Filed 9/8/17 P. v. Trompeter CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER LEONARD TROMPETER, Defendant and Appellant.

H043434 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1479213)

Defendant Christopher Leonard Trompeter pleaded no contest to four counts of spousal rape by force (Pen. Code, § 262, subd. (a)(1))[1] and was sentenced to a total term of 74 years in prison. He was further ordered to pay various fines and fees.

On appeal, Trompeter contends that the trial court erred in imposing a $129.75 booking fee. As set forth below, we find no error and will affirm the judgment of conviction.[2]

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Because Trompeter’s appeal is addressed solely to the propriety of one of the fees imposed at sentencing, the facts underlying his conviction are irrelevant and we will not address them herein.

Trompeter was charged by information filed April 2, 2015, with four counts of spousal rape by force (§ 262, subd. (a)(1)). It was further alleged that Trompeter had suffered three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)).

On September 8, 2015, Trompeter pleaded no contest to all charges and admitted the prior strike and prior serious felony allegations. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court granted Trompeter’s Romero[3] motion as to two of his three prior strike convictions. The trial court sentenced Trompeter to a total term of 74 years in prison, consisting of consecutive 16-year terms on each of the four counts of spousal rape (§ 262, subd. (a)(1)), plus two consecutive five-year terms for his prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)).

The trial court also ordered Trompeter to pay various fines and fees, including a “$129.75 criminal justice administration fee to the City of San Jose.” Defense counsel expressly objected to this fee on the ground “there’s been no actual finding that it cost that much for the City of San Jose to book anybody.” The trial court noted the objection, but imposed the fee regardless.

Trompeter timely appealed.

II. Discussion

Trompeter argues that the trial court improperly imposed the $129.75 criminal administration fee payable to the City of San Jose because there was “no evidence” of the “actual cost” of booking in this case. We disagree that any error has been shown.

“Three statutes address defendants’ payment of jail booking fees, Government Code sections 29550, 29550.1, and 29550.2. Which section applies to a given defendant depends on which governmental entity has arrested a defendant before transporting him or her to a county jail.” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 592.)

Here, the trial court imposed the booking fee pursuant to Government Code section 29550.1. That section states: “Any city . . . whose officer or agent arrests a person is entitled to recover any criminal justice administration fee imposed by a county from the arrested person if the person is convicted of any criminal offense related to the arrest. A judgment of conviction shall contain an order for payment of the amount of the criminal justice administration fee by the convicted person, and execution shall be issued on the order in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action, but the order shall not be enforceable by contempt. The court shall, as a condition of probation, order the convicted person to reimburse the city . . . for the criminal justice administration fee.”

Trompeter’s argument relies on the premise that a booking fee imposed pursuant to Government Code section 29550.1 must be supported by evidence of the actual administrative costs of booking. He concedes that the statute “does not contain express language” requiring evidence of the actual administrative costs of booking, but asserts that language in Government Code section 29550, subdivision (a)(1), which addresses actual administrative costs, “is incorporated into” Government Code section 29550.1.

Government Code section 29550, subdivision (a)(1) states, in pertinent part: “[A] county may impose a fee upon a city . . . for reimbursement of county expenses incurred with respect to the booking or other processing of persons arrested by an employee of that city . . . where the arrested persons are brought to the county jail for booking or detention. . . . For the 2005-06 fiscal year and each fiscal year thereafter, the fee imposed by a county pursuant to this subdivision shall not exceed one-half of the actual administrative costs . . . incurred in booking or otherwise processing arrested persons. A county may submit an invoice to a city . . . for these expenses incurred by the county on and after July 1, 1990.”

Government Code section 29550.1, regarding a defendant’s booking fee payment to the city, does not expressly limit the booking fee to the actual administrative costs incurred in booking. Nonetheless, the amount payable under that section is determined in accordance with Government Code section 29550, which limits the county’s ability to seek reimbursement from the city for booking to actual administrative costs. (Id., § 29550, subd. (a)(1).) Government Code section 29550 further provides that the booking county may directly bill the city for no more than “one-half of the actual administrative costs.” (Id., § 29550, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) As we have indicated, the city in turn may recover that (one-half) amount from the defendant. (Id., § 29550.1.)

In People v. Aguilar (2015) 60 Cal.4th 862 (Aguilar), the California Supreme Court considered Government Code section 29550 and its limitation on booking fees to actual administrative costs. (Gov. Code, § 29550, subd. (c); Aguilar, supra, at p. 869.) The California Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s contention regarding the absence of evidence of actual costs was without merit and explained that the trial court could rely “on the fee schedule set by the county board of supervisors based on actual cost data submitted by the county sheriff.” (Aguilar, supra, at p. 869.)

In this case, the minute order from the sentencing hearing is contained on a pre‑printed form. Regarding the booking fee, two amounts are pre-printed on the minute order form: $129.75 and $259.50. In this case, the lesser amount is hand‑marked, reflecting that Trompeter was ordered to pay $129.75. This amount is one-half the other pre-printed amount of $259.50. A reasonable inference arises that, because the amounts are pre-printed on the minute order form, and because the $129.75 payable to the city is one-half the other amount listed on the form (see Gov. Code, § 29550, subd. (a)(1)), the amounts are from a preexisting fee schedule. “Nothing before us suggests the trial court did not properly rely on the . . . fee schedule.” (Aguilar, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 869.)

This conclusion is further buttressed by the documents of which we have taken judicial notice, reflecting that the County of Santa Clara has adopted a booking fee of $259.51,[4] one half of which is $129.75. Given that the trial court imposed a booking fee of $129.75 on Trompeter, the exact same amount reflected on the trial court’s pre-printed minute order form and the amount set forth in the resolution adopted by the County of Santa Clara setting the booking fee, there is sufficient evidence the trial court relied on the fee schedule adopted by the county.

III. Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

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