In re C.G.

Filed 8/31/06 In re C.G. CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

Appellants Mary G. (mother) and Gilbert G. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s order, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,[1] terminating their parental rights with respect to their children, Z.G. (now four years old) and C.G. (now almost three years old). Appellants contend (1) the juvenile court’s finding that the parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the court’s finding that the sibling relationship exception to adoption did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the court abused its discretion by failing to consider whether the parent-child relationship and sibling exceptions to adoption in combination were applicable in the present case. We shall affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND[2]

“On October 24, 2003, the Solano County Health and Social Services Department (Department) filed an original petition alleging that Z.G. (then 21 months old) and C.G. (then one month old), along with their five siblings, D.G. (then nine years old), Ch.G. (then six years old), Da.G. (then five years old), A.G. (then three years old), and S.G. (then two years old) came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c). The petition also alleged that the children’s four older half-siblings--children of mother and B.B.--came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c).[3]

“Specifically, the petition alleged that mother had a long history of substance abuse that interfered with her ability to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment for her children. Between 1990 and 2003, she gave birth to at least five infants who tested positive for drugs, and had 32 referrals to Child Protective Services. On October 22, 2003, the Vallejo Police Department condemned the home in which mother and her 11 children were living. The home was filthy, full of trash, debris, and spoiled food. The yard was also full of trash and debris. Flies, fleas, mice, and rats were also seen at the home, and there were large holes in the sheetrock as well as exposed wiring. The petition also alleged mother permitted a registered sex offender to provide care for her children. The petition further alleged that father knew or should have known mother was abusing drugs and unable to adequately care for the children, and, by permitting the children to continue to reside with mother in the home that was condemned, placed each child at substantial risk of serious physical harm and illness. Finally, the petition alleged the children were permitted to run wild and out of control without supervision, were left to care for themselves and each other, had been exposed to drug abuse, and were severely neglected.

“At the October 27, 2003 detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered the children detained, to be placed in either a foster home or the home of a suitable relative.

“In an informational report, filed on March 3, 2004, prior to the jurisdictional hearing, the social worker reported that the four older children had been placed with father, who had not attended the parent education classes to which he had been referred and had not completed the assessment process for the Responsible Father’s Program, although he had said he would attend an upcoming parent training session at Catholic Social Services. Father also had permitted mother to have unsupervised visitation with the four children in his custody, contrary to the juvenile court’s order for supervised visitation only. In addition, ‘[h]aving four children to care for seems to be a handful for [father], and adding three more children, one of whom requires total care,[[4]] seems to be an [overwhelming] task.’

“Mother had refused to sign her case plan and said she would not participate in any services unless the Department placed the three younger children with father. She also refused to drug test on three occasions.

“The social worker asked the court to consider detaining the four older children who had been placed with father ‘because their parents do not take the orders of the Court seriously enough to obey them.’

“At the March 3, 2004 jurisdictional hearing, father admitted and mother submitted to the allegations in the petition, as amended. The court sustained the amended allegations of the petition.

“In a report prepared on March 18, 2004 for the dispositional hearing, the social worker reported that mother and father had been convicted of misdemeanor violations of Penal Code section 273a (abusing or endangering the health of a child), as a result of the October 2003 neglect leading to the Department’s intervention; both were on probation. The social worker also discussed the four older children who had been placed with father. D.G., the oldest of the seven siblings, was in third grade and was developmentally on target. He was oppositional and defiant at school, although his behavior had improved recently. Ch.G., who had tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines at birth, was in first grade and also appeared to be developmentally on target. He was described as a talkative boy who got along well with his fellow students. His grades were poor, but not due to a learning disability. Da.G., who had tested positive for methamphetamine at birth, was in kindergarten and appeared to be developmentally on target. He was described as a somewhat shy boy who got along well with his fellow students. A.G., who was not currently in preschool, also appeared to be developmentally on target.

“S.G., who was in foster care, appeared to be a very happy boy who enjoyed love and attention. S.G. had been diagnosed with seizure disorder, severe developmental delay, cerebral palsy, microcephaly, and cortical visual impairments. His verbal, gross and fine motor, and self care skills were all significantly delayed. He required constant monitoring and supervision. Z.G. was described as a physically active boy, who had little tantrums typical for his age. There were no diagnosed or observed developmental issues. C.G., who had tested positive for amphetamines at birth, was being treated for asthma. Although she was a bit small for her age, no developmental issues had been noted.

“The Department reported that mother, who had a severe, untreated drug problem, refused to participate in drug treatment or submit to drug testing.

“The Department noted that father still had not begun a parenting class, had allowed the children to have unsupervised visits with mother, and had been aware of mother’s drug problem and the conditions in which the children had previously lived without doing anything to protect them. In addition, father did not have a permanent place to live and had recently lost his job, and the childcare provider he had hired was living with a registered sex offender. The social worker concluded the four older children did not appear to be protected in father’s home and asked the court to consider detaining them. The social worker also recommended keeping S.G., Z.G., and C.G. in foster care, with six additional months of reunification services for the parents.

“At the May 13, 2004 dispositional hearing, the court adjudged the children dependents of the court, but did not change any of their placements.

“In an informational report prepared on August 25, 2004 in anticipation of the placement review hearing regarding placement of the three youngest children with father, the social worker reported that father had completed a parenting class and had also completed the Responsible Father’s Program with a very positive report from the facilitator. Father had also engaged in therapeutic services for the four children in his home and was participating in in-home support services through Families First and Child Haven. It was evident father had ‘put forth a lot of time and energy to complete his case plan tasks.’ He also had obtained appropriate housing for the family and was consistent with visiting the younger children.

“Mother had completed a psychological evaluation and her parenting class. She was also consistent in visiting her children. According to the psychological evaluation, mother had severe issues that would require intensive long-term individual therapy.

“The social worker continued to have concerns about father’s ability to care for all seven children. Specifically, father still had trouble understanding age-appropriate behaviors, expectations, and activities, and he continued to need direction from others in order to keep the children safe. He also continued to minimize the neglect issues that caused the children to come into care and took no responsibility for his involvement. He had been reluctant to put the younger children in daycare or preschool, and was ‘not motivated to expand his parenting role past the most basic duties of feeding, clothing and housing the children.’

“Father had been able to meet the minimal standards of care and supervision for maintaining the four older children in his home with the support of multiple service providers. The social worker recommended that the older children remain in father’s home, but recommended against returning the youngest three children to the home because that would jeopardize the placement of all seven children, particularly given that the three children were very young and in need of constant supervision and that S.G. had additional special needs.

“At the August 26, 2004 placement review hearing, the court followed the Department’s recommendations for placement, but ordered father to meet with the social worker to work out a plan for transitioning the three younger children home.[5]

“In a status review hearing report prepared on November 5, 2004, the social worker reported the four older children were doing well and father was meeting their basic needs and following up on their counseling. Their home was in good condition and free of safety hazards. There were some concerns about father’s ability to supervise the children and intervene appropriately when safety concerns arose, although there had been no injuries to the children.

“With respect to the other three children, [then] four-year-old S.G. was receiving many services for his disabilities. He had limited trunk control and required close supervision. He was legally blind, could not walk, and would probably never be toilet trained. [Then] two-and-one-half-year-old Z.G. and 14-month-old C.G. were both living in the same foster home and doing well, and father was having extended day visits with them. The plan had been to transition the two youngest children to father’s home first. However, S.G.’s foster mother had health issues that required S.G. to leave her home, and the Department was considering placing S.G. with father first, and, once he was settled, continuing the transition of Z.G. and C.G. into the home.

“Mother had been visiting the children regularly under father’s supervision, had begun attending a support group related to substance abuse, and had completed a parenting class. She was resistant to beginning individual therapy and had not yet completed any drug testing.

“The social worker recommended six more months of reunification services and out-of-home placement for the three youngest children, with discretion to return them to father when appropriate.

“The Department also submitted a September 27, 2004 letter from the Families First worker who had regularly visited father and the four older children over a two-month period. The worker described father as ‘a caring father who is actively involved in the lives of his children. He readily requests services and resources for his family. He actively pursues getting his youngest children back.’ The worker did also note, however, father’s lack of acknowledgement of the poor conditions of mother’s home, which led to removal of the children, as well as his reluctance to seek outside childcare and his decision to take care of the children at home.

“On November 10, 2004, the Department advised the juvenile court that S.G. would be removed from his foster placement and placed with father. This would involve a gradual transition with the assistance of the foster mother and other service providers. Father had expressed a willingness to suspend reunification with Z.G. and C.G. until S.G. had stabilized in his home.

“At the November 17, 2004 status review hearing, the court placed S.G. with father and continued foster care for Z.G. and C.G. Mother was ordered to abstain from drug use, submit to random drug testing, and participate in counseling. Father was ordered to participate in counseling and to ensure that the four oldest children participated in counseling.

“In a January 31, 2005 informational report, the social worker reported that S.G. was now in father’s home and father had successfully enrolled S.G. in school. Z.G. and C.G. had begun extended visitation with father, including overnight stays. The social worker expressed concern that father had cancelled two visits with Z.G. and C.G. On another occasion, father was not present when the foster parent attempted to drop them off at his home, though he called an hour later and asked her to bring them to his house. The foster parent did so, but when she returned later that day to pick up the two children, father was not present and E.B., the children’s teenage half-sibling, was there caring for the children. Father told the social worker that the older half-siblings babysat for two to three hours only occasionally.

“The Department planned to extend visits to include weekend visits and to place Z.G. and C.G. with father on March 1, 2005. The Department had requested that father locate an appropriate childcare provider for Z.G. and C.G. upon their return to the home. Father’s Cal-works eligibility worker had indicated that childcare services would be available to father once the two children were placed in his home.

“Mother was participating in weekly visitation with the children, but had refused to take a hair-strand drug test, had not completed her support group, and was not involved in any therapeutic services.

“Finally, Z.G. and C.G.’s current foster parents had expressed commitment to maintaining the children in their home on a long-term basis if needed.

“In a status review hearing report prepared on March 22, 2005, the social worker reported mother had made no further progress in completing her case plan during the reporting period. Father, who was living with his five oldest children, had maintained housing for 11 months and there had been no concerns regarding the safety of the home. Despite his questions about the need for services, father had been compliant with completing the case plan services. The five children in his care were doing well, including S.G., who has cerebral palsy and other physical and developmental issues. Z.G. and C.G., who were still together in foster care, were also developmentally on track.

“In early March 2005, during an extended visit by Z.G. and C.G., which was to have been for 10 days, father contacted the Department and asked that the two children be returned to their foster home early. Father was now struggling with the decision to place these two children for adoption with his sister in New Jersey. Mother was not in favor of this plan, but had not worked toward supporting the original plan of reunification, including drug testing and treatment.

“Because father had made steady progress towards completing his case plan services and had maintained the care of the five oldest children at a level that met or exceeded the minimum level of sufficient care, the social worker recommended termination of jurisdiction as to D.G., Ch.G., Da.G., A.G., and S.G. The social worker recommended a permanent plan of adoption for Z.G. and C.G., with placement with the paternal relatives in New Jersey, after assessment and approval.

“On April 5, 2005, the court terminated jurisdiction as to D.G., Ch.G., Da.G., A.G., and S.G., but set the matter for a contested permanency review hearing as to Z.G. and C.G.

“In an informational report prepared on May 24, 2005 for the contested hearing, the social worker reported that father was now having supervised visits with Z.G. and C.G. due to his having allowed unauthorized contact between the children and mother. Because of mother’s noncompliance with services, the Department had provided father with instructions that her visits were to be supervised by someone authorized by the Department.[6] When the social worker conducted an unannounced home visit to father’s home in April 2005, she saw mother through a window. Mother ran upstairs when she saw the social worker and father denied mother’s presence in the home; mother was located in an upstairs closet. Father said he did not understand why mother cannot be with the children and the Department was ruining his family.

“Father’s behavior on two other occasions also troubled the social worker. First, he had confronted Z.G. and C.G.’s foster mother after she reported she had seen mother at his house. The foster mother thereafter refused to go the home alone and the drop-off location was changed. Second, a social worker also ended a visit after father began yelling at her from across the room in the children’s presence.

“The social worker further observed that father had ended a 10-day home visit with Z.G. and C.G. on the second day, and had suspended overnight visits in late March, stating it was more than he could handle. He had also informed the social worker he had relatives who could care for the two children. He then came to court in early April and indicated he could in fact manage the care of the two youngest children, which, according to the social worker, ‘represented a discrepancy.’ In addition, while father had said he is the primary care provider for Z.G. and C.G., during two observations of father and the children, it appeared that E.B., an older half-sibling, was providing a majority of care for the two children. On one occasion, the social worker observed E.B. interacting with the children while father sat at a table.

“Mother was having supervised visits every other week due to lack of compliance with her case plan.

“The social worker recommended termination of reunification services as to both parents, and noted that the adoption assessment process had begun for the paternal relatives in New Jersey. The current foster parents had also expressed the desire to adopt Z.G. and C.G.

“At the May 25, 2005 contested permanency review hearing regarding Z.G. and C.G., the social worker testified that mother had not taken any significant steps toward addressing her mental health and substance abuse issues, which meant she continued to be a risk to the children. Father did not understand the risk mother posed to the children, which posed a risk to his ability to protect the children. The case had been before the court for approximately 19 months [by then], and the social worker was not prepared to return the two children to either parent. She believed the best plan for the children was to proceed to a section 366.26 hearing for the establishment of a permanent plan.

“Specifically, as to mother, she had refused to participate in individualized therapy or a substance abuse treatment plan, or to submit to hair strand drug testing. The only activities in her case plan she had completed were parenting classes and a drug-related support group.

“As to father, he had stopped overnight visits with Z.G. and C.G. in March, saying the visits were too much for him, and had requested day visits instead. Father also told the social worker he wanted relatives in New Jersey to adopt the two children. Also, father was letting mother visit the children in his home in defiance of the social worker’s specific directions, put into place after the April 2005 hearing. The social worker had also received information that mother was living in father’s home. In addition, she had received reports that father did not interact with the two youngest children, and had once observed E.G., one of the older half-siblings, caring for the children.

“The social worker was concerned that if Z.G. and C.G. were returned to father’s home, it would jeopardize the safety of the other children. Due to their ages, the two youngest children needed a high level of supervision. She was also concerned that father would rely on mother to provide care for the children.

“On cross-examination, the social worker acknowledged that, to her knowledge, mother was not using drugs or alcohol around the children. She also acknowledged that adoption is not an easy decision for a parent and that it would not be unusual for a parent to consider adoption and then to change his mind. She further acknowledged that father had maintained a safe home for the five older children for quite some time, there had been no reports of father allowing the children to be with mother without supervision, and mother’s interactions with the children had been appropriate. The social worker also acknowledged that, with large sibling groups, it is normal for older siblings to assist with younger siblings and that, in this family, the siblings did look out for each other, which did not necessarily mean father did not have a relationship with Z.G. and C.G. Finally, mother had a relationship with all of her children and there was no indication that she would physically abuse them if she did not receive counseling.

“After hearing argument on June 14, 2005, the juvenile court found that return of Z.G. and C.G. to their parents would be detrimental. In particular, he noted that the parents had violated a court order when father permitted mother to visit the children in father’s home and that mother was in complete denial of her severe drug problem. The court terminated reunification services as to both parents and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing for October 6, 2005.” (Mary G. and Gilbert G. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 2-12.)

Both parents subsequently filed petitions for extraordinary writ, arguing (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it refused to return Z.G. and C.G. to father’s care, and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided to assist the parents with reunifying with Z.G. and C.G. In a nonpublished opinion, filed on September 13, 2005, we denied the writ petition on the merits. (Mary G. and Gilbert G. v. Superior Court, A110760.)

On August 9, 2005, the Department filed an original petition alleging that, in July 2005, mother had given birth to a baby girl, An.G., at only 26 to 27 weeks gestation. The baby weighed just over two pounds at birth, had tested positive for methamphetamine, and had exhibited signs of withdrawal shortly after her admission to the hospital. Mother denied having recently used drugs and said she was not aware of her pregnancy. Mother did not want to participate in residential drug treatment because she assisted father in their son S.G.’s care, and was concerned that a residential program would interfere with that care.

Father, the alleged father of the baby, stated that he had not known that mother was pregnant and did not know she was using drugs. He believed substance abuse treatment would benefit mother, but felt it was unfair to require her to participate in drug treatment without a firm guarantee that baby An.G. would be returned to her. Father confirmed that mother came to his home on a daily basis to help him care for their children; she never used drugs in his home and did not appear to be under the influence when with the children.

On August 10, 2005, the juvenile court ordered baby An.G. detained. However, on August 20, the baby died due to complications from necrotizing enterocolitis.

In a report prepared on September 20, 2005 for the permanency planning hearing, the social worker reported that both Z.G. and C.G. were very active children who needed almost constant supervision due to their high activity levels and their regular sibling conflicts. C.G. also had regular tantrums when she did not get her way and when new people were introduced into her life.

Z.G. was on target developmentally, except in the areas of fine motor and receptive and expressive language development. He was referred for a hearing evaluation, which showed that his hearing appeared to be normal. C.G.’s speech also seemed to be delayed; a hearing evaluation showed that her hearing was within normal limits. Overall, both children were happy toddlers, though they engaged in normal sibling conflicts that often became physical and required redirection.

During supervised visits, father interacted minimally with the children and frequently appeared eager for visits to end. He appeared to be angry about his current situation, and frequently expressed distrust of the child protective services system and dissatisfaction with the care the children were receiving in foster care. During visits, mother at times interacted with her children adequately, while at other times she watched the children play together on the play structures. The children were well behaved during visits and the foster parent did not observe any significant changes in their moods or behaviors following the supervised visits.

An adoptability review had been held on March 22, 2005, and both children “were assessed as highly adoptable based on their young ages, no known, unmet medical or developmental issues, and the availability of relatives, a paternal aunt in New Jersey, who wanted to adopt them.” The social worker concluded that mother did not have a significant relationship with the two children such that termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to them. As to father, the social worker reported that he had decided that it would be in Z.G. and C.G.’s best interest to be placed for adoption with his sister in New Jersey, which would preserve biological ties and familial connections. The social worker also concluded that, as father had not actively parented the children since they came into placement almost two years previously, termination of his parental rights would not be detrimental to them either.

Regarding Z.G. and C.G.’s older siblings, the social worker reported that they did speak of their two youngest siblings. However, the social worker believed that, in spite of the significant distance between California and New Jersey, it would be in Z.G. and C.G.’s best interest to have permanence with their paternal aunt, with the opportunity for continued contact through letters and telephone calls. The social worker concluded that the relationship between Z.G. and C.G. and their older siblings was not mutually significant such that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the two youngest siblings. The social worker further found that Z.G. and C.G. had no significant relationship with their half-siblings such that termination of parental rights would be a detriment to Z.G. and C.G.

Finally, the social worker reported that the paternal aunt had an approved relative home assessment and was “ready, willing and able to have the children placed with her as she very much wants to adopt them.” The social worker recommended that parental rights be terminated and that the children be placed for adoption with the paternal aunt.

The contested permanency planning hearing took place on October 28, 2005. The social worker, Jenny Ponting, was the only witness. Ponting, who worked in the adoption unit of the Department, had been assigned to the case in approximately July 2005. In addition to Ponting, the supervisor of the adoption unit and the previously-assigned social worker were present at the adoptability assessment, at which the children were found adoptable.

At the time of the hearing, the parents had been having supervised visits with the children twice a month for about one hour per visit. Ponting had received no information that the children were requesting contact with their parents or older siblings. She had not received any information that led her to believe there was a parental relationship between the two children and their parents. Instead, the children looked to their foster family for comfort and for meeting their needs. Ponting did not have any concerns about the children transferring their attachment to the paternal aunt.

On cross-examination, Ponting acknowledged that young children would typically look to the people who took care of them regularly to have their needs met and that it would be unusual for two- or three-year-old children to look to their birth parents to meet their needs if they only saw them twice a month. Ponting did not believe there was a bond between the children and their parents; C.G. was removed from their custody at about one month old, and so appellants had never really parented her, and Z.G. had been in placement for almost half of his three years. She also acknowledged, however, that in light of their young ages and speech deficits, it would be difficult for C.G. and Z.G. to request to see their parents. The children had also had some visits with their older siblings, during which they played and ran around together as a group.

Ponting further testified that, even when children are bonded to their birth parents, adoption still might be appropriate, based on the totality of the circumstances. She acknowledged that, here, the children exhibited some signs of a bond or at least a positive relationship with their parents during visits. Ponting testified that, even assuming there was a bond between the parents and the two children, “nevertheless, in reviewing the whole history of this case and in looking at what’s in the best interest of these children, whatever the nature of that bond relationship is, it does not outweigh the benefit these children would receive by being in a permanent forever adoptive home.”

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found the children adoptable and further found that the parents had not satisfied their burden of showing that the parent-child relationship and sibling exceptions to adoption applied. The court therefore ordered that parental rights be terminated and that the children be placed for adoption.

Mother filed a notice of appeal on November 14, 2005. Father filed a notice of appeal on November 29, 2005.[7]

DISCUSSION

Applicability of the Parent-Child and Sibling

Relationship Exceptions to Adoption

Appellants contend the juvenile court’s finding that the parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence.

Although adoption is the preferred plan of care once reunification services have been terminated, the Legislature has provided various exceptions to the general rule of adoption. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 50.) As relevant here, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), provides in relevant part: “A finding under . . . Section 366.21 or 366.22, that the court has continued to remove the child from custody of the parent . . . and has terminated reunification services, shall constitute a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights unless the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances:

“(A) The parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”

. . .

“(E) There would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.”

The parent has the burden of proving applicability of the exceptions set forth in subdivision (c)(1) of section 366.26. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.) We review the juvenile court’s determination regarding whether an exception applies to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576; but see In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [finding abuse of discretion standard of review appropriate, but noting that practical differences between abuse of discretion and substantial evidence standards of review “are not significant”].)

I. Parent-Child Relationship Exception

In In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 567, the appellate court discussed the parent-child relationship exception to adoption: “In the context of the dependency scheme prescribed by the Legislature, we interpret the ‘benefit from continuing the [parent/child] relationship’ exception to mean the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.

“Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. The significant attachment from child to parent results from the adult’s attention to the child’s needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. [Citation.] The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.] The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; see also In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 50.)

In the present case, the only evidence presented at the section 366.26 hearing regarding the applicability of the parent-child relationship exception was the testimony of the social worker. Based on information received from the previous social worker, the visitation supervisor, and the foster parents, social worker Ponting did not believe there was a parental relationship between the two children and appellants. C.G. had been out of her parents’ custody since she was about one month old, and Z.G. had been in placement for almost half of his three years. While there was some evidence of a bond, or at least a positive relationship, between the children and their parents, Ponting testified that the children did not exhibit any distress following parental visits, and looked to their foster parents for comfort and to have their needs met. Thus, in her opinion, the relationship between the children and appellants did not outweigh the benefit the children would receive from being in a permanent adoptive home.

In light of the evidence presented at the hearing and other evidence in the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings. Although there was evidence that appellants were diligent in visiting Z.G. and C.G. and had a positive relationship with them, this evidence does not provide “a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the [children].” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) That is because the evidence does not demonstrate a parent-child relationship. As the appellate court in In re Jeremy S. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 514, explained: “Although [mother’s] contact with Jeremy was loving, it was not sufficient to establish the ‘benefit from a continuing relationship’ contemplated by the exception. One can know a child’s interests, enjoy playtime together, and be a loved relative, but not occupy a parental role in the child’s life. And while we recognize Jeremy would benefit from such a loving relationship, the court below was justified in finding it was outweighed by Jeremy’s need for a stable and permanent home that would come with adoption.” (Id. at p. 523; see also In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 811 [while mother maintained regular contact and had a positive relationship with child, fact that child was not upset when visits ended and looked to his grandparents to meet his needs, showed no parent-child relationship].)

We in no way mean to disparage the love appellants feel for Z.G. and C.G. or the efforts they have made on behalf of their children. But these two children were tiny when they were taken from their parents’ custody, and substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that there is not the type of strong parent-child bond that would outweigh the benefit they will receive from a permanent, adoptive home. (See In re Autumn. H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 [only if “severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed [is] the preference for adoption . . . overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated”].)

Father argues that the benefit of a permanent adoptive placement is reduced in this case by the fact that the prospective adoptive parent, the children’s paternal aunt, lives across the country in New Jersey, there is no evidence that the children are familiar with her, and there is no guarantee that visitation with the natural parents and siblings will occur. We disagree. That father’s sister will be adopting the children plainly increases the likelihood of the children’s continued contact with their birth family, when compared with most non-relative adoptions. Moreover, even without any guarantees of future contact, we have found there is substantial evidence that the benefits of adoption outweigh the benefits of continuing the parent-child relationships.

Father also argues that the benefit of continued contact between him and the children must be considered in light of the fact that the Department dramatically decreased visitation following termination of reunification services. (See In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1537-1538 [“The benefit of continued contact between mother and children must be considered in the context of the very limited visitation mother was permitted to have”].) In In re Brandon C., the appellate court found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings that the parent-child relationship exception did apply, where both the mother and grandmother (with whom the children lived) testified that there was a close bond between mother and the children and that a continuation of contact would be beneficial to the children, and the Department did not present any evidence to the contrary. (Id. at p. 1537.)

Here, on the other hand, we have concluded that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the children. Moreover, even when father had much more expansive visitation, the evidence does not reflect a parent-child relationship, for which the stability of adoption should be sacrificed.[8]

In sum, this is not the type of extraordinary case in which preservation of parental rights should prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placements. (See In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.)

II. Sibling Relationship Exception

Appellants also contend the juvenile court’s finding that the sibling relationship exception to adoption did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence.

In In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, the appellate court explained the two-step process for deciding whether the sibling exception applies: “Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E), the court is directed first to determine whether terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship by evaluating the nature and extent of the relationship, including whether the child and sibling were raised in the same house, shared significant common experiences or have existing close and strong bonds. (§366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E).) If the court determines terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is then directed to weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E).)

To show a substantial interference with a sibling relationship the parent must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the child. Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on termination, there is no substantial interference with that relationship.” (In re L.Y.L., at pp. 951-952, fn. omitted; accord, In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017-1018.) Then, if the court finds that “a sibling relationship exists that is so strong that its severance would cause the child detriment, the court then weighs the benefit to the child continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit to the child adoption would provide.” (In re L.Y.L., at pp. 952-953; accord, In re Jacob S., at pp. 1018-1019.)

In the present case, there is evidence of some sibling visitation, which Z.G. and C.G. seemed to enjoy, as well as evidence that at least some of the older children identified Z.G. and C.G. as their siblings. However, Z.G. and C.G. were very young when they were removed from their parents’ custody, and it is extremely unlikely they have any memory of the brief period they lived with their other siblings. Nor is there any evidence in the record that they shared common experiences with their siblings, or that they had developed close bonds with them.

Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that no significant sibling relationship existed such that its severance would cause Z.G. and C.G. detriment. (See In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 951-952 [affirming finding of no detriment even though a fairly strong sibling bond existed]; In re Jacob S. , supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1017-1018 [same].) In light of this conclusion, we need not address the second step in determining the applicability of the sibling exception: weighing the benefit to Z.G. and C.G. of continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit that adoption would provide. (See In re L.Y.L., at pp. 952-953.)

III. Parent-Child and Sibling Relationship Exceptions in Combination

Appellants contend the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to consider whether the parent-child relationship and sibling exceptions to adoption in combination were applicable in the present case.

Former subdivision (c)(1) of section 366.26 required that parental rights be terminated unless the court found that termination would be detrimental to the child “due to one of the following [listed] circumstances.” That subdivision was amended in 1998 to provide an exception to termination of parental rights if “that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more“ of the listed circumstances. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1), italics added; Stats. 1998, ch. 1056, § 17.1, pp. 6492-6496.) According to appellants, this change in language demonstrates that a juvenile court is now required to consider whether any of the applicable exceptions to adoption, in combination, would be detrimental to the child. Appellants assert the juvenile court in this case abused its discretion by failing to consider the parental relationship and sibling relationship exceptions together in deciding that the exceptions were not applicable.

We need not decide whether appellants are correct in their interpretation of the language of amended section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), because, even assuming the court was required to consider the exceptions in combination, and further assuming the court failed to do so, we find any such error harmless. (See In re Angel W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1085.) In light of the dearth of evidence of detriment to the children from termination of parental rights, as discussed earlier in this opinion, it simply is not reasonably probable the court would have found “a compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental” to Z.G. and C.G. due to the parent-child and sibling relationship exceptions, had it considered them in combination. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) & (E).)

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court terminating appellants’ parental rights to Z.G. and C.G. are affirmed.

_________________________

Kline, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Haerle, J.

_________________________

Lambden, J.

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[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

[2] The facts set forth in this opinion, through the filing of the petitions for extraordinary writ, are taken from the panel’s opinion denying the petitions. (Mary G. and Gilbert G. v. Superior Court (September 13, 2005, A110760) [nonpub. opn.].)

[3] The circumstances of these four half-siblings will be discussed only as relevant to the proceedings involving the seven children of mother and father.

[4] “S.G. had been described as ‘very disabled’ and in need of 24 hours a day care and supervision.” (Mary G. and Gilbert G. v. Superior Court, supra, A110760, at p. 3, fn. 4.)

[5] “In the meantime, at the recommendation of the Department, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction over the four half-siblings of the seven children, giving physical custody to their father, B.B.” (Mary G. and Gilbert G. v. Superior Court, supra, A110760, at p. 6, fn. 5.)

[6] “On November 17, 2004, the juvenile court had ordered that the social worker had ‘discretion to determine appropriate supervisors’ for mother’s visits.” (Mary G. and Gilbert G. v. Superior Court, supra, A110760, at p. 9, fn. 6.)

[7] On December 1, 2005, the juvenile court entered an order, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, authorizing Z.G. and C.G.’s out-of-state placement in the home of their paternal aunt and uncle.

[8] Appellants also cite In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 689-690, in which a psychologist who conducted a bonding study, two of the children’s therapists, and the court appointed special advocate (CASA) worker assigned to the case all believed that the mother and children had a strong primary bond that it would be detrimental to sever. In light of the “common theme running through the evidence” that the mother and children had “a beneficial parental relationship that clearly outweighs the benefit of adoption,” the appellate court found that the juvenile court erred in declining to apply the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception. (In re Amber M., at pp. 690-691.) Plainly, the evidence in this case is not comparable to the overwhelming evidence of detriment found in In re Amber M.