which allowed the court to consider the dismissed charge in imposing probation conditions.
II.
The Court’s Probation Conditions
The October 2015, report of the Juvenile Division of the Sonoma County Probation Department (Department) described the history of Brad and his family. The Department wrote about Brad’s parents’ contentious relationship, which ended in divorce, the shuttling of Brad back and forth between them to his emotional detriment and his one-time close relationship with a grandfather. Brad had poor attendance and performance in high school and could not “manage or modulate his emotions and aggression.” He had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), depressive symptoms and anxiety symptoms, for which various medications were prescribed, but had only an intermittent willingness to take them. His therapist reported that he had an “over-reliance on video gaming as a means to avoid other activities and responsibilities.” At juvenile hall, Brad initially struggled, but “subsequently earned level three status, the highest level, within the [juvenile hall] behavioral management system as of October 7, 2015.”
The Department recommended that Brad be declared a ward of the court and remain in his mother’s home, subject to various probation conditions. These conditions included that he report to his probation officer; have only peaceful contact with his mother and not annoy, harass, harm or threaten her; attend school and do schoolwork; participate in 60 hours of community service work to be completed within 150 days; participate in counseling and intervention programs; take all prescribed medication; attend all scheduled appointments with a psychiatrist or medical doctor; meet with his therapist and submit a violence prevention and safety plan within 10 days; and participate in chemical testing. The Department further recommended that Brad be committed to juvenile hall and subject to electronic monitoring for 14 to 21 days, and be required to participate in a “Wraparound” services program.
The district attorney and public defender agreed with the Department’s recommendations. In October 2015, the court declared Brad a ward of the court, ordered that he reside in his mother’s home and imposed the Department’s recommended probation conditions, to which Brad agreed.
III.
Brad’s Probation Violations
Over the next seven months, the juvenile court found on three separate occasions that Brad had violated his probation conditions.
First, in December 2015, the Department alleged that Brad had accrued nine consecutive days of unexcused absences from school; not submitted a violence prevention plan as ordered by the court; and missed a December 3, 2015 psychotherapy appointment. Brad was detained.
At Brad’s counsel’s request, the court appointed a psychiatrist, Dr. Burns, to evaluate Brad. Dr. Burns reported that Brad had a goal of becoming a professional gamer and described his “typical day” as playing video games, He had poor insight, limited ability to estimate what others are feeling and a tendency to blame others. He “began gaming when his parents’ marriage was failing,” and “[i]n this conflicted environment, coupled with his anxious nature and his desire to win, he slipped right into the gaming online world,” “drank energy drinks” and “at times was able to keep playing for two days in a row.” Based on her conversations with Brad, his therapist, his father and his mother, Dr. Burns thought there was “limited problem solving among the family members” and “a high degree of blame.” Brad “tends to blame others as well and so avoids identifying how he can change.” Thus, instead of moving toward independence as would be expected at this stage of his life, he was “staying in his room endlessly online,” and “addicted to gaming, which provides him with immediate gratification.”
Dr. Burns thought Brad should reestablish his relationship with his grandfather and needed a gradual plan to engage in school on a daily basis, leave the house, have chores and exercise. His mother would need “much support” if Brad were to go home, and if he could not live without gaming and continued to miss school, “a more structured environment would be key.” She diagnosed Brad with “Depressive Disorder NOS,” “Anxiety Disorder NOS” and “Video game addiction.” She was not sure he had ADHD, but thought such symptoms might not be obvious because of the medication he was taking.
At a January 2016 hearing, Brad admitted the probation violations alleged and the court found they had occurred. It ordered Brad to be in his mother’s custody with a Wraparound program, and left up to his Wraparound service provider, his mother and the Department whether he could engage in video games.
Four months later, in May 2016, the Department filed a second notice of probation violations. It alleged that Brad had accrued five unexcused school absences from April 13 to May 4, 2016, and received four “F’s” for the grading period. Brad admitted these violations. The court found they had occurred and ordered, in addition to its prior orders, that Brad be detained on electronic monitoring and not engage with video games, electronic devices or social media for 30 to 45 days.
Two weeks later, on May 20, 2016, the Department filed a third notice of probation violations. It alleged that Brad had accrued three unexcused absences from school and “three tardies.” He was detained and spent a weekend in juvenile hall. Brad again admitted the violations and the court found they had occurred. The court vacated its prior electronic monitoring order and ordered that Brad serve two additional consecutive weekends in juvenile hall.
IV.
The June 2016 Status Review
For a June 20, 2016 status review hearing, the Department reported that Brad had completed his community services hours, but had been truant one day from school to do so; he had successfully completed the Aggression Replacement Therapy (ART) after his “excellent” attendance and participation; he had intermittently missed appointments with his therapist; and the family was “working closely” with Wraparound staff on various issues, continuing “to build on the skills they are learning” and making “strides in these areas as a whole.” The Department observed, “For the most part, [Brad] remains mindful of his court conditions. It was recently determined he struggles to self-regulate when he plays video games. This seems to be the impetus behind his lack of school attendance. All parties agree, it is still in his best interest to not return [to] the games at this time.” Also, Brad had obtained a job, paid his $50 restitution and participated in chemical tests that had negative results.
At the June 20, 2016 status review hearing, the probation officer reported that Brad and his mother had worked very hard with the Wraparound program in the past two weeks, but had lost their housing and moved to Crescent City, California to live with his maternal grandmother. Brad’s job was on hold because of the move. The court suspended the requirement that the family participate in the Wraparound program until they returned to Sonoma County.
V.
The Court’s September 2016 Order
In preparation for a September 16, 2016 status review hearing, the court received a letter from Brad’s treating psychiatrist. The psychiatrist stated that Brad had been “diagnosed with Unspecified Anxiety Disorder, Unspecified Depression Disorder, and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Combined Presentation.” Despite treatment with therapy and medications, she continued, “Brad continues to have episodes of increased anxiety, which result in significant emotional and physical symptoms that may prevent him occasionally from attending school.”
In its status review report, the Department wrote that Brad and his family had returned to Sonoma County, where Brad had started the school year in high school. However, he only attended two and a half days, reporting that he suffered from severe anxiety that led to a two-week absence. His principal recommended that he enroll in the “Gateway to College” independent study program, but it was unclear whether Brad had done so. The previous semester, he had failed all but one course.
The Department reported that Brad had “completed his court conditions to the best of his ability.” He had participated in the Wraparound program for eight months with his family, successfully completed the ART program, completed 60 hours of community service and submitted a violence prevention plan as ordered by the court. However, he had failed to contact the Department weekly by phone while he was living at his grandmother’s home, in violation of the court’s order. “[B]y all accounts the summer was uneventful,” and Brad was “no longer physically aggressive or damaging property.”
The Department thought it was “unclear” whether the years of “family and marital discord” Brad experienced were “the impetus to [his] overall mental health issues.” He “suffer[ed] from anxiety” and had been participating in individual and family therapy, but his participation was “inconsistent” and he and his family “demonstrate[d] resistance to this process.” Brad “no longer ha[d] access to video games. He still demonstrated “emotional problems in the arena of school performance and compliance at home,” but was “not re-offending or demonstrating physical aggression.” He had access to mental health and medical services and had been placed at Gateway to College, which all parties thought would improve his school attendance. The Department saw no benefit to retaining him on probation and recommended “that all proceedings be dismissed unsuccessfully.”
At the September 16, 2016 status review hearing, the Department and the prosecutor argued in favor of the Department’s recommendation, which included that Brad’s records regarding the petition not be sealed. The prosecutor argued that Brad should “show compliance in the community without the support of probation” and then could petition for sealing under section 781.
In support of this recommendation, Brad’s probation officer testified that Brad’s “probation compliance is unsuccessful.” She reviewed his poor school attendance and performance, and the three instances of probation violations, and noted that Brad’s mother had “been wonderful.” In her view, “[a]ll year long the flavor has been ‘everybody was working harder than Brad.’ ” . . . Just to complete his community services hours, we seemed to have always been chasing him, always, ‘Brad, you need to do this.’ ” She acknowledged his mental health issues, but said that he had been receiving therapy “for a long time” and had “act[ed] out in therapy with no shows, and not complying with treatment plans.” In her view, “it wasn’t just all Brad’s anxiety. I think that he was stubborn,” and he received “a lot of chances, from probation, from his mother. A lot of encouragement.” She thought he had shown “a tremendous amount of resistance,” including up to the time of the hearing, as he had yet to begin participating in the Gateway to College program, although he was supposed to have done so. She continued, “I just don’t think it’s a probation issue anymore. I think that his original offense was doing a lot of acting out at home and vandalizing the home, assaulting his mother. We don’t see that anymore, and we haven’t seen that for quite some time. [¶] So, I think, a year on probation, it’s time he can be dismissed. I just don’t feel like it was successful.”
Brad’s counsel argued that Brad had successfully completed probation because he had done what the court had ordered “to the best of his ability,” and “that’s all you can ever ask of somebody is to do it to the best of their ability.” Brad had complied with many probation conditions, including his participation in Wraparound services for eight months, successful completion of aggression replacement therapy, completion of 60 hours of community service and submission of a violence prevention plan. He was “no longer physically aggressive or damaging property,” had paid his fine in full and had successfully participated in chemical testing. Also, his treating physician had diagnosed him with disorders that “are certainly going to impact his behavior.” Counsel contended that the statute authorizing a court to seal a juvenile’s records upon successful completion of probation, section 786, “doesn’t require perfect—doesn’t require A-plus. It really says—speaks to satisfactory compliance. And in my mind, that’s kind of a right around a C.”
The probation officer responded, “I think everybody that dealt with Brad did more work than Brad. I think he received a lot of chances. We said he had a strong issue with this video game, and he didn’t leave his house for two weeks at a time. Finally, it got to filing a violation, and we gave him four chances to reinstate the use of video games in his life, and every time he abused it. So we found out that didn’t work. He got straight Fs last year, all but one thing. Everything took a lot of effort on everybody’s part, and everybody pulled for Brad.
“There were times he was just flat out resistant, ‘I don’t give an F. I’m not going to therapy,’ you know, and I don’t see all of this because I feel like his hand was held through quite a bit of it, and I feel like everybody pulled for him, and some of them were very simple tasks, you know, and he went for quite some time not attending school.” She said he repeatedly promised to attend school and did not, did not make the best use of his treatment for anxiety while in juvenile hall and did not do his community service hours until the Department “practically held his hand,” missing a day at school to do so. She also thought “he was less than forthcoming a lot of the time.”
The court asked, “So maybe when the report says he completed his court conditions to the best of his ability, is that what you meant? I think that’s a problem here. If probation is telling us he did the best he could, that’s not really consistent with saying that the proceedings should be dismissed unsuccessfully, is it?”
The probation officer responded, “Well, I think, he had the ability to comply with his court conditions. You know, I may have said to the best of his ability thinking they were minimally done, and they were done with a lot of flaws. They were done with a lot of concessions on probation’s part and chances, and ‘I won’t violate,’ and just encouragement. [¶] And so, and you know, I think, there were a lot of promises, ‘Oh, yeah, I can do it.’ I mean starting with 654 and losing that.”
A second probation officer at the hearing noted that Brad had failed to contact the Department weekly as required during that summer he was in Crescent City, which was “something that seems like a very simple task that he failed to do.” She also pointed out that he was provided “a lot of support to try to get into [the] Gateway to College” program, but he had not enrolled yet that semester.
Brad’s mother also spoke. She told the court Brad had been “through a lot of trauma,” had come a long way, had severe “anxiety that kept him from leaving the house for a very long time,” and was no longer violent or destructive. She said, “when it seems like he’s doing nothing and he’s being difficult, he really tries.” When the court asked her “why probation wasn’t contacted all summer,” she referred to the trauma of being ejected from their house, but ultimately said that Brad “just didn’t pay attention, didn’t think about it, which he should have.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court declined to find that Brad had successfully completed probation and seal his records. It explained to Brad:
“We have a lot of issues here. And if I understand, this sounds like you had a pretty horrible year, your mom did too. But when we put somebody on probation and ask for some pretty minimal compliance, and even the minimal compliance has problems, you know; I can’t give you an automatic successful dismissal. [¶] . . . [W]hat I see here is not—you know, three violations that you already have dealt with that were deemed real violations, not things beyond your control. That’s just not successful completion of probation for purposes of sealing . . . . It doesn’t mean you haven’t made a lot of progress because it looks like you have. All it means is under the law somebody gets through probation without any violations and really does well then the Court can seal their file right away, but that’s got to require no violations or at least very minimal violations for us to do that. It doesn’t mean you haven’t done a good job. It means for purposes of immediate sealing.
“I can’t make the proper findings that I need to, but counsel can still ask us by a written motion to exercise a discretion, taking everything into account and consider it some other time especially if once probation is over, you show us, like your mom said, you’re going to use all of those tools you got now and not have any more problems, you know. That’s something that will weigh heavily for us in determining whether you warrant that kind of sealing.
“So if you get out in the community and use these tools and the maturity you developed, and you’re working with your mom, you’re working with your doctor, and if we see this is a changed young man who can be in the community without problems then, you know, that’s something that will weigh heavily in our decision. [¶] But at least with what’s in front of me right now, I can’t grant your counsel’s request.”
The court then dismissed the proceedings “unsuccessfully.” Brad filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s order.
DISCUSSION
Brad argues the juvenile court erred in denying his request that it order the sealing of his juvenile records under section 786 because he substantially complied with his probation conditions. We disagree.
Section 786 provides that if a ward of the juvenile court “satisfactorily completes” probation, “the court shall order the petition dismissed” and “shall order sealed all records pertaining to the dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court, and in the custody of law enforcement agencies, the probation department, or the Department of Justice.” (§ 786, subd. (a).) “[S]atisfactory completion . . . shall be deemed to have occurred if the person has no new findings of wardship or conviction for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude during the period of . . . probation and if he or she has not failed to substantially comply with the reasonable orders of supervision or probation that are within his or her capacity to perform.” (Id., subd. (c).)
To the extent Brad argues the juvenile court misinterpreted section 786, our review is de novo. To the extent he takes issue with the juvenile court’s findings of fact, we review those findings for substantial evidence and review the court’s ultimate decision for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 676, 681 [whether minors were fit and proper subjects to be tried as juveniles or as adults under section 707 is reviewed under abuse of discretion standard; findings of fact regarding statutory criteria for such a determination are reviewed for substantial evidence]; In re J.W. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 663, 668 [determinations about a former ward’s rehabilitation for purposes of petition to seal records under section 781 reviewed for abuse of discretion].)
Brad makes two main arguments for his contention that the juvenile court erred. First, he argues that he met the second prong of the “satisfactory completion” standard, but that the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating his performance. He argues that the juvenile court applied “an incorrect standard” because it in effect required no or “ ‘at least very minimal violations’ ” before ordering the sealing of his records under section 786. This standard, he contends, is “contrary to the express terms of the statute, which require only ‘satisfactory’ performance” and amounts to a requirement of “perfect performance on probation in order for a minor’s record to be sealed.” He contends based on the legislative history of the amendment to section 786 that added the “substantial compliance” definition for “satisfactory completion” that he was not required “to have fully and perfectly completed all conditions and orders of probation” to obtain a sealing order. Rather, the substantial compliance requirement sets “ ‘a “passing grade” standard for “satisfactory” completion. . . . On occasion, children on probation backslide by perhaps failing a drug test or skipping an appointment—but this does not mean that they cannot or do not rebound to a level of satisfactory overall performance.’ ” He also cites the Oxford English Dictionaries (2015), which define “satisfactorily” as “[i]n a way that fulfills expectations or needs; acceptably.”
We agree with Brad’s point that perfect performance is not required. As the People point out, the phrase “substantial compliance” in other contexts has been explained as meaning “ ‘ “actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute,” as distinguished from “mere technical imperfections of form.” ’ ” (People v. Jacobs (1987) 43 Cal.3d 472, 483 [and cases cited therein]; see also Costa v. Superior Court (2006) 37 Cal.4th 986, 1013 [minor defects did not preclude determination there was substantial compliance, as long as fundamental purposes underlying requirements have been fulfilled].) There is, as the People also point out, no reason to believe the Legislature intended a different meaning in using the phrase “substantially comply” in section 786. (People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1424 [courts may assume Legislature intended to adopt meaning of statutory terms already construed].) We therefore interpret substantial compliance with the “reasonable orders of . . . probation” as used in section 786 to mean “actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of” the statutes governing juvenile probation and probation conditions.
Second, Brad asserts he substantially complied with reasonable orders of probation that were within his capacity to perform. He lists the probation conditions he completed, cites the language in the final Department report stating that he had “completed his court conditions to the best of his ability,” and contends the Department’s reliance for its unsuccessful dismissal recommendation on the ground that he required hand holding and encouragement was inappropriate in light of his special needs, which included ADHD and an anxiety disorder. Further, the probation officer’s “minimization,” “discounting” and “negative portrayal of his efforts” in mental health treatment were “without foundation in evidence or expertise” and “improperly colored the court’s perception of Brad’s performance.”
Brad attributes to the probation officer “a bias against a key component of youth culture” in which Brad was engaged, i.e., video gaming. The “denomination of his gaming as an ‘addiction,’ and the resulting penalties for the time he spent gaming,” he argues, “ignored the prevalence with which youth culture is absorbed in that activity.” Also, his “goal of becoming a professional gamer were [sic] not so far-fetched—a point the therapist and his probation officer might have realized if they had displayed any familiarity with that sub-culture.” Brad acknowledges that he “needed to attempt to overcome his anxiety and complete high school,” but suggests the probation officer would have been “much more sympathetic to his passions and use of time had he been practicing the trumpet or playing chess” rather than playing video games.
Brad’s analysis disregards that he was not in “actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of” the statutes governing juvenile probation and probation conditions. The juvenile delinquency laws are generally designed to protect the public and to rehabilitate the delinquent minors by providing them with care, treatment and guidance and by holding them accountable for their behavior. (See § 202, subds. (a), (b).) Probation in particular “guides reform, promotes accountability, and protects the public.” (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 487–488.) “When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court, the court is authorized to impose and require any and all reasonable conditions it determines fitting and proper to obtain justice, and enhance the minor’s reformation and rehabilitation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subds. (a) & (b).) ‘A juvenile court enjoys broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation for the purpose of rehabilitation and may even impose a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper so long as it is tailored to specifically meet the needs of the juvenile. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘That discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse.’ ” (In re Gabriel T. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 952, 959.)
Further, the juvenile court is required to impose certain probation conditions. (In re Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 488.) For example, it must impose on a minor who is not removed from the custody of his parents, absent a finding of inappropriateness, the requirement that he or she “attend a school program approved by the probation officer without absence.” (§ 729.2, subd. (a).)
In arguing that he substantially complied with the terms of his probation, Brad largely ignores the juvenile court’s findings on three occasions that he violated certain probation conditions, in each instance based in whole or in part on his failure to attend school and do his school work. He barely addresses the subject, refers to it as “his difficulty in attending school” and as “conceded backslides” that “did not preclude him from demonstrating overall satisfactory compliance.” He insists, notwithstanding his repeated failure to comply with the requirement that he attend school and do his school work, that he met the “ ‘passing grade’ standard for satisfactory completion.” We cannot agree. The failure to attend school and perform his school work were not, as Brad implies, “ ‘merely technical’ ” or “ ‘minimal’ ” violations of his probation. Nor were his violations minor “ ‘backslide[s]’ ” followed by a “ ‘rebound to a level of satisfactory overall performance.’ ”
Brad does not argue that the court’s requirement that he attend school was unimportant; nor could he. The state has long had compulsory education laws (see Educ. Code §§ 48200–48297) and a legislative scheme for enforcing them. Our courts “have long recognized the importance of education to both the individual and to society [and] . . . the governmental interest in enforcing its truancy laws in order to achieve its educational goal, is substantial.” (In re James D. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 903, 915 [juvenile’s arrest during school hours to determine whether he was truant held permissible method of enforcing compulsory education laws], italics added.)
Moreover, while such laws, including those that allow habitual truants to be declared wards of the court (see, e.g., § 601, subd. (b)), are educational and not penal in nature, the Legislature has recognized a link between truancy and criminality. In adopting the mandatory education condition of juvenile probation (see Stats. 1989, ch. 1117, §15) along with other provisions, the Legislature declared an intent to address juvenile delinquency “at its inception rather than after it has progressed to serious criminality” and identified as “precursors of serious criminality by juveniles” “incorrigibility, truancy, curfew, illiteracy, and alcohol and drug abuse.” (Id. § 1, italics added.) It stated the legislation would, among other things, “promote the positive development of juveniles by emphasizing the enforcement of school attendance laws.” (Ibid.)
The school attendance and performance of school work conditions imposed by the juvenile court here thus served the objectives of reforming and rehabilitating Brad, preventing him from reoffending, promoting his positive development and preparing him for a law-abiding and constructive adult life. The question is whether Brad’s conduct in regard to school attendance and performance represents “actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to” these objectives. The evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that Brad fell short. Not technically or minimally short, but far short.
The first violation, noticed on December 14, 2015, was based in part on Brad’s failure to attend school for nine consecutive days, unexcused, after having been ordered to attend school and do school work only two months earlier. Despite having spent three weeks in juvenile hall for that violation, just three months after his release, Brad again began accruing unexcused absences from school, accruing five from April 13 to May 4, 2016, and received four F grades for the grading period. He was detained on May 5, 2016, and placed on electronic monitoring, admitted the violation on May 6, and was ordered by the court to remain on electronic monitoring and prohibited from playing video games. The court made clear that it was “real concerned about him missing school, and real . . . concerned about his bad grades,” and encouraged Brad to attend school and bring up his grades for the final month of the semester; if he did so the court would not continue the electronic monitoring or prohibition on video gaming. Notwithstanding this, Brad continued to be truant, accruing three absences and three tardies by May 9, 2016, leading to a third notice of violation of probation. He was detained and spent a weekend in juvenile hall and, after admitting the violations, was ordered to serve two additional consecutive weekends in juvenile hall. He failed all but one course that semester.
Further, as soon as the new school year began later that year, Brad again violated these conditions, attending only two and a half days of school before absenting himself. And although his principal recommended he enroll in the Gateway to College independent study program, which apparently did not require his physical presence at school, Brad did not enroll that semester, which, according to his probation officer, “was supposed to happen.”
In short, far from actually complying with the substance of the education requirements and the objectives they were designed to serve, Brad repeatedly absented himself from school, failed almost all of his courses, and did not enroll in the independent study education program as required. This alone is substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that Brad failed to substantially comply with the reasonable orders of supervision or probation. That he complied with other terms and conditions of his probations does not overcome his failure to comply with this very basic and important requirement.
Brad contends the court still erred because he complied with his probation conditions to the best of his ability, as stated in the Department’s report, and further contends that his failures were the result of his “special needs,” most particularly, his “ADHD and anxiety disorder.” He also blames the fact that a psychologist recommended to his parents that an IEP (Individualized Education Program) be put in place, but that recommendation “apparently was never acted upon.” These arguments are unpersuasive in light of the court’s specific finding that Brad could comply with the probation conditions that he violated, stating, “what I see here is . . . three violations that you already have dealt with that were deemed real violations, not things beyond your control.” (Italics added.) Nor does he address the substantial evidence that he failed to comply with certain conditions, such as that he call the Department weekly in the summer of 2016, timely submit a violence prevention plan to the court and enroll in the independent study program in the fall of 2016, none of which appear to have triggered what he described as his “social anxiety” and “lack of social skills.”
Further supporting the court’s finding of his capabilities is the undisputed evidence that Brad was provided therapy and medications to address his anxiety and his ADHD, was able to adjust to the structure at juvenile hall in October 2015 and earn the highest level of behavior status there, was absent from school in order to play video games, and was sometimes defiant and refused to go to therapy or acted out in therapy. Also, his probation officer testified that “it wasn’t just all Brad’s anxiety. I think that he was stubborn, and he received a lot of chances . . . from probation, from his mother. A lot of encouragement. [¶] And again, we just saw a tremendous amount of resistance.”
As for the Department’s report that Brad complied “to the best of his ability,” the juvenile court probed into its seeming inconsistency with the Department’s recommendation of unsuccessful termination with the probation officer at the September 2016 hearing, and she provided a satisfactory explanation of it.
Thus, contrary to Brad’s contention, the juvenile court did not base denial of sealing on some technical or minor failing or imperfection, but rather on “three violations that you already have dealt with that were deemed real violations, not things beyond your control.” In the end, what mattered was the evidence of Brad’s repeated and substantial probation violations and capacity to comply with the conditions he violated. And it was based on that evidence that the juvenile court found he did not “substantially comply with the reasonable orders of supervision or probation that [were] within his or her capacity to perform” as required by section 786, subdivision (c).
Finally, we disagree with Brad’s contention that the probation officer improperly recommended unsuccessful termination based on certain biases, or that any such biases “improperly colored the court’s perception of Brad’s performance.” In light of our conclusions, we need not address these contentions further, other than to comment that the record does not support them. The Department and the court conducted a thorough review of Brad’s circumstances, set reasonable probation conditions and provided ample services and attention to him in an effort to help him successfully address the issues that led to his wardship.
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed.
 




STEWART, J.



We concur.




KLINE, P.J.




MILLER, J.






















People v. Brad O. (A149588)