P. v. Lopez

Filed 10/4/06 P. v. Lopez CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Peter M. Schultz, Judge.

Rebecca P. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, John G. McLean and Harry Joseph Colombo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Sammy Lyn Lopez was convicted of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)),^[1] burglary (§ 459), felony petty theft (two counts) (§ 666), and conspiracy to obstruct justice (§ 182, subd. (a)(5)). Each felony conviction constituted a third strike pursuant to the provisions of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), resulting in a total term of 75 years to life.^[2] He argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence intended to impeach one of his witnesses, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

The above crimes were charged in four separate informations. Case No. 04CM8800, as amended, charged Lopez with one count of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)). The victim in this case was Ronald Caetano.

Case No. 04CM9368 charged Lopez with one count of burglary (§ 459) and one count of petty theft with a prior burglary conviction (§ 666). The victim in both counts was Sandra Patty Valenzuela.

Case No. 04CM9441 charged Lopez with one count of petty theft with a prior burglary conviction. (§ 666.) The victims in this case were Joe Henderson and Mark Henderson.^[3]

Case No. 04CM9452 charged Lopez with one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice. (§ 182, subd. (a)(5).) Lopez’s coconspirator was identified as Anell Diaz.

Except for the two crimes charged in case No. 04CM9368, each charge arose out of a separate incident. Each case also alleged Lopez had suffered numerous prior convictions that constituted strikes as defined in section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). The cases were consolidated for trial. We will address the evidence by count.

I. Grand Theft -- Caetano

Caetano owned two houses in Avenal. He met Lopez through one of his tenants. The tenant hired Lopez to work on the house owned by Caetano. The tenant was not paying rent because the house was in poor condition, and Caetano told her that she could stay there but would have to fix the house with her own funds. Caetano never asked Lopez to perform any services at the house, nor did he agree to pay Lopez for work he may have performed on any house he owned.

In March or April 2004, Lopez told Caetano he knew someone who needed a place to live. Caetano’s other house in Avenal was vacant as he was attempting to sell it. Caetano agreed to rent the house to Lopez’s friend if she signed a month-to-month rental agreement and on the condition the house remain on the market. Caetano was leaving on a short vacation, but he agreed to meet Lopez and the prospective tenant at a restaurant to consummate the transaction. The tenant was to bring the first month’s rent with her to the meeting. Lopez offered to do some work on the house, but Caetano deferred any discussion on this issue until he returned from vacation. Lopez called back a short while later and cancelled the meeting.

When Caetano returned from vacation, he tried to call Lopez but did not reach him. A week or two later, Caetano went by the house and discovered someone living there. Caetano discovered the lock on the front door had been changed. Caetano called the police. Caetano never rented the property to Lopez, or received payment from him, or anyone else. Lopez did not have authority to allow anyone to move into the house.

Lopez, his brother, or his mother had attempted to intimidate Caetano and Tina Toste, Caetano’s employee and girlfriend, by calling them names and threatening them.^[4] Toste essentially confirmed all aspects of Caetano’s testimony.

Valenzuela met Lopez in 2004 through her sister, Diaz. Valenzuela was looking for a place to rent in March or April 2004. Maricela, another of Valenzuela’s sisters, rented one of Caetano’s houses in Avenal. Maricela told Valenzuela that Caetano might have a house she could rent. When Valenzuela told Diaz about Caetano, Lopez said he knew Caetano and might be able to help. Lopez made a call and told Valenzuela to get a rental agreement. Lopez said the rent was $400 per month and the deposit was $100. Valenzuela gave Lopez the entire amount. When Valenzuela said she did not have any money for gas, Lopez returned $20. Lopez gave her a receipt for the money. Valenzuela went to Caetano’s office and received a rental application from Toste. Valenzuela received keys to the house from Lopez.

Valenzuela claimed she called Caetano’s office and he instructed her to give the money to Lopez. The phone conversation occurred, however, when Caetano was out of town. She also failed to inform the police of this conversation when the incident was investigated.

Sonia Henson, Lopez’s girlfriend, testified that Lopez did a lot of work for Caetano on the two houses owned by Caetano in Avenal. She overheard Lopez talking to Caetano on the phone on one occasion. According to Henson, Caetano told Lopez to collect the rent from Valenzuela and use that money for the materials purchased to fix up the two houses. Henson also claimed that Valenzuela told her that Caetano and Toste threatened that if Valenzuela did not testify against Lopez, they would evict her from the house.

II. Burglary and Petty Theft -- Valenzuela

Sergio Reyes was living with Valenzuela and her husband, Miguel Guzman, in November 2004. Lopez lived next door. One night Reyes was in bed when he heard a sound outside and saw a shadow pass by his window. A short time later Reyes heard the front door open. He initially thought Valenzuela and Guzman had returned home. When Reyes did not hear Valenzuela and Guzman talking, he got out of bed to investigate. Reyes saw Lopez exiting Valenzuela’s bedroom. Lopez was wearing a sweater with a hood. He had a flashlight in his hand. In Spanish, Reyes asked Lopez what he was doing in the house. Lopez yelled out Valenzuela’s name and left the house.

When Valenzuela came home, she discovered a black pouch with jewelry and a checkbook/wallet missing. The pouch contained watches, earrings, necklaces, rings, and bracelets. The wallet contained $100 in cash.

The sheriff’s deputies investigating the burglary brought a set of keys to the house to see if any of the keys would open the door. Valenzuela noticed her watch attached to the key ring. Valenzuela was not aware the watch was missing.

Deputy Sheriff Tom Wilcox investigated the burglary at Valenzuela’s residence. As part of his investigation he searched Lopez’s bedroom. During that search he found two key rings. An old watch was attached to one of the key rings. Wilcox and another deputy returned to Valenzuela’s home to determine if any of the keys would unlock the doors. While they were trying the keys, Valenzuela identified the watch as hers.

Lucy Louise Gonzalez testified that Valenzuela told her that someone stole her jewelry before Valenzuela accused Lopez of doing so. Gonzalez also stated that Valenzuela was not truthful.

Lucy Mary Gonzalez testified that Valenzuela was not a truthful person. She also testified that Valenzuela stated her jewelry was missing before Lopez was accused of stealing it.

Valenzuela’s mother, Juana Isela Diaz Castro, testified that Valenzuela hardly ever spoke the truth.

III. Petty Theft -- Joe and Mark

Joe owns a commercial building in Avenal that contains a bar and video store. In November 2003 a fire damaged the building. During reconstruction, Joe removed his personal collection of wine glasses from his office and put them in an abandoned bank vault located in the building. The wine glasses were discovered to be missing in approximately October 2004. The value of the wine glasses exceeded $200. The glasses eventually were returned to Joe by Lopez’s girlfriend.

Wilma Epps is the manager of the bar located in the building owned by Joe. One afternoon in November 2004, Epps saw Lopez walking out of the area near the vault with the box of wine glasses in his hands.

Mark is Joe’s son and co-owns the fire-damaged building. Mark was working at the building on the day the wine glasses were stolen; however, he did not see who took them. When Epps described the man who took them, Mark thought the description might match Lopez. Mark met with Lopez and asked him if he (Lopez) took something from the building. Lopez denied doing so.

Adam Woodring talked to Lopez on behalf of Joe to see if he could retrieve the wine glasses. Lopez initially denied taking the glasses but, when told a witness identified him as the thief, asserted that he purchased them from a man named Sandy who worked for Joe and Mark. Lopez said he would bring the glasses back, but never did so.

Carrington Crawford works at a pizza parlor close to the fire-damaged building owned by Joe and Mark. In November 2004, Crawford was preparing to open the restaurant when Lopez approached. Crawford knew Lopez and permitted him to wait inside the restaurant for a ride, even though the restaurant was not open yet. Lopez was carrying a cardboard box containing dusty glasses.

In November 2004, Officer Parker asked Henson about the missing wine glasses. Henson eventually found the glasses at Lopez’s mother’s house. Henson took the glasses to Joe.

Dorothy E. Jackson owns the store across the street from the fire-damaged building. On the date in question she observed Lopez park his car, enter the fire-damaged building, leave with a box, and put the box in the trunk of his car.

IV. Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice

A short time after the burglary, Valenzuela was contacted by her sister, Diaz, about the watch that was discovered on the key ring. Diaz was upset and asked Valenzuela to lie about the watch. Diaz told Valenzuela that she would regret it if she did not change her story. Diaz gave her a watch like the one on the key ring and told Valenzuela to tell the sheriff’s deputy that it was her watch and that she was mistaken about the watch on the key ring.

A tape recording of a conversation between Diaz and Lopez was played to the jury. In the recording, Lopez asked Diaz to get a watch like the one Valenzuela claimed was stolen, take it to Valenzuela, and have Valenzuela tell the district attorney she made a mistake, and that she found the watch she thought was attached to the key ring.

The jury found Lopez guilty of each of the above crimes. Lopez admitted he had prior convictions that would elevate the petty theft counts to felonies and admitted six of his prior convictions constituted strikes pursuant to section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). The trial court reduced the petty theft from Joe and Mark to a misdemeanor and imposed a one-year concurrent sentence. The sentence on the petty theft from Valenzuela was stayed pursuant to section 654. The trial court refused to strike any of the prior convictions and sentenced Lopez to consecutive terms of 25 years to life on the three remaining convictions.

DISCUSSION

I. Witness Impeachment

Castro is mother to both Valenzuela and Diaz. She testified on Lopez’s behalf that Valenzuela “hardly ever speaks with the truth.” The prosecution sought to establish that Castro was biased against Valenzuela because Valenzuela’s testimony resulted in Diaz being convicted of a crime. Lopez objected, arguing the prejudicial impact of the testimony outweighed its probative value. (Evid. Code, § 352.) The trial court weighed the various factors and concluded that the probative value of the testimony outweighed its prejudicial impact and permitted the testimony.

After the objection was overruled, Castro admitted (1) she was not speaking to Valenzuela; (2) she knew Valenzuela made statements to law enforcement that implicated Diaz; and (3) she knew Diaz was convicted of a crime and was now in state prison as a result of Valenzuela’s comments. Immediately after this testimony the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

“Ladies and gentlemen, the jury may consider that evidence that you just heard since you came into the courtroom only for the limited purpose and that is as to your assessment as to whether or not the witness has a bias against her daughter, Patty Valenzuela. You are not to consider that evidence for any other purpose, at all.”

Lopez argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted this testimony. He admits evidence that establishes bias has some probative value (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 494), but argues its prejudicial impact was so great it should have been excluded.

Lopez relies on People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233 to support his argument. Cummings and Gay were convicted of murdering a police officer to avoid arrest and were sentenced to death. At the time of the shooting, Cummings and Gay were passengers in a car driven by Cummings’s wife, Pamela. Gay’s wife, Robin, helped the three in their attempt to escape and was convicted of being an accessory.

Pamela testified during the People’s case as part of a plea bargain. The People introduced Robin’s conviction into evidence, arguing it corroborated Pamela’s testimony. The Supreme Court held the conviction should have been excluded because it lacked relevance, was hearsay, and was more prejudicial than probative. (People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1294-1295.)

Here, we have a different situation. The evidence that Diaz had been convicted of a crime as a result of Valenzuela’s testimony was relevant because it established that Castro may have been biased when criticizing Valenzuela. Moreover, Lopez did not object on hearsay grounds. The issue, therefore, is whether the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352.

Evidence Code section 352 requires the trial court to weigh the questioned evidence and exclude it if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will “¦ create substantial danger of undue prejudice .”¦” (Evid. Code, § 352.)

We review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 664.) “Under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether the probative value of particular evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion or consumption of time. [Citation.] Where, as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124-1125.)

As explained above, Castro’s admission that Valenzuela’s testimony resulted in Diaz’s imprisonment had probative value because it established Castro’s potential bias against Valenzuela. Lopez argues the probative value of the testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect because Valenzuela provided the key testimony on the burglary and conspiracy counts. According to Lopez, the admission of Diaz’s conviction inevitably led the jury to conclude that Diaz was in prison because she conspired with Lopez to obstruct justice in this matter. Diaz’s conviction, according to Lopez, thus improperly bolstered Valenzuela’s testimony.

The trial court recognized the possibility that Diaz’s conviction might lead the jury to conclude that Valenzuela was truthful, but determined this possibility could be negated by admonishing the jury that it could consider the testimony only for the purpose of determining whether Castro was biased against Valenzuela.

Moreover, the jury already had learned during Valenzuela’s testimony that Diaz had been arrested for asking her (Valenzuela) to change her testimony. While we realize there is a difference between an arrest and a conviction, we do not think the jury would have placed significant emphasis on the distinction.

The trial court’s approach in admitting this relevant evidence and then instructing the jury that it could be considered only for a limited purpose was reasonable, and certainly not arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. There was no abuse of discretion.

Lopez also contends the trial court’s limiting instruction could not mitigate the prejudicial impact of the testimony. As our analysis establishes, we disagree. Also, the cases cited by Lopez, Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 and Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, are distinguishable.

Bruton held that it was impermissible to admit the confession of a defendant in a joint trial with another codefendant when the confession implicated the codefendant in the crime, even if a limiting instruction were given informing the jury that it may consider the confession only in the case of the confessing defendant. (Bruton v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. at pp. 135-136.) Bruton did not, however, hold that limiting instructions always are ineffective. “We agree that there are many circumstances in which this reliance [on limiting instructions] is justified. Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances occur in almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently. ‘A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.’ [Citations.] It is not unreasonable to conclude that in many such cases the jury can and will follow the trial judge’s instructions to disregard such information. Nevertheless, as was recognized in Jackson v. Denno, supra, [378 U.S. 368,] there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. [Citations.]” (Bruton, at p. 135.)

Jackson, cited in Bruton, addressed the New York criminal procedure that permitted the prosecutor to introduce a defendant’s confession, as well as the circumstances surrounding the confession, without the trial court determining whether the confession was admissible. The jury was then instructed that it was to determine whether the confession was voluntary. If the jury concluded the confession was involuntary, it was instructed to disregard the confession. Since the jury returned only a general verdict, a reviewing court could not determine if the jury found the confession voluntary and considered it, or involuntary and disregarded it.

The Supreme Court held this procedure violated the defendant’s right to due process. (Jackson v. Denno, supra, 378 U.S. at p. 377.) The Supreme Court based its conclusion on at least two lines of reasoning. First, since the jury heard the confession, it may consider the admission of guilt in deciding whether the confession was voluntary. The Supreme Court concluded there was a great risk the jury would conclude the confession was voluntary to ensure the defendant, who admitted his guilt, was convicted of the charged crime. Second, the Supreme Court held that even if the jury found the confession involuntary, the risk that the jury would use the information in the confession to convict the defendant was too great to comport with the requirements of due process.

Neither Bruton nor Jackson addressed the issue presented in this case. Nor did either case hold that limiting instructions always are inadequate. The issue, therefore, is whether “the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” (Bruton v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 135.) We conclude this is not such a case.

First, we are not dealing with a confession. A confession directly admits culpability for a crime. The inferences that would have to be drawn here (Diaz was found guilty of the same crime with which Lopez was charged, and therefore Lopez also must be guilty) were not of the same caliber as a confession to the crime by Lopez. Moreover, the jury may not have drawn the inferences suggested by Lopez. It was never informed of the crime of which Diaz was convicted. In this situation, the limiting instruction sufficiently guided the jury in the use of Castro’s testimony.

In any event, any error was harmless under any standard of review because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Lopez was recorded instructing Diaz to convince Valenzuela to inform the district attorney she made a mistake. No one disputed that Diaz approached Valenzuela with another watch similar to the one found in Lopez’s possession. Lopez’s only defense is that Valenzuela was untruthful. The tape recording was so incriminating, however, that no reasonable jury would have disregarded Valenzuela’s testimony, even if it concluded she lied in other parts of her testimony. The primary witness on the burglary charge was Reyes, whose testimony was undisputed, not Valenzuela. Left with no defense to the charges, the outcome was certain.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Caetano was the first witness in the trial. During direct examination, the prosecutor established that Lopez contacted Caetano about renting a house for a friend, the two were to meet, along with the potential renter, but the meeting was cancelled. Caetano testified he did not authorize Lopez to rent the house or act on his behalf. When Caetano discovered Valenzuela was living in the house, he called the police. Caetano also testified that he never received any money from either Lopez or Valenzuela “for moving in.”

On cross-examination, Lopez’s attorney asked Caetano what happened after he discovered Valenzuela living in the house and called the police. Caetano explained that he hired an attorney and commenced unlawful detainer proceedings against Valenzuela but sold the house about six months later, with her still living in it. Lopez’s attorney next asked if Valenzuela paid any rent to Caetano. Caetano said he did not receive any rent.

Lopez argues this information was not relevant and was prejudicial. His attorney, therefore, provided ineffective assistance of counsel for eliciting the testimony. According to Lopez, this testimony portrayed him as an aider and abettor of the criminal act of conversion.

A defendant is entitled to a new trial if he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. (People v. Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1030, 1036.) “Establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires the defendant to demonstrate (1) counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that, but for counsel’s failings, defendant would have obtained a more favorable result. [Citations.] A ‘reasonable probability’ is one that is enough to undermine confidence in the outcome. [Citations.]

“Our review is deferential; we make every effort to avoid the distorting effects of hindsight and to evaluate counsel’s conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. [Citation.] A court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s acts were within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. [Citation.] “¦ Nevertheless, deference is not abdication; it cannot shield counsel’s performance from meaningful scrutiny or automatically validate challenged acts and omissions. [Citation.]” (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 540-541.)

“If the record contains an explanation for the challenged aspect of counsel’s representation, the reviewing court must determine ‘whether the explanation demonstrates that counsel was reasonably competent and acting as a conscientious, diligent advocate.’ [Citation.] On the other hand, if the record contains no explanation for the challenged behavior, an appellate court will reject the claim of ineffective assistance ‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation .”¦’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 623.)

Lopez’s attorney did not explain why he explored this issue, nor was he asked to do so. Therefore, unless there is no possible explanation for exploring this topic, we must reject the claim.

Although Lopez disagrees, it seems obvious that counsel was attempting to discredit Valenzuela by attacking her credibility. Lopez’s defense was predicated on convincing the jury that Valenzuela was being untruthful. Even if Lopez had stolen the first month’s rent, that did not justify Valenzuela’s failure to pay rent for each of the following months. By introducing this fact into evidence, counsel undoubtedly was attempting to establish Valenzuela was dishonest.

Because there is a reasonable explanation for counsel’s conduct, we must conclude that Lopez’s counsel was effective. Even if we were to assume, however, that there was no satisfactory explanation for this line of questioning, Lopez could not prevail because there was not a reasonable probability that Lopez would have obtained a better result if the evidence had been excluded.

First, Lopez’s character was destroyed by his own actions. He took money from Valenzuela to pay rent on the house and never gave it to Caetano. Two independent eyewitnesses saw him steal a box of wine glasses from Joe and Mark. Another eyewitness saw Lopez enter Valenzuela’s house at night when he had no reason to be there. He was heard on a tape recording instructing Diaz to convince Valenzuela to change her testimony. Given these facts, Lopez’s character could not have suffered more damage by Valenzuela’s not paying Caetano after Lopez stole the first month’s rent.

Second, the prosecution introduced through Valenzuela that she did not pay any rent to Caetano. Lopez discussing the subject with Caetano during cross-examination thus becomes meaningless.^[5] The extent of the damage, if there was any damage, would be the same, regardless of who testified to the facts.

Finally, Lopez had no discernable defense to the grand theft charge. Valenzuela’s testimony was not challenged seriously in court. The prosecution produced a receipt from Lopez to Valenzuela for the rent money. Lopez apparently attempted to establish that he had an agreement with Caetano to keep the money in exchange for services rendered, but Caetano denied any such agreement and no one provided contrary testimony that was believable.^[6] Once again, Lopez had no viable defense to the charges, thus ensuring his conviction.^[7]

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

_____________________

CORNELL, J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________

VARTABEDIAN, Acting P.J.

_____________________

DAWSON, J.

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^[1] All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

^[2] One of the petty theft convictions was reduced to a misdemeanor, and the sentence on the other petty theft was stayed pursuant to section 654.

^[3] We will refer to Joe and Mark by their first names, not out of disrespect but to ease the reader’s task.

^[4] Lopez was charged with two counts of witness intimidation (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2)) as a result of these threats in case No. 04CM8898. The jury returned verdicts of not guilty on these counts.

^[5] We reject any suggestion that the prosecution would not have discussed the subject with Valenzuela if Lopez first had not discussed the subject with Caetano. Such a suggestion would require us to speculate about the prosecution’s strategy, which we will not do.

^[6] Lopez’s girlfriend, Henson, testified there was such an agreement, as did Valenzuela. Valenzuela’s testimony was inherently unbelievable, while Henson could hear only Lopez’s side of a phone conversation.

^[7] Analysis of the other charges also establishes that there was no viable defense to any claim. Two eyewitnesses saw Lopez steal the wine glasses from Joe and Mark. A tape recording established that Lopez conspired with Diaz to obstruct justice. Lopez was identified as the intruder in Valenzuela’s house by an independent witness. Lopez’s best defense was to the petty theft charge where Valenzuela was the victim. By casting doubt on her veracity, Lopez could attempt to establish that he did not steal anything after he broke into her house. However, the watch that was recovered by police from Lopez’s room doomed this defense. Nor was there any other reasonable explanation for Lopez’s presence in Valenzuela’s house without an invitation.