Filed 7/7/17 In re C.T. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re C.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

R.C. et. al.,

Defendants and Appellants.


E067218

(Super.Ct.No. SWJ010208)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew C. Perantoni, Judge. Affirmed.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant R.C.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.T.
Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, and James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent Riverside county Department of Public Social Services.
Arthur J. LaCilento for Plaintiffs and Respondents M.W. and S.W.
Defendants and appellants R.C. (father) and C.T. (mother) appeal from an order terminating the parental rights to their daughter, Ca.T. On appeal, they challenge the adequacy of notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Separately, mother contends the juvenile court should have found applicable the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights, codified at Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
Ca.T. (child) was born in April 2009 with a gastrointestinal defect that required surgery to cut out a portion of the small bowel. The resulting “short bowel syndrome” meant less area available to absorb nutrients and feeding by “total parenteral nutrition” (TPN). TPN was administered through a central line catheter in the chest, requiring close monitoring to avoid infections and to make sure the child was getting enough nutrients and not losing weight. The child was hospitalized at Loma Linda University Medical Center (LLUMC) until March 2, 2010. Her complex medical circumstances required a significant amount of medical care.
A. The First Section 366.26 Hearing Resulting in Legal Guardianship for the Child.
From March 2010 to July 2010, child protective services received several referrals regarding the child, all alleging general neglect. In July 2010, at 15 months old, the child came to the attention of the Riverside County Department of Public Services (the Department) due to concern that mother had not followed through with medical treatment and advice regarding the child’s serious medical condition. On July 28, 2010, the juvenile court detained the child.
In the jurisdiction/disposition report filed on September 17, 2010, the social worker reported that the child was doing well in her placement in the subacute unit at Community Hospital of San Bernardino. Mother appeared to have untreated mental health and dependent personality issues. A doctor had concluded the child had “multiple diagnoses which may be life-threatening when her condition isn’t stable”; her condition had not been stable since she was sent home from the hospital in March; mother did not appear to be capable of stabilizing the child at home despite training and in-home nursing assistance; and the child was considered medically fragile and would require a specialized foster home. A nurse, who was one of two primary caregivers for the child in the neonatal intensive care unit at LLUMC and who had become a family friend, asked that she and her husband be considered for placement.
At the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on September 23, 2010, the juvenile court sustained allegations that mother failed to follow through with medical treatment for the child and had a history of abusing controlled substances. The court ordered mother to participate in a psychological evaluation to determine whether she could provide appropriate care for the child. Reunification services were offered to mother.
In January 2011, the child was placed with the nurse from LLUMC (foster mother), who expressed a willingness to provide a permanent home should reunification efforts fail. The child remained medically fragile, was often sick because of infections and other complications, and was hospitalized three more times. Nonetheless, she was developing normally and appeared to be happy when medically stable. Mother attended a parenting class, completed the first part of the medically fragile training class, and attended individual counseling. On May 2, 2011, the court continued mother’s reunification services.
Mother made significant progress on her case plan. Her consistent, positive visitation with the child prompted the social worker to recommend unsupervised weekend visits once mother completed one-on-one medically fragile classes with the Public Health Nurse, with the possibility of placing the child with mother on family maintenance. The child was developing normally and appeared happy. The social worker, mother, foster mother, and the Public Health Nurse were working together closely to get mother trained so she could transition to caring for the child and her extensive medical problems.
On September 21, 2011, the juvenile court ordered an additional six months of reunification services, and authorized mother to have unsupervised weekend and overnight visits once she completed her one-on-one medically fragile classes with the Public Health Nurse. On December 29, 2011, father was located at a jail in Harrisonburg, Virginia.
In January 2012, things looked promising. The plan was to keep the child with the foster mother for approximately three more months to get her onto regular food and off the TPN before transitioning her to mother’s care. The child had four successful, unsupervised 12-hour visits with mother on days when she did not have TPN. She then had two successful overnight stays at mother’s home, at least one of which was during her TPN feeding. However, beginning in April 2012, mother experienced some setbacks with attending to the child’s medical routine. The pediatric surgeon opined that mother was very chaotic in her judgment and approach to the child’s care and lacked the insight to care for her medical needs. Concerned about mother’s ability to make appropriate medical care decisions for the child, the Department recommended the child not be returned to mother’s full-time custody.
On May 2, 2012, an addendum report recommended that mother’s reunification services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set to consider a permanent plan of legal guardianship. The attempt to wean the child from TPN was unsuccessful. She had to have another surgery in March, and the TPN was resumed for 14 hours every day, meaning that the child would continue to require intense, continuous monitoring and care. Although mother was receiving extensive training in caring for the child, she continued exhibiting poor judgment in assessing the status of the child’s health for certain activities, and she was less than diligent in administering to the child’s medical needs. The social worker was concerned about mother’s ability to care for the child and understand the seriousness of her condition.
On September 5, 2012, at the contested 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court terminated family reunification services, set a section 366.26 hearing to implement a permanent plan for the child, and authorized one supervised visit per week.
In a report filed October 24, 2012, the social worker recommended that the dependency be terminated and the child placed in legal guardianship. She had reduced TPN feedings to three days per week and was beginning a trial routine without TPN. The social worker opined the child’s success in therapy, aimed at helping her eat normally, had improved once the unsupervised visits with mother stopped because she was in a consistent care environment where the foster mother enforced the rules. Mother agreed to the proposed legal guardianship.
On January 28, 2013, at the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court selected legal guardianship with the foster parents (S.W. and M.W.) as the child’s permanent plan, and terminated the dependency. The court ordered supervised visitation for three hours every other Friday as set forth in a mediation agreement. The juvenile dependency case was closed.
B. The Second Section 366.26 Hearing Resulting in the Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights and a Permanent Plan of Adoption for the Child.
From January 2013 to September 2014, mother visited with the child pursuant to a court-approved agreement. On September 12, 2014, the legal guardians filed a section 388 petition asking the court to allow them to adopt the child. The legal guardians asserted three new bases for the order: (1) the child would require ongoing medical care for the rest of her life; (2) after four years of dependency, mother had failed to make changes in her life that would allow her to care for the child; and (3) mother not only continued to fail to understand the child’s medical needs, but she denied that the child had medical needs. The legal guardians asserted the requested change would be in the child’s best interest because she had thrived and her medical condition had improved during the time she had been in their care; she needed long-term stability and a family that could provide for her medical needs on a permanent basis.
On November 24, 2014, the juvenile court granted the petition, reinstated the dependency, set a section 366.26 hearing, and authorized bonding studies of the legal guardians and mother. Father was located in custody in a federal detention facility in Florida; a DNA test established he was the biological parent.
Mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ, which was denied by our opinion filed on March 11, 2015, holding that the legal guardians’ declaration that they now wished to adopt the child, in and of itself, established a changed circumstance and that the record as a whole reflected adoption would be in the child’s best interest.
In the section 366.26 report filed on March 12, 2015, it was noted the child was no longer using the J-tube. Mother continued to participate in supervised visitation, which the child enjoyed. An addendum report filed on March 13, 2015, included an adoption assessment. The child indicated she liked living with the legal guardians/prospective adoptive parents “‘because they make her happy and take really good care of her’; she wished to live with them permanently.” She referred to the prospective adoptive parents as her “‘parents’” and said she loved them. The social worker concluded the prospective adoptive parents had a parental bond with the child. Dr. Yanon Volcani completed a bonding study of the prospective adoptive parents and the child on March 22, 2015. He concluded it would be “profoundly detrimental” to the child’s development and well-being if her relationship with them was disrupted in any significant manner.
On March 23, 2015, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting termination of the legal guardianship, placement of the child with her, and reinstatement of reunification services. She cited as changed circumstances that the child’s medical condition had improved and her therapeutic needs had decreased. Mother claimed the requested change was in the child’s best interest, because the two had a strong bond and mother was now ready to resume parental responsibility. The court granted a hearing on mother’s petition.
By April 2015, Deren Mikels, a licensed clinical social worker, completed a bonding study of mother and the child. He noted that the child looked forward to visitation with mother, and that the two shared a strong bond which, if broken, could be problematic and create emotional damage for the child. On April 27, 2015, father filed a section 388 petition indicating he was only recently notified of the child’s existence and had learned through DNA testing that he was her biological father. Father remained incarcerated, but requested presumed status and placement of the child with paternal relatives who had previously requested placement.
On July 8, 9, and 13, and September 8, 9, 10, and 11, 2015, the juvenile court held hearings on mother’s section 388 petition. Mikels testified about mother and child’s strong bond, opining there was a parent/child relationship between the two. Dr. Volcani testified that when asked to draw pictures of her family, pick out members of her family who were important to her, or draw a picture of anyone, the child chose to draw the prospective adoptive parents, not mother. When asked if she wanted to return to live with mother, the child responded that she wanted to remain with the prospective adoptive parents. Dr. Volcani opined that the child sees the prospective adoptive mother as the central caring person in her life. Mother testified that she had contacted father and they discussed having him become involved in the child’s life. Mother noted that she had an apartment of her own, was studying nutrition at the local junior college, consistently visited with the child, had a strong support network, and had become educated regarding the child’s medical condition. The child’s pediatric gastroenterologist testified that it was necessary for her to have a stable home with someone capable of maintaining her specific feeding needs. The prospective adoptive mother initially supported reunification between mother and child; however, by summer 2012, she realized that the extensive time she spent training mother how to care for the child’s medical needs was not important to mother. The prospective adoptive mother stated she would be concerned if the court were to order unmonitored visitation with mother because, “‘[a]fter almost two years of really hands-on training and explaining the rationale behind why I requested certain things to be done, it was unheeded, and [the child] suffered as a result, and even though I don’t expect anybody to be a nurse, I know parents who could very well follow directions and do what I ask them to do.’”
After listening to all of the testimony and considering all of the evidence, the juvenile court found it was in the child’s best interest to grant mother’s petition. The court ordered an evaluation of mother’s home, granted her six more months of reunification services, prohibited unauthorized contact with father or mother’s boyfriend, and granted mother six hours of unsupervised visitation each weekend. The court authorized a transition to overnight and weekend visitation if appropriate. As part of mother’s reunification services, the court ordered conjoint counseling between the child and mother, a referral to a Public Health Nurse for updated care of the child’s J-tube as directed by a doctor, and domestic violence counseling. The child remained in out-of-home placement with the prospective adoptive parents. The court vacated the section 366.26 hearing.
On March 1, 2016, the social worker filed a six-month status review report in which she recommended mother’s reunification services again be terminated and the section 366.26 hearing be scheduled. During the review period, mother completed J-tube training, medically fragile child training, first aid and CPR training, and several other components of her case plan. Previously, the court had ordered the social worker to determine if mother required additional medical training; however, mother failed to respond to the Public Health Nurse’s instruction to practice the skills and call to schedule an assessment. Mother visited consistently with the child for six hours each Saturday; however, the child expressed concerns regarding the visits and made statements suggesting she just wanted to get the visits over with. The conjoint therapist expressed concerns with mother’s ability to understand the child’s emotional and medical needs. When asked if she wished to spend more time with mother, the child said, “‘no, thanks.’” The therapist recommended visits not be increased. Father completed a coparenting program, and he was living in Veteran’s Administration transitional housing in California, receiving treatment for posttraumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder.
On March 15, 2016, the prospective adoptive parents filed a section 388 petition requesting the termination of unsupervised visitation. The prospective adoptive mother declared that the child reported mother had been improperly caring for her J-tube and forcing her to eat orally. The child said she no longer wished to participate in the visits. An investigator had witnessed father at mother’s apartment on numerous occasions.
The juvenile court held the hearing on the prospective adoptive parents’ section 388 petition on April 12, 27, and 28, and May 2, 2016. The social worker testified that mother had completed J-tube training and a two-day medically fragile training, but had yet to complete the component of her medical training in which the Public Health Nurse required her to demonstrate her hands-on ability to care for the J-tube. The conjoint therapist expressed numerous concerns regarding mother. During a face-to-face meeting on January 22, 2016, the social worker recommended a domestic violence education course; however, as of February 5, 2016, mother had not begun such course, claiming it was located too far from her residence. The social worker observed the reoccurring issue in mother’s life to be less than positive relationships involving domestic violence. In response, mother testified that she had never received a referral for domestic violence classes. She stated that she had completed a parenting class and participated in individual counseling, both of which dealt with domestic violence issues. She did not complete the hands-on portion of the J-tube training because the child was never made available to her; however, she was ready and willing to complete that training. Mother admitted that she had recently been in contact with father, including having him at her home on a handful of occasions. Father had been convicted of terrorist threats against her; she had sustained injuries from him “as a result of violent, rough sex which had gone overboard.” Mother testified that she was in a position to care for the child because she was employed, had stable living arrangements, an awareness of the child’s health issue, and a support system through family and friends.
The parties stipulated that the child would testify that she would like to continue to have visitation with mother at the current rate with continued conjoint therapy. She had been afraid on two occasions during recent unsupervised visits when mother left her alone in the car. She did not wish to live with mother; she wanted to stay at her home with the prospective adoptive parents because she loved them.
On May 2, 2016, the juvenile court found that mother had made minimal progress toward alleviating the causes necessitating placement, terminated reunification services, and set the section 366.26 hearing. Mother was granted a minimum of two supervised visits each month. The prospective adoptive parents reported their intent to adopt the child, who indicated she wanted to be adopted by them.
On November 9, 2016, at the contested section 366.26 hearing, mother testified that she consistently engaged in positive visits with the child since the inception of the dependency. Mother stated that the child was affectionate towards her and would sometimes say, “I love you.” Mother recognized that the child shared a bond with the prospective adoptive parents, but believed the child also shared a very strong attachment with her (mother). She claimed the child recently said, “‘Mommy, I want to keep seeing you. I feel torn.’” Mother’s counsel argued that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) parent-child bond exception to termination of parental rights applied because mother had consistently visited the child and the two shared a bond. Counsel requested the court maintain the permanent plan of legal guardianship. Rejecting this request, the juvenile court found the child adoptable, determined that the parent-child bond exception did not apply, and ordered parental rights terminated.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Concluding Mother Failed to Establish the Beneficial Parent-child Relationship Exception.
At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court selects and implements a permanent plan for the dependent child. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52-53.) Adoption is the preferred permanent plan because it is more secure and permanent than legal guardianship or long-term foster care. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 50.) “Adoption must be selected as the permanent plan for an adoptable child and parental rights terminated unless the court finds ‘a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child’” under one or more of the exceptions set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B). (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315 (Bailey J.).) One such exception is the beneficial parental relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
To establish the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights, a parent has the burden of showing “both regular visitation and contact [with the child] and the benefit to the child in maintaining the parent-child relationship.” (In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 80-81; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) With respect to the “benefit to the child” prong of the exception, a beneficial relationship is one that “‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.’” (In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1534.) The parent has the burden of demonstrating that “severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed . . . .” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s factual determinations, including the issue of regular visitation and contact with the child, and the existence of a beneficial parental relationship. (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) The determination of whether the existence of a beneficial parental relationship constitutes a “‘compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child’” within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) is a “‘quintessentially discretionary’ decision,” which we review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (Bailey J., supra, at pp. 1314-1315.) When the party with the burden of proof appeals, contending the trier of fact erred in concluding that party failed to meet his or her burden, the question on appeal “becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528.) Accordingly, “a challenge to a juvenile court’s finding that there is no beneficial relationship amounts to a contention that the ‘undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion.’” (Bailey J., supra, at p. 1314.)
Mother contends the beneficial parent-child relationship exception precludes termination of her parental rights. The record here does not compel a finding in favor of mother. Although mother met the visitation prong, the evidence shows that the parent-child relationship is qualitatively insufficient and does not outweigh the benefit of adoption. “Satisfying the second prong requires the parent to prove that ‘severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed. [Citations.] . . . .’ Evidence that a parent has maintained ‘“frequent and loving contact” is not sufficient to establish the existence of a beneficial parental relationship.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643.)
According to mother, the child was removed from her care in 2010 when the child was 15 months old. In reality, the child was in mother’s care for only four of those 15 months due to her hospitalization. Nonetheless, mother argues that (1) a May 2015 bonding study concluded that there was a strong bond between the two and that breaking the bond could be problematic and create emotional damage for her; (2) in May 2016 the child indicated that although she did not want to live with mother, she wanted to have continued visitation with her; (3) she (mother) completed her court ordered case plan; (4) she (mother) had stable housing and was capable of safely caring for the child; and (5) the child “derives some measure of benefit from her visits with [m]other,” citing In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 300-301 (S.B.).
Mother’s reliance on S.B. is misplaced, because this case is not like S.B. There, a three-year-old child was removed from her father’s custody; the father immediately acknowledged his drug use, fully complied with his case plan, and remained drug free. (S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.) The child wanted to live with the father and became upset when visits ended. (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded the beneficial relationship exception applied. (Id. at pp. 298-299.) S.B. is confined to its “extraordinary facts.” (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 558.) The same court that decided S.B. later stated that S.B. “does not support the proposition a parent may establish the parent-child beneficial relationship exception by merely showing the child derives some measure of benefit from maintaining parental contact. As [In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575] points out, contact between parent and child will always ‘confer some incidental benefit to the child,’ but that is insufficient to meet the standard. [Citation.]” (In re C.F., supra, at pp. 558-559.)
Here, the evidence shows that mother has not fulfilled a parental role for most of the child’s life and that the prospective adoptive parents have filled that role since January 2011. The prospective adoptive parents have been “the most constant and consistent source of medical, emotional, and developmental stability [the child] has experienced since birth.” The child expressed her desire to remain in their care and be adopted by them. They shared a healthy and bonded relationship and the child thrived in their care. The prospective adoptive mother was the child’s primary attachment figure. When asked to draw anyone she wished, the child drew a picture of the prospective adoptive mother. When asked to draw a picture of her family, she drew a picture of herself, the prospective adoptive parents and the family pets. When asked if she could have anyone live with her, the child chose the prospective adoptive parents. The family they created together was a “fundamental part of her psychological self-structure.”
Based on the evidence presented, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that the child’s long-term emotional and developmental interests would be better served by the permanency of adoption. In short, mother has demonstrated no error by the court.
B. The ICWA Notice Was Adequate.
Father contends the evidence fails to support a finding that meaningful notice under the ICWA was provided because the notices did not contain complete or adequate information for the relevant tribes to determine the child’s Indian heritage. Mother adopts father’s argument.
At the time of the initial detention in July 2010, mother claimed Indian ancestry with the Zuni and Mescalero Tribes of New Mexico. On September 2, 2010, notice was provided to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Mescalero Apache Tribe, and the Pueblo of Zuni Tribe. The notice contained the mother’s information (name and birthdate) and the names and addresses of two of the maternal great-grandparents (B.S. and H.S.). The same ICWA notice was sent out again and filed with the court on March 17, 2011. Responses from the tribes indicated that the child was not an Indian child. Regarding the Zuni Tribe, members must possess at least one quarter Zuni Indian blood, and at least one natural parent must be enrolled as a member. On September 5, 2012, the court found that ICWA did not apply.
On March 2, 2015, father filed a parental notification of Indian status indicating that his paternal grandmother was a member of the Cherokee Tribe. In March 2015, the maternal great-grandmother claimed to have “35% Indian blood.” She also declared ties to Zuni, Mescalero Apache, and Pueblo Indian Tribes; however, her grandparents were “moved off the reservations.” She stated that she still had relatives living on reservation land in Mescalero, and on the Zuni and Pena Blanca Indian Reservation. Her ancestors left the reservation and were not registered with their tribes, since living on the reservation was a condition to being a registered member.
On March 19, 2015, the Department provided notice of the dependency proceedings to the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the BIA, and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians. The notice included paternal grandmother’s name, with no other information and no name of any information as to paternal grandfather. No other information for the paternal relatives was included. Other than mother’s name, no information as to any maternal relatives was included. The certified mail receipts were included in the record. The United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians responded, stating that there was no evidence that the child was a descendent from anyone on the Keetoowah roll, and the tribe would not intervene.
On March 24, 2015, father again filed a parental notification of Indian status in which he clarified that his paternal great-grandmother was a member of the Cherokee Eastern Band Tribe. The juvenile court ordered the Department to provide notice of the proceedings to the BIA. On May 15, 2015, the Department provided notice to three Cherokee Tribes and the BIA. The tribes responded that the child was neither registered nor eligible to register as a member of the tribe.
On May 21, 2015, father and maternal great-grandmother appeared in court. County counsel indicated there were letters from all of the Cherokee Tribes and asked the juvenile court to find that ICWA did not apply, as notice had been provided to the Cherokee tribes. On May 2, 2016, the court found that ICWA did not apply.
“Congress enacted ICWA to further the federal policy ‘“that, where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community . . . .”’ [Citation.]” (In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 48.) “When applicable, ICWA imposes three types of requirements: notice, procedural rules, and enforcement. [Citation.] First, if the court knows or has reason to know that an ‘“Indian child”’ is involved in a ‘“child custody proceeding,”’ . . . the social services agency must send notice to the child’s parent, Indian custodian, and tribe by registered mail, with return receipt requested. [Citation.] . . . . [¶] Next, after notice has been given, the child’s tribe has ‘a right to intervene at any point in the proceeding.’ [Citation.] . . . . [¶] Finally, an enforcement provision offers recourse if an Indian child has been removed from parental custody in violation of ICWA.” (Id. at pp. 48-49.) “Thorough compliance with ICWA is required. [Citations.]” (In re J.M. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 375, 381.)
Of concern here is the notice requirement. If an agency “knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved” in a dependency proceeding, the agency must send notice of the proceeding to, among others, a representative of all potentially interested Indian tribes. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) If the identity of the child’s tribe cannot be determined, ICWA requires notice be given to the BIA. (25 U.S.C. §§ 1903(11), 1912(a); In re Michael V. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 225, 232.) “[F]ederal and state law require that the notice sent to the potentially concerned tribes include ‘available information about the maternal and paternal grandparents and great-grandparents, including maiden, married and former names or aliases; birthdates; place of birth and death; current and former addresses; tribal enrollment numbers; and other identifying data.’ [Citations.]” (In re A.G. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1396-1397.) California implements ICWA’s notice requirements. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.480-5.487.)
“Deficiencies in an ICWA notice are generally prejudicial, but may be deemed harmless under some circumstances. [Citations.]” (In re Cheyanne F. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 571, 577.) “We review the trial court’s findings whether proper notice was given under ICWA and whether ICWA applies to the proceedings for substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re D.N. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1251.) “‘“On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘Mere support for a contrary conclusion is not enough to defeat the finding [citation]; nor is the existence of evidence from which a different trier of fact might find otherwise in an exercise of discretion [citation].’ [Citation.]” (In re Charlotte V. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 51, 57.)
Father’s primary contention is the absence of any evidence that the social worker actively attempted to obtain complete biographical information about either his or mother’s relatives with Indian ancestry. Basically, he asks us to infer that the Department failed to interview the people who logically could have supplied such information. For example, he notes that there was no information about the maternal grandparents and the information about the one set of maternal great-grandparents failed to provide birthdates or birthplaces despite the fact that they appeared in court and had legal guardianship of the child’s older half sibling. Regarding his family, father points out that the notice lists his name and birthdate only, and his great-grandmother’s name only. Although he admits that he was present in court, he does not claim that the social worker failed to ask him for more information about his Indian ancestry. Rather, he asserts “[t]here was no information provided by the Department as to attempts to gain complete information including both names and date of birth for paternal grandmother and paternal great-grandmother.”
One possible inference is that the social worker never asked him or mother for more information about the Indian relatives; however, another possible inference is that the social worker did ask, but they were either unable or unwilling to provide this information. Under the applicable standard of review, we must draw all possible inferences in favor of the prevailing party” “Under this standard, we do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reweigh the evidence.” (In re M.B. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1506.) Similarly, regarding the missing birthplaces for maternal and paternal relatives who were available to be interviewed, it is not inconceivable that they did not know or chose not to share this information. (In re Charlotte V., supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 58 [“It is also possible that the maternal grandfather was evasive or uncooperative about his wife’s information.”].)
Father argues that the burden of coming forward with information about possible Indian ancestry “does not rest entirely, or even primarily, on the child and his or her family,” but that the Department has an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire as to whether the child is or may be an Indian child. We agree that the Department has the burden of obtaining all possible information about the child’s potential Indian ancestry; however, as already discussed, under the official duty presumption, we must assume that this duty has been performed, and the burden is on the father to rebut the presumption. Moreover, on appeal, “[t]he juvenile court’s judgment is presumed to be correct, and it is appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error. [Citation.]” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; see also In re Kathy P. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 91, 102 [appellant failed to present adequate record to rebut official duty presumption].)
In the well-chosen words of Charlotte V., “If [father] had raised the ICWA notice issue in the juvenile court, [he] could have subpoenaed [the Department’s] employees and questioned them about their efforts to elicit the required information . . . . In that event, [the Department] could have introduced additional evidence to show that it had made an adequate inquiry. However, [father] did not raise the issue below and [the Department] now lacks that opportunity. At this point, [father] must take the record as [he] finds it.” (In re Charlotte V., supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 58.)
We therefore conclude that father has not shown that the juvenile court erred by finding that ICWA did not apply.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:

MCKINSTER
J.

FIELDS
J.