Filed 6/21/17 In re Joel S. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re JOEL S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.


THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOEL S.,

Defendant and Appellant.


G053210

(Super. Ct. No. DL042843-002)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Theodore M. Cropley and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
A juvenile court found true allegations that defendant Joel S. (minor) committed the offenses of petty theft (Pen. Code, §§ 484, subd. (a), 488) and possession of an alcoholic beverage by a minor (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25662, subd. (a)). The court declared him a nonward of the court, placed him on probation, in the custody of his parents, and ordered him to perform 20 hours of community service. On appeal, minor contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s conclusion that he committed petty theft. We affirm the order.
I
FACTS
The People filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 charging minor with two misdemeanors: petty theft and underage possession of alcohol. At a contested jurisdictional hearing (hearing), the juvenile court heard testimony from a 7-Eleven convenience store clerk and the minor.
The store clerk testified that on the afternoon in question, he was working at a 7-Eleven in the City of Santa Ana when he saw two Hispanic juvenile males enter the store. They appeared to be nervous, so the store clerk monitored their behavior. From an unobstructed vantage point, he saw the two males walk over to a cooler where the beer was kept and open its door. Minor reached in, grabbed “a couple of tall cans” of beer and ran out of the store with the other male. The store clerk followed them out the door and observed them running down the street away from the store.
Before pursuing the males, the store clerk went back into the store to tell his coworker he was going to go see where the two had gone. He also called 911. During that call, an audio recording of which was played during minor’s hearing, the store clerk conveyed to the dispatcher what had just occurred. He identified the individuals as Hispanic males around 20 to 21 years of age, one wearing a blue shirt and blue pants, and the other wearing no shirt and black pants. He further stated that the former rode away from the store on a scooter, and the latter on a skateboard. Based on the audio recording of the 911 call, the store clerk appeared to be repeating descriptions that were simultaneously being relayed to him by a third party witness.
In an attempt to locate the males, the store clerk drove his car in the direction they fled. He found them at a park located behind the 7-Eleven store, sitting and drinking beer. The store clerk made a second 911 call to provide the police with the updated details. During the call, an audio recording of which was also played at minor’s hearing, the store clerk conveyed that the two Hispanic males were sitting in the park drinking “next to some kids that are sitting right there.” He once again described them, this time stating they were “both tall,” both “in their late teens [or] early 20s,” both wearing “dark pants,” and one wearing a blue shirt and the other a black shirt.
After making the second 911 call, the store clerk returned to the convenience store. He spoke with Santa Ana Police Department Detective Armando Chacon and communicated what had transpired. They then went to the nearby park, and the store clerk pointed out the two males who stole the beer, which included minor. Detective Chacon spoke with the two males and, thereafter, arrested them.
At the hearing, the store clerk made an in-person identification of minor as one of the two individuals who had stolen the beer. Additionally, in response to questions from minor’s counsel, he described one of the perpetrators as wearing shorts and a black shirt, and the other as wearing blue jeans and, “if [he] recall[ed] correctly,” a gray hooded sweater. This was the first time the store clerk had made any mention of a gray sweater.
Minor testified and gave his version of what occurred on the afternoon in question. He stated that he was outside the 7-Eleven store when he saw his friend run out of it with beer in his hands and run down the street. Minor said he followed his friend to the nearby park and they proceeded to drink beer. He claimed the beer was given to them by “some guy” driving a truck who said he was giving it to them so that they would not have to steel beer. Minor denied being inside the 7-Eleven store that afternoon, denied having any knowledge that his friend was going to steal beer and denied having any intention to help him do so.
Ultimately, the juvenile court found the allegations in the petition true beyond a reasonable doubt. In doing so, it found the store clerk’s nonhesitant in-court identification of minor to be credible, and expressed concern about the credibility of minor’s testimony.
II
DISCUSSION
Minor argues there was insufficient evidence he committed the theft. Specifically, he claims there was insufficient evidence of his identity as one of the perpetrators. We disagree.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile delinquency case, we apply the same substantial evidence standard of review that we apply in adult criminal proceedings. (See In re Arcenio V. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 613, 615.) Minor “has a heavy burden in demonstrating that the evidence does not support the juvenile court findings. [Citation.] An appellate court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment in order to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1136 (Ricky T.).) “The testimony of just one witness is enough to sustain a conviction, so long as that testimony is not inherently incredible.” (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.)
“The trier of fact determines the credibility of witnesses, weighs the evidence, and resolves factual conflicts.” (In re Daniel G., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.) “We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275.) “If the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict, we will not reverse simply because the evidence might reasonably support a contrary finding.” (In re Daniel G., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.)
Here, aside from minor, the only person to testify was the store clerk who personally witnessed the theft with an unobstructed view. He described in detail what happened, the direction the two males fled when they left the store and how he found them less than 10 minutes later drinking beer in the nearby park. In addition, not only did the store clerk identify minor to Detective Chacon within 45 minutes of the crime, but he also unhesitatingly identified minor twice during the hearing as one of the two Hispanic males who stole the beer.
Minor argues that the store clerk’s testimony was improbable because he gave three different descriptions of the males who committed the theft — one during the first 911 call, one during the second 911 call, and one at the hearing. At its core, minor’s argument is nothing more than an assertion that the store clerk lacked credibility due to what minor believes are “contradictory” descriptions. However, “[t]he inherently improbable standard addresses the basic content of the testimony itself — i.e., could that have happened? — rather than the apparent credibility of the person testifying. . . . In other words, . . . [t]he only question is: Does it seem possible that what the witness claimed to have happened actually happened?” (People v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 729.) Here, there is nothing inherently incredible about the facts described by the store clerk; the situation he described is certainly plausible.
Minor testified that he was not involved in the actual theft of the beer, but instead simply happened to be standing outside the 7-Eleven when he saw his friend come running out with a couple of beers in his hand and he then followed his friend to the park where they proceeded to drink beer. But, the juvenile court was not required to give credence to this testimony. In evaluating it, the court had the authority to take into account minor’s self-interest in the outcome of the case. (Huth v. Katz (1947) 30 Cal.2d 605, 608–609; People v. Rumph (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 262, 267-268.) The court apparently disbelieved minor’s testimony, and its finding is controlling on appeal.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the order, as we must, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s true finding that minor committed petty theft.
III
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.



MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:



ARONSON, J.



THOMPSON, J.