Filed 8/15/17 P. v. Melendez CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
| THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JESUS MELENDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
|
F073669
(Super. Ct. No. F14910887)
OPINION |
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Brian Alvarez, Judge.
Tutti Hacking, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and Raymond L. Brosterhous II, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Jesus Melendez pled no contest to one count of second degree burglary after his motion to suppress was denied. He contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On December 3, 2014, Melendez was charged with one count of second degree burglary, in violation of Penal Code[1] sections 459 and 460, subdivision (b). It also was alleged that he had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
Melendez filed a motion to suppress on June 3, 2015. The People filed written opposition to the motion. The suppression motion was heard as part of the preliminary hearing and at the conclusion of the hearing, the motion was denied.
At the preliminary hearing, Kerman Police Department Patrol Sergeant Jeff Davis testified on the suppression issue. At the time of the hearing, Davis had been a sworn peace officer for 15 years. He was on patrol in the early hours of November 22, 2014 in the area of Kearney Boulevard and Kenneth Avenue. Around 3:45 a.m. that morning, Davis saw a Toyota vehicle drive out of an almond orchard and onto Kearney, then turn and go back into the orchard.
Schaad Almonds had a plant on the orchard property where Davis had seen the Toyota leave and enter. Davis patrolled the area of the orchard on a regular basis because he had recovered stolen vehicles left in the orchard on prior occasions and the area was adjacent to the town of Kerman. Davis ran the license plate of the Toyota and found it was registered to an address in Fresno, some 17 miles from Kerman.
Davis followed the vehicle back into the orchard and effected a traffic stop. Davis noted that there was no activity at that hour in the orchard and no other vehicles at the orchard. Davis testified he decided to effect a traffic stop of the Toyota based on the early hour of the morning with no activity in the orchard, the fact the vehicle was registered to a Fresno address, and the history of prior criminal activity in the orchard.
After stopping the Toyota, Davis walked up to the vehicle. As he approached, he saw several boxes of almonds and a flat-screen TV in the back seat of the Toyota. Melendez was one of two people in the Toyota. Davis believed that an “ag theft” had just occurred because the vehicle was “loaded with almonds.”
On cross-examination, Davis acknowledged that when he ran the license plate, the Toyota did not show up as a stolen vehicle. Davis testified he was familiar with the orchard property and there was an almond plant on the orchard, but to his knowledge no residence; the residence was across the street from the orchard.
On redirect, Davis testified that based upon his training and experience, stolen vehicles often were not reported stolen the moment they were taken; it might be hours or even days later before a report is made. Davis also testified it was “very uncommon” to see any vehicles in the orchard at that hour of the early morning.
Sheriff’s Deputy John Erickson also testified at the hearing. He arrived after Davis had effected a traffic stop. The vehicle was a maroon Toyota Tercel. When he spoke with the occupants of the Toyota, they admitted breaking into a break room at the plant; the almonds and TV were removed from the break room and Melendez placed them into the Toyota.
On October 6, 2015, Melendez renewed his suppression motion by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 995. The trial court heard and denied the motion on October 30, 2015.
Thereafter, on January 14, 2016, Melendez signed a Felony Advisement, Waiver of Rights and Plea form. The plea bargain called for Melendez to plead no contest to the second degree burglary count, in exchange for a stipulated sentence of 16 months. The sentence was to be comprised of eight months in local confinement and eight months on mandatory supervised release.
On February 29, 2016, Melendez was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. He filed his notice of appeal on April 28, 2016.
DISCUSSION
The appeal challenges the denial of Melendez’s motion to suppress. Melendez contends Davis provided no specific and articulable facts that would indicate he was involved in criminal activity, thus justifying the traffic stop. Consequently, the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress.
Standard of Review
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a suppression motion, we accept the court’s implicit or explicit factual findings when supported by substantial evidence and independently determine, in light of the facts so found, whether the search and seizure was reasonable. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 924; People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673-674; People v. Watkins (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1408 (Watkins).) Law enforcement officers may lawfully detain a motorist based on no more than a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or some other law. (United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 682; Watkins, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1408; People v. Castellon (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1376, fn. 3.)
A traffic stop that is lawful at its inception, based on a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred, is not made unlawful because the officer does not ultimately cite the motorist. “A traffic stop is lawful at its inception if it is based on a reasonable suspicion that any traffic violation has occurred, even if it is ultimately determined that no violation did occur.” (Brierton v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 499, 510; also see People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926.)
“ ‘A defendant may move to suppress evidence on the ground that “[t]he search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.” [Citation.] A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating a legal justification for the search.’ ” (People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1053.) We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979), and we affirm a correct decision by the trial court even if based on an erroneous reason (People v. Lujano (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 182).
Analysis
Melendez contends Davis had no articulable facts indicating possible criminal activity warranting a traffic stop. He is mistaken.
Davis observed the Toyota exit the Schaad orchard at 3:45 a.m., then re-enter the orchard; the business was closed and there were no other vehicles or people on the premises. The vehicle also was registered to an address in Fresno, some 17 miles away; it was not registered to the Schaad business. At a minimum, these facts articulated by Davis give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the Toyota were trespassing, a violation of section 602, subdivision (l). Davis lawfully could detain the occupants of the Toyota based on no more than a reasonable suspicion of a violation of any law, and trespassing violates section 602. (Watkins, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1408.)
Additionally, Davis testified he patrolled the area of the orchard on a regular basis because he had recovered stolen vehicles left in the orchard on prior occasions and the area was adjacent to the town of Kerman. Davis also testified that based upon his training and experience, stolen vehicles often were not reported stolen the moment they were taken; it might be hours or even days later before a report is made. Based upon his regular patrols of the area, Davis knew it was “very uncommon” to see any vehicles in the orchard at that hour of the early morning.
Davis testified he decided to effect a stop of the Toyota based on the early hour of the morning with no activity in the orchard, the fact the vehicle was registered to a Fresno address, and the history of prior criminal activity in the orchard, specifically the dumping of stolen vehicles. Davis described the stop as an “investigative stop” based upon “suspicious activity.” An officer’s experience and observations “can furnish the reasonable basis for an investigatory stop.” (People v. Nice (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 928, 939.)
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling denying the motion to suppress, we conclude Davis articulated specific facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring. (People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 979.) Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. (People v. Lujano, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 182.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
