Filed 8/29/17 In re Jesse D. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Hugo J. Loza, Judge.

Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kathleen Bales-Lange, County Counsel, John A. Rozum and Carol E. Helding, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Jesse D. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over his child, Jesse, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] He argues the juvenile court erred when it found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply. We reject father’s claim and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Previous Section 300 Petition

Jesse first came to the attention of the juvenile court in September 2012, when the Tulare County Health & Human Services (Agency) filed a section 300 petition alleging Dolores O. (mother) had a substance abuse problem and father failed to protect newborn Jesse, as well as eight-year-old half-brother D., from mother.[2] The allegation was based on a presumed positive methadone test on mother at the time of Jesse’s birth, but the test was later determined to be inaccurate.

The family had numerous prior referrals, including allegations of general neglect regarding Jesse’s half-brothers D. and N., substance abuse by mother, and domestic violence. In October 2012, the petition was found not true and the dependency action dismissed.

Current Section 300 Petition

After the first dependency action concluded, the Agency continued to receive referrals of general neglect of Jesse and D., as well as physical abuse of D.

In June 2014, the Agency filed another section 300 petition, this time alleging that, in addition to mother’s substance abuse, mother and father failed to adequately provide clothing, shelter and medical care for D. and Jesse. The petition was based on the result of a referral from a police officer, who responded to a Wal-Mart store petty theft and concerns of child neglect. During the investigation, 21-month-old Jesse was found to have a severe diaper rash, including ruptured blisters. A safety check of mother and father’s home found it filthy and without electricity. There were cats in the home and no litter box. Two BB guns were within reach of the children. D.’s room had a twin mattress without bedding. When the social worker spoke to mother and father, father became irate, stating “‘fucking CPS took my kid last time.’”

While drug test results for both mother and father were negative, a search of the family history showed 25 prior referrals since 2007. Both children were taken into custody.

At the detention hearing on June 12, 2014, mother and father reported no Indian ancestry. The Agency was given discretion to return the children prior to the next hearing if the home was found suitable and safe. A contested detention hearing was set for June 17, 2014.

An Agency addendum report filed in anticipation of the contested detention hearing described the subsequent home inspection, stating there were two large pit bulls tied to a tree, which required the parents to come outside before the social worker could enter. There was still no electricity, and the power box had been smashed. They had a $2,000 outstanding power bill.

The home had a strong odor of urine, although there was now a litter box in the home. Extension cords and uncovered electrical outlets were still present. Multiple windows were boarded up, blocking fire exits. There was no clothing for the children, although the parents claimed they washed it and packed it in a suitcase. There were no soap or hygiene products in the bathroom, and D. claimed mother “‘forgets’” to bathe Jesse and he had only seen her do it two or three times.

The foster mother where the children were staying reported that she had to bathe Jesse multiple times as he had a thick layer of dirt on his scalp. His diaper rash was determined to be a yeast infection, which showed immediate signs of improvement with medication. A developmental assessment of Jesse showed him to be “‘well below the cut off for all areas of development,’” and a referral to Central Valley Regional Center (CVRC) was recommended.

Mother denied drug use, but tested negative only one out of the four times requested by the Agency. The rest of the time, she either refused or claimed unable to provide a sample.

Based on the addendum report, counsel for mother withdrew her request for a contested detention hearing, and the children remained detained. Both children were detained and mother and father ordered to have supervised visits three times a week for two hours in duration. Jurisdiction was set for July 29, 2014.

Jurisdiction and Disposition

The Agency report prepared in anticipation of jurisdiction and disposition reported Jesse was seen by a doctor in February 2014 for a diaper rash and was also diagnosed with scabies. D. was also diagnosed with scabies, which meant the entire foster family had to undergo treatment. D. was found to have seven cavities; three teeth were so decayed they required extraction.

When the social worker discussed the case with mother, mother said the police officer did not like her and knew the family because father used to hit her. Mother reported that father last hit her five years ago; later obtained police reports showed reports of domestic violence in December 2010 and March and July 2012. Mother had various accounts of her substance abuse, stating she used prescribed pills nine years ago, that she last abused drugs one year ago, but then said she had a bottle of Tramadol that was prescribed.

The social worker also discussed the case with father, who stated they moved to a new home because their old home was dirty. While the new home was found appropriate, with working utilities, there were no beds for the children. When asked if he knew why the Agency was involved, father said the police officer accused him of not taking care of his son, but that the officer lied. Father also said it was not his fault there was no electricity in their previous home. Father denied drug use. Father blamed Jesse’s lack of medical care on mother, stating he repeatedly told her to take him to the doctor. According to father, he and mother were not “on the same page at all” about parenting.

On July 3, 2014, mother informed the social worker that she and father attended their Alcohol and Other Drug (AOD) assessments the previous day and were told to drug test, which they stated they would do. The social worker subsequently learned mother and father failed to attend their AOD assessment appointments and failed to drug test.

Mother subsequently completed her AOD assessment on July 16, 2014, and was referred for outpatient treatment. Father also completed an AOD assessment and was found not to need treatment. However, the social worker recommended father’s case plan include parenting education, domestic violence intervention and a mental health assessment and counseling.

Neither mother nor father attended a July 23, 2014, scheduled assessment at CVRC for Jesse. A Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) reported that when Jesse first arrived in foster care at 20 months, he was just beginning to walk and moved mainly by scooting around.

Mother and father visited the children three times a week and, while the parents at times arrived late, the visits were appropriate. On one visit, father was upset to find milk in Jesse’s bottle, as he usually gave him Hi-C. Both mother and father exhibited hygiene issues.

At the July 29, 2014, jurisdiction hearing, both parents signed waivers and submitted on the petition and reports. As to disposition, upon objection from mother and father, the juvenile court removed the domestic violence classes from the case plans, and ordered that individual counseling be tailored to address any domestic violence issues.

The juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition regarding mother’s substance abuse and the parents’ failure to adequately provide for the children, and the children were detained. Supervised visitation three times a week was continued. A six-month review hearing was set for January 15, 2015.

Interim Progress Review Hearing

The Agency filed a September 30, 2014, interim review report in which it stated neither mother nor father were participating in services. Neither had enrolled in parenting classes or attended the mental health assessment. Mother failed to report for drug testing since August 2014 and was terminated from her substance abuse program for nonattendance.

At the September 30, 2014, review hearing, visitation was continued at three hours each week. Mother was ordered to meet with her social worker and review her case plan.

Six-month Review Hearing

The report prepared in anticipation of the January 2015 six-month review hearing recommended reunification services continue. Father was participating in his parenting program and found not to need mental health counseling. He said he was willing to end his relationship with mother and have her move out of the home to have Jesse returned to him. But father was not D.’s father, and wished to keep the children together. Mother recently started parenting classes and attended a mental health assessment. But she failed to report for drug testing and was not involved in substance abuse treatment.

Both mother and father visited the children consistently. Father’s interaction with the children was appropriate. He showed them affection and told them how much he loved them. However, the CASA advocate reported that mother and father failed to change Jesse’s diapers during visits, leading to diaper rash, and that the parents overfed him, which caused diarrhea.

The maternal aunt, who had guardianship of mother’s child N., reported an interest in placement of the children; however, she lived in Sacramento, which would make visitation during reunification difficult. The aunt asked to be considered for placement if reunification failed.

At the January 15, 2015, six-month review hearing, reunification services were continued. A 12-month review hearing was set for June 25, 2015.

Father’s First Restraining Order Request

In March 2015, father filed a request for a temporary restraining order against mother, which was granted. In the application, father wrote that mother was “crazy and on pills” and that he and his friends “don’t know if she would try and hurt us.” But at the hearing on the permanent order in April 2014, father requested that the matter be taken off calendar.

Twelve-month Review Hearing

By the time of the 12-month review hearing in June 2015, father had completed the parenting program. Father and mother were still visiting the children consistently and the visits were appropriate and affectionate, although on one occasion, father refused a request that he pull up his pants as his buttocks was showing. He continued to refuse after security was called. The Agency assessed that, although father completed his case plan, he was still living with mother, who was not in compliance. It was determined it was therefore not safe to return the children. The children were found to be adoptable.

The juvenile court followed the Agency’s recommendation to terminate reunification services, finding that, while father had completed his case plan, mother had not and was still living with father. Supervised visitation orders remained in place. A section 366.26 permanent planning hearing was scheduled for November 2015 and mother and father were advised of their writ rights.

Father’s Second Restraining Order Request

On July 28, 2015, father filed a second request for a temporary restraining order against mother. This time, the order was denied pending hearing. At the August 18, 2015 hearing, counsel for mother noted that there was no allegation of violence and, therefore, no reason for a restraining order. The request for a restraining order was denied.

Section 366.26 Report

The report prepared in anticipation of the November 2015 section 366.26 hearing reported Jesse had been receiving CVRC services, but was no longer eligible because he turned three years old and had made significant improvements. He was receiving assistance with his speech through a different organization.

The caregivers for D. and Jesse, where the children had been placed since detention, were willing to provide legal guardianship, the option the Agency recommended. While a maternal aunt had been assessed for placement, the Agency determined it might be detrimental to place the children with her because she had had only minimal contact with the children. In addition, mother and father both threatened the maternal aunt when all three arrived at a meeting on the issue of placement.

Mother and father were still consistently visiting the children. They brought food to the visits, but were again advised to bring healthier snacks. Both had to be reminded not to discuss the case with the children. At times, father had to be redirected to spend time with Jesse.

A contested section 366.26 hearing was set for November 24, 2015.

Father’s Section 388 Petition

On November 9, 2015, father filed a section 388 petition requesting Jesse be returned to him because he had completed his case plan and Jesse was bonded to him and wanted to return home. Father alleged he and mother had a stable home, and he was requesting family maintenance services.

The Agency recommended father’s section 388 petition be denied because father and mother were still living together and mother had made only minimal progress in her case plan. Although father had tried to obtain a restraining order forcing mother from the home, it was denied. In addition, mother was not participating in drug testing or mental health counseling, and she was not participating in substance abuse treatment.

On November 24, 2015, the juvenile court dismissed father’s section 388 petition without prejudice. The section 366.26 hearing to explore guardianship or adoption was taken off calendar because the caregivers were no longer interested in legal guardianship. Instead, a section 366.3 permanent plan review hearing was set for May 17, 2016. Visitation remained supervised for mother; father was granted unsupervised visits.

Permanent Plan Review Hearing

In May 2016, the Agency submitted a report in anticipation of the postpermanent plan review hearing. The children were still doing well with their initial caregivers. Jesse’s speech had improved significantly. The children had weekend visits with their maternal aunt, who continued to be interested in adopting them. The hope was to move the children to the home of the maternal aunt in June after school ended. While Jesse was found to be adoptable, D., now 11 years old, did not want to be adopted.

Visitation between parents and children was still consistent and appropriate. But while father was allowed unsupervised visits, he chose to attend supervised visits with mother. The Agency was concerned that the visits were too frequent, confusing the children and giving them false hope that they would return home. The Agency recommended a new section 366.26 hearing be scheduled for Jesse, to address a permanent plan of adoption with the maternal aunt.

A section 366.3 contested review hearing was set for June 2, 2016. The frequency of the visitations remained, but each visit was reduced from two hours to one and one-half hours.

Mother and Father’s Section 388 Petitions

At the end of May 2016, mother and father each filed a section 388 petition. Father’s petition was similar to his prior petition, except it added that mother no longer needed to move from the house because she had changed her life and was “drug free.” Mother’s petition stated she had consistently tested negative for drugs and completed a substance abuse treatment program on May 26, 2016 (five days before the petition was filed), and was attending aftercare meetings.

In the Agency’s response to the section 388 petitions, it was reported that mother had started a substance abuse treatment program in February 2016, but was discharged halfway through for noncompliance. She had also failed to drug test from February through June 2016. As such, it assessed Jesse could not be safely returned to father because mother was still in the home.

Contested Permanent Plan Review and Section 388 Petitions Hearing

On June 30, 2016, a combined hearing on mother and father’s section 388 petitions and the section 366.3 permanent plan review was held. The juvenile court denied both mother and father’s petitions, finding there had been no change of circumstances and that reinstating services was not in the best interest of the children.

A section 366.26 hearing was set for Jesse on October 13, 2016; a section 366.3 review for D. that same date. Visits were ordered to be two times per month for three hours.

Section 366.26 Hearing

The report prepared for the October 13, 2016, section 366.26 permanent plan hearing for Jesse reported that the children had been placed with the maternal aunt in July 2016. Jesse, now age 4, was thriving in the home and had a strong attachment to her. The maternal aunt had already adopted mother’s other child N.

Father consistently visited Jesse as ordered. The visits were appropriate, with the exception of one visit when father threatened to spank Jesse. The maternal aunt reported that there were occasions when Jesse said he did not want to visit mother and father.

The plan was for maternal aunt to adopt Jesse and for D. to remain with maternal aunt, although he did not wish to be adopted.

A contested section 366.26 hearing was set for November 3, 2016, regarding the recommendation of adoption for Jesse.

Mother and Father’s Additional Section 388 Petitions

On November 7, 2016, father filed another section 388 petition, which was similar to his prior petitions. Mother did the same on November 9, 2016.

Final Hearing

On November 29, 2016, combined section 388 and contested section 366.26 hearings were held.

Father testified that he had completed his court-ordered case plan. He stated Jesse would run to him and hug him at the beginning of the visits and called him “‘dad.’” During visits, father played with Jesse, they watched movies together, colored, and father taught him the alphabet. Father acknowledged that he was told by the Agency and the juvenile court that mother had to move out of his home for Jesse to return, but she still lived there.

When mother testified, she acknowledged that she still lived with father. She claimed that she had completed her case plan. She acknowledged pending criminal charges for identify theft.

In denying both mother and father’s section 388 petitions, the juvenile court found there were no changed circumstances. The juvenile court further stated that mother had not resolved her issues, and father had allowed mother to remain in the home, which was an impediment to Jesse returning to father. The juvenile court also noted that the children had been out of the parents’ home for two and one-half years, and it was not in their best interest to reopen reunification services.

As for the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found father’s visitations were consistent and appropriate, but that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply, as father and Jesse did not have the type of relationship in which he was meeting the everyday needs of the child. The juvenile court terminated mother and father’s parental rights.

DISCUSSION

Father does not dispute that Jesse was adoptable. Instead, he argues his parental rights were wrongly terminated because the juvenile court failed to apply the parent-child beneficial relationship exception to adoption and grant legal guardianship instead. We disagree.

Beneficial Parent-child Exception to Adoption

After reunification services are terminated, “‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.’” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52 (Celine R.).) A hearing under section 366.26 is held to design and implement a permanent plan for the child. At a section 366.26 hearing, once the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time, the court is required to terminate parental rights and select adoption as the permanent plan, unless the parent shows that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of several statutory exceptions. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 (Bailey J.).) One of these statutory exceptions is the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption, which applies when it would be detrimental to the child to terminate parental rights if “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

The burden is on the party seeking to establish the beneficial relationship exception to produce evidence establishing the exception is applicable. (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) Once the juvenile court finds that a parent has met his or her burden to establish the requirements of the beneficial relationship exception, the juvenile court must choose a permanent plan other than adoption if it finds the beneficial relationship to be “a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child .…” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); see Bailey J., supra, at p. 1315.)

Standard of Review

We acknowledge the parties’ discussion in their respective briefing regarding the split of authority as to whether the substantial evidence standard, the abuse of discretion standard, or a hybrid standard applies in reviewing the juvenile court’s rejection of exceptions to adoption. (See Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314–1315 & In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621–622 [hybrid combination of substantial evidence and abuse of discretion standards; applying substantial evidence test to determination of existence of a beneficial sibling relationship and the abuse of discretion test to issue of whether that relationship constitutes a compelling reason for determining termination would be detrimental to the child]; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.) [substantial evidence test: “On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order”]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 (Jasmine D.) [abuse of discretion test].) Father asserts our review be for substantial evidence; the Agency, abuse of discretion.

Under any of these standards of review, our conclusion in this case would be the same because the practical differences between them are “not significant,” as they all give deference to the juvenile court’s judgment. (See Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) “‘[E]valuating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling.… Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge. The reviewing court should interfere only “‘if [it] find[s] that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge could reasonably have made the order that he [or she] did.’ …”’” (Ibid.) Similarly, a substantial evidence challenge to the juvenile court’s failure to find a beneficial parent-child relationship cannot succeed unless the undisputed facts establish the existence of that relationship, since such a challenge amounts to a contention the “undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1529; see Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)

Applicable Law and Analysis

In deciding whether the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies, “the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) “If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (Ibid.) The parent-child relationship must “promote[] the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (Ibid.)

A parent claiming the applicability of the parent-child relationship exception has the burden of proof. (In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 133.) “t is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” ([i]Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350; see Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.)

The parent-child relationship exception “does not permit a parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child to derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent.” (Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348.) “[A] child should not be deprived of an adoptive parent when the natural parent has maintained a relationship that may be beneficial to some degree but does not meet the child’s need for a parent.” (Id. at p. 1350.) Even a “loving and happy relationship” with a parent does not necessarily establish the statutory exception. (See In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1419.)

“The Autumn H. standard reflects the legislative intent that adoption should be ordered unless exceptional circumstances exist, one of those exceptional circumstances being the existence of such a strong and beneficial parent-child relationship that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child and outweighs the child’s need for a stable and permanent home that would come with adoption.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51.) “[T]he Autumn H. language, while setting the hurdle high, does not set an impossible standard nor mandate day-to-day contact.” (Ibid.) “Day-to-day contact is not necessarily required, although it is typical in a parent-child relationship. A strong and beneficial parent-child relationship might exist such that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child, particularly in the case of an older child, despite a lack of day-to-day contact and interaction.” (Ibid.)

The Agency does not dispute that father maintained regular visitation with Jesse. But in order to demonstrate Jesse would benefit from a continued relationship with him, father needed to demonstrate that maintaining the parent-child relationship would promote Jesse’s well-being, outweighing the emotional benefits he would gain in a permanent home with adoptive parents. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) In determining whether the relationship between parent and child is beneficial, we look to such factors as “(1) the age of the child, (2) the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, (3) the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and the child, and (4) the child’s particular needs.” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 467, fn. omitted.) The juvenile court’s conclusion that father did not satisfy the second prong of the exception “turns on a failure of proof at trial, [such that] the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.)

Father’s interactions with Jesse at weekly visits was generally positive, and there was some evidence that Jesse enjoyed his visits with father. Father played with Jesse, watched movies with him, colored with him, and taught him his ABC’s. Father testified Jesse would run to him and hug him at the beginning of the visits and called him “‘dad.’” However, frequent and loving contact with a child does not necessarily establish the existence of a benefit for continuing the parent-child relationship. (Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.) Father must also demonstrate he occupies “‘a parental role’” in Jesse’s life, which he failed to do. (In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108.)

There was evidence that when Jesse was removed from father’s care, father reported that mother was the primary caretaker and that he was not around Jesse much and did not feed, change or bathe him. There was also little or no evidence that father changed diapers, comforted Jesse when upset, or tried to help him with his speech problems during visits. Instead, the evidence showed father at times got frustrated when trying to interact with Jesse and would talk with the visit supervisor instead. He would often give Jesse his cell phone to play with during the visits. Father had to be reminded to pay attention to Jesse. And, although father had been given unsupervised visits as of June 2016, he chose not to take advantage of that and to attend supervised visits with mother instead. By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, Jesse, who had been out of father’s care for well over half of his young life, periodically said he did not want to visit father.

Furthermore, even if father had satisfied his burden to establish a beneficial parent-child relationship existed, his claim would still fail because the juvenile court would not have abused its discretion in finding that the exception did not present a “compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child .…” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) There is no dispute that Jesse was adoptable, and that his maternal aunt was ready and willing to adopt him. While Jesse had been in the maternal aunt’s home for only four months at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, it was reported Jesse was “thriving due to the stability, involvement and well-structured environment provided by the identified adoptive parent.”

While father does not wish Jesse returned to his custody, but argues instead that a legal guardianship would give him a better chance of continuing his relationship with Jesse, the Legislature has decreed that guardianship is not in the best interests of a child who cannot be returned to his parents. Instead, a child such as Jesse can be afforded the best possible opportunity to get on with the task of growing up by being placed in the most permanent and secure alternative that can be afforded him. In decreeing adoption to be the preferred permanent plan, the Legislature recognized that, “‘Although guardianship may be a more stable solution than foster care, it is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and permanent placement intended by the Legislature.’” (Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419.)

The juvenile court’s conclusion that severing the parent-child relationship in this situation would not deprive Jesse of a substantial, positive emotional relationship such that he would be greatly harmed did not exceed the bounds of reason. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) Father has failed to demonstrate that Jesse was attached or bonded to him or that he would suffer detriment as a result of terminating his parental rights. Accordingly, we find the juvenile court did not err in rejecting the beneficial parent-child exception to adoption.

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

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MEEHAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

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HILL, P.J.

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GOMES, J.