Filed 8/11/17 Conservatorship of James S. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sutter)
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Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of JAMES S. C082870


SUTTER COUNTY PUBLIC GUARDIAN,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

JAMES S.,

Objector and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. No. CVSM16-0847)




James S. challenges the appointment of a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS or LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.), contending the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding he was gravely disabled. Because the one-year LPS Act conservatorship has terminated by operation of law, we will dismiss the appeal as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
James S. was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder bipolar type. The trial court granted the appointment of a temporary LPS conservator on May 16, 2016, and placed James S. in a locked facility at Sutter County Mental Health on May 24, 2016. On June 23, 2016, following a contested trial, the trial court found James S. was gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder and placed him in a one-year conservatorship. The trial court also imposed special disabilities, restricting James S. from: having a driver’s license; entering into contracts; refusing medical treatment both related and unrelated to his grave disability; and possessing a firearm.
James S. filed a notice of appeal in the trial court on June 29, 2016, and the case was fully briefed in this court on May 31, 2017. On June 23, 2017, the conservatorship terminated by operation of law. We requested supplemental briefing on whether James S.’s appeal has been rendered moot.
DISCUSSION
James S. contends there was insufficient evidence to support the finding he was gravely disabled and unable to provide food, clothing, and shelter for himself. He contends his appeal is not moot as the issues raised may affect the trial court’s right to continue jurisdiction in subsequent conservatorship proceedings and he should not be denied review because appellate review took longer than the conservatorship lasted.
None of the cases James S. relies upon to support his claim that the issues raised may affect the trial court’s right to continue jurisdiction arise in the context of an LPS conservatorship. The cases James S. cites involve commitments of mentally disordered offenders (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.) and commitments pursuant to insanity pleas (Pen. Code, § 1026 et seq.). These statutory schemes are entirely distinct from LPS Act conservatorships. Under these statutory schemes, extended commitments are dependent upon findings made in the original commitment. This is why the propriety of the initial commitment may affect the trial court’s right to continue jurisdiction under the original commitment. (People v. J.S. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 163, 170-172; Pen. Code, §§ 1026, 1026.2, 1026.5.)
The same is not true in an LPS conservatorship. The reestablishment of an LPS conservatorship is not a continuation of earlier proceedings, nor can the trial court rely on earlier findings to establish a subsequent conservatorship. Rather, the proceeding to reestablish a conservatorship is a new and independent proceeding at which the conservator must establish that the proposed conservatee remains presently gravely disabled. (§ 5350; Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235; Conservatorship of Diedre B. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1312.) That is, each subsequent establishment of an LPS conservatorship is independent of an LPS conservatorship that preceded it. In addition, with the filing of a new petition for a conservatorship, the trial court may appoint a temporary conservator pending the outcome of trial. (§ 5352.1; Conservatorship of Early (1983) 35 Cal.3d 244, 255.) The conservatee may challenge the propriety of that appointment and the conservator’s placement choices for the conservatee prior to trial by writ of habeas corpus. (§ 5275; Conservatorship of Early, supra, at p. 255; In re Lois M. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1036, 1040-1041.) Thus, the trial court’s jurisdiction is not dependent on the propriety of the original commitment.
James S. also relies on People v. Hurtado (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1179, 1186, a Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (§ 6600 et seq.) commitment, to support his claim that his appeal is not moot because he should not be denied his right of review solely because the review took longer than his conservatorship lasted. Hurtado did not involve a claim of insufficient evidence as to a particular appellant and it does not support the position that every appeal from a relatively short commitment period should be decided on the merits because it is likely to become moot before the appellate process is completed. Rather, Hurtado involved a matter of public interest likely to recur while evading review—whether the jury in an SVPA commitment was required to determine whether the offender was likely to commit sexually violent predatory acts prior to being committed as an SVP. (Hurtado, supra, at pp. 1185-1186.)
Similarly, in LPS conservatorship appeals, courts have exercised their inherent discretion to determine the merits of some cases when the appeal raises an issue of public interest likely to recur while evading review. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142, fn. 2 [proposed conservatee’s due process right to be present at hearing]; Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1011, fn. 5 [applicability of exclusionary rule]; Conservatorship of George H. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 157, 161, fn. 2 [sua sponte instructional requirements]; Conservatorship of Joel E. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 429, 434 [right to self-representation].) This case, unlike those, does not raise an issue of continuing public interest. The substantial evidence issues James S. has raised are particular to this case and particular to this appellant; they are not matters of broad public interest. It is true that LPS conservatorship proceedings may often elude appellate review because the conservatorships may expire before an appeal can be decided. That outcome, however, is a result of the statutory scheme by the Legislature and is beyond our purview to supplant.

DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.



BUTZ , J.



We concur:



ROBIE , Acting P. J.



DUARTE , J.