Filed 5/19/17 In re M.P. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----




In re M.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SHASTA COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

C077891


(Super. Ct. No. 13JVSQ2988901)

Appellant T.P., an alleged father of the minor M.P., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying him presumed father status. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395.) He contends the juvenile court erred in rescinding the voluntary declaration of paternity he signed after the minor’s birth and in setting aside the subsequent paternity judgment entered by a family law court. He also contends that, even without the voluntary declaration of paternity and paternity judgment in place, he qualified as, and should have been declared, the minor’s presumed father. We conclude the juvenile court did not err in exercising its equitable powers to rescind the voluntary declaration of paternity and set aside the paternity judgment. Further, the juvenile court did not err in resolving the competing presumptions of parentage and determining T.B., the biological father, is the minor’s sole presumed father. Accordingly, we shall affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
BACKGROUND
Initiation of Proceedings
On October 22, 2013, the Shasta County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) placed M.P. (born September 2006) into protective custody after mother did not pick her up from an afterschool care program. School officials were concerned mother was using drugs, as she appeared “fidgety, was jumpy, and would become agitated easily.” They reported T.P., mother’s former husband and the man identified as the minor’s father, was overly aggressive toward female staff at the school. Both mother and T.P. used methamphetamine and there was a history of violence between them.
Mother told the Agency staff T.P. was present at M.P.’s birth, his name was on her birth certificate, and they married shortly after M.P.’s birth. Mother and T.P. executed a declaration of paternity on September 8, 2006, after the minor’s birth, which was filed with the Department of Child Support Services. They divorced in 2010 and the family court had granted them both physical and legal custody of M.P. M.P., however, lived at mother’s residence that was located on the maternal grandmother’s property, next to the grandmother’s residence.
M.P. referred to T.P. as her “dad.” She told the social worker she “rarely” saw him. M.P. said she did not want to live with T.P. because he became angry very quickly. The maternal grandmother stated she had once witnessed T.P. intentionally bash the minor’s head into a window sill and when he came around, M.P. did not want to be left alone with him.
A petition was filed on October 24, 2013, alleging M.P. was at a substantial risk of harm within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code, section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged mother’s mental health issues, her anger issues, and her substance abuse issues affected her ability to parent M.P. The petition also alleged T.P. had substance abuse and anger issues that interfered with his ability to care for M.P. The petition further alleged T.P. was aware of mother’s issues and had failed to protect M.P. by leaving her in mother’s custody most of the time after they separated in 2010.
At the detention hearing on October 25, 2013, mother identified T.B., not T.P., as the biological father of the minor. She indicated she had been living with T.B. at the time of conception, but had lived with T.P. at the time of M.P.’s birth. The minor was detained.
On November 14, 2013, after the Agency contacted him, T.B. filed a Form JV-505, “Statement Regarding Parentage,” checking the box indicating he did not know if he was M.P.’s father, but requested that paternity testing take place. An ex parte application was filed and the juvenile court ordered that paternity testing take place.
Jurisdiction and Disposition Proceedings
The jurisdiction report filed on November 20, 2013, included a copy of the voluntary declaration of paternity that had been signed by mother and T.P. on September 8, 2006.
The disposition report, filed November 26, 2013, indicated M.P. continued to reside in foster care. Mother told the Agency she was an alcoholic and reported using methamphetamine at the beginning of November 2013. She was willing to participate in services in order to have M.P. returned to her custody. She enrolled in an outpatient program on October 23, 2013, but did not attend any of the classes. She scheduled an appointment for domestic violence services but did not keep the appointment and she did not complete her mental health assessment. She had visited M.P. on a consistent basis and the visits went well, but during two of the visits, mother smelled like marijuana.
T.P. had not participated in any assessments, services, or drug-tests. At the time of the detention hearing, he refused to participate in any services or complete any necessary paperwork to obtain assessments. He did not call to request visitation and his whereabouts had been unknown, as the address he provided to the Agency was incorrect. T.P. eventually contacted the Agency on November 25, 2013, with his correct address.
T.B. had continued to express uncertainty about whether he was M.P.’s biological father. Although he believed he was not the minor’s father, he stated if the results of the paternity testing indicated otherwise, he wanted to have M.P. placed with him.
On December 3, 2013, the mother submitted a written waiver of her rights to contest the allegations of the petition. An addendum was filed on January 10, 2014, reporting the paternity test indicated T.B. was M.P.’s biological father. The Agency recommended T.B.’s paternity status be raised to that of a presumed father, M.P. be declared a dependent of the court, legal and physical custody be given to T.B., and the dependency proceedings be dismissed.
The addendum report indicated T.B. had begun visits with the minor. The visits had progressed over time and were reportedly going extremely well. T.B. was patient and understanding, and allowed for their relationship to progress on the minor’s terms. When asked about going to live with T.B., M.P. reportedly smiled and stated she felt good about that. T.B. was married and had a one-year-old daughter. He recognized M.P. was likely going through a period of adjustment after learning he was her biological father, and he and his wife agreed to participate in therapy with the minor to assist with any issues that may arise. On January 14, 2014, the Agency was given the discretion to allow overnight visits between T.B. and M.P.
The Agency reported mother had sporadically participated in some of her substance abuse classes but continued to use methamphetamine. She had not completed a mental health assessment, had not signed up for parenting or anger management classes, and had not attended her domestic violence services. T.P. had signed up for substance abuse treatment but attended only half of the scheduled classes and tested positive for marijuana on November 26, 2013. He had not signed up for parenting classes or completed his referral to anger management classes.
At the time of the Agency’s second addendum report, filed on February 14, 2014, M.P. was still in a foster home. Mother had not been compliant with the requirements of the case plan. T.B. had two overnight weekend visits with M.P. that had gone well. M.P. reportedly exhibited difficulty listening and had started pushing her limits with T.B., and she was to begin therapy with T.B. and his wife. The Agency renewed its recommendation that the court elevate T.B.’s paternity status to that of a presumed father, and the minor be placed with him.
A third addendum report, filed on March 10, 2014, reflected both mother and T.P. were noncompliant with their case plan and their providers were going to discharge them from their outpatient substance abuse programs. T.B. had continued to visit with M.P. and they were going to start therapy soon to address some parenting issues.
A combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing began on March 12, 2014, and carried over to March 13, 2014, during which testimony was taken from T.P., T.B., and mother regarding the issue of paternity. The testimony reflects T.B. and mother had been in a four- to six-month romantic relationship, ending in December 2005. T.B. lived with mother during this time. In March 2006, mother contacted T.B., informing him she was pregnant and she believed he was the father. T.B. accompanied mother to a doctor’s appointment. The doctor told them mother was three weeks pregnant. Since T.B. had ceased having sexual relations with mother after he moved out of mother’s home three months prior, he dismissed the idea he was the child’s father. After the doctor’s visit, while driving back, mother told T.B. she disagreed with the doctor and believed she was three months pregnant. She also contacted T.B. a few weeks later and reiterated her belief he was the father of the unborn child. Shortly thereafter, they ceased contact. T.B. later heard from a friend’s wife that mother had delivered a baby but did not know the date of the child’s birth.
In 2012, after her divorce from T.P., mother contacted T.B. and told him she wanted to tell M.P. that T.B. was her biological father. T.B. again disputed being the biological father and told mother he would submit to a paternity test. In response, mother threatened to tell M.P. her biological father was dead and hung up on him. Mother had called from a blocked telephone number and T.B. had no way to call her back. T.B. did not consider the possibility he was M.P.’s biological father until the social worker contacted him in 2013, and informed him of M.P.’s date of birth, at which point he recognized he could be the father.
With regard to the voluntary declaration of paternity signed by mother and T.P., T.P. did not discuss with mother whether he was the biological father. Although he had fathered children prior to M.P., he had known by M.P.’s birth that he had a medical condition making it unlikely he could conceive children. He had also heard rumors prior to the minor’s birth that he was not the biological father. He had had a relationship with mother prior to her relationship with T.B., resumed his relationship with mother before the minor’s birth, and married mother shortly after M.P.’s birth. T.P. held M.P. out as his own child and received her into his home. In response to the court’s question about whether he thought it possible someone else was the father, T.P. stated, “possibility, yeah, but I thought -- I closed out those possibilities by getting back together with my wife and signing the Birth Certificate and acting as the father.”
At the conclusion of testimony and after argument, the juvenile court indicated it was going to take the matter under submission and was taking judicial notice of and reviewing the family law file from the divorce proceeding that occurred in 2010. On March 25, 2014, the juvenile court advised the parties the family law file contained a judgment of paternity. The juvenile court directed the parties to file briefs as to whether the family law judgment should take precedent.
Both the Agency and T.B. asserted T.B. qualified as a presumed father pursuant to either Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), or Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816 (Kelsey S.). T.P. asserted he should be declared the presumed father as a result of the voluntary declaration of paternity and the paternity judgment from the family law court. He also asserted he qualified as the presumed father pursuant to section 7611, subdivision (c), because his name was on M.P.’s birth certificate and he had married mother shortly after the birth; and pursuant to section 7611, subdivision (d), because he had held M.P. out as his own child and received her into his home.
On May 9, 2014, the court sustained the allegations of the petition, finding M.P. came within the jurisdiction of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). M.P. was declared a dependent of the court and it was ordered that she continue to be placed outside of parental custody pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c). Reunification services were provided to mother, T.P., and T.B. The court did not rule on the matter of paternity.
Six-Month Review Proceedings
An addendum report filed on June 19, 2014, indicated mother continued visiting the minor on a consistent basis, but appeared to be under the influence during the visits. She had not kept in contact with the Agency. T.P. had completed Triple P Primary Care, but continued to test positive for marijuana. He had been referred to eight weeks of anger management but only attended one class and told the social worker he did not have any further need for sessions. He did not complete a referral for mental health assessment and his living situation was unknown because he refused to answer questions. He continued to have visitation with M.P., but the visits did not go smoothly, and on one occasion, the minor hid from him.
T.B. continued to have extended visitation with M.P. (Friday afternoons through Monday evenings) and the visits were enjoyable. Occasionally, the minor had a hard time listening and was sent to her room. T.B. was very committed to having the minor placed with him. The minor got along well with his other daughter and was accepted as a member of the family. The juvenile court found continued contact with T.B. to be in the minor’s best interests.
On June 24, 2014, the minor filed a motion to set aside the voluntary declaration of paternity, urging the juvenile court to exercise its equitable powers and set aside the declaration pursuant to section 7575, subdivision (c)(4). On July 9, 2014, the minor requested that the court find visitation with T.P. was not beneficial to her. The Agency reported T.P. had been discussing court proceedings with the minor. The minor had also been observed to slouch away from T.P.’s embrace. During one visit at the visitation center, the minor wanted to attend her foster sister’s birthday party taking place in the next room but T.P. did not let her go.
A status review report was filed on October 27, 2014. M.P. was still in foster care. Mother had not been participating in her reunification plan. She continued to visit M.P., but there were still concerns she was under the influence and having inappropriate conversations during the visits. M.P.’s therapist opined the visits were having a negative effect on M.P. Visits had been reduced to one time per month in September 2014.
T.P. had met expectations for attendance and participation in his drug treatment program at Right Road Recovery Program, but continued to test positive for marijuana. He had completed six anger management classes before dropping out of the program. Although he had completed the parenting course, it was reported he struggled to demonstrate the techniques he learned during visitation. His provider requested an additional eight sessions. Visits had been moved to the Agency’s office and reduced to once a month because T.P. was not following the rules and guidelines (including bringing unauthorized gifts, discussing court proceedings, and pressuring M.P. for affection when she was not willing to initiate affection on her own), and because the minor expressed discomfort and fear with T.P., and the therapist was concerned the visits were having a negative effect on the minor.
M.P. had continued to spend extended weekend time with T.B. and enjoyed these visits. T.B. had met with M.P.’s mental health provider on two occasions and stated he was willing to attend more counseling. The minor was receiving services for adjustment disorder. The minor still had a hard time listening occasionally and was sent to her room. She was accepted as part of the family and was very close to T.B.’s other daughter. M.P. was in the third grade and making improvements in school. She had expressed mixed feelings about visitation with mother and T.P.
On October 31, 2014, the juvenile court issued a written statement of decision. The court exercised its equitable powers to rescind the voluntary declaration of paternity pursuant to section 7575, subdivision (c)(4), and set aside the paternity judgment, and then determined T.B. was the presumed father of M.P. pursuant to section 7611, subdivision (d). With regard to the voluntary declaration of paternity, the court found T.P. knew at the time he executed the declaration under penalty of perjury that he was not the biological father of the minor. The unique facts required the court to act as a court of equity. Under such authority, the court rescinded the voluntary declaration of paternity. As to the family law court’s paternity judgment, the court found T.B. was precluded from exercising his right to have custody of the minor based on mother and T.P.’s false assertions on the voluntary declaration of paternity. The court found T.B. established extrinsic fraud on the part of mother and T.P. and ordered the default judgment, as it relates to paternity, vacated. Finally, under the unique circumstances of this case, the court found T.B. is the presumed father. The court explained that “[g]iven that [T.B.]’s late arrival to his role as a parent to [the minor] was caused by the misrepresentations and fraud on the part of the mother and [T.P.] he should not now be penalized by the mere passage of time.”
At the subsequent November 14, 2014, six-month-review hearing, the juvenile court placed the minor with T.B., giving him sole legal and physical custody, set visitation rights for mother, and dismissed the dependency. T.P. appealed from the juvenile court’s October 31, 2014, order determining T.B. to be the minor’s presumed father and from the November 14, 2014, order dismissing the dependency.
DISCUSSION
I
Presumptions of Paternity
The Uniform Parentage Act (section 7600 et seq.) enumerates the circumstances under which a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child. Presumed fatherhood status entitles a man to custody of a child. (§§ 3010, 7611.)
Section 7611 establishes rebuttable paternity presumptions under each of its six subdivisions. Under subdivision (d), a man is a presumed father if he “receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.” This presumption is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence. There are no time limits or standing requirements for challenging, or asserting, a section 7611, subdivision (d) presumption. “Any interested party may bring an action at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship presumed under subdivision (d) or (f) of Section 7611.” (§ 7630, subd. (b).) “If two or more presumptions arise under Section . . . 7611 that conflict with each other, . . . the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.” (§ 7612, subd. (b).)
The presumption of paternity created by the signing of a voluntary declaration of paternity, however, is a conclusive presumption. Unless rescinded or set aside, a voluntary declaration of paternity has the same force and effect as a judgment of paternity issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. (§ 7573; Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1132.) A judgment or order of the court determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship is determinative for all purposes (except for actions brought pursuant to section 270 of the Penal Code). (§ 7636.) A presumption under section 7611 is rebutted by a judgment establishing paternity of the child by another man. (§ 7612, subd. (c).)
At the time the Agency received the results of the DNA tests confirming T.B. as the minor’s biological father, a judgment of paternity declaring T.P. to be the minor’s father existed. That judgment of paternity was entitled to res judicata effect and neither the blood test evidence nor T.B.’s late blooming relationship with the minor could be used to override the paternity determination. (City and County of San Francisco v. Cartagena (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1065 (Cartagena).) Accordingly, unless or until the voluntary declaration of paternity and judgment of paternity were set aside, T.P.’s presumption of paternity rebutted any claim made by T.B.
II
Rescission of Voluntary Declaration of Paternity
T.P. asserted he should be declared the minor’s presumed father by virtue of the voluntary declaration of paternity he and mother signed at the minor’s birth. He argues the juvenile court erred in rescinding that voluntary declaration of paternity.
Section 7575 sets forth the circumstances under which a voluntary declaration may be rescinded or set aside. Subdivision (a) provides that either parent may rescind the declaration within 60 days by filing a rescission form. (§ 7575, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b) provides that, in addition, a court may set a declaration aside when court-ordered blood tests establish the declarant is not the child’s father. (§ 7575, subd. (b); County of Los Angeles v. Sheldon P. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1340.) The notice of motion for genetic tests, however, must be filed no later than two years from the date of the child’s birth. (§ 7575, subd. (b)(3)(A); see also § 7551 [in action where paternity is relevant, court “shall upon motion of any party” order the alleged father to submit to genetic tests].) Additionally, either parent may “file an action or motion to set aside the voluntary declaration of paternity on any of the grounds described in, and within the time limits [maximum of six months] specified in, Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure [relating to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect].” (§ 7575, subd. (c)(1).) Finally, subdivision (c) provides that “[n]othing in this section is intended to restrict a court from acting as a court of equity.” (§ 7575, subd. (c)(4).) An equitable collateral attack on a voluntary declaration of paternity is available on the grounds of extrinsic fraud. (In re William K. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1, 10.)
Here, the juvenile court acted as a court of equity and rescinded the declaration of paternity due to its finding of extrinsic fraud perpetrated by mother on T.B. We note the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud is quite nebulous. The viability of the distinction has been undermined further by its inconsistent application. (See In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1060 (Marriage of Stevenot).)
“[F]raud is intrinsic if a party has been given notice of the action and has not been prevented from participating therein, that is, if he or she had an opportunity to present his [or her] case and to protect himself [or herself] from any mistake or fraud of his [or her] adversary, but has unreasonably neglected to do so”. (Marriage of Stevenot, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 1069.)
“Fraud is extrinsic where the defrauded party was deprived of the opportunity to present his or her claim or defense to the court, that is, where he or she was kept in ignorance or in some other manner, other than from his or her own conduct, fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceeding.” (Marriage of Stevenot, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 1068.) “Extrinsic fraud [. . .] arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he [or she] has been ‘deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his [or her] claim or defense.’ ” (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 471.) “The essence of extrinsic fraud is one party’s preventing the other from having his [or her] day in court.” (Cartagena, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067.)
T.P. argues his and mother’s false assertions on the voluntary declaration of paternity, made under penalty of perjury, that T.P. was the only possible biological father of the minor, constituted intrinsic fraud rather than extrinsic.
Mother and T.P. executed this document, without notifying T.B. of their intent. The juvenile court found T.P. knew at the time he executed the declaration of paternity under penalty of perjury he was not M.P.’s biological father. And mother also knew T.P. was not the minor’s biological father.
While mother told T.B. she believed he was the minor’s father in 2006 approximately six months before the minor was born, mother also knew T.B. had been provided incorrect information about her pregnancy by the doctor. Based on this incorrect information from mother’s doctor, it was impossible for T.B. to be the biological father. Yet mother did not inform T.B. of the fact of, or date of, the minor’s birth (which would have informed T.B. he could be the biological father), nor did she inform him she intended to execute (and have another man execute) a declaration of paternity attesting no other man could be the minor’s father. These actions denied T.B. the opportunity to establish his paternity.
T.B. did not consider the possibility he was M.P.’s biological father until the social worker contacted him in 2013, and informed him of M.P.’s date of birth, at which point he recognized he could be the father.
Prior to 2013, there is no evidence in the record T.B. made any efforts to find out the date of birth for the minor. The question is whether he was put on notice he might be the biological father such that he should have done more to ascertain the date of birth and come forward earlier to find out if he was the biological father. Based on the medical opinion provided by mother’s doctor that mother was three weeks pregnant, T.B. could not be the biological father. After the doctor’s visit, mother told T.B. she was three months instead of three weeks pregnant. She also contacted T.B. a few weeks later and reiterated her belief he was the father of the unborn child.
Later, when T.B. heard from a friend about the birth of the minor, he did not make further inquiries about the date of birth. But there was no reason to ask about the date of birth because T.B. could not be the biological father based on the doctor’s medical opinion.
Mother did not contact T.B. again until 2012, after the divorce and approximately six years after the minor was born. Mother told T.B. she wanted to tell M.P. that T.B. was her biological father. T.B. again disputed being the biological father and told mother he would submit to a paternity test. In response, mother threatened to tell M.P. her biological father was dead and hung up on him. Mother had called from a blocked telephone number. T.B. testified he did not have any way to contact mother; he did not know where she lived, did not know what her name was, and did not know her phone number.
This is a unique factual situation. Based on the doctor’s medical opinion on mother’s pregnancy, it was impossible for T.B. to be the biological father. Even though mother told T.B. more than once he was the father, there is no evidence in the record she told him the minor’s date of birth. While T.B. could have done more to find out the date of birth, there was no reason for him to question whether he could be the biological father. Under these circumstances, we conclude it was reasonable for T.B. to rely on the doctor’s medical opinion.
Based on this record, we conclude mother’s actions in not informing T.B. of the date of birth and executing the voluntary declaration of paternity constitute extrinsic fraud. As a result of these actions, T.B. was deprived of the opportunity to contest the voluntary declaration of paternity.
We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it acted as a court of equity and rescinded the voluntary declaration of paternity. (See County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1230 [court’s decision to grant equitable relief reviewed for abuse of discretion].)
III
Setting Aside of Paternity Judgment
T.P. also argues the juvenile court erred in exercising its equitable power to set aside the judgment of paternity from the family law court, stemming from his divorce from mother, finding M.P. was a child of his marriage to mother. Again, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion.
“[A] judgment establishing paternity may be set aside or vacated upon a motion by the previously established mother of a child, the previously established father of a child, the child, . . . if genetic testing indicates that the previously established father of a child is not the biological father of the child.” (§ 7646.) As applicable here, section 7646 requires, however, such a motion be filed “[w]ithin a two-year period commencing with the date of the child’s birth if paternity was established by a voluntary declaration of paternity.” (§ 7646, subd. (a)(2).) Alternatively, a party may seek relief from a final judgment by appealing to the equitable power of the court; the court, sitting in equity, can, under certain limited circumstances, set aside or modify a valid final judgment obtained by fraud, mistake or accident. (In re Margarita D. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1294.) However, the only type of fraud that can be the basis of vacating a final judgment is extrinsic fraud. (Marriage of Stevenot, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 1068.)
Failing to give notice of an action or proceeding to obtain a judgment without the knowledge of the other party is extrinsic fraud. (Marriage of Stevenot, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d at p.1068; Kulchar v. Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 471.) Such is the case here. T.B. had no notice of the family law proceeding. The judgment of paternity was entered by the family law court upon dissolution of mother and T.P.’s marriage. At the time of the divorce proceedings, mother and T.P. knew T.P. was not the biological father and mother believed T.B. was the biological father. We conclude T.B. was not given the opportunity to present his case for paternity in the family law court prior to the entry of the judgment. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the judgment of paternity due to extrinsic fraud.
IV
Qualification as Presumed Father under Section 7611
Having rescinded the voluntary declaration of paternity and set aside the family law paternity judgment, the juvenile court found both T.P. and T.B. qualified as presumed fathers under section 7611, subdivision (d). We agree.
As set forth above, a man is a presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d), if he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child. (Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1043, 1051; see In re Zachariah D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 449.)
A biological father who does not fulfill the statutory criteria to qualify as a presumed father may nevertheless attain parental rights equal to those of the mother by showing he promptly stepped forward to assume full parental responsibilities for the child’s well-being, including a financial, emotional or other commitment; the child’s mother or a third party prevented him from assuming his parental responsibilities or physically receiving the child into his home; and he demonstrated a willingness to assume full custody of the child. (In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 932, fn. omitted; In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 545.) Such an individual is often referred to as a Kelsey S. father. (Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th 816.) A Kelsey S. father is entitled to assume immediate custody under section 361.2. (In re Zachariah D., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 451, 454; § 361.2; § 7600 et seq.)
T.P. argues T.B. did not promptly come forward because he did not believe he was the father until these proceedings were initiated and, therefore, T.B. did not qualify as a Kelsey S. father. We reject this argument. The juvenile court found T.B. had been precluded from exercising his right to the minor based on mother and T.P.’s misrepresentations and fraud and should not be penalized by the passage of time. Once T.B. learned he was the minor’s biological father, he took the minor into his home and made her a part of the family. Based on these facts, we agree with the juvenile court’s finding T.B. promptly came forward and assumed full parental responsibilities and qualified as a Kelsey S. father. Additionally, whether T.B. received reunification services and visitation by entitlement (by virtue of being a Kelsey S. father), or through the exercise of discretion (by virtue of being a biological father) , T.B. elevated his status to presumed father during the pendency of these proceedings.
A natural father may become a presumed father if “[he] receives the child into [his] home and openly holds out the child as [his] natural child.” (§ 7611, subd. (d), see In re Phoenix B. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 787, 790, fn. 3 [construing predecessor statute, presumed father status achieved when alleged father “came forward when the Department instituted dependency proceedings, offered to care for his daughter, took her into his home and . . . held her out as his child”].) After the DNA test confirmed T.B. was the biological father, T.B. made a place in his home for M.P., providing her with her own bedroom, where she spent extended weekends. M.P. was accepted into the family, was very close with T.B.’s other daughter, and had visited extensively with the family, who had embraced her as a family member. The family had participated in counseling together and T.B. has made every effort possible to establish a relationship with the minor. T.B. openly held M.P. out as his own. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding T.B. qualified as a presumed father. (See S.Y. v. S.B. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1031 [factual findings under section 7611, subdivision (d), reviewed for substantial evidence].)
The juvenile court also found T.P. qualified as a presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d), as he took the minor into his home and held her out as his own. Although T.P. does not contest this finding, he does argue the juvenile court should have also found he qualified as the minor’s presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (c) -- having subsequently married mother and had his name on the minor’s birth certificate. While it would appear subdivision (c) of section 7611 also applied to T.P., the juvenile court’s failure to expressly make that finding is immaterial, as it bestows no different or greater claim of parentage on T.P. than his qualification as the minor’s presumed father under subdivision (d). (See § 7612, subd. (b), discussed infra.)
V
Competing Presumptions of Parentage
Finally, having two competing presumptions of parentage under section 7611, the juvenile court weighed considerations of policy and logic under section 7612, subdivision (b), and concluded T.B.’s presumption deserved greater weight under the statutory procedure for resolving competing presumptions of paternity found in section 7612, subdivision (b). In making this finding, the juvenile court noted what “tips the scale in favor of [T.B.], and against [T.P.], is the lack of engagement [T.P.] had under the family law visitation orders.” We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in declaring T.B. to be the minor’s sole presumed father.
“If two or more presumptions arise under Section . . . 7611 that conflict with each other, . . . the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.’ ” (Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1570; § 7612, subd. (b).) In weighing the conflicting interests, “the trial court must in the end make a determination which gives the greatest weight to [the child’s] well-being.” (Craig L. v. Sandy S. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 36, 52-53 [“no single factor—whether social or biological—controls resolution of the conflict between competing presumed fathers”].) We review the juvenile court’s determination for abuse of discretion. (In re Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 607.)
T.P. argues there is no support in the record for the juvenile court’s findings he was not committed to his parental responsibilities. We disagree. The record reflects that, after T.P.’s divorce from mother, he did not take advantage of the 50 percent custody he was granted. As the juvenile court found, while T.P. had contact with the minor after his separation and divorce from mother, he appeared to do so primarily to maintain a relationship with mother and was not motivated by a deep commitment to the minor. Since the inception of these dependency proceedings, T.P. has demonstrated a limited commitment to his parental responsibilities. T.P. did not complete all the services designed to help him reunify with the minor. At times he was uncooperative, refused to follow rules and guidelines, and showed little regard for the minor’s desires or comfort during visitation. As a result, visits were moved to the Agency’s office and reduced to once a month. In sum, he has not taken the steps necessary to provide a home for the minor.
On the other hand, since discovering he was the minor’s biological father, T.B. was fully committed to his parental responsibilities. He sought custody, took the minor into his home and made her part of his family. He pursued counseling to help with her adjustment disorder and to resolve behavioral issues. He made every effort possible to establish a relationship with the minor and provide her a home.
Based on the record, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in declaring T.B. to be the minor’s sole presumed father.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.



/s/
HOCH, J.



We concur:



/s/
NICHOLSON, Acting P. J.



/s/
DUARTE, J.