Filed 5/16/17 In re G.H. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
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In re G.H. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. C081229


SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.T. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

(Super. Ct. No. JD236693, JD236694, JD236695)


George H. (father) and Nancy T. (mother) appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders placing the minors with mother under dependent supervision and granting services to both parents. Mother contends no substantial evidence supports the court’s jurisdictional findings as to her, and therefore the court’s dispositional orders based on those findings were an abuse of discretion. Father contends the court erred by not ordering informal supervision; he also joins in mother’s arguments.
The Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the department) contends father’s argument is forfeited because he did not object to dependent supervision below, and so far as he objects to the court’s orders as to mother he lacks standing to do so. The department contends mother’s argument is moot because it goes to only one of the three grounds raised for jurisdiction. Assuming arguendo that the parents’ contentions are properly before us, the department also contests them on the merits.
We shall affirm the juvenile court’s findings and orders.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Petitions
On November 25, 2015, the department filed non-detaining petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual abuse), and (j) (abuse of sibling) as to George H. (aged 9), Nicolas H. (aged 6), and Ge.H. (aged 2). The petitions alleged under all three subdivisions that father sexually abused the minors’ 16-year-old half sibling, P.H. As to subdivision (b) only, the petition also alleged that mother failed to protect the minors from the substantial risk of sexual abuse posed by father’s conduct, that she maintained contact with father and wanted to maintain a relationship with him, and that she had openly doubted P.H.’s credibility.
The petitions described father’s conduct as follows: “[Father] has committed lewd and lascivious acts with the child, [P.H.,] on at least one occasion. The sexual abuse includes, but is not limited to, inappropriate comments, fondling[,] and the father penetrating the child’s vagina with his penis. The father has made inappropriate comments to the child, [P.H.], about his sexual relationship with the children’s mother . . . , including but not limited [to] ‘I hope I get some tonight’ and ‘She needs to give it up more.’ Furthermore, on one occasion, [P.H.] woke up to the pain of . . . father . . . putting his penis in her vagina and her shirt pulled down exposing her bra. [Father] told her, ‘I’ll go slow, don’t worry.’ After the sexual assault, the child stood up and put her underwear back on and a ‘gooey’ substance exited her body and onto her underwear which was collected by [the] Sacramento [County] Sheriff[’s] Department during their investigation. Subsequent testing revealed the ‘gooey’ substance contained a mixture of the father’s semen and [P.H.]’s DNA.”
B. The Initial Hearing Report
The initial hearing report, filed December 1, 2015, recommended that the juvenile court place the minors in mother’s custody, remove them from father’s custody, and provide services for both parents, including parenting education, counseling, a sexual abuse program for offenders (for father), and a sexual abuse program for non-offenders (for mother).
The minors were in mother’s care and custody; father was living at a different address. Prior to the events that prompted the petitions, father, mother, P.H. (father’s biological daughter), and the minors had resided together.
A mandated reporter informed Child Protective Services (CPS) on July 13, 2015, that father sexually abused P.H. on or about July 8, 2015. P.H. disclosed the alleged abuse while at a church camp in Monterey County, after which the minors were placed in protective custody.
On July 14, 2015, Sacramento County Sheriff’s detectives informed mother that P.H. had accused father of raping her, her statements had been consistent, and her underwear had been collected as evidence. Mother said she had no prior knowledge of the incident and had seen nothing inappropriate in the home, but her children came first and she would do whatever the department requested, including filing for divorce or a restraining order; she had already told father he could no longer stay in the home.
Mother did not understand why P.H. had not reported the incident to her before going to the retreat. The social worker told mother that P.H. feared mother would not support her because she did not do so in December 2014 when P.H. reported that she had been raped by a classmate. Mother replied that P.H. said nothing about the alleged December 2014 rape by a classmate until March of 2015. Furthermore, P.H. had “exhibited sexually acting out behaviors,” including “sending inappropriate pictures” and “getting caught having oral sex with boys at school.” She had also ditched classes, taken up smoking, and was failing school. Mother never discounted P.H.’s allegations involving a classmate, but had a serious conversation with her about them “to ensure she was being truthful.”
According to mother, P.H. wanted to move out of the parents’ “very structured” home and to move in with her maternal grandmother in Reno, who would not provide the same kind of supervision.
Mother stated that P.H. “has had a lot of challenges with mental health,” was placed on a section 5150 hold in April 2013 due to attempted suicide and depression, and had been diagnosed with “[m]ajor depressive disorder with psychotic features.” After her release, she spent seven months in residential treatment. P.H. was taken off medication in January 2015 at her request. She decompensated, and the parents put her back on Abilify.
In the social worker’s view, although mother said she had no choice but to believe P.H., she appeared “conflicted.” However, she understood the need to put the minors’ safety first and was willing to sign a written safety plan.
Father claimed P.H. made false charges against him so she could move out of the family home. She had made false rape charges before and had not demonstrated that she could be honest or truthful. However, father was willing to leave the home pending the outcome of the criminal and CPS investigations.
On July 16, 2015, the parents and the department agreed to the following safety plan: Father was to move out and keep the social worker informed of his whereabouts. Mother was to prevent father from having unsupervised contact with the minors; all visits with father were to be supervised by a third party and conducted away from the home. The parents were to abide by the safety plan until the investigation concluded, and mother was to apply for a restraining order if father violated the plan. The plan was to remain in effect until further notice by the department. Failure to comply would result in a higher level of intervention.
On October 16, 2015, father told the social worker that he had learned law enforcement would not pursue the case. He did not know why his DNA was found on P.H.’s underwear, but asserted the underwear might really have been mother’s because she and P.H. wore the same size. He claimed he sometimes masturbated in the garage of the family home, and would grab random clothes on the floor to clean himself afterward.
On October 19, 2015, mother told the social worker that she had learned from father no criminal charges would be filed. She had just recently been made aware that DNA evidence had been found, and could not explain why father’s DNA would be on P.H.’s underwear, except to speculate that it might really have been her own underwear. When the social worker told mother that the DNA found was a mix of father’s and P.H.’s, mother did not visibly react, but merely reiterated she had no prior knowledge of any abuse.
Mother said she would file for custody of the minors and a legal separation or divorce from father. But the next day, mother asked “if there were other options other than filing petitions or filing for divorce.” Father was not sure he wanted to give up his rights and might seek reunification services.
Mother, who was employed by Sacramento County as a juvenile dependency social worker, was concerned about whether the investigation could affect her job status. She wanted options such as informal supervision out of county to be explored. She said her boys wanted father in their lives and she had to do what was in their best interest.
On October 21, 2015, father formally requested reunification services. Informed that the DNA evidence showed a mixture of his semen and P.H.’s DNA, he still denied wrongdoing. He wanted to return home. He was willing to start counseling immediately.
On October 23, 2015, mother reiterated that she wanted father to get services and asked if it would be possible to continue with the current safety plan and close the referral, to go to informal supervision, or to transfer the case to another county. She suspected “something happened” between father and P.H., but could not elaborate on what “something” meant.
On November 20, 2015, the social worker told mother a non-detaining petition would be filed. Mother questioned why a “less intrusive option,” such as informal supervision, was not explored. She also questioned how Sacramento County juvenile dependency court could hear the case, given her preexisting relationships with judges and counsel.
Mother admitted she had left a voicemail message for P.H. urging her to “drop it” and “move on,” but claimed the message was taken out of context: She merely wanted P.H. to be happy, move forward with her life, and experience normal teenage activities. She would not feel comfortable with P.H. contacting the minors because she could not control what P.H. might say to them.
Mother acknowledged again that the DNA evidence showed something must have happened between father and P.H., but she still could not say exactly what she thought had happened. She admitted she “was not overly cooperative” with law enforcement on the case and had requested that they obtain a warrant for her DNA.
Interviewed on July 14, 2015, P.H. gave an account of father’s actions consistent with what she had told law enforcement. She stated that father “ ‘took advantage of [her] while [she] was asleep’ ” by inserting his penis into her vagina, hurting and waking her. She hid her semen-soaked underwear to preserve it, because when she was previously raped by a classmate the investigation failed for lack of evidence, and her stepmother had said, “ ‘He didn’t rape you. You wanted to do it.’ ” P.H. no longer felt safe in the family home and did not believe her stepmother would support her. P.H. said father had not done anything like this before and she did not suspect any sexual abuse of the minors.
Minors George H. and Nicolas H., interviewed on July 14, 2015, were upset, not knowing why they were taken into protective custody. Both denied abuse or neglect and were eager to return home. At later contacts, the minors did not report any unsupervised meetings with father; they repeatedly expressed a desire for more contact with him, including sleepovers.
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Detective Wilson stated that P.H. had admitted her prior allegation of being raped by a classmate was false: It was actually consensual sex. She had offered to take a lie detector test, then changed her mind. Even with the DNA results in hand, a criminal case might not be filed because the district attorney did not feel comfortable putting P.H. on the stand: She had a history of false charges and mental disturbance, and a cousin claimed that P.H. had said she would make up a lie to get out of her home. However, Detective Wilson also observed that mother had been “difficult,” refusing to provide DNA without a search warrant or to answer questions such as “Is this your underwear?” She told the officers that P.H. lies, and if anything had been going on she would have spotted it because she was a trained social worker and knew what to look for.
Dr. Benjamin Yu, P.H.’s treating psychiatrist, stated that her diagnosis was attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and major depressive disorder with psychotic features. She was impulsive and emotionally immature, made very poor decisions, and “had problems with self-mutilation, defiance, hypersexuality, [and] internet addiction (including pornography).” She was often naive and did not foresee the consequences of her actions. P.H.’s father and stepmother had been very supportive during her treatment, yet she still struggled, even with the help of medication. Her moods fluctuated and she needed almost constant supervision and redirection. P.H. tended to perceive constructive criticism as bullying.
On July 31, 2015, P.H. was released to the care of her maternal grandmother, in whose home she was adjusting well. She had stuck to her original story, which was consistent with the DNA evidence and not negated by her mental health problems or the district attorney’s failure to file criminal charges. In the social worker’s opinion, “what she disclosed more than likely occurred.” Unlike the maternal grandmother, who was supportive and reassured P.H. that she believed her disclosures, P.H.’s family in Sacramento had not supported her.
C. The Initial Hearing
On December 2, 2015, the juvenile court ordered the minors maintained in mother’s home and removed from father’s custody, with services provided to both parents.
D. The Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
The jurisdiction/disposition report, filed December 24, 2015, recommended that the juvenile court sustain the petitions on all grounds, adjudicate the minors dependents of the court, continue the minors’ placement with mother, and order services for the parents, including conjoint family counseling.
On December 8, 2015, mother said the allegations of the petitions were “partially true.” Mother stated the minors were not at risk with her, but indicated “ ‘there is risk’ and the father ‘needs to do services.’ ” She denied that she failed to recognize the risk posed by father based on his conduct toward P.H.; she agreed to a safety plan that included his removal from the home, and he had not been there since without supervision. She had observed nothing inappropriate in the home before July 2015, but she was not normally there during the day because she worked full-time; father had been the stay-at-home parent for the last five years. She still did not know exactly what happened between father and P.H., but the DNA evidence showed that something sexual did happen. She claimed she had always said she believed P.H., but gave information about P.H.’s past “simply to help provide an understanding of the family issues.” Mother was willing to participate in services, had enrolled in a parenting education class, and would begin participating in a sexual abuse non-offender program. She was “in a relationship with father,” to whom she had been married for 12 years, but did not know what the future held for the relationship. She wanted him to be a parent to the minors and to be a part of their lives.
On December 18, 2015, father said that on advice of counsel he would not discuss the charges against him. He denied that the minors were at risk of sexual abuse and stressed the depth of his love for them. He had offered to leave the home even before the safety plan was created. He was willing to participate in services, had begun individual and family counseling and parenting education, and was waiting for a referral to sexual abuse counseling. He intended to seek employment and to reunify with his family.
Ge.H. was not interviewed due to her young age, but appeared comfortable in the home and in the presence of her mother and siblings; she frequently asked for father. Nicolas H. also appeared comfortable there and did not wish to speak to the social worker. George H. said he had nothing to tell the social worker and wanted father home; he felt completely safe with both parents. All three minors seemed to be doing well, although George H. had begun family counseling along with the parents.
Marriage and family therapist Tim Johnson had seen father three times in November, and had conducted two sessions of conjoint family counseling. He believed he was building a good rapport with father and George H.
The social worker opined that the minors needed the juvenile court’s protection “due to the nature and severity of the allegations and the mother’s lack of acknowledgment to [sic] the seriousness of the allegation against her husband.” The safety plan provided safety for the minors, but did not address the reasons for their initial removal and the department’s and the court’s current involvement.
The parents needed intensive services to address the issues that led to the department’s involvement. Despite the physical evidence against him, father maintained his innocence. Although mother could provide appropriate care for the minors at this time, she “ma[de] no effort in acknowledging the abuse occurred,” “fail[ed] to recognize the trauma that her step-daughter suffered and continues to suffer,” “[did] not demonstrate shock with such allegations made against her husband,” and tried to discredit P.H.’s allegations by citing her mental health problems and mother’s own training as a social worker.
E. The Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing
At the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on December 30, 2015, the parties did not present additional evidence.
Father’s counsel objected to jurisdiction, asserting that there was not a preponderance of evidence to sustain the petitions because P.H. was not credible and the juvenile court had insufficient information about the DNA evidence. If the court sustained the petitions, however, father supported the recommendation to provide him reunification services and continued visitation and contact with the minors. Father did not request informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b).
The juvenile court amended the petitions and the proposed factual findings so that the last sentence under “failure to protect” read: “The mother’s failure to recognize the risk the father poses to the children places the children at substantial risk of physical harm, abuse and/or neglect.” In other words, the court deleted the language alleging mother failed “to protect from the father’s sexual abuse of the half-sibling” because there was no evidence mother knew about it until after the fact. With these changes, the court sustained the petitions and adopted the proposed findings.
As to P.H.’s credibility, the juvenile court found:
“[W]ithout any doubt there are credibility issues that exist as it relates to [P.H.] I don’t have the letter from [P.H.’s cousin alleging that P.H. had announced a plan to lie], but if the letter . . . indicates what [the cousin]’s belief is, it’s not of much probative value to the Court because the Court has very little information about why [the cousin’s] belief would make it more or less likely as to whether or not [P.H.] was telling the truth. The information that the Court has regarding [P.H.] really cuts both ways. She’s very much described as a child with poor insight and poor coping skills. And the number of circumstances that would have had to have fallen in place at the right point in time, the right date in order for [P.H.] to be able to set up this claim [falsely] certainly does not appear to be all probable in light of the lack of insight and coping skills that [P.H.] is described as possessing at this point in time.
“The DNA evidence really in my mind is the dam[n]ing evidence in this case. And the Court would in order to dismiss this petition, it would have to find [P.H.] not credible and find that she somehow came into possession of underwear with [father]’s DNA evidence on it and then set up this whole grand plan. And that’s just not likely and not credible based on the information I have regarding this child.
“So I certainly understand that there are issues as it relates to [P.H.], and there are difficulties with the case. And certainly I think it was very clear from the information the Department gathered that that is why the District Attorney’s office is not pursuing criminal charges at this time.
“But I do think that there is a preponderance of the evidence in this court given the statements, the corroboration of DNA evidence . . . with the totality of the facts and circumstances, and that’s the reason the Court is sustaining these petitions.”
As to disposition, the juvenile court ordered the minors to remain in mother’s home and father to remain removed from the home. Offered the opportunity to comment, both parents said nothing. Father’s counsel objected to the order to remove father from the home.
The juvenile court ordered that the minors be placed under dependent supervision, that mother receive family maintenance services, and that father receive reunification services. However, the court struck the proposed order for the family and father to participate in conjoint counseling, and substituted the following orders: “[T]he mother and the children shall participate in conjoint counseling . . . . [¶] . . . Conjoint counseling [for father] will be appropriate when [father] makes sufficient progress in his individual counseling. So it looks like from reading the report that conjoint counseling has already begun. That needs to stop immediately. [¶] . . . [¶] So once the father has successfully completed his sexual abuse counseling for offenders and is able to take responsibility for the damage to the family, then it would be appropriate to begin conjoint therapy. [¶] I’ll direct that there be no conjoint counseling between [father] and the children pending further order of the Court.” The court also ordered regular supervised visitation for father with the minors consistent with their well-being, and directed that mother not be the visit supervisor pending further orders of the court.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Father’s Appeal
Father contends the juvenile court erred by failing to order informal supervision. He also purports to join in and adopt mother’s arguments.
The department replies that this court should dismiss father’s appeal, asserting (1) father’s first contention is forfeited because he did not object to the juvenile court’s order of dependent supervision or request informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b) after the court sustained the petitions, and (2) father lacks standing to challenge the dispositional orders as to mother’s services. We agree with the department’s first point and find it unnecessary to reach the second. However, we decline to dismiss father’s appeal because the department does not make any argument or cite any authority to explain why we should do so. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [legal propositions asserted without argument and authority will not be considered].)
As the department observes, father did not request informal supervision at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. On the contrary, he stated that if the juvenile court sustained the petitions, he was willing to engage in reunification services and visitation as recommended by the department—i.e., he acquiesced in a plan of dependent supervision. Thus, father’s argument depends on the premise that the juvenile court may order informal supervision sua sponte. But he cites no authority so holding, and we know of none.
Father cites In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159 in his opening brief for the proposition that it is within the juvenile court’s discretion whether to grant informal supervision. But in that case, the parent requested it. (Id. at p. 165.) The case does not hold that a parent is entitled to a ruling on informal supervision without a request, or that a parent does not forfeit consideration of informal supervision by acquiescing in reunification services under a plan of dependent supervision. In re N.M. does not assist father.
Father also cites and discusses In re Jasmin C. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 177 in his opening brief to illustrate the wide latitude available to juvenile courts in making orders to protect the child’s best interests, and the courts’ responsibility not to make orders that go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. In re Jasmin C. is inapposite because it does not address informal supervision, let alone a court’s authority to adopt it without a request. The sole issue posed there was whether a nonoffending parent could be required to attend parenting classes in the absence of substantial evidence that the child or the parent would benefit. (Id. at p. 177.) Thus, In re Jasmin C. also does not assist father.
Father’s reply brief simply ignores the department’s forfeiture argument.
Ordinarily, a parent’s failure to raise an issue in the juvenile court forfeits the issue on appeal. (See, e.g., In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293; In re Cheryl E. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 587, 603.) Father does not explain why a different rule should apply here. Therefore, we conclude his claim that the court should have ordered informal supervision is forfeited.
As to the department’s second point, we need not decide whether father has standing to contest the order of services for mother because she clearly has standing to do so.
B. Mother’s Appeal
Mother contends the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings as to her under section 300, subdivision (b) were unsupported by substantial evidence, and the court’s dispositional orders based on those findings were therefore an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the jurisdictional findings, if not reversed, could have adverse future consequences for mother.
The department replies that we should dismiss mother’s appeal as moot because her argument does not address the findings under section 300, subdivisions (d) and (j), which were sufficient to sustain the petitions, and her claim of potential adverse consequences is speculation. We disagree.
An appellate court may affirm a juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over minors based on a valid finding under any subdivision of section 300, even if other findings are invalid. (In re D.P. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 898, 902.) However, we also have discretion to reach the merits of an attack on a jurisdictional finding that could prejudice a parent, even if reversing that finding would not require reversal of the outcome. (Ibid.)
Mother asserts that the finding she failed to protect the minors from the risk posed by father, if upheld, could damage her job prospects as a social worker in the field of juvenile dependency. We agree that that consequence is reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances. The finding goes directly to mother’s professional skill and judgment, especially since she initially asserted her training and experience as grounds to disbelieve P.H.’s allegations.
The department relies on In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 62-63. But there, dependency jurisdiction had been dismissed and the appellant had regained custody of the minor while the appeal was pending, and the appellate court could see no possible adverse effect in any future proceeding from the facts developed in the dismissed proceeding. (Id. at pp. 57, 61, 63.) That is not this case.
Finding no procedural bars to mother’s appeal, we turn to the merits.
C. Jurisdiction
Mother, joined by father, contends that the juvenile court should have refrained from exercising jurisdiction over the minors because no substantial evidence supported the allegation that mother failed to protect the minors from the substantial risk posed by father. We disagree.
The department must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the minors are dependents of the juvenile court under section 300. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).) Once the juvenile court has so found, we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s finding under the substantial evidence standard. In applying this standard, we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s findings, drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor. We do not reweigh the evidence or redetermine credibility; we merely ascertain if there are sufficient facts, viewed most favorably to the court’s findings, to support them. (Ibid.)
Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.”
“A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) requires: ‘ “(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the child, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] The third element ‘effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135.)
“Evidence of past conduct, without more, is insufficient to support a jurisdictional finding under section 300. There must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]” (In re James R., supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 136.)
A juvenile court’s finding that a father sexually abused one of his children may provide substantial evidence that all of his children are at substantial risk of abuse, even if there is no evidence that he sexually abused or mistreated the others and they did not know of the abuse. (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 770, 778-780.)
Viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences from the evidence most favorably to the juvenile court’s findings, substantial evidence showed that if the court did not exercise jurisdiction over the minors, mother would fail to protect them from the risk posed by father.
Mother never wholeheartedly accepted the truth of P.H.’s charges. At first she branded them as lies and left a phone message urging P.H. to drop the matter; then she appeared to support father’s claim that the underwear containing his semen was really her own, while not assisting police scrutiny of that claim. Even after admitting that “something” had happened, she could not say what it was. She seemed untroubled by father’s continued protestation of innocence in the teeth of the DNA evidence. Given her insistence that P.H. was not generally credible and had acted out sexually in inappropriate ways, the juvenile court could reasonably have concluded, despite mother’s claim to “believe” P.H., that mother still did not credit the charge of forcible rape and suspected P.H. was somehow to blame for whatever happened. If mother could not acknowledge what father had done, that failure of insight significantly increased the risk that she might fail to protect the minors from similar conduct by father. (See I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 778-780.)
Furthermore, mother still appeared to want father in her life as a spouse or partner. Although she had said, under pressure from the social worker, that she was prepared to seek divorce or separation, she had taken no steps to do so. Her reluctance to end the relationship also increased the risk to the minors.
In addition, mother never told even the oldest of the minors anything about why father had been forced to leave the home. At the same time, mother wanted to keep P.H. from contacting the minors because mother could not control what P.H. might say to them. In short, mother sought to keep the minors in the dark about father’s conduct, thus encouraging them to demand his full and speedy reentry into their lives without any awareness of what that could entail.
Lastly, mother apparently had an unwarranted confidence in her ability to spot trouble or wrongdoing in the home, even when she was not there.
All of these points, individually and together, constituted substantial evidence that without dependent supervision and the services it would require mother to complete, she would continue to fail to protect the minors from the risk posed by father. The fact that the evidence could also be construed more favorably to mother, as she and father argue at length, does not require reversal. (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
Since most of mother’s arguments on this issue amount to invitations to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773), we will not attempt to respond to every point in full. However, we note that to a large extent mother simply ignores or misstates the evidence.
For instance, mother asserts, under the heading “The Sexual Abuse Was a First Time Incident Which Appellant Could Not Have Predicted,” that she “stated she had not noticed any red flags, had no prior knowledge of the incident, and had not observed anything inappropriate in the home.” That is not all mother said on this topic. She also said that due to her training and experience as a social worker, she would have known if anything untoward had been going on (even though she was not at home during the day, but father was). In other words, mother was potentially trying to exonerate father and challenge the credibility of P.H.
Under the heading “By Jurisdiction, Appellant Had Demonstrated Continuing Concern for P.H. and Consistently Stated She Believed P.H. Had Been Truthful About the Abuse,” mother asserts that on July 15, 2015, she stated “she had to believe P.H. And, from that point on, she reiterated her belief.” However, she ignores the social worker’s comment, at the point in the record she cites to, that mother appeared “conflicted” about that statement of alleged belief in P.H.—a “conflict” that continued to play out up to the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, as we have shown above.
Mother misstates the record when she alleges that as of December 8, 2015, “she believed that father had made inappropriate comments and had sexually assaulted P.H.” No such statement by mother, even in paraphrase, appears at the record passage she cites. On the contrary, she said she had never heard the “inappropriate comments” or anything like them from father. The most she would admit as to father’s conduct was that “something,” or “a sexual act,” occurred—while simultaneously repeating his story that the underwear on which his DNA was found might really have been mother’s own. Mother never directly acknowledged in her own words that father had “sexually assaulted” P.H.
In light of mother’s consistent pattern of denying or minimizing father’s conduct and attempting to cast doubt on P.H.’s credibility, the social worker’s assessment in the jurisdiction/disposition report, impliedly adopted by the juvenile court, that mother did not acknowledge “the seriousness of the allegation against her husband” and “fail[ed] to recognize the trauma that her step-daughter suffered and continues to suffer” was well-grounded in the evidence.
So far as mother claims she appreciated the risk posed by father to the minors and acted properly to protect them, she ignores the evidence that she kept the minors in the dark about why father was no longer in the home and wanted to make sure P.H. could not give them any information. She also ignores her own attempts to try to avoid the juvenile court’s jurisdiction by making proposals, such as closing the referral or going to informal supervision out of county, that appeared designed to protect her own and father’s interests, not the minors’ interests.
So far as mother claims her relationship with father was “limited to and focused on the children’s desire to maintain a connection to him,” she ignores the fact that she never followed up on her original plan to seek divorce or separation, insisting instead that she still had a relationship with father after 12 years of marriage and did not know what its future would be.
So far as mother claims there was no substantial evidence of a “continuing, substantial risk of serious future harm to the children,” she ignores the holding of I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at pages 778-780, that a parent’s sexual abuse of one child in the home may be substantial evidence that all children in the home are at risk of such harm. Father’s temporary absence from the home was not enough to alleviate that risk if he and mother did not fully accept it and engage in services to deal with it.
When the evidence is viewed most favorably to the juvenile court’s findings, as we must view it, substantial evidence clearly supported those findings.
Mother contends the juvenile court’s dispositional orders were an abuse of discretion because substantial evidence did not support the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in the first place. She does not challenge any of the court’s orders on any independent ground.
Since we have found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s dispositional orders.
II. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders are affirmed.


/S/

RENNER, J.



We concur:


/S/

MAURO, Acting P. J.


/S/

MURRAY, J.