Filed 6/20/17 P. v. Johnson CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

PAUL RUSSELL JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.
D071636, D071972


(Super. Ct. Nos. MH113103, SCN365008)

CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Steven E. Stone, Judge. Dismissed as moot.

Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Adrianne S. Denault, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In these consolidated appeals, Paul Russell Johnson appeals from the trial court's December 23, 2016 judgment finding him to be incompetent to stand trial and authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. (Pen. Code, §§ 1368-1370.) We conclude that Johnson's appeals are moot because he has subsequently been found mentally competent to stand trial, and we accordingly dismiss the appeals.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 5, 2016, a complaint charged Johnson with one count of driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property while evading police (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) and further alleged that Johnson incurred one prior strike and three prison priors (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b)).
On October 18, 2016, the trial court raised questions about Johnson's mental competency, suspended proceedings pursuant to section 1368, and ordered a psychiatric evaluation to determine whether Johnson was competent to stand trial.
Dr. Michael M. Takamura performed a psychiatric examination on December 1, 2016, and filed a report with the court on December 19, 2016. Dr. Takamura concluded that Johnson was not competent to stand trial because he was not capable of understanding the nature of the criminal proceedings and could not rationally cooperate with an attorney in preparing a defense. Dr. Takamura also filed a report recommending the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to Johnson and opined that those medications would likely render Johnson competent to stand trial.
On December 23, 2016, the trial court held a competency hearing. Defense counsel stated that he would "submit on the report and submit on the doctor's qualifications." Relying on Dr. Takamura's report, the trial court found that Johnson was incompetent to stand trial and entered a judgment of mental incompetency, ordered Johnson's commitment to Patton State Hospital for a maximum term of three years, and authorized the administration of antipsychotic medication. (§1370.)
On January 27, 2017, the trial court filed a minute order clarifying that Johnson would not receive credit for the 79 days of actual time spent in custody prior to the competency hearing for the purpose of reducing his maximum term of three years of confinement to a mental health treatment facility.
Johnson filed notices of appeal on January 4, 11 and 26, and March 24, 2017, challenging the finding of incompetency, the order authorizing the involuntary administration of medication, and the order denying credit of 79 days of actual custody against the three-year maximum term of commitment in a mental health treatment facility.
On April 12, 2017, while this appeal was pending, the trial court found that Johnson's mental competency had been restored. According to the trial court's minute order of April 12, 2017, finding Johnson to be mentally competent, Johnson was remanded to the custody of the sheriff, a readiness conference was scheduled for April 20, 2017, and a preliminary examination was scheduled for April 25, 2017.
II.
DISCUSSION
Johnson presents several arguments on appeal.
First, Johnson argues that the judgment of mental incompetency and the order for commitment should be vacated because the trial court failed to appoint a second medical health professional to evaluate him. Specifically, section 1369, subdivision (a) states that "[i]n any case where the defendant or the defendant's counsel informs the court that the defendant is not seeking a finding of mental incompetence, the court shall appoint two psychiatrists, licensed psychologists, or a combination thereof." (Ibid.) Johnson contends that although defense counsel did not take issue with the finding of mental incompetency in Dr. Takamura's report, Johnson put his competency at issue by making a motion to dismiss at the competency hearing, triggering the requirement that two different mental health professionals examine him. (§ 1369, subd. (a).)
Second, Johnson contends that the order authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication must be reversed because it was allegedly made without factual findings or evidentiary support, and because it is inconsistent with the trial court's oral pronouncement at the competency hearing as transcribed by the court reporter.
Finally, Johnson argues that the trial court improperly failed to reduce his maximum time of commitment to a mental health treatment facility to take into account his credits for actual time served prior to the competency hearing.
In requesting that we take judicial notice of the trial court's April 12, 2017 order finding that his mental competency had been restored, Johnson observed that this appeal was potentially moot. In Johnson's reply brief, filed after the trial court's April 12, 2017 order, Johnson did not dispute that this appeal may be moot due to the finding that his competency has been restored. However, Johnson pointed out that we could nevertheless address the issues presented in this appeal under our discretion to decide "an otherwise moot case present[ing] important issues that are 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " (Thompson v. Department of Corrections (2001) 25 Cal.4th 117, 122.) Johnson did not attempt to explain why the issues presented here are capable of repetition yet evading review.
We conclude that this appeal is moot. " ' "[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed." ' " (People v. Delong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 486.) As established in People v. Lindsey (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 742 (Lindsey), when a defendant is found to be mentally competent after he appeals an earlier finding of mental incompetency, a successful appeal of the earlier mental incompetency finding will no longer afford any meaningful relief, and the appeal accordingly becomes moot. As Lindsey explained, "[t]he law imposes no disadvantageous collateral consequences upon one whose trial has had to be postponed by reason of such a temporary disability. In the event defendant is convicted, the fact that he had been so disabled . . . should not affect the kind of sentence imposed by the trial court. If defendant's mental state is considered in future proceedings, the issue will turn upon what that state is found to be as of the relevant time, and not the fact that an order was made [regarding his mental incompetency in the past]. If any social opprobrium is thought to attach by reason of the commitment, that is nothing which is likely to be relieved by an appellate decision. The temporary commitment is nothing from which defendant needs to 'clear his name.' " (Id. at pp. 744-745.)
We agree with Lindsey's analysis and follow it here. Johnson's appeal of the December 23, 2016 mental incompetency judgment and the order authorizing the administration of antipsychotic medication has been rendered moot by the subsequent April 12, 2017 finding that Johnson is once again competent to stand trial and remanding him to the custody of the sheriff to await trial. Further, we conclude that this is not an exceptional case presenting an important issue capable of repetition yet evading review, under which we would exercise our discretion to decide an otherwise moot controversy. Any important legal issues presented in this appeal will not evade review because they can be considered in a different case in which the defendant's competency is not able to be restored prior to the resolution of the appeal. We accordingly dismiss the appeal as moot.
DISPOSITION
The consolidated appeals are dismissed as moot.



IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:




HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.




DATO, J.