Filed 7/24/17 In re G.C. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
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In re G.C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. C082157


SHASTA COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.C. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

(Super. Ct. Nos. 14JVSQ3008101, 14JVSQ3008201)




Gary C. (father) and Reyna C. (mother) appeal from orders of the juvenile court terminating their parental rights and finding that adoption is the permanent plan for minors G.C. and R.C. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395; further undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Parents contend the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the exception to adoption based on avoiding interference with a sibling relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) We will affirm the juvenile court orders.
The selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, “is designed to protect children’s ‘compelling rights . . . to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52-53.) “ ‘The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child. [Citation.]” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368, original italics.)
There are only limited circumstances which permit the court to find a “compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One such circumstance is when termination of parental rights would result in “substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
There is a “heavy burden” on the parent opposing adoption under the sibling exception. (In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813.) The authors of the legislation envisioned that the applicability of this exception would “ ‘likely be rare.’ [Citation.]” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 950.) “To show a substantial interference with a sibling relationship the parent must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the child.” (Id. at p. 952, fn. omitted.) If the court determines that the child has a significant sibling relationship and would suffer detriment if that relationship were severed, the court then must weigh the benefit to the child of continuing the relationship against “the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v); see In re L.Y.L., at pp. 952-953.)
In this case, minors G.C. (born May 2012) and R.C. (born April 2014) were detained from parents’ home, where they had lived with older brothers J.F. and Ja.F., on May 13, 2014. G.C. and R.C. were placed together in a separate foster home from their older brothers throughout the dependency proceedings. Parents failed to reunify with minors G.C. and R.C. and the minors were placed together in a prospective adoptive home.
By the time of the March 2016 section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing, older brother J.F. was 18 years old and living in a college dormitory. Nevertheless, parents presented evidence at the section 366.26 hearing that G.C. had a “very good bond” with J.F. and argued that the sibling relationship exception to adoption applied to preclude the minors’ adoption. The juvenile court acknowledged that minor G.C. had a relationship with J.F. but found the sibling relationship exception inapplicable.
We agree with the trial court that the sibling relationship exception is inapplicable under the facts of this case. The termination of parental rights did not directly interfere with the minors’ sibling relationship with J.F., nor would retaining parental rights necessarily preserve the sibling bond. Parents have no control over whether J.F. maintains a relationship with the minors. J.F. is an adult, does not live with parents, and maintains a relationship with parents and the minors by choice. His relationship with the minors does not depend on whether parents retain parental rights to the minors. There is no way to force J.F., as an adult, to maintain his sibling relationship with the minors, and J.F.’s history suggests he might not choose to avail himself of sibling visitation even if given the opportunity. On February 4, 2015, the social worker reported that J.F. was not attending visits or seeing his siblings by his own choice. The visitation logs from May 1, 2014 to February 2, 2015 show that J.F. attended only four visits with minors G.C. and R.C. Thus, the record reflects that J.F. did not avail himself of regular visitation with minors G.C. and R.C. during the pendency of this matter, by his own choice, even though it was court-ordered. Contrary to parents’ assertion, a permanent plan of legal guardianship could not assure a continued relationship or visitation between J.F. and the minors.
“Where the parents’ continuing relationship with the dependent child, or absence thereof, can in no way affect the nature of the sibling relationship because the parent no longer has a relationship with the sibling, the exception does not apply.” (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403; see also In re J.T. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 707, 719.)
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.



/S/
MAURO, J.



We concur:



/S/
RAYE, P. J.



/S/
RENNER, J.