Filed 8/31/17 In re K.K. CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re K.K. et al., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.	H044389 (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. Nos. 16JU00410, 16JU00411, 16JU00412)
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.A. et al., Defendants and Appellants.

In December 2016, the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (Department) filed separate petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b), and (c) relative to three children, K.K. (age 14), K.A. (age 7), and R.A., Jr. (age 5; collectively, the minors).[1] The Department alleged that the mother, L.A. (Mother), had substance abuse and mental health issues, and the father, R.A. (Father), had a history of domestic violence. After a contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in February 2017, the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the amended petitions, declaring the minors dependent children. It ordered the minors removed from the parents’ care and custody and ordered family reunification services for Mother and Father.

Father and Mother (collectively, Parents) separately appeal the jurisdictional and dispositional orders in the three cases. Mother contends that the court abused its discretion in its order providing for a minimum of one hour per week of supervised visitation with her older daughter, K.K. Mother asserts that because her interaction with K.K. involved one hour per week of conjoint counseling, not visitation, the court effectively denied her visitation with K.K. Father contends that the court erred by requiring that, as part of his reunification plan, he submit to a psychological evaluation where no such evaluation was necessary or appropriate.

We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in connection with its visitation order for Mother or its order requiring Father to submit to a psychological evaluation. Accordingly, we will affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional orders declaring the minors dependent children and removing them from the Parents’ custody.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. Petitions and Detention Orders

On December 20, 2016, the Department filed petitions on behalf of each of the minors under subdivisions (b)(1) and (c) of section 300. The Department alleged that the minors were at substantial risk of suffering severe emotional damage as a result of (1) the Parents’ failure or inability to care for, supervise, and protect the minors, (2) the Parents’ failure to provide the minors with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, (3) Mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues, and (4) Father’s domestic violence to which the minors were exposed.[2] Mother abused controlled prescription medications, including nonprescribed morphine and methadone. Mother’s substance abuse had a negative impact on her ability to care for the minors, as manifested by her inability to (1) get the minors to school on a regular basis, (2) attend to their needed counseling, (3) attend to their hygiene, and (4) supervise the youngest child, R.A., Jr., who had behavior issues. Mother also had mental health issues, including stress and anxiety, which negatively impacted her ability to provide a safe environment and proper care for the minors.[3] On or about November 2, 2016, the home was found to be in a filthy and unsanitary condition with household items and trash strewn everywhere. It was reported that Mother slept all day due to her depression, thereby requiring the oldest child, K.K., to step in as primary caregiver. It was also reported that Mother had been involved in multiple car accidents in the recent past and there was concern that the accidents were the result of her substance abuse.

It was further alleged in the petitions that Father was unable or unwilling to protect the minors from Mother’s behavior, and that he had a history of domestic violence that had resulted in the issuance of a three-year restraining order in August 2016 that prohibited unsupervised contact with the minors. The minors had not seen Father since July 2016.

Additionally, K.K. had serious emotional problems, including depression. She had a history of cutting herself and had suicidal ideation. Shortly before the filing of the petitions, K.K. had been placed in a custodial hold pursuant to section 5150. The younger daughter, K.A., also had serious emotional problems, including anxiety and depression. Mother denied K.A. had such problems, despite K.A.’s stuttering and poor hygiene. The son, R.A., Jr., also suffered from serious behavioral problems, including violent behaviors toward K.A., defecating on the kitchen floor, and urinating on the carpet. The Parents had not followed through with counseling and antidepressants recommended for K.K. Additionally, the Parents had not followed through with needed counseling services for K.A. and R.A., Jr.

On December 21, 2016, the court, pending a one-day continuance granted at the request of Father’s counsel, found that a prima facie showing had been made that the minors came within section 300; found that the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA) was inapplicable as to Mother; and ordered the minors detained and that temporary placement be vested with the Department. The court ordered that the Parents receive supervised visitation of the minors a minimum of one time per week. The next day at the continued hearing, the court confirmed its prior findings and orders; it also found Father to be the presumed father of the minors and that ICWA was inapplicable as to Father.

II. Jurisdiction/Disposition Reports

In its January 2017 jurisdiction/disposition reports, the Department repeated and elaborated upon the allegations in the petitions. The report included as attachments several reports, including investigation narratives and two reports of the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Office. The Department noted that K.K. had been placed with her maternal grandparents in Ben Lomond, and K.A. and R.A., Jr. had been placed with their maternal uncle and his girlfriend in Antioch.

A. Prior History with Department

There was a prior history of the family’s contact with the Department. In December 2011, a mandated reporter contacted the Department expressing concern for the minors. K.K. had disclosed “ ‘that she finally told her grandmother about all that is happening because she has lived in fear for [three] years. Ever since Dad got out of the marines Dad has big and scary anger issues.’ ” K.K. stated that she only lived at the home on weekends “ ‘only because’ ” she was required to babysit her younger sister and do all of the chores. She reported that Mother would leave and Father would play videogames, sometimes making K.K. “ ‘watch the really, really violent ones.’ ” She told the mandated reporter that she had nightmares and did not want to return to the home on Saturday. K.K. said, “ ‘We need to get away from them. We need help.’ ” K.K. stated that her Parents yelled all the time, and that “ ‘Dad grabbed [K.A.] by the wrists in the air, shaking her, and Mom kept slapping her.’ ” She said that her Parents warned her that if she told anyone, “ ‘something really bad is going to happen to [her].’ ” The Department evaluated the allegations of physical abuse and determined they were unfounded. The allegations of emotional abuse of K.K. by her Parents were evaluated and determined to be inconclusive.

The Department was contacted in December 2014 with a report of concerns of general neglect of K.K. and K.A. The younger daughter had missed school for three days and, upon her return, exhibited a bruise on her forehead. K.A. gave conflicting stories as to its origin and seemed scared when she gave her explanations. The reporting party was later contacted by the maternal grandmother, who stated that K.K. was living with her since her Parents had kicked her out of the home; K.K. was supposed to return the next day, but did not want to go home. The grandmother reported without elaboration that it was not safe in the home. K.K. was later brought to a sheriff’s substation and said that her Parents “ ‘forced [her] to do chores until midnight and couldn’t do her homework,’ was punished via spanking that left no marks or bruises but made it ‘hurt to walk,’ was forced to run on a treadmill, and was forced to participate in military style exercises.” The Department determined inconclusive the allegations of physical and emotional abuse of K.K. by Father and the allegation of general neglect of K.K. by Mother.

In August 2016, the Department was contacted concerning Father’s alleged emotional abuse of the minors and general neglect of the minors by Mother. It was reported that Father had been arrested for domestic violence on July 26, 2016. The incident arose after an argument between the Parents in which Mother objected to Father accompanying her in her car. As Mother went back in the home and attempted to lock the doors, Father used his upper body to push Mother, causing her pain in her shoulder. The minors were reportedly home but did not witness the incident. After driving herself to the hospital, Mother made a police report. The report to the Department was evaluated out and not investigated.

B. Current Allegations

In October 2016, the Department received another report of general neglect of the minors by Mother, which ultimately resulted in the filing of the instant petitions. K.A. had stated that she was “rarely fed breakfast and lunch and her [M]other refuse[d] to take her to school because her [M]other stay[ed] in bed all day.” It was reported that K.A. had poor school attendance, bad hygiene, stuttered, and appeared depressed and anxious. K.A. stated that Mother had instructed her to lie to school officials about being ill when she was not. K.A. also said that Mother smoked all the time and left her in the care of a teenager related to Mother’s friend. K.A. said that her brother was aggressive toward her, kicked her and punched her in the face. The reporting party stated that Mother was suspected of drug use.

In early December 2016, K.A. reported that a teenaged babysitter, a friend of K.K.’s, took out knives from the kitchen drawer and threatened her younger brother with them to get him to behave (i.e., R.A., Jr.’s going to bed when asked). It was stated in another report to the Department that K.K. had a suicide pact with her best friend, that K.K. had cut herself in the past, and she had recently been the subject of a detention under section 5150.

In support of the Department’s allegation of Mother’s general neglect of the minors due to her substance abuse, it cited (1) multiple reports of the two daughters’ chronic school absenteeism, poor hygiene, and depression; (2) multiple reports that Mother was very difficult to reach, whether it concerned the minors or personal appointments; (3) Mother’s statement to a mandated reporter “that she ‘maybe’ is dependent on prescription drugs and they impact her negatively”; (4) Mother’s refusal to accept counseling services for the minors; (5) K.A.’s report that she and her brother rarely took showers; (6) R.A., Jr.’s report that Mother slept most of the day and was difficult to awaken; (7) a November 2016 incident in which Mother, while R.A., Jr. was asleep in the car, was required to pull over while driving on Highway 9 because of her lethargy; (8) reports from multiple providers working with the minors that concluded they were “ ‘severely neglected and traumatized’ ”; (9) Mother tested positive for morphine and methadone on November 15, December 1, and December 5, 2016, although she had prescriptions for neither drug and her doctor of eight years had no record of her taking either drug; (10) Mother failed to appear for at least four scheduled drug testing appointments; (11) Father had stated that Mother had been on prescription pain medications for years and only realized a few years ago that she was abusing such medications; (12) Mother’s primary physician reported that Mother suffered from complex depression; and (13) a social worker reported concerns about Mother’s use of prescription medications and driving, and the worker’s observations that Mother did “not seem to be present when the social worker [met] with her,” was unfocused, had difficulty comprehending and retaining information, and appeared “at her ‘breaking point’ ” in her dealings with R.A., Jr.

The Department alleged that the minors were at substantial risk of suffering severe emotional damage as a result of their exposure to domestic violence by their Parents. It cited two incidents in support of the allegation. Officers responded to the home on August 20, 2015, based upon the Parents’ fighting and Mother’s not feeling safe. Mother reported that she had locked herself in the bathroom because she was afraid of Father. She told the officers that “[F]ather told her if he wanted to open the door, he had a gun that could shoot through the lock to open it.” Father pried open the door and yelled at Mother, threatening to hit her. Mother stated she was afraid of Father and that he owned guns. Father was arrested for domestic violence and making terrorist threats. The second incident occurred on July 26, 2016, when, as referenced above, Father pushed Mother with his upper body, causing injury to her shoulder. Father was arrested as a result of the incident.

It was the recommendation of the Department that Father participate in a psychological evaluation as part of the case plan. The Department noted a report that Father suffered from Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) resulting from his military service in Iraq. Based upon a review of the child welfare history, Father appeared “to have anger issues and to possibly engage in excessive types of discipline (such as forcing [K.K.] to run on a treadmill as discipline).” The Department also noted that a social worker had “heard paranoid thinking in recent conversations with the [F]ather. In one of these conversations, the [F]ather expressed a strong feeling that everything/everyone was against him when he did not have an attorney for the first day of the detention hearing. The [F]ather’s thinking appeared excessive . . . and beyond what is usually expressed by parents who are frustrated and upset with the dependency process.”

III. February 2017 Jurisdictional/Dispositional Hearing

A contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing took place on February 15, 2017.[4] The Department advised that it wished to change Father’s case plan to eliminate the requirement that he submit to drug testing. Mother submitted on the report, presenting no affirmative evidence. Her counsel provided several comments, including statements that Mother was under the care of a psychiatrist, had participated in a substance abuse evaluation, and was willing to participate in a recommended medical evaluation and a court-ordered psychological evaluation. Father was sworn as a witness and provided testimony.

After testimony and argument, the court sustained the allegations of the amended petitions and declared the minors to be dependents of the court in out-of-home placement. Over Father’s objection, the court ordered that he participate in a psychological evaluation. It found the case plan proposed by the Department (subject to elimination of the drug testing requirement for Father) to be appropriate, ordered that reasonable family reunification services be provided to Parents, and ordered supervised visitation for both Mother and Father of a minimum of two hours per week as to K.A. and R.A., Jr., and a minimum of one hour per week as to K.K. Mother objected to the visitation order as to K.K.

Parents separately filed timely notices of appeal. The orders are ones from which an appeal lies. (§ 395; see In re Daniel K. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 661, 667 [order entered at dispositional hearing is final judgment from which appeal lies].)

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Legal Principles

Section 300 et seq. provides “a comprehensive statutory scheme establishing procedures for the juvenile court to follow when and after a child is removed from the home for the child’s welfare. [Citations.]” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52.) As our high court has explained, “The objective of the dependency scheme is to protect abused or neglected children and those at substantial risk thereof and to provide permanent, stable homes if those children cannot be returned home within a prescribed period of time. [Citations.] Although a parent’s interest in the care, custody and companionship of a child is a liberty interest that may not be interfered with in the absence of a compelling state interest, the welfare of a child is a compelling state interest that a state has not only a right, but a duty, to protect. [Citations.] The Legislature has declared that California has an interest in providing stable, permanent homes for children who have been removed from parental custody and for whom reunification efforts with their parents have been unsuccessful. [Citations.] This interest is a compelling one. [Citation.]” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307.)

The court at the jurisdictional hearing must first determine whether the child, by a preponderance of the evidence, is a person described under section 300 as coming within the court’s jurisdiction. (§ 355, subd. (a).) Once such a finding has been made, the court, at a dispositional hearing, must hear evidence to decide the child’s disposition, i.e., whether he or she will remain in, or be removed from the home, and the nature and extent of any limitations that will be placed upon the parents’ control over the child, including educational or developmental decisions. (§ 361, subd. (a).) If at the dispositional hearing, the court determines that removal of the child from the custody of the parent or guardian is appropriate, such removal order must be based upon clear and convincing evidence establishing that one of five statutory circumstances exists. (§ 361, subd. (c).)

One such circumstance justifying the child’s removal is the existence of substantial danger to the dependent child’s “physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” if he or she is returned to the home. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “ ‘ “The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” [Citation.] The court may consider a parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1126.)

When the dependent child is removed from parental custody, the juvenile court is ordinarily required to provide the parent with services to facilitate the reunification of the family. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); see Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 303.)[5] “The law favors reunification whenever possible. [Citation.] To achieve that goal, ordinarily a parent must be granted reasonable reunification services. [Citation.]” (In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242.) “But reunification services constitute a benefit; there is no constitutional ‘ “entitlement” ’ to those services. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

The services offered by the agency must be “reasonable ‘under the circumstances.’ Such circumstances necessarily include the mental condition of the parent, her [or his] insight into the family’s problems, and her [or his] willingness to accept and participate in appropriate services.” (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.) Under section 361.5, the agency is required to make “ ‘[a] good faith effort’ to provide reasonable services responding to the unique needs of each family. [Citation.]” (In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 306.)

“An obvious prerequisite to family reunification is regular visits between the noncustodial parent or parents and the dependent children ‘as frequent[ly] as possible, consistent with the well-being of the minor.’ [Citations.]” (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 49, quoting § 362.1, subd. (a).) However, “[w]hile visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children ‘and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300.’ [Citation.] This includes the ‘possibility of adverse psychological consequences of an unwanted visit between mother and child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Julie M., at p. 50.)

The court is vested with “broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance with this discretion. [Citations.] The court’s determination in this regard will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (In re Jose M. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1103-1104.) Likewise, “trial courts are vested with broad discretion” in making visitation orders. (In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 953.)

II. The Visitation Order

A. Background

As noted, at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, Mother presented no affirmative evidence, submitting on the Department’s report. Although her counsel provided several comments, none concerned Mother’s visitation of the minors. The court initially ordered that the Parents have visitation rights with each of the minors for a minimum of once per week for a minimum of two hours. The minors’ counsel requested that visitation of K.K., instead, be a minimum of once per week for a minimum of one hour.

Mother’s counsel objected to the proposed reduction. In support of more lengthy visitation of K.K., Mother’s counsel argued that “[Mother] advises that as the visitation happens now, it’s actually joint counseling and she doesn’t have any additional visitation with [K.K.] And she would like to have regular visits with [K.K.]” County Counsel responded: “[T]he visitation is supervised, it’s currently supervised. It’s not counseling, it’s at the Parent’s Center, but that’s because the Parent’s Center provides the supervision.” Counsel for Father stated that his client’s visitation with K.K. was “actually a co-therapy session.” Afterwards, the Department social worker assigned to the case confirmed County Counsel’s representation by stating, “It’s supervised visits.”

The court changed the proposed order as to K.K. to provide for visitation for a minimum of once per week for a minimum of one hour, subject to the social worker having the discretion to adjust the amount of time of visitation, “if those visits go well and [K.K.] is benefiting from the whole interaction and it’s really positive.” The court observed that the benefits of supervised visitation included the supervisor’s ability to “talk with the parent about appropriate ways to interact with [K.K.]” It explained further that K.K. was suffering from having previously witnessed instances of domestic violence, and the Parents should keep their minds open in understanding how their past behaviors had harmed K.K. and learning new ways of interacting with her.

Mother claims on appeal that “[t]he juvenile court abused its discretion when it, in essence, ordered no visitation for [Mother] with her daughter [K.K.]” She argues that the one hour per week of visitation ordered by the court was in fact “conjoint counseling and not visitation.” Mother contends that because visitation is essential to the reunification plan, it must be provided by the juvenile court except in rare instances, not extant here, where a no-visitation order is necessary for the protection of the child and visitation would be harmful to him or her.

B. Court’s Visitation Order Was Not Error

“Under section 362.1, subdivision (a), . . . visitation with the parent is a mandatory element of the reunification plan with the single exception that ‘[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.’ (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B); [citation].) In other words, when reunification services have been ordered and are still being provided . . . some visitation is mandatory unless the court specifically finds any visitation with the parent would pose a threat to the child’s safety. The frequency of such visits, in contrast, depends on a broader assessment by the court of the child’s ‘well-being.’ (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A); [citation].)” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1491, fn. omitted.) Further, “[w]hile visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children ‘and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300.’ [Citation.] This includes the ‘possibility of adverse psychological consequences of an unwanted visit between mother and child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 50.)

Based upon our review of the entire record, we conclude that Mother’s claim of error is based upon a faulty premise: that the court effectively ordered no visitation between Mother and K.K. because the only existing contact between the two was conjoint counseling. There was no evidence before the court that the contact between Mother and K.K was, in fact, conjoint counseling. The only references to conjoint counseling were those made by counsel for Mother and Father in their respective arguments. Statements of counsel are not evidence. (In re Heather H. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 91, 95.) The only evidence before the court contradicted Mother’s claim: The assigned social worker (confirming the representation to the court made by County Counsel) advised the court that the contact between the Parents and K.K. were “supervised visits.”

Moreover, even were we to credit the statements of the Parents’ counsel that the contact was conjoint counseling, the court had contrary evidence before it from the Department. Assuming such evidentiary conflict, the juvenile court resolved it against Mother, concluding that the existing contact between Mother and K.K. was supervised visitation.[6]

Therefore, since the court did provide for visitation between Mother and K.K., it was entitled to exercise its discretion in fashioning such visitation order. Indeed, Mother concedes that “the court can place limitations on visitation such as requiring that it be supervised.” In this instance, there was evidence that K.K. had serious emotional problems, including depression, a history of cutting herself, and suicidal ideation. There was evidence that K.K.’s emotional and mental well-being had been significantly impacted negatively by her Parents’ behaviors, including Mother’s substance abuse, withdrawal, abdication of parental duties resulting in K.K. having to step in to provide a parenting role for her younger siblings, and Father’s anger issues and history of domestic violence. It is clear that the court took these issues into consideration in exercising its discretion to fashion a visitation order from a determination of “[t]he frequency of such visits . . . [based] on a broader assessment by the court of the child’s ‘well-being.’ [Citations.]” (In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.)

“The court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion. [Citations.] We cannot reverse the court’s determination in this regard absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.) It is clear from the record that Mother and Father love their children very much, and that Mother’s desire for more extensive visitation with K.K. is a manifestation of that love. The court here, however, carefully considered the well-being of K.K., including the negative impact Mother’s prior behavior had upon K.K.’s mental and emotional health, in fashioning an appropriate visitation order, an order which included the possibility of extending the length of visits if the interaction between Mother and daughter was “really positive.” The court did not abuse the broad discretion vested in it in making the visitation order. (In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 253.)

III. The Psychological Evaluation Order

A. Background

Father testified at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing that he underwent a psychological evaluation through the Veteran’s Administration (VA) in April 2015 (April 2015 Evaluation). He understood that he was diagnosed with having combat PTSD resulting from his 15 months’ service in Iraq. Father testified that he had attended an anger management course and obtained counseling through the VA in an effort to address his PTSD.

On cross-examination, Father testified that he had not to date provided the Department with a copy of his April 2015 Evaluation and had refused to sign releases for the Department to obtain such information. He did not, at the time of the hearing, have a treating psychiatrist; his prior psychiatrist “was J.T. from the Vet Center.” J.T. did not prescribe medications for Father and he was not a medical doctor.

The person, J.T., to whom Father referred in his testimony was Javeit J.T. Bikul, who identified himself in an August 31, 2015 letter, addressed “To Whom It May Concern,” as a “Readjustment Counseling Specialist.” In his letter, Mr. Bikul stated that Father had been under the care of the Santa Cruz Vet Center since March 12, 2015, and he had attended weekly counseling sessions, showing “a willingness to address his cognitive deficiencies and [a] dedicat[ion] to learning and applying coping strategies in order to overcome symptoms commonly experienced with [PTSD].” Mr. Bikul added that Father had been assessed as having combat PTSD on April 9, 2015.

After hearing testimony, the court announced its tentative decision that it would order Father to submit to a psychological evaluation. Father’s counsel argued the evaluation was not necessary because Father had previously received the April 2015 Evaluation and was attempting to address his PTSD. Father’s counsel also stated that his client was willing to sign a release to share information concerning the April 2015 Evaluation. The court adopted its tentative ruling, ordering that Father submit to a psychological evaluation.

On appeal, Father challenges the court’s order, contending that requiring him to submit to a psychological evaluation was unduly burdensome and contrary to the family’s needs. He argues that he had previously been diagnosed with combat PTSD, he had been addressing this condition and was willing to continue with therapy as part of his case plan, and there was no evidence of any other mental health issues posing a risk to the minors. Father contends there was no “evidence that [he] had a present problem with mental health functioning . . . [or that he] had an ongoing or unresolved problem with mental health.” Father asserts that where there was “no evidence showing [Father] had an ongoing problem with his mental health, the court[-]ordered service goal requiring him to participate in a psychological evaluation was an abuse of discretion.”

B. Court’s Psychological Evaluation Order Was Not Error

The juvenile court has broad discretion in the issuance of its orders concerning reunification services. (In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164.) Its “discretion in fashioning reunification orders is not unfettered. Its orders must be ‘reasonable’ and ‘designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.’ (§ 362, subd. (c).) ‘The reunification plan “ ‘must be appropriate for each family and be based on the unique facts relating to that family.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1229.)

Father bases his claim of error upon the proposition that there was no evidence that he “had an ongoing or unresolved problem with mental health.” To the contrary, as he admitted, he had combat PTSD for which he had received ongoing counseling and anger management courses and he intended to begin a patient relationship with a VA psychiatrist shortly after the hearing. Based upon the child welfare history presented by the Department, it was apparent that Father had “anger issues and [that he] possibly engage[d] in excessive types of [child] discipline.” A social worker also expressed concern that Father had exhibited “paranoid thinking” and “expressed a strong feeling that everything/everyone was against him” From this record, there was a clear basis upon which the court implicitly rejected the notion that Father had no ongoing or unresolved mental health issues.

Further, to the extent it may be inferred from Father’s argument that no psychological evaluation was required because his diagnosed PTSD issue was neither ongoing nor unresolved, there is little support for this claim. Although Father claims that his PTSD and domestic violence concerns “were being properly addressed,” he presented no documentation of a psychological professional confirming this fact. Although Father testified that he had previously been under the care of Bikul, whom he described as a psychiatrist, he also stated that Bikul was not a medical doctor and had not prescribed medications to him. As noted, Bikul identified himself in an August 31, 2015 letter as a “Readjustment Counseling Specialist.” There is no information in the record that he possessed the requisite professional skills to make psychological diagnoses or to opine that any treatment of psychological issues may have resolved the patient’s issues. Moreover, any information imparted by Bikul concerning Father’s condition and the progress of his treatment was of limited use to the court as his letter was written 17 months before the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing.

Additionally—responding to the argument of Father’s counsel below that a psychological evaluation was unnecessary because Father had previously undergone the April 2015 Evaluation—we note that there were many uncertainties concerning the April 2015 Evaluation. Although Father claims that it was a formal psychological evaluation, there is no confirmation of this fact. There is no evidence identifying the person who performed the April 2015 Evaluation or describing his or her qualifications. Further, there was no indication as to the nature or scope of the April 2015 Evaluation, such as the extent to which (if at all) the evaluator considered Father’s relationship with his children or his tendencies toward domestic violence. Indeed, as to the latter subject, the April 2015 Evaluation predated by four months the first reported instance of Father’s domestic violence.

The court acknowledged these uncertainties, stating that it was “not really sure what type of psychological evaluation [Father] had.” And the court explained its rationale for requiring a psychological evaluation, stating that it would have “a different focus” than the prior April 2015 Evaluation, insofar as the new evaluation would center “on can you be a safe father.” It explained further that it had a concern that Father’s history of domestic violence included one instance in which he had threatened that if he really wanted to get through to Mother in the bathroom, he could shoot off the lock with a shotgun. The court described the impact of Father’s domestic violence behavior upon the minors as “significant.”

The authorities relied upon by Father do not support his position. In In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, the principal case relied on by Father, the parents challenged, among other things, the substance abuse component of the court-ordered reunification plan, contending there was no evidence of substance abuse warranting it. (Id. at pp. 172-173.) The appellate court agreed, concluding that the scant evidence that a social worker observed that the mother “behaved somewhat out of the usual and was obsessed with discussing a fortune-making invention” (id. at p. 172) did not justify imposing the substance abuse component. (Id. at pp. 172-173.) Using the parallel of substance abuse in In re Basilio T. with mental health issues here, Father admitted there were existing (albeit, he claimed, resolved) mental health issues—combat PTSD which had been addressed with counseling and anger management courses. Additionally, as noted, there was significant evidence of other potential mental health issues concerning Father, including a history of anger issues, two incidents of domestic violence, possibly engaging in excessive types of discipline with his elder daughter, and “paranoid thinking.” In re Basilio T., where there was virtually no evidence supporting imposing a substance abuse component of a reunification plan, offers no support for Father’s claim of error here, where there was significant evidence of mental health issues justifying an order that Father submit to a psychological evaluation.

Similarly, In re Sergio C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 957 does not support Father’s position. There, the appellate court struck down a drug testing order of the father where it was based solely upon the unsworn, unconfirmed allegation of the mother (an admitted drug abuser who had abandoned her children) that the father flatly denied. (Id. at p. 960.) Here, as noted, there was significant evidence supporting the psychological evaluation order.

And in In re Jasmin C. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 177, 180, the mother challenged the juvenile court’s order requiring her to complete a parenting education class. The appellate court, acknowledging that “[t]he juvenile court has wide latitude in making orders necessary for the well-being of a minor” (ibid.), struck the order. It reasoned that the mother was the nonoffending parent in the proceedings, and there were no allegations that she had abused her children, failed to protect them, or had engaged in any other improper conduct. (Id. at p. 181.) The court rejected the Department’s purported justification that it felt “ ‘[the mother] can benefit from a parenting class,’ ” particularly in light of the trauma the family had endured as a result of the father having punched his adult stepdaughter, breaking her nose, and then having repeatedly struck his 15-year-old daughter when she tried to intervene. (Ibid.) In re Jasmin C., like In re Basilio T. and In re Sergio C., involved instances—dissimilar to this case—in which the juvenile court issued an order as part of the reunification plan that was not justified by the particular circumstances involving the parent.

We acknowledge that “[t]he juvenile court has broad discretion in the issuance of its orders concerning reunification services (In re G.L., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164), but that such discretion is not unfettered.” (In re Nolan W., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1229.) The court in this instance considered the individual circumstances of the family, including Father’s combat PTSD, history of anger issues and domestic violence, and other behavior indicative of potential mental health issues “to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion. [Citations.]” (In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006.) The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Father to submit to a psychological evaluation.

DISPOSITION

The February 15, 2017 jurisdictional and dispositional orders declaring K.K., K.A., and R.A., Jr., dependent children and removing them from their Parents’ custody are affirmed.

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