In re Jacob S.

Filed 9/29/06 In re Jacob S. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Robert W. Nagby, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.

Defendant and Appellant Johnny S. (Father) appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to his two-year-old son, Jacob. Father contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that Jacob was likely to be adopted. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND^[1]

The minor, Jacob S., came to the attention of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) in April of 2004 when he was one month old. The minor had been left by his parents with a friend. He was very small and did not appear well; it was reported that he had recently been taken to the hospital for dehydration. At that time, his mother (Mother) was informed by the medical staff that Jacob was allergic to Similac, but she continued to feed him that formula.

The parents were at the time homeless and moving from one motel to another. They acknowledged to police that they were half siblings. Mother reported a history of neglect, sexual abuse, and mental instability, including suicidal thoughts. Both parents appeared to be “struggling significantly in their ability to understand things.” Both also indicated that they had concerns about their ability to care for a young child and expressed willingness to accept reunification services. The minor was placed in foster care.

By the time the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was finally held on September 9, 2004, psychological reports had been completed for both parents. Mother’s overall intellectual functioning was estimated as being below that of 98 percent of her peers. Father ranked below approximately 86 percent of his peers. Father was considered relatively free of emotional or mental abnormalities, while Mother was diagnosed with major depression. Mother was considered to be unlikely to be able to benefit from services and to care properly for a small child, while Father’s prognosis in this respect was marginally better. Mother was also described as employing strategies of avoidance and denial, while Father was described as passive with tendencies toward fantasy.

The court found that the minor came within the jurisdiction of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).^[2] Reunification services were ordered. The minor remained in foster care.

The six-month review report was prepared three months later. It had apparently been learned that Mother had three other children, all placed with others. She also informed the social worker that she was pregnant again with twins. Mother had completed a parenting program and had been in counseling; Father had also completed a parenting program. Both visited regularly and behaved appropriately with Jacob. The court ordered an additional six months of reunification services, with a specific direction that DPSS provide “hands-on” parenting classes.

By the time the 12-month review report was prepared in June 2005, the parents were residing in a mobile home but were preparing to move. Both parents had completed the most recent parenting program. They continued to visit regularly, although it was of considerable concern that on one occasion they fed the infant a cookie, causing him to choke, and then did not seem to know what to do. (The foster mother dislodged the cookie.) It was also noted that the parents had to be prompted to feed the infant during visits. Mother’s reported pregnancy had long since passed the typical nine-month mark, and her doctor informed the social worker that she was not pregnant. Mother, on the other hand, repeatedly insisted that she had a “certificate of pregnancy“ from her doctor and once left a visit early due to “pains from the twins.” This was after the social worker told her that her doctor had denied that she was pregnant.

The 12-month hearing was commenced on August 23 and eventually continued until September 28, 2005. A first addendum to the social worker’s report indicated that the parents had gone to Florida in early June. Mother indicated that a scheduled hearing on June 27 would be inconvenient due to her pending delivery. On August 17, she told the social worker that she believed the babies would be born soon because she was “having trouble breathing.” A second addendum reported Mother’s alleged delivery of a baby girl in late August; Father confirmed the birth, although he could not remember the exact date. However, when Mother failed to send documentation of the birth (and when her later recital of dates proved erratic), the social worker made inquiries of Florida social workers, who told her there was no infant in the home but that Mother had stated she was due in November.

At the hearing, the notes of the foster family agency social worker with respect to visitation were admitted into evidence. These notes reflected that the parents generally behaved appropriately and affectionately with Jacob and often brought him gifts, although they were also observed to have difficulty with tasks such as dressing and diapering. These notes also reflected Mother’s claim that she was having a difficult pregnancy and that bed rest had been advised.

The parents were not present at any of the hearing dates, although Mother was in telephone contact on the date most of the actual testimony was taken. At that time, the person who had given the parents in-home training testified that the parents had complied with her suggestions and requests with respect to child safety issues and had also straightened up their home. She also testified that Mother had been able to assimilate instructions on feeding technique and was becoming more comfortable at diapering the infant by the end of the program. In her opinion the parents could care adequately for Jacob. She acknowledged, however, that the minor was essentially brought from his foster placement to the parents’ home for the sessions, so she was unable to verify that the parents were able to consistently exercise proper supervision and care over an extended period. She also conceded that she was unaware of the incident where the minor choked on a cookie offered by Mother and of the report that the minor had fallen on his head while trying to walk without assistance; she indicated that these facts would cause her concern.

Mother’s testimony was then entered by stipulation. It was limited to the representation that she could not travel due to “health problems“ but that she intended to return to Riverside County in approximately two weeks. Father did not testify and was not in telephone contact.

After hearing argument, the trial court noted that in fact the “18 month” date was barely a month away. It found a substantial risk of detriment if the minor were to be returned to parental care and custody, and found that although the parents had worked hard and made some progress, there was no substantial probability of return within the remaining statutory reunification period. Accordingly, it terminated reunification services and directed that a selection and implementation hearing be held. (§ 366.26.)

The parents both filed writ petitions challenging the termination of services and setting the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. On February 23, 2006, this court issued an unpublished opinion denying the writ petitions (case No. E038985).

In a section 366.26 report, the social worker opined the foster parents were financially stable and capable of meeting Jacob’s medical, educational, physical, and emotional needs and requested terminating parental rights. The parents had returned from Florida in the fall of 2005 and had begun visits with Jacob that November. The visits went well, and Jacob was comfortable in the care of his parents. Though the parents had continued to make efforts at reunifying with their son following their return from Florida, the social worker did not believe it would be beneficial to Jacob’s well-being for the court to maintain parental rights. Prior to resurfacing in November 2005, neither parent had called or visited Jacob since their departure in June 2005. The parents’ statements suggested that they would not have returned to California without prompting from their respective attorneys. Their return to California did not seem motivated out of genuine concern for Jacob.

On the other hand, Jacob, who was then about two years old, was thriving in his prospective adoptive parents’ home. He continued to be assessed in the Early Start Program at Inland Regional Center (IRC). He was receiving help with his gross motor skills and was able to stand and walk without assistance, a “vast improvement” from his previous state of immobility. IRC was concerned with Jacob’s tendency to “hang his head on the left side of his body.” Jacob was described as “an extremely happy and social child” who smiled and laughed easily. He was securely attached to his foster parents. His foster parents wished to adopt him and were able and willing to provide him with the intense specialized care he needed. Jacob had been residing in the foster parents’ home for almost his entire life. The foster parents had continued with Jacob’s medical care since the onset of the placement, had helped supervise visits, and had attempted to facilitate reunification. The foster mother is a stay-at-home mother who had provided Jacob with the attention and structure he needed. Jacob also appeared to enjoy the interaction from the other children in the home, and the other children adored Jacob and understood that they had to be gentle with him. The foster parents were live scanned for their state foster care license, and the results of that scan, received on November 10, 2005, indicated no negative criminal contact. In addition, the foster parents had no negative prior child welfare history.

Attached to the section 366.26 report was a preliminary assessment of the foster parents. The foster parents had received the application to adopt in October 2005 and had filled it out and returned it to DPSS in December 2005. The report noted that Jacob had resided with the foster parents since March 2004, and it had been his only placement. At the time of the report, Jacob was 22 months old. He had been very ill when he was first placed with the foster parents and had had no interest in eating. He was slowly becoming healthier. Jacob was developmentally delayed; at 22 months of age, he functioned at the level of a 9 to 13 month old. His vocabulary consisted of only three words, and he had only recently begun to walk.

The prospective adoptive parents lived in a four bedroom, three bath home in Temecula near schools, parks, and other recreational facilities. The home was well maintained and equipped to meet Jacob’s needs. They appeared to be emotionally and financially stable and demonstrated a strong, loving bond toward Jacob, themselves, their children, and family members. Their home was a licensed Riverside County foster home, and they had attended many classes over the 15 years they had been foster parents. They had enjoyed having over 60 children in their home over the years. They were in the process of scheduling a live scan through Riverside County Adoptions; however, no criminal history was indicated when they completed a live scan for their state foster care license. The results of prior child welfare history showed no history for the prospective adoptive mother; there was no information provided as to the prospective adoptive father.

Attached to the report was a delivered service log. In relevant part, the October 14, 2005, service log indicated Jacob might be moved due to licensing violations in his prospective adoptive parents’ home. Their home had been foreclosed upon, and they had to move to a four-bedroom home. They were awaiting emergency approval through licensing from their foster care agency; however, because they were unable to get the emergency approval, they had to decertify with the foster care agency. A supervisor for DPSS stated that they could be certified as “NREFM” through Riverside County, and Jacob would not have to be moved. By October 20, 2005, the prospective adoptive parents had moved into their new home and had begun the process of being approved.

The section 366.26 hearing was continued, and an addendum report was filed. The report indicated that the parents were provided with weekly visits with Jacob. During a February 2006 visit, the parents had again provided Jacob with a cookie, and he began to choke. The parents were unable to dislodge the cookie and had again compromised Jacob’s health and safety. The parents had thereafter cancelled five visits with Jacob and had not maintained regular contact with him. Meanwhile, Jacob was doing exceptionally well in the home of his prospective adoptive parents, who were continuing to provide him with the specialized care he required.

The contested section 366.26 hearing was held on March 28, 2006. The parents were present but offered no affirmative evidence. The prospective adoptive mother was also present. The social worker’s reports and recommendations were submitted into evidence. Father’s stipulated testimony was offered into evidence. If called to testify, Father would have stated that he had visited Jacob approximately once a week and had cancelled one visit due to illness and one because he did not think he could visit without Mother. Father’s counsel argued against terminating parental rights based on the beneficial relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) and insufficient evidence to support adoptability. Specifically, Father’s counsel stated that the adoptive assessment was deficient, as the live scan results had not been obtained, and thus there was no criminal history clearance. In addition, counsel argued that the evidence did not support an adoptability finding due to Jacob’s developmental problems and mental issues, which might be hereditary. Mother’s counsel submitted on the social worker’s recommendation, noting Mother believed Jacob was in a good home and was being well cared for and requested a postadoption contact agreement with the prospective adoptive parents. County counsel noted the prospective adoptive parents were willing to participate in mediation for a postadoption contact agreement and made an oral representation to the court that the “background checks have come back with no negative results.”

Responding to Father’s counsel’s concern regarding adoptability, the court stated the adoption assessment report noted that the prospective adoptive parents had adopted other children and had provided care for a child who is autistic. The court found that even if Jacob did have mental health issues, the prospective adoptive parents were prepared to adopt him. Additionally, the court noted that the adoption assessment report indicated that the prospective adoptive parents had “recently Livescanned for social services with no hits found.” The court also pointed out that the prospective adoptive parents were foster parents for other children out of San Bernardino County, and that “reading between the lines, in order to qualify for that, to take legal guardianship, they would need to also be able to pass state requirements.” The court found, “It does appear that there’s sufficient evidence outlined in the report to indicate that there’s no indicia of criminality on the part of the prospective adoptive parents.”

Jacob’s counsel pointed out that the prospective adoptive mother was present and was available for cross-examination and that she had indicated that she does have children in legal guardianship and that she was willing to adopt Jacob “no matter what kind of mental health issues are in the background of the child or the parents.” The court then accepted her stipulated testimony that the prospective adoptive parents were willing to adopt Jacob regardless of any mental health issues.

The court, finding Jacob adoptable and that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply, terminated parental rights. It acknowledged that Jacob might have mental health issues, but that, in and of itself, did not make the child unadoptable, pointing out that the prospective adoptive parents were still willing and able to adopt Jacob regardless of any mental health issues.

II

DISCISSION

Father contends the order terminating his parental rights must be reversed because the juvenile court’s finding that it was likely Jacob would be adopted was not supported by substantial evidence. In support of that claim, Father claims that the juvenile court based its decision exclusively on the prospective adoptive parents’ stated desire to adopt Jacob. He also argues the prospective adoptive parents had not been approved as an adoptive home at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, nor had the results of their live scans been received, and therefore “the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Jacob would be adopted within a reasonable time, given his special needs.”

“We review the factual basis of a termination order to determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a factual basis for termination by clear and convincing evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154.) In other words, when the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the juvenile court is clear and convincing evidence, we must determine if there is any substantial evidence -- that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) In making this determination, we resolve all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact, and we do not reweigh the evidence when assessing its sufficiency. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; Jason L., at p. 1214; In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.)

The goal of dependency proceedings is protection of the child. (In re Kerry O. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 326, 333.) An important aspect of this goal is to provide the child with a stable, permanent home. (In re Gerald J. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1188.) A preference for permanent placement, as afforded by adoption, is a vital component of the statutory scheme. (In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 923-924.)

“At the [section 366.26] hearing the court must order one of three permanent plans for the dependent child -- adoption, legal guardianship, or foster care. Adoption is the preferred permanent plan. [Citation.] Freeing a child for adoption requires termination of parental rights. ‘[I] n order to terminate parental rights, the court need only make two findings: (1) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the minor will be adopted; and (2) that there has been a previous determination that reunification services shall be terminated.’ [Citation.]” (In re Jasmine T. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 209, 212, quoting Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249-250.)

“‘The issue of adoptability posed in a section 366.26 hearing focuses on the minor, e.g., whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor. [Citations.] . . .’ [Citation.] ‘Usually, the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.’ [Citation.]” (In re Lukas B., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154, quoting In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649-1650.)

The record in this case reflects that Jacob was happy, in good health, and attached to his prospective adoptive parents. Though Jacob had some developmental issues and may have some mental health issues in the future, in most respects, he was adapting well in the care of his foster parents, who had expressed an interest in adopting him and who had experience in caring for a behaviorally and/or mentally challenged child. The prospective adoptive parents had been foster parents for 15 years and had cared for over 60 children. Besides their four biological children, one of whom is a high functioning autistic child, they are legal guardians of two children, one of whom had some behavioral problems, from San Bernardino County. Based upon this evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could find, as it did, that although the record suggested Jacob may continue to present some challenges to his caregivers, he was likely to be adopted. (Cf. In re Roderick U. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1543, 1550.)

Father attacks the prospective adoptive home because the live scan results of the prospective adoptive parents had not yet been received. He thus suggests that the foster parents may have an unknown criminal background. We reject this contention. According to the adoption assessment report, the live scan results done through Riverside County Adoptions were not available at the time the report was prepared. However, the prospective adoptive parents had been live scanned for their state foster care license, and those results were received on November 10, 2005, indicating that they had no criminal history. These results were received two months prior to the preparation of the adoption assessment report. Additionally, the deputy county counsel at the section 366.26 hearing stated that the background checks were completed, and there were no negative results. Father did not object to this statement. Moreover, the prospective adoptive parents had been foster parents for 15 years. As the juvenile court pointed out, the prospective adoptive parents are foster parents to two children out of San Bernardino County, and “in order to qualify for that, to take legal guardianship, they would need to also be able to pass state requirements. It does appear that there’s sufficient evidence outlined in the report to indicate that there’s no indicia of criminality on the part of the prospective adoptive parents.”

Father also complains that the prospective adoptive parents had to decertify themselves with their foster family agency, and therefore he presumes their new home did not meet licensing standards. However, Father’s argument is based on pure speculation. Although there had been a foreclosure on the the prospective adoptive parents’ home, they were moving to a four-bedroom home, and there was an attempt to get emergency approval for three children to a room. Because of time constraints, a decision was made to have the prospective adoptive parents decertify with the foster family agency and get licensed through Riverside County. Subsequently, according to the adoption assessment report, the prospective adoptive home was reported to be a licensed Riverside County foster home.

Father’s reliance on In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200 for the proposition there was insufficient evidence of adoption is misplaced. In Jerome D., the adoption assessment report stated that the minor was adoptable and that the mother’s former boyfriend, with whom the child had been placed, was interested in adopting him, although no home study had yet been conducted to determine the former boyfriend’s suitability. The assessment report referred briefly to the child’s “‘good mental health, physical health, and sociability,’” but the report did not mention that the child had a prosthetic eye that required care and treatment, that the child had a close relationship with his mother, or whether any approved family was available. (Id. at p. 1205.) The court concluded that the mere expressed desire to adopt a child by a person not yet approved as an adoptive parent was insufficient to support the adoptability finding because the adoption assessment did not address the child’s prosthetic eye, which required care and treatment, or the stepfather’s criminal and Child Protective Services (CPS) history. (Ibid.) The boyfriend had been convicted of domestic violence and listed as a CPS perpetrator for abusing his nephew and niece. (Id. at p. 1203.)

The circumstances in the instant case are significantly distinguishable from those in Jerome D. The adoption assessment in the instant case fully assessed the adoptive parents and Jacob. It essentially established the adoptive parents had no criminal history. It found that they were willing and able to take care of all of Jacob’s needs. It also clearly noted Jacob’s developmental limitations and his progress in overcoming those delays.

Here, there was ample evidence that Jacob was adoptable. The evidence showed that both Jacob and the adoptive parents very much desired that he be adopted by them; that they had developed a strong bond over the period they had lived together; that Jacob was thriving in their home; that they were aware of Jacob’s needs yet continued to care for him and had expressed a clear desire to adopt him; and that Jacob presents as a physically active, happy, and vibrant child.

Father’s suggestion that Jacob is in danger of becoming a legal orphan is clearly wrong. There is no evidence in the record to support this assertion. Jacob had been placed in the adoptive parents’ home when he was one month old; he is currently two years old and has lived with the adoptive family for almost his entire life. He has been well cared for and loved by the adoptive parents. It is true that sometimes “special needs” children are more difficult to place than those without such needs. For example, in In re Michael G. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 56, the minor was developmentally disabled and suffered from serious emotional problems. According to the record in that case, the seven-year-old minor functioned below his age level, was not completely toilet trained, and possessed limited language abilities. On that record, the court noted all parties had conceded adoptive placement would be difficult. (Id. at pp. 58-59.) The situation here is quite different. Although Jacob continues to have some special needs, the evidence before the juvenile court noted Jacob’s “overall general health is reportedly strengthening and he is slowly becoming healthier.” The adoptive parents reported that Jacob “is a sweet little boy who enjoys laughing and giggling” and is “very easygoing . . . .” Moreover, as the evidence showed, the health of Jacob was good and Jacob was developing close attachments to his adoptive family. This evidence tends to refute the claim of Father that the evidence adduced by DPSS suggests Jacob was not generally adoptable. There was no evidence that Jacob’s developmental delays would necessitate a specialized placement or that his problems were so severe as to pose an obstacle to adoption. On the contrary, the adoptive parents were willing and had continued to provide Jacob with the specialized care he needed. In addition, according to the prospective adoptive mother’s stipulated testimony, even if Jacob displayed mental health issues in the future, the adoptive parents would be willing to adopt Jacob anyway and provide care for him. Nor, contrary to the suggestions of Father, was there anything else about “[his] age, physical condition, and emotional state [that would] make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt [him].” (In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1649.)

In re Jayson T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 75 (disapproved on other grounds in In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413-414), cited by Father, recognized “it is only common sense that when there is a prospective adoptive home in which the child is already living, and the only indications are that, if matters continue, the child will be adopted into that home, adoptability is established.” (Jayson T., at p. 85.) While the reviewing court in Jayson T. referred to “th[e] trap that a trial court may easily fall into” when it terminates parental rights based on the existence of a committed prospective adoptive placement that later falls through (id. at p. 88), this statement was made in the context of deciding whether an appellate court should accept posthearing evidence on this issue. (Id. at pp. 87-88.) Hence, Father’s reliance on Jayson T. is unavailing.

Father also rely on In re Amelia S. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1060, in which the adoption assessment report indicated that some of the foster parents for a set of 10 siblings who suffered from “various developmental, emotional and physical problems, some of a serious nature,” were “considering adoption.” (Id. at pp. 1062-1063.) The court stated that “[t]his is a far cry, however, from the clear and convincing evidence required to establish the likelihood of adoption.” (Id. at p. 1065.) As discussed above, the record in the present case reveals that the prospective adoptive parents were both suitable and committed to adopting Jacob. The existence of prospective adoptive parents, although not determinative, is nonetheless a factor in determining whether a child is adoptable. (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 400 [“[a] prospective adoptive parent’s . . . interest in adopting is evidence that the child’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to discourage others from adopting the child”].) Amelia S. is distinguishable from the instant case because it did not involve a committed adoptive parent.

Father also relies on In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051 to support his position that “when a specific, as opposed to a general, adoptability finding is made, the juvenile court must look carefully at the prospective adoptive family to determine whether any impediments to adoption exist,” rather than just solely on the caretakers’ stated desire to adopt the child. Father’s interpretation of Carl R. is misplaced. That case is of limited relevance to the present case. First, we cannot say on this record that Jacob’s adoptability was based solely on the fact his prospective adoptive family was willing to adopt. Second, the issue in Carl R. was “very narrow -- what is the proper scope of the inquiry by the juvenile court in determining the adoptability of a child who will require intensive care for life?” (Id. at p. 1062.)^[3] By no stretch of the imagination could one compare the situation in Carl R. with Jacob’s circumstances. Third, we question the imperative of Carl R. given its reliance on Sarah M., wherein the appellate court stated an inquiry at the trial court level into legal impediments may be made (In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1650). Indeed, the appellate court in In re Scott M. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 839, 844 reasoned that, if a parent sought to introduce evidence of some legal impediment to adoption, such evidence would be relevant when a social worker’s opinion regarding adoptability was based at least in part on the existence of a prospective adoptive parent willing to adopt. Father ignores the evidence in this case that established there was no legal impediment to adoption by Jacob’s prospective adoptive parents. The legal impediments to adoption are codified in Family Code sections 8601 through 8603. Prospective adoptive parents such as Jacob’s who are unrelated to him must be at least 10 years older than the child. (Fam. Code, § 8601.) Here, the record establishes that status. Further, because Jacob was only about two years old, his consent was unnecessary. (Fam. Code, § 8602 [consent of a child over the age of 12 is necessary for that child’s adoption].) Also, the prospective adoptive parents, according to the record, have an intact marriage. (Fam. Code, § 8603 [a married person, not lawfully separated, may not adopt a child without the consent of the spouse, provided the spouse is capable of giving consent].)

In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that Jacob was likely to be adopted. He was still very young, healthy, and improving developmentally. As we have seen, the record contains no evidence, contrary to the claims of Father, suggesting that anything about the personal characteristics of Jacob or the prospective adoptive parents would make it difficult to find Jacob to be adoptable. Accordingly, we conclude there is clear and convincing evidence in the record that it is likely Jacob will be adopted.

III

DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RICHLI

J.

We concur:

HOLLENHORST

Acting P.J.

KING

J.

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^[1] The factual and procedural background up until the termination of reunification services is taken from this court’s prior opinion in case No. E038985 unless otherwise indicated.

^[2] All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

^[3] The child in Carl R. suffered severe disabilities such that he would always require total care. Indeed, he had lived for most of his life in a convalescent hospital and, although almost eight years old, had the emotional maturity of an eight-month-old child. (In re Carl R., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058.)