In re Z.F.

Filed 9/29/06 In re Z.F. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Robert W. Nagby, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Carole A. Nunes Fong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jennifer Mack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.

S.C. (the mother) appeals from orders summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition (section 388 petition) and terminating parental rights to her daughter, Z.F. She contends:

1. The juvenile court erred by denying the section 388 petition.

2. There was insufficient evidence that Z.F. was adoptable.

3. The juvenile court erred by finding that the “beneficial parental relationship” exception (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) did not apply.

We find no error. Hence, we will affirm.

I

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In November 2000, based on a report of physical abuse, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) began providing the mother with voluntary family maintenance services. By April 2001, however, the mother had stopped cooperating with services.

In June 2001, the Department learned that the mother had left Z.F. -- then aged three -- and three older siblings with a friend indefinitely; also, the friend’s son-in-law had physically abused one of the children. Accordingly, the Department detained all four children and filed a dependency petition concerning them, alleging failure to protect or provide. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b).) A few days later, the children were placed back with the mother. In August 2001, the juvenile court sustained the petition, formally placed the children with the mother, and ordered reunification services.

In February 2002, the Department redetained the children and filed a subsequent petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 342 (section 342 petition), alleging failure to protect or provide (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)), sexual abuse (solely as to Z.F.) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (d)), and abuse of a sibling (solely as to the other three children) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (j)).

In May 2002, the Department filed a supplemental petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 (section 387 petition), alleging that the mother had left the children with the same friend and that the friend’s son had physically abused them. It voluntarily dismissed its section 342 petition. Later in May 2002, the juvenile court sustained the section 387 petition.

In August 2003, at an 18-month review hearing on the section 387 petition, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and adopted a permanent plan of long-term foster care.

In April 2005, the juvenile court temporarily suspended the mother’s visitation.

In August 2005, the Department identified a prospective adoptive parent for Z.F. Accordingly, the juvenile court set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (section 366.26 hearing) for Z.F. It also permanently terminated the mother’s visitation with Z.F. On October 25, 2005, Z.F. was placed with the prospective adoptive mother.

On February 6, 2006, the mother filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (section 388 petition) with respect to Z.F., requesting that reunification services be reinstated and the section 366.26 hearing vacated. The juvenile court denied the petition without a hearing. Also on February 6, 2006, at the section 366.26 hearing, it found that Z.F. was adoptable and that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to her. It therefore terminated all parental rights to Z.F.

II

SECTION 388 PETITION

The mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her section 388 petition without a hearing.

A. Additional Factual and Procedural Background.

The mother’s section 388 petition alleged: “Mother has turned her life around in that . . . she is employed and subsequently established a business, ‘Maid 4 You.’” Her “business goal” was “an income of $1200.00 per week within the next 6-12 months.” She had also “obtained a suitable residence.

She has had her driver[‘]s license reinstated . . . , purchased an automobile, and acquired car insurance.” She had been “clean and sober” since July 2005. She had reenrolled in an anger management program. Although her visitation with Z.F. had been terminated, she had been visiting her other children regularly and successfully.

The exhibits to the petition included a letter dated November 21, 2005, which stated that the mother had been employed as a medical biller since October 20, 2005. There was also a letter dated November 18, 2005, which stated that she had been living in a “clean and sober environment” since September 1, 2005, and she was in an outpatient drug program. She submitted copies of three negative drug test results, in October, November, and December 2005.

In opposition to the section 388 petition, the Department submitted a social worker’s report. It noted that a major problem during the dependency had been that the mother had “continued to place the children . . . at risk by leaving them in the care of a daycare provider who had previously physically abused the children” and “to lead a lifestyle where her children are neglected . . . .” When the mother had had weekend visitation, “[t]he children reported that the mother was sleeping most of the time . . . .”

The mother also had a long history of drug abuse. Since 2001, she had received multiple referrals to drug programs, but “she ha[d] not been successful at any one of these programs for more than six months.” She had likewise received multiple referrals to anger management and domestic violence classes, but she had either failed to enroll in them or failed to complete them.

The mother told the social worker that she had quit her medical billing job. Similarly, she had stayed in her sober living home only about 11 weeks; after obtaining the letter that was attached to her petition, she had moved out. The “suitable residence“ she now claimed to be in was her father’s house.

On October 25, 2005, Z.F. had been placed with the prospective adoptive mother. In January 2006, Z.F. wrote a letter to the prospective adoptive mother stating, “I am really really really happy you came into my heart and my life. I wouldn’t have a better life th[a]n I have now and I am glad God bro[ught] us together . . . . You are the greatest mother I ever had and I think you will be the greatest mom I ever had[.] I am really happy you adop[t]ed me as a dau[gh]ter. I ca[n] see in your heart that you are loving, caring, giving, and . . . we have a lot in c[ommo]n and you are [al]ways happy[.] I will accept you as a mother . . . . I love you very love you [sic]. Never forget that.” She decorated the letter with a drawing of a flower blooming in the sun.

The juvenile court denied the petition, finding that it (1) “fail[ed] to state new evidence or a change of circumstances” and (2) “fail[ed] to show how the requested modification will promote the best interest of the child.”

B. Analysis.

“Under section 388, a person with an interest in a dependent child may petition the court to change, modify, or set aside a previous court order. The petitioning party has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a change of circumstances or new evidence, and the proposed modification is in the child’s best interest. [Citations.]

“‘[I]f the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing on the petition. [Citations.] The prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.’ [Citation.]” (In re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445, quoting In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.)

“The allegations of [the] petition [a]re to be liberally construed, but conclusory claims are insufficient to require a hearing. Specific descriptions of the evidence constituting changed circumstances is required. ‘Successful petitions have included declarations or other attachments which demonstrate the showing the petitioner will make at a hearing of the change in circumstances or new evidence.’ [Citation.]” (In re Ramone R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348, quoting In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.)

“‘The petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.] ‘”’The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’”’ [Citation.] ‘The denial of a section 388 motion rarely merits reversal . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re Daniel C., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445, quoting In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415, In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319, and In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685-686.)

Here, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that the petition -- even when liberally construed -- did not adequately allege changed circumstances. The main problem that led to the dependency was that the mother could not be bothered to be a mother. Whenever she could, she left the children with caretakers, who abused and neglected them; when she could not, she neglected them in person. Her section 388 petition addressed her employment, her residence, her transportation, her visitation, her sobriety, and her anger management; however, it simply ignored this central problem.

Moreover, the juvenile court could also reasonably conclude that the petition alleged “changing” rather than “changed” circumstances. (See In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 49.) All of the mother’s claimed accomplishments were recent and not well-established. For example, she alleged that she had been “clean and sober” for about seven months; however, she had been in drug programs before, for as long as six months, without success. “[R]elapses are all too common for a recovering drug user. ‘It is the nature of addiction that one must be “clean” for a much longer period . . . to show real reform.’ [Citation.]” (In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423-424 [200 days], quoting In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531, fn. 9 [120 days].) Indeed, before the section 366.26 hearing could even take place, the mother had already left her “clean and sober” living home.

Separately and alternatively, the mother’s petition did not so much as try to allege that the modification sought would be in Z.F.’s best interest. Her visitation had been terminated; thus, the juvenile court had found that visitation would be detrimental to Z.F. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(C).) On the other hand, Z.F. considered the prospective adoptive mother to be “the greatest mother I ever had . . . .”

The mother seeks to fill this round evidentiary hole with a square peg. She asserts that: “[W]hether the parent made a prima facie showing entitling them to a hearing depends not only on the facts alleged in the petition but the facts established without dispute by the court’s own file,” citing In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454. Angel B., however, does not stand for quite so broad a proposition. What the court said in Angel B. was that “[w]hether Mother made a prima facie showing entitling her to a hearing depends on the facts alleged in her [section 388] petition, as well as the facts established as without dispute by the court’s own file (e.g., Angel’s age, the nature of her existing placement, and the time she came into care as a dependent child).” (Id. at p. 461.) The court then held that the mother had not made a prima facie showing. (Id. at pp. 462-465.)

Here, by contrast, the mother wants us to consider the “fact” that Z.F. “continually wanted to return to her mother.” However, the mother did not allege this in her petition, and she did nothing to call this so-called fact to the attention of the juvenile court. Arguably, under Angel B., the juvenile court could have considered reports previously filed in the case; however, it had no obligation to comb through them all, on its own initiative, in search of evidence that might support the section 388 petition. Moreover, the asserted fact is hardly beyond dispute, in light of Z.F.’s tender and adoring letter to the prospective adoptive mother.

We therefore conclude that the juvenile court properly denied the section 388 petition without a hearing. Indeed, in light of the mother’s failure to allege any facts to show that the petition was in Z.F.’s best interest, the juvenile court would have abused its discretion if it had granted the petition.

III

THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OF ADOPTABILITY

Next, the mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that Z.F. was adoptable.

A. Additional Factual and Procedural Background.

At the section 366.26 hearing, two specified social worker’s reports were admitted into evidence. We will limit our consideration to these reports -- the only evidence that was actually before the juvenile court. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (b).) Consistent with the applicable standard of review, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the judgment. [Citation.]” (In re Marina S. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 158, 165.)

By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, Z.F. was eight years old. In January 2005, she had been put in a new placement; she had been “comfortable” and “doing well” there. Finally, on October 25, 2005, she had been placed with the prospective adoptive mother. Z.F. loved the prospective adoptive mother, and she was looking forward to adoption. “She had been telling everyone around her (church and school) that she [was] going to be adopted.” The prospective adoptive mother, for her part, “ha[d] developed a loving and committed relationship with [Z.F.]” She was “fully committed to the adoption of [Z.F.]” She understood “that commitment to a child is forever.”

Z.F. was “pretty” and “talented.” The social worker described her as “animated” and “generally a happy child.” She was “very bright,” “verbal and outgoing.” Despite “continu[ing] to struggle cognitively[,] especially in the areas of reading and writing,” she was “making a lot of progress in school.”

According to the social worker, “[Z.F.] can sometimes be very manipulative to adults . . . . She lacks boundaries when she is out in public. She will approach strangers and try to have a conversation. . . . She is . . . learning how to be polite and respectful to peers and adults.” She was taking Strattera for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). She was in good health.

The juvenile court had suspended the mother’s visitation with Z.F. As a result, Z.F. was more “stable” than at any other time during the dependency.

B. Analysis.

The juvenile court cannot terminate parental rights unless it finds, “by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)

“Review of a determination of adoptability is limited to whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1061.) “[W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the judgment. [Citation.] An appellate court does not reweigh the evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Marina S., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 165.)

“The ‘clear and convincing’ standard is for the edification and guidance of the juvenile court. It is not a standard for appellate review. [Citation.] ‘”The sufficiency of evidence to establish a given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, on appeal from a judgment required to be based upon clear and convincing evidence, “the clear and convincing test disappears . . . [and] the usual rule of conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to the respondent’s evidence, however slight, and disregarding the appellant’s evidence, however strong.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 911, quoting Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881, quoting Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750; accord, In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 519; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581.)

“‘The issue of adoptability . . . focuses on the minor, e.g., whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 406, quoting In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) “‘”Usually, the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.“’ [Citation.]” (In re Gregory A. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1562, quoting In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 510, quoting In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1649-1650.)

Significantly, the mother did not argue below that Z.F. was not adoptable; while this did not constitute a waiver (In re Gregory A., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1559-1560), it reflects the fact that her adoptability was almost indisputable. It is simply absurd to suggest that a healthy, “happy,” “pretty,” “bright,” “verbal and outgoing” eight-year-old girl is not adoptable. She was also described as “manipulative,” but what child is not? She had been diagnosed as having ADHD, but she was taking medication for it, and there is no indication that her ADHD was actually causing any undesirable behavior.

Basically, the mother is arguing that the prospective adoptive mother’s willingness to adopt was not substantial evidence because Z.F. had been with her for only about three months. The juvenile court, however, could reasonably find that this was long enough for the honeymoon to be over. This is especially true because Z.F. was adoptable in general; thus, there was no reason to suppose that some “time bomb” would go off in the future and alter the prospective adoptive mother’s willingness to adopt.

The mother also relies on evidence in earlier social worker’s reports; these, however, were not introduced at the section 366.26 hearing. In any event, the evidence she cites actually hurts her position. First, she argues that “[Z.F.] was confused about what she wanted and sabotaged the stability of her placements.” She cites a September 2004 report, which stated: “[Z.F.’s] emotional stability has decreased . . . . Her behavior has worsened. [Z.F.] reports feeling confused and angry after she visits with mother. [Z.F.] has been told that the foster parents could adopt her. When she visits with her mother, she has hope that she will reunite with her birth mother. This has been very confusing for [Z.F.]. Every time there is someone willing to adopt [Z.F.], she will come up with allegations of being abused to sabotage the placement.” This, however, shows that there were other families willing to adopt Z.F. Moreover, in the intervening 17 months, the mother’s visitation had been terminated, and, as a result, Z.F. had become more “stable.” She had been in a single stable placement from January 2005 until October 2005, when she was placed with the prospective adoptive mother; she had been “comfortable” and “doing well” there. Thus, it appears that terminating the mother’s visitation had also terminated Z.F.’s obstructionism and confusion.

Second, the mother argues that the Department “had only reported two families as being interested in adopting [Z.F.], and [Z.F.] had rejected one of them.” She cites a report from August 2005, which stated: “I have been showing [Z.F.] prospective adoptive families. The first family really liked [Z.F.] but [Z.F.] did not like them because they were not Christians. I have since matched her with another family.” Thus, once again, this shows that there were other families willing to adopt Z.F.

We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding of adoptability.

IV

THE BENEFICIAL PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION

Finally, the mother contends the juvenile court erred by finding that the “beneficial parental relationship” exception did not apply. This “may be the most unsuccessfully litigated issue in the history of law. . . . And it is almost always a loser.” (In re Eileen A. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1255, fn. 5, disapproved on other grounds in In re Zeth S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 413-414.) Although it can have merit in an appropriate case (e.g., In re Amber M., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 689-691), in this case, it is frivolous.

In general, at a section 366.26 hearing, if the juvenile court finds that the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1).) This rule, however, is subject to five statutory exceptions. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(A)-(c)(1)(E).) The only one relevant here is the beneficial parental relationship exception. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(A).) It applies when “[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Ibid.)

“We have interpreted the phrase ‘benefit from continuing the relationship’ to refer to a ‘parent-child’ relationship that ‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent[-]child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.’ [Citations.]” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 953, quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)

“[T]he parent must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits. [Citation.] ‘Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. . . . The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child’s life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. [Citations.]” (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 953-954, quoting In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) “In other words, for the exception to apply, the emotional attachment between the child and parent must be that of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or friendly nonparent relative, such as an aunt. [Citation.]” (In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 468.)

“Once the court determines a child is likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to show that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the . . . exceptions listed in section 366.26, subd. (c)(1). [Citation.] We must affirm a trial court’s rejection of these exceptions if the ruling is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 809.) Because the mother had the burden of proof, we must affirm unless there was “indisputable evidence [in her favor] -- evidence no reasonable trier of fact could have rejected . . . .” (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.)

Preliminarily, we note that, if the juvenile court did err, the error was invited. The mother’s trial counsel conceded, “I cannot present facts to the Court under an exception under 366.26.”

The juvenile court, however, did not err, for two reasons. First, it could reasonably find insufficient evidence that the mother had maintained regular visitation and contact. Her visitation with Z.F. had been suspended, by court order, for over nine months. The fact (if it is a fact) that she had been visiting regularly up until that point is irrelevant. It would be absurd to find a “beneficial parental relationship” when a parent’s visits have been found to be detrimental and the parent, for that very reason, has not visited since.

Second, the juvenile court could reasonably find that Z.F. would not benefit more from continuing her parent-child relationship with the mother than from adoption. Z.F. had not seen her mother for nine months, and she evidently was not suffering any ill effects; in fact, she was thriving. It was undisputed that she had developed a positive and loving parent-child relationship with the prospective adoptive mother. There was simply no evidence that Z.F. would be harmed -- much less “greatly harmed” (see In re L.Y.L, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 953) -- by severing the natural parent-child relationship.

In an effort to turn to her advantage the fact that her visitation had been terminated, the mother relies again on evidence in earlier reports. She argues that her visitation was detrimental only in the sense that Z.F. was so attached to her that she was resisting adoption. Thus, the mother implies that Z.F. actually had a substantial, positive emotional attachment to her, which the Department^[1] deliberately sabotaged to promote its own agenda -- namely, adoption.

We would reject this argument in any event because the reports the mother cites were not before the juvenile court. However, we also reject it for the more fundamental reason that the mother’s visitation was found to be detrimental because it upset Z.F., not because it caused Z.F. to resent adoption.

During visits, the mother would “promise[]” that she was going to regain custody. That was why Z.F. had been in at least eight different placements: “When she visits with mother, she completely stops following foster parents’ rules because she thinks that she will go back with her mother. This in turn leads to 7 days[‘] notices to move her to a different placement.” By contrast, when Z.F. did not have visits, the social worker reported, “she is stable and appears to be doing well. In fact, her academics improve and her attitude gets positive.” Z.F. told the social worker she “want[ed] to return to the mother if possible“; however, if that was not possible, then she wanted to be adopted.

The Department asked the juvenile court to terminate visitation because it was “detrimental to [Z.F.’s] stability in placement.” The juvenile court, however, distinguished between “detriment[] to the child” and “detriment[] to . . . stability in the placement.” It refused to suspend or terminate visitation until it was assured that Z.F.’s behavior had improved without it.

In response, Z.F.’s therapist reported that, after visits, Z.F. “was completely out of control. She lost all interest in school, was defiant, . . . started biting her nails down to the quick and screamed and yelled frequently. She was always getting into trouble at school . . . .” When visitation paused, she “stabilize[d]” and her behavior improved. She did not ask to see her mother. The therapist concluded that Z.F. should have no contact with the mother.

This is hardly the model of a beneficial parental relationship. Thus, even if we were to consider the earlier reports, we would find ample evidence that adoption would promote Z.F.’s well-being and that the natural parent-child relationship would not.

V

DISPOSITION

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RICHLI

J.

We concur:

HOLLENHORST

Acting P.J.

KING

J.

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^[1] Actually, minors’ counsel joined in the Department’s request to terminate the mother’s visitation.