Filed 6/2/17 In re A.O. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re A.O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.O.,

Defendant and Appellant.


E066832

(Super.Ct.No. RIJ1500497)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Roger A. Luebs, Judge. Affirmed.
Joshua L. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Lynne G. McGinnis and Allison V. Hawley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 1, 2015, the San Bernardino County District Attorney filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 602 alleging that defendant and appellant A.O. (minor; male, born July 1998) possessed methamphetamine under Health and Safety Code section 11377, case No. J259544 (first petition). On April 16, 2015, minor admitted the allegation and the juvenile court found that there was a factual basis for the admission, adjudged minor a ward of the court, and placed him on supervised probation.
On April 22, 2015, the prosecutor filed a subsequent petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (subsequent petition), using the same case number as the first petition, alleging that minor made criminal threats under Penal Code section 422, case No. J259544.
On May 14, 2015, the court dismissed the subsequent petition and transferred the case to Riverside County. On January 11, 2016, the Riverside County juvenile court found that minor violated the terms of his probation under section 777. On June 29, 2016, the Riverside County Probation Department alleged that minor again violated the terms of his probation.
On September 9, 2016, the juvenile court found that minor successfully completed probation and terminated minor’s wardship. The court dismissed the first petition and ordered the records from that petition to be sealed. It also dismissed the June 29 probation violation allegation. The court denied minor’s request to seal the subsequent petition filed on April 22, 2015, and dismissed on May 14, 2015, in San Bernardino.
On September 12, 2016, minor filed his notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. THE SUBSEQUENT PETITION DOES NOT QUALIFY UNDER SECTION 786
Minor claims that the court erred in failing to recognize its discretion under section 786 to order the sealing of records pertaining to minor’s subsequent petition.
Under section 786, subdivision (a), when a ward of the juvenile court completes an informal program of supervision or probation for an offense, the juvenile court must dismiss the petition for that offense and order all records pertaining to that petition sealed. Section 786, subdivision (c)(1) defines “satisfactory completion” of an informal program or supervision or probation as “no new findings of wardship or conviction for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” and substantial compliance with the orders of supervision or probation. Effective January 1, 2016, subdivision (e)(1) of section 786 was amended to read that, in its order dismissing “the instant petition” and ordering the record sealed, the juvenile court “may . . . include an order to seal a record relating to, or to dismiss, any prior petition or petitions that have been filed or sustained . . .” if the petition “appear[s] to the satisfaction of the court to meet the sealing and dismissal criteria otherwise described in this section.”
“In construing a statute, our role is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.] In determining intent, we must look first to the words of the statute because they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute governs.” (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1056.) In other words, if there is “no ambiguity or uncertainty in the language, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said,” and it is not necessary to “resort to legislative history to determine the statute’s true meaning.” (People v. Cochran (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396, 400-401.) The unambiguous language of section 786 requires the court to seal records pertaining to a “dismissed petition” based upon first finding that a minor has satisfactorily completed probation for an offense alleged in the petition. Otherwise, a minor retains his or her ability to request sealing of juvenile records at a later date. (See, § 781; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.830.)
“‘The interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review independently.’ [Citation.] To ascertain legislative intent, we first examine the words of the statute and, if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, its plain meaning governs. [Citation.] A court may not interpret a statute to reflect an intention that does not appear from its plain language.” (In re A.B. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 912, 919.)
In this case, when denying minor’s request to seal minor’s records relating to the subsequent petition, the juvenile court stated, “I don’t believe that falls within [section] 786 so I’m not going to address the earlier dismissed petition.” Minor argues that the court erred in this finding because the court did have discretion to seal the subsequent petition under section 786.
Initially, although not considered by the juvenile court, it is clear that section 786, effective January 1, 2016, was not applicable to minor’s subsequent petition, which was dismissed on May 14, 2015, seven months prior to the effective date of the amendment to seciton786, subdivision (e).
We are guided by the well-established rule that “[a] new or amended statute applies prospectively only, unless the Legislature clearly expresses an intent that it operate retroactively.” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 664; see Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1207 [“‘[it] is an established canon of interpretation that statutes are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made to appear that such was the legislative intent’”].)
In this case, minor’s subsequent petition was dismissed on May 14, 2015, which was prior to the effective date of subdivision (e) of section 786. The juvenile court could not apply these provisions to a petition that was already dismissed. Nothing in the language of section 786 provides as such. The plain and unambiguous language of section 786 describes dismissal and sealing together, prospectively. It uses language such as “[t]he court may, in making its order to seal the record and dismiss the instant petition pursuant to this section.” (Italics added.) Based on the plain language of section 786, it does not operate retroactively to those petitions dismissed prior to its effective date. (See In re Y.A. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 523, 527.) [“the plain language of former section 786 did not support the proposition that it was intended to be a panacea for all sealing issues”].) Minor was not entitled to have his school records sealed on a petition dismissed prior to the effective date of the statute.
Moreover, the juvenile court properly determined that it lacked authority to seal minor’s school records in the subsequent petition because minor did not satisfactorily complete probation as to that petition. When the sealing order was issued, the unambiguous language of section 786 required the court to seal records, pertaining to a petition, based upon first finding that the minor satisfactorily completed probation for an offense alleged in the petition to be dismissed. (In re Y.A., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 526-527.) As stated in Y.A., “Minor has not cited, and we are unaware of, any controlling or persuasive authority supporting the conclusion that . . . section 786 required or permitted the juvenile court to seal records relating to a prior petition for which no finding was made regarding satisfactory probation completion.” (Id. at p. 527.)
B. THERE IS NO EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION
Minor contends that a denial of his request to seal the subsequent petition deprives him of his rights to equal protection. We disagree.
“The concept of equal treatment under the laws means that persons similarly situated regarding the legitimate purpose of the law should receive like treatment. [Citation.] ‘“The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’ [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.”’” (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 408.)
For the purpose that minor challenges the law in this case, minor is not treated in an unequal manner as he is entitled to seek relief under section 781. Section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(A), effective January 1 2016, provides, “In any case in which a petition has been filed with a juvenile court to commence proceedings to adjudge a person a ward of the court, in any case in which a person is cited to appear before a probation officer or is taken before a probation officer pursuant to Section 626, or in any case in which a minor is taken before any officer of a law enforcement agency, the person or the county probation officer may, five years or more after the jurisdiction of the juvenile court has terminated as to the person, or, in a case in which no petition is filed, five years or more after the person was cited to appear before a probation officer or was taken before a probation officer pursuant to Section 626 or was taken before any officer of a law enforcement agency, or, in any case, at any time after the person has reached 18 years of age, petition the court for sealing of the records, including records of arrest, relating to the person’s case, in the custody of the juvenile court and probation officer and any other agencies, including law enforcement agencies, entities, and public officials as the petitioner alleges, in his or her petition, to have custody of the records. . . . Once the court has ordered the person’s records sealed, the proceedings in the case shall be deemed never to have occurred, and the person may properly reply accordingly to any inquiry about the events, the records of which are ordered sealed.” (Italics added.)
Section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(B) provides, “The court shall send a copy of the order to each agency, entity, and official named in the order, directing the agency or entity to seal its records. Each agency, entity, and official shall seal the records in its custody as directed by the order, shall advise the court of its compliance, and thereupon shall seal the copy of the court’s order for sealing of records that the agency, entity, or official received.”
Based on the language of section 781, minor could file a request to have his school records sealed under that section.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


MILLER
Acting P. J.


We concur:


CODRINGTON
J.


SLOUGH
J.