In re A.G. and M.R.

Filed 10/5/06 In re A.G. and M.R. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Anthony Trendacosta, Referee. Affirmed.

Ernesto Paz Rey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel, and O. Raquel Ramirez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Mother appeals from an order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] petition seeking modification of an earlier order that no reunification services be provided because Mother’s whereabouts were unknown. Mother’s petition sought to modify that order and to reinstate family reunification services with the goal of returning her two daughters to her custody. We conclude that Mother did not meet her burden of showing that the modification of the order was in the children’s best interests. Mother failed to rebut the presumption in favor of the children’s continued stable placement in the home of their prospective adoptive parents, with whom the children were strongly bonded. There was also evidence that return to Mother’s custody would harm the children’s development and emotional well-being. The evidence supported the trial court’s exercise of its discretion, and we affirm the juvenile court’s denial of the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Detention: On August 9, 2002, the Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) initiated a Voluntary Family Maintenance (“VFM”) contract with Trisha R. (“Mother”) and Elmer G., the unmarried parents of A.G., born August 2002, with a positive toxicology screen for cocaine. Trisha R., 18 years old, was also the mother of M.R., born January 2000, whose father was Francisco P., believed to be incarcerated for the statutory rape of Mother when she was 14 years old. Mother admitted using drugs before A.G.’s birth and agreed to participate in a VFM contract. In November 2002, Mother was arrested for shoplifting and jailed until January 2003. By February 14, 2003, Mother’s whereabouts were unknown after she had left the home with a new boyfriend and had intermittently abandoned the children in the previous few months. Elmer G. had seen Mother living on the streets and she had refused his request to return home and was believed to be using drugs. The juvenile court ordered the children detained on February 24, 2003, with Elmer G. As Elmer G. is not a party to Mother’s appeal, facts relating to Elmer G. will be largely omitted.

Section 300 Petition: On February 24, 2003, the DCFS filed a petition alleging that because of Mother’s failure or inability to supervise or protect them and to provide regular care, the children were persons described by section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged A.G.’s birth exposed to cocaine, Mother’s history of substance abuse and frequent cocaine use, and that despite prior DCFS intervention and VFM services, Mother continued to abuse drugs. The juvenile court set an adjudication hearing and a contested dispositional hearing for April 21, 2003.

Adjudication and Disposition: As of the April 21, 2003, hearing, Mother’s whereabouts were unknown. She was believed to live on the streets and had not visited since the detention. The juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petition, declared A.G. and M.R. dependent children of the court under section 300, subdivision (b), and ordered them placed in Elmer G.’s home. Finding Mother’s whereabouts unknown, the juvenile court ordered no reunification services be provided for Mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1). The matter was continued for a section 366.26 permanent plan hearing for M.R. and a judicial review hearing for A.G.

Review Period Between April 21 and October 20, 2003: As of October 20, 2003, Mother’s whereabouts remained unknown. Mother had no visits with the children in this period and made no effort to inquire as to their well-being. The family reported that Mother was seen in Los Angeles and was living with her boyfriend at an unknown address. A.G. and M.R. lived with Elmer G. in Arizona.

With regard to M.R., the juvenile court did not terminate parental rights but it identified adoption as the permanent plan and continued the matter, and A.G.’s review hearing, to April 29, 2004.

Review Period Between October 20, 2003, and April 19, 2004: As of March 5, 2004, Elmer G. lacked funding and child care and could not care for the children on his own. On March 11, 2004, Elmer G. returned the children to California. On March 16, 2004, the DCFS filed a section 387 petition as to M.R. and a section 342 petition as to A.G., alleging that Elmer G. could not provide a home for the children, placing them at risk. Mother’s whereabouts remained unknown as of March 16, 2004.

At the March 16, 2004, hearing, the juvenile court detained both minors from Elmer G.’s care. Before the next hearing, a 49-year-old maternal great-aunt, the sister of Mother’s mother, called the children’s social worker (“CSW”) to see if she could care for the children. She and her husband had raised their children, who no longer lived in their home, and owned a three-bedroom house at a 25-acre ranch in Moorpark with plenty of room for M.R. and A.G.

On March 24, 2004, the juvenile court ordered the assessment of the maternal great-aunt for placement.

April 19, 2004, Hearing: A DCFS home study found the maternal great-aunt and great-uncle’s home to be appropriate. Mother agreed to the children living with the maternal great-aunt and great-uncle, with whom Mother had lived for four years when she was young and whom she loved and respected.

Mother appeared at the April 19, 2004, hearing, in which the juvenile court ordered placement of A.G. and M.R. with their maternal great-aunt. Mother appeared at this hearing. The juvenile court ordered monitored visits for Mother and continued the matter to May 13, 2004. On May 13, 2004, the juvenile court ordered a permanent plan for M.R. of planned permanent living arrangement with foster care.

July 14, 2004, Hearing: For the July 14, 2004, hearing, the DCFS reported that M.R. and A.G. loved their aunt and uncle, loved living with them, and had traveled to their caretakers’ cabin at Lake Mead. The children loved the animals on the caretakers’ property, rode the tractor, played in the yard, and lacked for nothing. Extended family members visited and the children had met their cousins, aunts and uncles, and neighborhood friends. The children and caretakers had bonded.

Mother’s calls upset the children. The caretaker reported that when Mother called every day, it upset the children, who had a difficult time after they got off the phone. The caretaker asked mother to reduce her calls to twice a week, and Mother sometimes complied. M.R. did well until she heard from Mother and became upset. A.G., nearly two years old, was confused by Mother’s sudden reemergence in her life.

The children benefited from the structure of the caregivers’ home, and their behavior and social skills improved.

Mother did not appear for the July 14, 2004, hearing. The juvenile court sustained the sections 342 and 387 petitions as to A.G. and M.R. The juvenile court judge observed that the DCFS case plan did not offer further reunification services to Mother, whose statutory time to receive those services would end the following month. The juvenile court identified long-term foster care as the permanent plan.

November 10, 2004, Review of Permanent Plan: Before the next hearing on November 10, 2004, hearing, the CSW visited the children three times. The DCFS reported that Mother’s too frequent calls upset the children. M.R. never asked to speak with Mother, and when she did M.R. cried for a long time afterward. M.R. had great difficulty coping after a visit from Mother on Mother’s day. A.G. did not have much response to Mother’s visit. The maternal great-aunt was interested in guardianship of the children. The maternal great-aunt reported that Mother called and visited, but not on a regular basis. The children needed limits and discipline, but they had started to listen, slept better, and went to bed without a fuss. They did not ask for Mother. By September 29, 2004, A.G. had started to talk, and M.R. was doing well attending preschool four hours a day. The children thrived living with their maternal aunt and uncle in a beautiful home with lots of farm animals that they fed, named, and loved. The maternal great-aunt loved the children and they loved her.

Mother called too frequently, and her calls were disruptive and confusing to the girls. At times the children did not want to talk to her. M.R. acted out when Mother called. Mother’s visits went fairly well. Neither M.R. nor A.G. asked to speak to their parents.

Mother had not made progress toward completing her case plan goals. Mother stated that A.G. and M.R. should be placed with her current caregivers. The maternal great-aunt and -uncle were willing to adopt the children, and were financially able to provide a loving, secure home. They were building a large home in which M.R. and A.G. would each have a bedroom and bath.

Mother appeared at the November 10, 2004, hearing. The juvenile court ordered visits to occur either less frequently but for an extended length, or one time a week. The juvenile court set the matter for a section 366.26 permanent plan hearing on March 10, 2005.

November 10, 2004, to June 9, 2005, Review Period: For the March 10, 2005, hearing, the DCFS reported that the maternal great-aunt and -uncle had agreed to a plan of adoption for the children, who continued to do well in their care. Mother had regular visits with the children at the prospective adoptive parents’ home, and usually stayed all day. Mother made inappropriate promises to M.R. that she would return home with Mother, which confused and upset M.R. M.R. had a difficult time after this visit, and maternal great-aunt had to reassure M.R. that she was not returning to Mother. M.R. acted out when Mother phoned. Both girls were healthy and appeared happy and well taken care of.

A.G. and M.R. were very bonded to their prospective adoptive family, which had made a great effort to give the children love, a sense of security, instruction in elementary social manners, and discipline. Mother had lived with the prospective adoptive parents when she was a teenager, they had known A.G. and M.R. since birth, and after nine months with the children they wanted to adopt them.

Mother stated that she believed she could get her children back. Mother had an unresolved drug problem, had not complied with the court-ordered case plan of parenting, counseling, or random drug testing and drug counseling, and had provided the DCFS with no proof of her compliance with the case plan.

The review hearing and section 366.26 hearing were set for September 6, 2005. On June 9, 2005, the juvenile court ordered the DCFS to provide a completed home study and ordered adoption as the children’s permanent placement goal.

September 6, 2005, Hearing: For the September 6, 2005, hearing the DCFS reported that A.G. was very bonded to her prospective adoptive parents and would not leave their side. A.G. showed no feelings for Mother and did not ask for her or go to her during visits.

Mother had a new baby daughter in July 2005. She could not understand why M.R. was upset when Mother spoke to her about the new baby. After the prospective adoptive parents explained Mother’s new child to her, M.R. adjusted. Mother had monthly visits and visits on holidays and birthdays at the home of the prospective adoptive family. Mother often stayed all day during visits. The prospective adoptive mother stated that these visits were hard on the children and it took them several days to recover. A.G. was uncomfortable during Mother’s visits, and more than once said she was afraid of Mother. Visits became increasingly difficult due to Mother’s agitated, argumentative behavior and accusations that the prospective adoptive parents were trying to take her children. Mother often picked a fight with the prospective adoptive family before leaving, confusing and upsetting the children.

Mother told the CSW on August 17, 2005, that she would like M.R. and A.G. to live with her, and felt she was able to provide for them and for her third, new baby. M.R. said she wanted to live with her prospective parents and her sister, and did not mind seeing Mother but did not want to live with Mother.

In March, April, and May of 2005, M.R. saw a therapist, who reported that M.R. was close to A.G. and emotionally attached to her prospective adoptive parents. The therapist found that M.R. and A.G. thrived in their current home, that M.R.’s behavior had changed positively while she lived with her prospective adoptive parents, and that it was likely that M.R.’s behavior, academic achievement, and mental health would suffer greatly if she were removed from their home. The therapist concluded that if M.R. were removed from the prospective adoptive parents’ home, she would need intense therapy to help her adjust in the absence of her bond with her prospective adoptive parents, which was “the major stabilizing force in her life.”

Mother’s Section 388 Petition: On November 8, 2005, Mother filed a section 388 petition to modify the April 21, 2003, order that no reunification services be provided for Mother as her whereabouts were unknown, and seeking to reinstate family reunification services for Mother with the goal of returning the children to her.

Mother’s petition attached documentation concerning her progress in completing individual and group counseling, parenting, and substance abuse counseling, and her participation in drug testing and an aftercare treatment program. Mother also argued that she had visited M.R. and A.G. despite the caretakers’ imposition of obstacles to her regular contact with her children. Mother also cited her third daughter’s drug-free birth in July 2005. The petition argued that it would be in M.R. and A.G.’s best interests to return to Mother’s custody and live with their sister as a family. The juvenile court granted a December 6, 2005, hearing on Mother’s petition.

The DCFS report for the section 388 hearing reported that regarding the children, A.G. would not leave the side of her prospective adoptive mother and father and was bonded to both of them, showed no feelings for Mother, and did not ask for her or to go to her side during visits. The CSW observed A.G. running away from Mother during a November 15, 2005 visit. A.G. did not want to leave the prospective adoptive father, and did not want to enter the room for the visit. M.R. also hesitated and went to her room instead, and did not come down for awhile. After the CSW coaxed M.R. to the visit, the children spent the entire time playing with Mother’s new baby and avoiding Mother. M.R. read out loud to everyone who would listen.

The CSW observed that Mother’s counseling and parenting classes had given her little insight into her children’s feelings. The children did not respond to Mother’s requests for hugs during visits or when Mother asked the children several times if they loved her.

Regarding documentation attached to the petition, the DCFS stated that it had not received any of Mother’s drug test results. Regarding visitation, the DCFS stated that Mother was given every opportunity to visit A.G. and M.R. at the prospective adoptive parents’ home. Since March 2005, Mother had arrived late for many visits, and did not have a phone so she would appear for visits at a time of her choosing. Mother had several “no shows” and did not call to cancel. The prospective adoptive parents accommodated Mother’s visits by giving up vacation time and giving up a family outing. In late August the prospective caregivers reported that Mother had become increasingly difficult during visits, challenging them in front of the children, which upset the children. During a November 5, 2005, visit Mother became confrontational with the prospective adoptive mother, called her a liar in front of the children, and refused when asked to leave the home. The prospective adoptive mother called the CSW to say that Mother could not come to her home without a monitor due to her behavior.

The DCFS disagreed with Mother’s contention that it would be in A.G. and M.R.’s best interests to return them to Mother’s custody. Mother completed her court-ordered plan several years after it was ordered and after she abandoned the children. The children had grown to know their prospective adoptive parents as parents and had bonded with them. On the last monitored visit, the CSW observed that A.G. ran from Mother and hung onto her prospective adoptive father’s leg for protection, and had to be coaxed to attend Mother’s visit. Mother left early in A.G.’s life and she and A.G. had not bonded. A.G. had bonded to her prospective adoptive parents. M.R. suffered a form of panic attack because she was afraid she would be removed, and the CSW had to console her on each visit that she would remain safe in her prospective adoptive parents’ home. After 38 visits since March 2005, the children continued to resist Mother’s attempts to bond with them, remained uncomfortable in her presence, and did not ask to see her or live with her. They had bonded to their prospective adoptive parents and the DCFS recommended they stay in their care.

The juvenile court held a hearing on Mother’s section 388 petition on December 6, 2005. Mother testified that it was in the children’s best interests to return to her because she was their mother. She was afraid the children would resent her when they were older because she left them, and was afraid they would resent her aunt and uncle for not letting them come back to her. Mother felt she had made mistakes because her own mother was not there for her when she was younger, and wanted things to be different for her daughters and to be there for them always. She stated that she loved her daughters and did not want them to feel the pain she had felt.

The juvenile court found that as to the first requirement of a section 388 petition, Mother had shown a substantial change of circumstances, as evidenced in the reports, which the DCFS conceded. As to the second requirement, whether granting the petition would be in the children’s best interests, the juvenile court found that Mother’s testimony concerning her fear of the children’s later resentment of her was speculation and not a showing that granting the petition would be in the children’s best interest. The juvenile court cited Mother’s abandonment of the children, the failure of the placement with Elmer G., and the instability of the children’s lives until their placement with their current relative caretakers. Those caretakers had established a stable, loving, caring home for the children, where they were flourishing. The juvenile court did not find it to be in the children’s best interest to cause emotional upset by removing them from their current home and placing them in the custody of someone with whom M.R. had not lived for two years and A.G. had never lived with. The juvenile court therefore denied the section 388 petition.

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal on December 12, 2005.

ISSUE

Mother claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it ruled that reunification services were not in the best interests of M.R. and A.G.

DISCUSSION

A. The Standard of Review of an Order Denying a Section 388 Petition

“Under section 388, a parent may petition the court to change, modify, or set aside a previous court order. The petitioning party has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [(1)] there is a change of circumstances or new evidence, and [(2)] the proposed modification is in the minor’s best interests.” (In re S.M. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1119.) The petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, whose decision the appellate court will not disturb absent a clear abuse of discretion, defined as whether the juvenile court exceeded the bounds of reason. (Id. at pp. 1119-1120.)

Once the juvenile court orders termination of reunification services, a rebuttable presumption arises that continued care is in the child’s best interest. The focus shifts away from the precedence formerly given to the parent’s interest in reunification and toward the child’s need for permanency and stability. To revive the reunification issue, the parent bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by proving in a section 388 petition that changed circumstance warrant further consideration of reunification. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309-310.) Since the DCFS conceded that Mother’s petition had shown a change of circumstances, the issue on appeal is whether the proposed modification--which sought to reinstate family reunification services for Mother with the goal of returning the children to her--was in the children’s best interests.

B. Mother Had the Burden of Proving, by a Preponderance of the Evidence, That

Modifying the Order Denying Reunification Services Was in the Children’s

Best Interests

Mother argues that by granting a hearing on her section 388 petition, the juvenile court had found that she had made a prima facie showing that reunification would be in the children’s best interests. Therefore Mother concludes that she had only a “minimal” burden of showing the children’s best interests. Mother understates that burden. A prima facie showing refers to facts that will sustain a favorable decision if the juvenile court credits the evidence submitted in support of petitioner’s allegations. (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) At a hearing on the petition, the moving party must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that new evidence or a change of circumstances demonstrated that it was in the children’s best interests to modify the order denying reunification services to Mother. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1432(f).)

C. Mother’s Petition Came After the 18-Month Maximum Period for Provision of

Reunification Services

Mother also argues that until family reunification services have been tried and failed, or are precluded for some other reason, there is a statutory presumption that reunification of children and parents is in the children’s best interests. Mother, however, fails to provide legal authority for this purported statutory presumption; it is not found in the case Mother cites, In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 307. Instead of setting forth a statutory presumption, Marilyn H. identifies the compelling state interest in “providing stable, permanent homes for children who have been removed from parental custody and for whom reunification efforts with their parents have been unsuccessful.” (Ibid.) This compelling state interest “requires the court to concentrate its efforts, once reunification services have been terminated, on the child’s placement and well-being, rather than on a parent’s challenge to a custody order.” (Ibid.)

The provision of reunification services is a statutory benefit, not a constitutional entitlement. (In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 476.) Section 361.5, the statute governing reunification services, sets forth numerous situations in which reunification services need not be provided. The juvenile court’s April 21, 2003, order not to provide reunification services to Mother relied on section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1), which states that reunification services need not be provided to a parent whose whereabouts is unknown. Section 361.5, subdivision (d) further provides: “If reunification services are not ordered pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) and the whereabouts of a parent become known within six months of the out-of-home placement of the child, the court shall order the social worker to provide family reunification services in accordance with this subdivision.” As Mother’s whereabouts remained unknown until April 19, 2004, she did not qualify for this mandatory provision.

As of April 19, 2004, Mother agreed with M.R. and A.G.’s placement with their maternal great-aunt and great-uncle. Mother waited until November 8, 2005, to bring her section 388 petition. Thus more than two years and nine months elapsed from the detention of M.R. and A.G. from Mother on February 19, 2003, and more than two years and seven months elapsed from the April 21, 2003, order not to provide reunification services. These periods exceed the 18-month maximum for providing reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).)[2] The statutory 18-month limit for reunification services controls, “because at the 18-month benchmark, the focus of a dependency proceeding shifts to the child’s needs for permanency and stability.” (Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1510.) The juvenile court may extend this period “only under extraordinary circumstances ‘involv[ing] some external factor which prevented the parent from participating in the case plan.’ “ (Ibid.) Mother has not argued or provided evidence that extraordinary special circumstances require an extension. Thus for the juvenile court to extend services beyond 18 months would be an abuse of discretion and in excess of its jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 1511.) To initiate reunification services to a parent after the end of the 18-month period would likewise be an abuse of discretion and in excess of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.

D. The Evidence Shows That Denial of Mother’s Petition Would Be in the

Children’s Best Interests

Mother argues that the juvenile court erroneously interpreted the children’s “best interests” by a simple comparison of the prospective adoptive parents’ home for A.G. and M.R. with the home Mother would be able to provide them. We find no error.

Mother’s petition provided no information concerning the home Mother would be able to provide for the children. Other than the absence of a telephone in Mother’s home as of August 16, 2005 (an omission Mother claimed had been rectified), the record contains no other information concerning Mother’s home. Thus it would not have been possible for the juvenile court to make a simple comparison of the prospective adoptive parents’ home with Mother’s home.

The authority Mother cites requires the juvenile court to consider “all familial attachments and bonds between father, mother, sister and brother,” the child’s interest in preserving an existing family unit, and to “address the child as a whole person, including his or her formative years with a natural parent.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 529-530.) The juvenile court, however, expressly cited Kimberly F. in determining whether it was in A.G. and M.R.’s best interests to grant Mother’s petition. The juvenile court said that one factor in this determination was the relationship between the children and the current caretaker versus the relationship between the children and Mother. The juvenile court weighed positive effects of the successful current placement on the children, who had previously known instability after being abandoned by Mother and being unsuccessfully placed with Elmer G., against the emotional upset of being removed from the only home they had known for approximately 18 months. On this basis the juvenile court denied the petition. We conclude that the evidence supports the juvenile court’s exercise of its discretion in making this order.

M.R. was just over two years old when Mother abandoned the children. A.G. had no formative years with Mother, who admitted using drugs before A.G. was born in August 2002, with a positive toxicology screen for cocaine. Mother was arrested in November 2002 and jailed until January 2003, and by February 14, 2003, her whereabouts were unknown. Thus A.G. had unstable and intermittent contact with Mother during the first six months of her life, and thereafter had no contact with Mother until April 19, 2004. A.G. and M.R. had lived successfully with their maternal great-aunt and great-uncle since that time. Although from this time Mother had more contact with the children, as of July 14, 2004, A.G., nearly two years old, was confused by Mother’s sudden reemergence in her life. Between July and November 2004, Mother’s daily telephone calls upset the children. A.G. had no response to Mother’s visit on Mother’s Day in 2004; M.R. had great difficulty coping after Mother left. The maternal great-aunt stated that M.R. never asked to speak with Mother, and when she did speak with Mother she cried for a long time afterward. As of September 2004, at times the children did not want to speak to Mother when she telephoned, and Mother’s calls were disruptive and confusing to the girls. M.R. “act[ed] out” when Mother called.

As of the time of Mother’s section 388 petition, the DCFS reported that A.G. showed no feelings for Mother and did not ask for her or go to her side during visits. A.G. was bonded to both prospective adoptive parents, would not leave their side, and did not want to enter the room for Mother’s November 15, 2005, visit. M.R. also hesitated and went to her room, and did not come down for awhile. After the CSW coaxed M.R. to join the visit, the children played with Mother’s new baby and avoided Mother. When Mother asked the children for hugs, neither child wanted to hug her and did not respond when Mother asked them several times if they loved her. The prospective adoptive mother reported that during Mother’s phone calls, M.R. did not respond to Mother’s questions whether M.R. loved her. M.R. told the CSW on August 24, 2005, that she only wanted to live with her prospective adoptive parents and did not want to live with Mother. On the last monitored visit, A.G. ran from Mother and hung onto her prospective adoptive father’s leg for protection. The CSW described A.G. as having bonded to her prospective adoptive parents, but as having no bond to Mother, who left early in A.G.’s life.

The evidence clearly satisfied the Kimberly F. criteria. The juvenile court did not engage in a simple comparison of households, but instead addressed the existence of the children’s bonds to their prospective adoptive parents and to Mother, their progress in their current placement, and the emotional and developmental effects of removing them from that placement. We find no abuse of discretion in the order denying the petition.

Mother further argues that the existence or nonexistence of a parental bond becomes significant only after reunification services have been tried and failed, citing David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 788. In David B., however, reunification services were still being provided, giving the parent the benefit of the presumption in favor of family preservation and maintaining family relationships. (Ibid.) Here, by contrast, the 18-month maximum period of family relationships had long since elapsed by the time Mother brought her section 388 petition, and Mother cannot claim the benefit of that presumption. Instead the children’s need for stability and continuity is now the paramount concern. (In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 67.) When placement is successful and continues for a significant period of time, the children’s need for continuity and stability “ ‘will often dictate the conclusion that maintenance of the current arrangement would be in the best interests of [those children]. ‘ “ (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) That is the case here. Mother’s evidence did not rebut the presumption that continued foster care is in the children’s best interests. (Ibid.) To reintroduce uncertainty and instability into the children’s lives by initiating a period of reunification services, which might--or might not--lead to custody of the children with Mother would not be in their best interests: “Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.” (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.)

We affirm the denial of the section 388 petition.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KITCHING, J.

We concur:

KLEIN, P. J.

ALDRICH, J.

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Analysis and review provided by La Mesa Property line attorney.

[1] Unless otherwise specified, statutes in this opinion will refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

[2] Section 361.5 states that child welfare services, when provided, shall not exceed a 12-month period from the date a child who was three years old or more when removed from the physical custody of her parent, and shall not exceed a 6-month period from the date a child under three years old was removed the physical custody of her parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1) & (2).) There is, however, an exception which may lengthen these periods, but the exception only provides a maximum of 18 months of reunification services: “Notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), court-ordered services may be extended up to a maximum time period not to exceed 18 months after the date the child was originally removed from physical custody of his or her parent . . . if it can be shown, at the hearing held pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 366.21, that the permanent plan for the child is that he or she will be returned and safety maintained in the home within the extended time period.” (Id., subd. (a).)