Filed 6/23/17 Cal. Dept. of State Hosptials at Coalinga v. Moore CA5



NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS AT COALINGA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ARDELL MOORE,

Defendant and Appellant.

F073311

(Super. Ct. No. 15CRAD683003 )


OPINION

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kimberly A. Gaab, Judge.
Linda J. Zachritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ismael A. Castro and Renu R. George, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Ardell Moore is an adjudicated sexually violent predator over whom the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) has custody pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.). Moore resides at a DSH facility in Coalinga, where he receives treatment for previously diagnosed mental disorders. He appeals from an order requiring him to submit to involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. However, the order in question was only valid for one year and expired on February 1, 2017. Accordingly, and for the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
In November 2015, the DSH petitioned the Fresno County Superior Court for an order permitting the involuntary administration of antipsychotic/psychotropic medication to Moore in accordance with California Code of Regulations, title 9, section 4210, Welfare and Institutions Code section 5300, and the holding in In re Calhoun (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1315. The petition was heard on February 1, 2016. Moore was represented at the hearing by a deputy public defender but did not personally appear. According to the sworn declaration of a DSH employee, Moore had refused to be transported to court. Based on that declaration, the deputy public defender purported to waive her client’s right to be present.
The proceedings focused on the issue of Moore’s mental faculties and capacity to refuse treatment. Dr. Ravindra Chand, a psychiatrist, testified on behalf of the DSH. Dr. Chand opined, based on a face-to-face evaluation of Moore four days earlier and a review of the patient’s medical records, that Moore was experiencing “auditory hallucinations, disorganizational thought process[es] and mood disability secondary to psychotic symptoms,” and could not effectively weigh the risks and benefits associated with the decision to accept or reject administration of his prescribed medications. The trial court ruled in favor of the DSH and issued an order authorizing involuntary administration of psychotropic medication for a period “not to exceed one year from the date of the order.”
On appeal, Moore claims (1) the trial court had no authority to hear and rule upon the petition in his absence and (2) Dr. Chand’s testimony related hearsay in contravention of the holdings in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. The Attorney General disputes these arguments and further submits that the appeal is moot. We agree with the latter contention, and express no opinions as to the remaining arguments. Moore concedes the issue of mootness but asks that we exercise discretion to resolve the case on the merits.
As a general rule, appellate review is limited to actual controversies; a case that involves “ ‘only abstract or academic questions of law cannot be maintained.’ ” (People v. DeLong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 486.) “ ‘ “[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In other words, “[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief.” (Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479 (Cucamongans).) Here, since the order appealed from has expired, resolving the issues presented would not confer any effective relief to the parties.
There are three exceptions to the rule against adjudicating moot claims. A reviewing court may decide an appeal on the merits: “(1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur [citation]; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties [citation]; and (3) when a material question remains for the court’s determination.” (Cucamongans, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp 479-480.) We are aware of our discretionary authority, and are not compelled to exercise it under the circumstances of this case.


DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.



GOMES, Acting P.J.
WE CONCUR:



DETJEN, J.



FRANSON, J.