Filed 7/28/17 In re J.R. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re J.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.


E067187

(Super.Ct.No. RIJ1500863)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew C. Perantoni, Judge. Affirmed.
Zulu Ali, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman, and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

C.A. (mother) appeals from the judgment terminating her parental rights over her son, J.R. She argues the court erred by determining the parental benefit exception (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply. We affirm.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Detention, Jurisdiction, and Disposition
In August 2015, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) filed a dependency petition for newborn J.R., alleging he was at substantial risk of harm within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged J.R. had tested positive for opiates and methamphetamine at birth and was being treated for withdrawal. The petition also alleged mother and father suffered from unresolved substance abuse and mental health issues.
In the detention report, the social worker stated J.R. weighed four pounds 14 ounces at birth and exhibited significant signs of opiate withdrawal. He had been transferred to intensive care and was receiving methadone twice a day and morphine as needed.
The social worker interviewed mother in the hospital the day after J.R. was born. Mother admitted she had used heroin for the last month of her pregnancy, but claimed she did so only because a friend told her it would ease her back pain. Shortly before J.R. was born, she told her physician about her heroin use and Kaiser’s chemical dependency department prescribed her Subutex. The medication was the only treatment she had received, but she was willing to participate in a drug treatment program “if her prescribing physician thinks she needs treatment in addition to the Subutex.” She also admitted she had been hospitalized in 2012 “for an overdose.”
Mother had never been employed. She had been dating father for 10 months and they lived with her parents, who were financially supporting her. Father admitted he was addicted to heroin.
On August 13, 2015, the juvenile court detained J.R. from his parents and ordered visitation based on the hospital’s guidelines. J.R. was released from the hospital a few days later and placed with the paternal grandparents.
In its jurisdiction/disposition report, DPSS recommended the court declare J.R. a dependent and provide mother with family reunification services. The social worker reported mother was thinking of enrolling in an inpatient drug treatment program to show her willingness to get help. Mother had visited J.R. daily while he was at the hospital, and staff noted no concerns. After J.R. was placed with the paternal grandparents, mother visited him two to three times a week. The paternal grandmother told the social worker she had a good relationship with the parents and thought they should visit with J.R. as much as possible to foster a strong bond with their son. To prepare the parents for reunification, she allowed them to feed and change J.R. and put him to sleep during visits.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in September 2015, the juvenile court found the petition’s allegations true, declared J.R. a dependent, and removed him from his parents. The court ordered family reunification services for mother.
B. Failed Reunification and Termination of Parental Rights
Things did not go well for mother during the six-month review period. She visited J.R. three to five days a week in September 2015, only once or twice a week in October, and then not at all from November to mid-January. The social worker spoke with mother over the phone on December 28, 2015. Mother said she was interested in taking parenting classes and agreed to meet with the social worker the following day to discuss her case plan. However, mother did not show up to that meeting and never contacted DPSS afterward. From mid-January to March 2016, mother’s visits with J.R. were inconsistent.
DPSS recommended terminating mother’s services in its six-month status review report. The social worker wrote: “[M]other has not made herself available to the Department and she has not returned phone calls.” As a result, DPSS was unaware of her living arrangement, or the status of her relationships, employment or health.
Mother attended the six-month status review hearing on March 3, 2016 and brought a list of services she claimed to have been participating in. The court ordered DPSS to review her case plan efforts and submit an update. After the hearing, the social worker asked mother to follow her to DPSS’s office so she could administer a drug test and discuss her case plan progress. Mother did not show up and later called the social worker to say she “was busy; [and] had important insurance stuff to take care of.” The social worker informed her that a failure to drug test was considered a positive test.
By the time DPSS submitted its addendum report on March 24, 2016, mother had still not been in contact with the social worker or provided any documentation of her participation in services. DPSS concluded it would be detrimental to return J.R. to mother’s care due to her unresolved substance abuse and mental health issues. It recommended terminating her services because her visits with J.R. had been inconsistent and she had not begun a drug treatment program. At the review hearing on March 24, 2016, the court terminated mother’s services and set a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing.
At his six-month well-baby exam in February 2016, J.R. weighed 14 pounds and was described as “healthy and thriving.” He was physically active and suffering from no noticeable developmental delays. J.R. was still living with the parental grandparents, who were providing him a stable and loving home and desired to adopt him. J.R. had developed a strong bond with his prospective adoptive parents and was noticeably attached to them. The social worker observed that father also had a strong, loving bond with J.R. and consistently showed up for visits. Mother, on the other hand, had been inconsistent. J.R. had a difficult time recognizing her at the start of visits and, while he would begin interacting with her after about 20 minutes, sometimes he would cry and look for his prospective adoptive parents.
In the section 366.26 report, the social worker updated the court on mother’s contact with J.R., stating: “Mother has remained inconsistent with her visitation plan since the time of J.R.’s removal. She has had limited communication with the Department to inquire about her son’s status or regarding his well-being. She has made appointments with the caregiver so that she can see J.R., however, she has cancelled or not showed up to the visits. The contact between mother and J.R. has been inconsistent.” DPSS recommended the court terminate parental rights and select adoption as J.R.’s permanent plan. DPSS submitted a positive adoption assessment for the paternal grandparents.
At the permanency and planning hearing on October 20, 2016, mother objected to terminating her parental rights on the ground she shared a “significant bond” with J.R. Mother provided no argument or evidence to demonstrate the strength of the bond and acknowledged her visitation had been inconsistent. The court found adoption was in J.R.’s best interest and termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to him. The court also found that none of the exceptions to termination applied.
II
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the court erred by determining the parental benefit exception to terminating parental rights did not apply to her. We find no error.
“‘Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature.’” (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) “[I]t is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
The exception at issue here, commonly called the parental benefit exception, requires the parent to prove “termination would be detrimental to the child” because the parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i), italics added.) “[T]he court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 528-529.)
Once a parent has failed to reunify with the child and the juvenile court finds the child adoptable, the parent bears the burden of proving the exception applies. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343.) We review the juvenile court’s determination whether a beneficial parental relationship exists for substantial evidence, and its determination whether the relationship provides “a ‘compelling reason’ for finding detriment to the child” for abuse of discretion. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.)
Here, mother cannot meet her burden of demonstrating the exception applies because she did not maintain regular visitation with J.R. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) She did not visit her son at all for almost three months during the reunification period and, in the last several months of the proceedings, she either cancelled or failed to show up for many of her visits. This inconsistency affected her relationship with J.R. The child did not recognize her at the beginning of visits and would look for his caregivers and cry before the visit was over.
Consistent visitation is a minimal requirement of the parental benefit exception. Without it, a parent cannot hope to show he or she is sufficiently committed to strengthening or maintaining the parent/child bond. As a result, mother’s failure to consistently visit J.R. is sufficient on its own to defeat her claim of error. However, the record also demonstrates mother made no progress toward resolving her substance abuse issue and did not take the dependency seriously. Despite using heroin while pregnant with J.R. and placing his health at great risk, she never provided any documentation that she had sought any type of substance abuse treatment. She talked about enrolling in parenting class and inpatient drug treatment programs, but never followed through. Significantly, on the day she represented to the court that she was participating in services, she blew off her appointment with the social worker and failed to drug test. Mother’s refusal to keep in contact with DPSS during the reunification period indicates she was not serious about seeking treatment or staying in contact with her son.
Mother points out she sought help for her substance abuse even before J.R. was born and consistently visited him in the hospital. Unfortunately, these initial efforts are overshadowed by her subsequent lack of effort or interest. Aside from his time in the hospital receiving withdrawal treatment, J.R. has spent his entire young life in the loving and stable care of his paternal grandparents. We conclude the juvenile court properly determined that whatever parent-child bond mother and J.R. share does not override J.R.’s need for a stable, permanent future with his caregivers. (In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 528-529.)
III
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

SLOUGH
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

McKINSTER
J.