Filed 9/5/17 In re David S. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



In re DAVID S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DAVID S.,

Defendant and Appellant.
D071510


(Super. Ct. No. J238620)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Lorna A. Alksne, Judge. Dismissed.
Michelle Jarvis, under appointment by Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the prosecution alleged that David S. committed felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)) and misdemeanor vandalism (id., § 594, subds. (a), (b)(2)(A)). After David denied the allegations, the juvenile court placed him on informal supervision under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2. The court "reserve[d] jurisdiction" over the issue of restitution to the victim. Several months later at a restitution hearing, it heard testimony from the victim. The court set restitution at $1,100 and ordered David to pay that amount as a condition of his informal supervision.
David appeals the restitution order. His appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, but has not raised any specific issues on appeal. She asks this court to review the record independently for error as required by Wende. We granted David the opportunity to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf. He has not responded.
During our independent review of the record, it came to our attention that the restitution order may not be appealable under Welfare and Institutions Code section 800. We requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the appealability issue. After reviewing the briefs, and for the reasons explained below, we conclude the restitution order is not appealable and will therefore dismiss the appeal.
DISCUSSION
A judgment or order is not appealable unless expressly made so by statute. (In re Mario C. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1306.) In juvenile delinquency proceedings, the minor may appeal from the judgment and any subsequent order after judgment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 800.) " 'In general, a "judgment" is "the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding." [Citation.] More specifically, the "judgment" in a juvenile court proceeding is the order made after the trial court has found facts establishing juvenile court jurisdiction and has conducted a hearing into the proper disposition to be made.' " (Ricki J. v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 783, 789.)
An order granting informal supervision is not a judgment and is not appealable. (Ricki J. v. Superior Court, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 789.) A restitution order predicated on informal supervision is therefore not an order after judgment and is likewise not appealable. (See Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 303, fn. 3 [restitution order not appealable in analogous context of deferred entry of judgment]; In re T.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1432-1433 [same].) Because the restitution order here is not appealable, we have no jurisdiction to entertain David's appeal and must dismiss it on our own motion. (See In re Mario C., supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307.)
We have the discretion to treat David's abortive appeal as a petition for writ of mandate and consider its merits. A petition for writ of mandate would be the proper method for challenging conditions of informal supervision. (See, e.g., Derick B. v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 295, 306.) And while David asks the court to treat this appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, he has not shown the court erred by ordering restitution. As we have noted, David's counsel filed a brief under Wende and raised no specific grounds for reversal. Likewise in her supplemental brief, counsel references possible issues encompassed by the restitution order, but she presents no argument or authority to support a claim that the court made any error.
In the absence of any showing the court erred, we decline to treat David's appeal as a petition for writ of mandate.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:



HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.



O'ROURKE, J.