Filed 9/14/17 Marriage of Nelson CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

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In this case, Eric Leroy Nelson appeals from a domestic violence restraining order issued against him and in favor of his wife, Maria Carmen Nelson, following an evidentiary hearing in this marital dissolution proceeding.[1] Finding no merit in any of Eric’s arguments, we will affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Maria and Eric met in May 2010 and married in December 2010. They have no children together.

In November 2012, an incident occurred between them in their home that Eric recorded on the body camera he used to wear when he was a police officer. In that incident, Maria was upset because she claimed Eric was with another woman while she was left at home to care for Eric’s developmentally disabled brother, Brian. Eric accused her of drinking, which she admitted, and he repeatedly asked her to leave him alone. Among other things, Maria told Eric she was going to ruin him, and he told her she had broken the law (because she grabbed his hand where he was holding his cell phone). Eventually, Eric called the police, and though he admitted to the dispatcher (contrary to what he had told Maria) that she had not committed a crime yet, he nonetheless asked them to send an officer over to talk to her. As Eric was dialing the police, Maria went into another room, saying that she was going to call the police, too. (Whether she actually did so is not clear from the record.)

Over the next two years, the relationship did not improve. On December 31, 2014, Eric sent an e-mail to Maria with the subject line, “Your wish come true.” The text of the e-mail was as follows: “You said you want to have an affair, and get some dick now. So, I found some for you. I ran an ad on Craigslist that describes you. I triaged through the responses, and found the ones most likely to fit for you. They are attached. Good luck in your endeavor.”

Attached to the e-mail was a document file named “DickForMaria.doc.” The document began with the following text: “You said you want to get ‘some young dick’, so I helped you out. I ran an ad for you (see below). I screened through the responses, and found the individuals who might be a good ‘young dick’ for you. I think Larry Johnson, Steven, or Chill Out are your best bets. Happy hunting.” What followed was the text of the advertisement Eric had placed on Craigslist. The advertisement described a woman with Maria’s physical characteristics (including age, height, weight, hair color, and body type) who was “seek[ing a] younger White or Hispanic lover.” The text of the advertisement included the following paragraph: “I can turn from sweet to bitch in 1/2 second. When I am a bitch I will falsely accuse you of things, I will push your buttons to make you angry and to hurt you. I will sometimes ignore you for a week or two. I will never admit I started it, or was wrong, or apologize. The best you will get is some very hot make up sex--when, by the way, you are most likely to get a BJ.” The advertisement also included a few complimentary statements about the subject, such as, “When I am sweet I am wonderful to be around.”

Following the text of the advertisement, and preceding the text of 12 responses to the advertisement (one of which included a photograph of a naked man) was this: “Of all the responses, these seem like your type, young, submissive, wanting abuse. Maybe you can find some of the ‘you[ng] dick’ you said you want.”

About three weeks later, on January 20, 2015, Eric sent another e-mail to Maria that began as follows: “I was upset at what you were doing. My bad, I apologize. I wish you apologized about things, we wouldn’t be where we are right now if you did. You have done some mean things, and I did some mean things also.” This e-mail was his apology for the Craigslist incident.

Around that same time (toward the end of January 2015), Maria moved out of the house and commenced this dissolution proceeding.

According to Maria, toward the end of 2015, when the parties were very close to settling the case, Eric sent her a threat that if she did not sign a marital settlement agreement in which she denied there was domestic violence during the marriage, he was going to take various audio and video recordings that he took of her during the marriage and post them on YouTube. Thereafter, on the morning of December 1, 2015, Eric sent Maria an e-mail with the subject line, “Video of your DV, for you to review,” in which he stated as follows:

“Because in court you persist in insinuating I am dangerous, you must hide, the police told you not to disclose your address to me, etc., and because none of that is true, and because my good name is important to me I have taken the precaution of posting video #6 for your review:^[[2]^]

“[YouTube web address]

“Please note that in the video you commit the following crimes:

“• You grab me at least twice, PC 243(e)(1)

“• You attempt to take my phone away as I call 911 (entire 911 call included in video) PC 136.1(b)(1)

“• You cause Brian, a developmentally disabled man, extreme emotional distress PC 368(b)(1)

“Please consider this a final warning to cease and desist from any insinuation that I in any way committed any crime towards you. If you continue to make these insinuation[s], I will take appropriate legal action.”

Maria replied shortly thereafter as follows:

“As I previously shared with you, legal counsel informed me if you post a video of me, (which I cannot open), that I can take legal action against you. Who has access to this You Tube video? Can it be viewed by anyone today?

“Please note this morning’s written threat can also be included in our trial documents and the DV document already drafted. It was my choice not to file it as I just wish to move on, and you would lose your guns and gun permits. I supported you and remember how hard you worked to obtain the gun permits.

“Proceed as you wish. Don’t proceed as angry. I hope you choose to act with integrity and agree to settle our pending action, so we can both move on.

“Today is December 1, 2015=congratulations on passing probation at your current State position. Have a good day.”

Later that morning, Eric replied as follows:

“You won’t succeed in causing my permit to be taken away because nothing happened other than you committing crimes. Audio and video files are a textbook example of me attempting to be a peacemaker, and to avoid conflict with you. They are also classic examples of out of control anger by you, alcohol abuse by you, elder/dependent adult abuse by you to my developmentally disabled brother, . . . and misdemeanor domestic violence by you against me.

“I did you a favor by only telling the responding police you were intoxicated and not sharing the rest of the story, or giving them a copy of the video. If I had given them a copy of video #6, you would have been arrested, I would have been granted an emergency protective order with 10 day move out, and most likely you would have been prosecuted for domestic violence and elder/dependent adult abuse.

“Be cautious, and think your way through this. I won’t lose my permit. You may end up with additional legal troubles--for what? So you can hardball divorce negotiations by putting my hard-earned good reputation at risk? I urge you to join me on the ‘high road’ of honorable negotiation. You can negotiate hard within the laws and rules of the court--that is ok--but be fair and honorable. No cheap shots, no innuendo, no false hoods [sic]. Make this agreement with me? I hope you respond with something such as ‘Yes, I agree. No innuendo, no dirty tricks.’

“If you are willing to engage in reasonable negotiation, by email, I am willing to do so.”

After Maria told Eric she was unable to view the video he had posted on YouTube, Eric told her he would make a DVD and send it to her. On December 3, 2015, Eric sent Maria another e-mail in the same e-mail chain that began as follows:

“By now the CD I mailed should have arrived. If needed, I can re-post it on youtube. I checked with folks who have iPhones and they said they are able to watch youtube videos.”

The e-mail then continued in much the same vein as his second e-mail to Maria two days earlier. Among other things, Eric said that “early on you started making untrue claims; and so, I gave you written notice of recording and thereafter for my protection I recorded many incidents where you were drunk and/or aggressive. Thus, I am protected because should there be any question about my integrity and character and conduct, I have a small library of recordings which verify my integrity and honorable actions, and which also at the same time reveal a different view of you than you might tell your children, sister, niece, the court, or anyone else.”

The next day, on December 4, 2015, Maria signed a request for a restraining order. In her request, she alleged as the most recent incident of abuse the e-mails Eric had sent her on December 1 and December 3. As the second most recent incident of abuse, she alleged the Craigslist e-mail Eric sent her on December 31, 2014. She also alleged two other incidents: (1) an incident on December 7, 2014, in which Eric “booby trapped” the front door to their home so that a can would strike Maria’s head when she entered the home; and (2) an incident in September of 2014, in which Eric frightened Maria by telling her he would purchase a python after work and place it in their bed so she would never enter their master bedroom again.

It appears Maria originally intended to present her restraining order request to the court on December 4, but for some reason she did not do so until December 21, 2015. The court issued a temporary restraining order that day and set a hearing for January 7, 2016. At that time, the matter was set for trial on January 15, 2016. On January 11, 2016, Eric filed his response to Maria’s request.

The trial began at 11:01 a.m. on January 15, 2016. Both parties appeared without attorneys. The court began by familiarizing the parties with the trial process and answering their questions about that process. The court then heard opening statements from both parties. In his opening statement, Eric did not directly address the four instances of abuse Maria had alleged in her restraining order request. Instead, he told the court he was going to show that Maria “makes inaccurate and false statements including to the Court” and that she had “grossly misrepresented multiple facts to the Court in her application for a [restraining order].” He further told the court that he would show the court a video of the November 2012 incident, which according to him was “the only domestic violence incident that occurred during [their] marriage.” He also told the court he would offer evidence regarding the dissolution proceeding, in which he contended Maria was “not far[ing] well,” which he asserted gave Maria a motive to file the request as revenge.

Next, Maria testified in support of her request. Her testimony began at 11:30 a.m., and over the next 15 minutes she testified about the most recent incident of abuse (the e-mails at the beginning of December 2015) and the second most recent act of abuse (the Craigslist incident in December 2014). The court then spent about five minutes discussing with the parties the documents they had brought with them and what to do so the court could consider them. At 11:50 a.m., the court recessed for lunch until 1:30 p.m.

When the trial resumed after lunch, Maria resumed her testimony by covering the Craigslist incident again, asserting that Eric had admitted posting the advertisement. During this testimony, Maria’s restraining order request was marked as an exhibit. Maria then testified about the “booby trapped” front door incident on December 7, 2014, and the snake incident in September 2014. After testifying about a few additional matters, Maria told the court she had no further evidence. The court then told the parties that, rather than having Eric cross-examine Maria at that time, the court would have Eric offer his direct testimony, “and then we’ll proceed from there.”

Eric began by testifying about “why the video [wa]s uploaded to the internet,” and at that time his response to the restraining order request was marked as an exhibit.[3] (After Eric began to explain what was on the video, the trial judge told him she “want[ed] to make sure that [she] g[a]ve [him] an opportunity to, of course, address testimony that [he] heard Ms. Nelson give a moment ago,” and the judge asked him whether he had admitted the Craigslist posting, as Maria had testified. He said he had admitted the posting, but he had also apologized to Maria for it the following month. He said he “readily acknowledged it was wrong, it’s indefensible.”

The court then asked Eric about the snake incident, and he said he did not “have a good recall of that.” After Eric testified generally about using notes to refresh his recollection when he was a police officer, he told the court that “nothing prompted [his] memory [about the snake incident] other than I know there was a conversation.”

Eric then began offering more testimony about the Craigslist incident and his apology for it. The court asked him why he posted the ad, and after thinking about it, he said, “I don’t recall. I’m sure that my emotion was being angry or upset, but I can’t tell you why.” When the court asked him why he shared the ad and the responses to it with Maria, Eric responded, “I’m pretty sure my purpose was either to get her upset or something like that.”

When the court asked Eric about the “booby trapped” door, Eric responded, “Your Honor, I have testimony prepared and I think there’s an important sequence to it that might not be provided to the Court if I am responding to just certain questions and not to providing the full context that surrounds them.” He then asked the court if he would “have the opportunity to present [his] testimony.” The court replied, “Well it depends in terms of how far our proceedings are going to last today, because I will tell you that the Craigslist incident alone is sufficient for the Court to issue a restraining order. So in terms of whether and to what extent, sir, you want to explain that incident or any of the other allegations that Ms. Nelson has made in terms of whether they might also be independently sufficient for a restraining order. [¶] I’m trying to give you that opportunity now. So that’s the reason for my questioning of you. I would suggest that you present your strongest evidence to the Court at this point in terms of why you believe, for example, that the apology for the Craigslist incident would in some way or in whatever way diminish it constituting abuse under the Family Code under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act.”

Eric then asserted that “[t]he Court should contemplate if there’s a pattern of behavior” and “whether or not there’s a probability of recurrence.” He also asserted “the Court should consider the fact that neither compulsion from a court order, not under pressure from anyone else, that on my own I initiated an apology, not months later, not a year later, less than a month later.” Eric’s apology e-mail was then marked as an exhibit.

When the court asked Eric what else he wanted the court to know, Eric told the court that “f there were allegations that didn’t catch the Court’s attention and might not prompt a permanent order, then those were probably allegations I can skip. [¶] If not, then I do have a full presentation of testimony and evidence that addresses all four of them. And I also have a series of questions for Petitioner primarily to establish that she has a habit, a repetitive habit of exaggerating and misrepresenting what she would call the truth of things.” Eric further asserted that he had “evidence that when I question Petitioner about it, may convince the Court that in fact she’s been deceptive, both in her communication with me and also in communications with Judge Mize. That would then cause the Court to contemplate the possibility that she could have some deception in the request she’s made to the Court and the testimony she’s provided today.”

“Quite frankly, in the Court’s view, the video also supports that it is more likely than not that Mr. Nelson has a history of doing this to Ms. Nelson. And this is consistent with this Court’s observations indeed of Mr. Nelson in this courtroom today. This simply is not a closed [[i]sic] case at all for the Court.”

The court then granted Maria a three-year restraining order against Eric, with personal conduct orders and a stay-away order. One effect of the restraining order was to prohibit Eric from owning or possessing guns, other firearms, or ammunition.

Eric timely appealed the restraining order.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Eric offers many, many pages of arguments challenging the trial court’s ruling.[4] As we will explain, we find no merit in any of his arguments and therefore will affirm.

I

The Trial Court’s Finding Of Abuse

Eric first contends the Craigslist incident does not constitute “abuse” as defined in the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code,[5] § 6200 et seq.). We disagree.

The court may issue an order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing “acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence” (§ 6220), if the evidence “shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse” (§ 6300). “Abuse” includes “engag[ing] in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4).) Under section 6320, a court can enjoin a party from committing various acts, including “disturbing the peace of the other party.”

Here, the trial court reasonably found that by posting the false Craigslist ad and then e-mailing the ad and some of the responses to the ad to Maria, Eric disturbed Maria’s peace. It has been held that the act of destroying the mental or emotional calm of the other party constitutes disturbing the peace of that party within the meaning of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. (In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497-1498; Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1144-1147.) Thus, the evidence of the Craigslist incident was sufficient to prove that Eric committed a past act of abuse against Maria.

Contrary to Eric’s assertion, it does not matter that “emotional abuse,” “intimidation,” and disturbing the “emotional calm” of someone -- terms the trial court also used to describe what Eric did -- do not constitute “abuse” within the meaning of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. As we have seen, the trial court specifically found that Eric disturbed Maria’s peace. That alone was sufficient to support a finding of a past act of abuse, and the trial court’s use of other related or synonymous terms as well does not undermine the validity of the court’s finding.

To the extent Eric complains that his testimony about why he shared the Craigslist ad and responses with Maria -- Eric testified, “I’m pretty sure my purpose was either to get her upset or something like that” -- was insufficient to prove he intended to upset her, we have two responses. First, while Eric characterizes his testimony as a “guess” that the trial court improperly interpreted as an “admission of intention,” we find Eric’s testimony sufficiently certain for the trial court to have reasonably inferred that Eric’s purpose was indeed to upset Maria. If Eric was “pretty sure” his purpose was to upset Maria, the court could reasonably find that was his purpose. Second, even without Eric’s testimony, the trial court could have reasonably inferred from the incident itself that Eric intended to upset Maria by doing what he did.

Next, to the extent Eric complains that because he did not testify about his intention regarding his “cease and desist” e-mail on December 1, 2015, there was no evidence for the trial court to make a finding of his intention, we disagree. From the e-mail itself, considered along with the Craigslist incident in particular and all of the other evidence in general, the trial court could have rationally determined that Eric acted to “intimidate and/or disturb the peace of Ms. Nelson” when he sent the cease and desist e-mail just as much as when he sent the Craigslist e-mail.

Eric next asserts, without elaboration, that the Craigslist e-mail is protected speech under the First Amendment. To the extent he intends to insinuate that the trial court could not find the e-mail constituted an act of abuse because it was speech, Eric offers no reasoned argument or authority to support that assertion, so we need not discuss it further. (See Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [“When legal argument with citation to authority is not furnished on a particular point, we may treat the point as forfeited and pass it without consideration”].) We do note, however, that it would be absurd to conclude that the First Amendment gives a person carte blanche to disturb the peace of another as long as the means used to that end are limited to speech, rather than conduct.

Eric next contends the phrase “disturbing the peace of the other party” is void for vagueness. We disagree.

“A statute is void for vagueness if persons of common intelligence must guess as to its meaning and differ as to its applications. [Citation.] ‘The void-for-vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” [Citation.] The requirement that government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of clarity ensures that state power will be exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative choice among competing social values, reduces the danger of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the laws, enables individuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, and permits meaningful judicial review.’ [Citation.]

“When assessing a facial challenge to a statute on vagueness grounds, courts should where possible construe the statute in favor of its validity and give it a reasonable and practical construction in accordance with the probable intent of the Legislature; a statute will not be declared void for vagueness or uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given its language. [Citation.] The statute must nevertheless be sufficiently clear to give fair warning of the prohibited or required conduct, although a statute not sufficiently clear may be made more precise by judicial construction and application of the statute in conformity with the legislative objective.” (Schweitzer v. Westminster Investments, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1206.)

In Nadkarni, the court ascertained the meaning of the phrase “disturbing the peace of the other party” in the Domestic Violence Prevention Act by reference to the dictionary, as follows: “The ordinary meaning of ‘disturb’ is ‘[t]o agitate and destroy (quiet, peace, rest); to break up the quiet, tranquility, or rest (of a person, a country, etc.); to stir up, trouble, disquiet.’ [Citation.] ‘Peace,’ as a condition of the individual, is ordinarily defined as ‘freedom from anxiety, disturbance (emotional, mental or spiritual), or inner conflict; calm, tranquility.’ [Citation.] Thus, the plain meaning of the phrase ‘disturbing the peace of the other party’ in section 6320 may be properly understood as conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (In re Marriage of Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497.)

Because the meaning of the phrase “disturbing the peace of the other party” can be ascertained by reference to the dictionary, this is not a case where persons of common intelligence must guess as to the meaning of the phrase and differ as to its applications. Thus, the phrase is not void for vagueness.

Eric next contends the phrase “disturbing the peace of the other party” is unenforceable under the fair notice doctrine, but he does not show that there is such a doctrine that is distinguishable from the void-for-vagueness doctrine we have addressed already. Thus, even if the issue is analyzed strictly in terms of determining whether Eric received fair notice of the conduct that would subject him to a restraining order, the answer to that question is “yes” for the reasons stated already. The plain meaning of the words used in the statute gave Eric the fair notice required for the statute to survive a vagueness/fair notice challenge.

Eric next complains that the trial court’s statement about its observations of him in the courtroom during the trial “is a serious flaw in the trial court’s decision.”[6] We do not find it to be, however, as we need not and do not consider those unspecified observations in upholding the trial court’s finding of abuse based on the Craigslist incident. As the trial court itself recognized, the Craigslist e-mail is sufficient by itself to support the trial court’s finding that Eric committed an act of abuse.

To the extent Eric complains that the trial court’s statement about its observations of him in the courtroom during the trial constituted a prohibited ex parte communication to this court that “may have emplaced a negative reviewing lens into the conscious or unconscious minds of reviewing Justices, causing their view of the entire trial to become more negative,” we find no merit in that argument either. There is nothing ex parte about the trial court’s statement, as it was not a communication made outside the record in this proceeding, but rather was part of the trial court’s decision that was recorded and transmitted to this court as part of the reporter’s transcript, to which Eric was clearly privy. More important, though, is that we have placed no stake in the trial court’s unspecified observations, as the lack of specification gives us nothing to review or rely upon. Accordingly, Eric has not been prejudiced in any manner by the trial court’s statement about its observations of him.

Eric complains that the trial court’s criteria for issuing a restraining order is “too low” because the trial court indicated that a single act of past abuse consisting of disturbing the peace of the other party is sufficient. Interpreting this as an assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in its ruling based on the Craigslist incident alone, we find no merit in that assertion. The law is clear that a restraining order may be issued if the evidence “shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (§ 6300, italics added.)

Moreover, to the extent Eric contends “it is improper to automatically apply the ‘one act’ standard to non-violent, non-criminals . . . for single acts that are not a crime, contain no threat, and were committed a year prior,” Eric admits he “was unable to find any case law to cite to establish this point.” In any event, we do not find any such “automatic” application here. It appears the trial court here carefully considered all of the evidence before deciding that a restraining order was warranted based on the Craigslist incident, as illuminated by the more recent “cease and desist” communication and all of the other evidence before the court. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision.

II

Due Process

Eric contends the trial court denied him due process of law by denying him the opportunity to “fully testify in order to present all admissible testimonial facts [he] wanted to submit to the court,” “to present all admissible evidence [he] wanted to submit to the court,” and “to cross-examine [his] accuser.” We disagree.

“The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution ensure that an individual may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Central to this constitutional right is the guarantee that ‘absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.’ ” (Salas v. Cortez (1979) 24 Cal.3d 22, 26-27.) “ ‘ “[D]ue process,” unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘(D)ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’ ” (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 334 [47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33].)

Here, Eric apparently presumes that his right to due process included the right to present all of the admissible evidence, including his own testimony, that he wanted to present, as well as the right to cross-examine Maria. That is not the case.

“The due process right to present evidence is limited to relevant evidence of significant probative value to the issue before the court.” (In re Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 817.) Furthermore, “due process is not synonymous with full-fledged cross-examination rights.” (Ibid.) “Even where cross-examination is involved, the trial court may properly request an offer of proof if an entire line of cross-examination appears to the court to be irrelevant to the issue before the court.” (Ibid.)

Here, the trial court allowed Eric to present his case by a mixture of testimony, documentary evidence, and offers of proof. Indeed, we have set out the course of the hearing in detail above to show exactly how the trial court made every reasonable effort to allow Eric to present his case through these various means without an undue consumption of time. Eric was able to give an extended opening statement detailing to the court exactly what he intended to prove. He was also given the opportunity to testify and present documentary evidence addressing each of the instances of abuse to which Maria had testified and on which she based her restraining order request. He was also allowed the opportunity to describe the rest of the evidence he wanted to present and to explain to the court what he believed that evidence would show. Through these offers of proof, Eric was able to communicate to the court that his primary purpose was to show that Maria was not a credible witness because “she has a repetitive habit of exaggerating.”

Having permitted Eric to fully explain what he intended to show by the evidence he was not permitted to introduce and the cross-examination of Maria he was not permitted to conduct, the court in its decision explained exactly why that showing would not have altered its decision. Essentially, the court explained that it believed a restraining order was warranted based on the Craigslist incident alone, which was undisputed, even though the incident occurred a year earlier, Maria had not raised it with the court until recently, it was not a crime, and it did not involve any physical abuse, and even if future abuse was improbable. In this manner, the court explained why the evidence Eric wanted to introduce and the cross-examination he wanted to conduct would have been immaterial in light of the undisputed evidence already introduced.

By allowing Eric to make a full presentation through the introduction of testimony, documentary evidence, and offers of proof, the trial court gave Eric the meaningful opportunity to be heard that his right to due process guaranteed him. There was no error.

III

Miscellaneous Arguments

The Domestic Violence Prevention Act labels “abuse” that is perpetrated by certain persons, including a spouse or former spouse, as “domestic violence.” (§ 6211.) Furthermore, as we have seen, the law includes within the definition of “abuse” acts that may be both nonviolent and noncriminal. Eric contends that by including nonviolent, noncriminal acts in the definition of what constitutes “abuse” under the law, the State of California has thus “improperly defined” those nonviolent, noncriminal acts as “domestic violence.” (Italics added.) In support of this contention, he cites United States v. Castleman (2014) 572 U.S. ___ [188 L.Ed.2d 426], but that case has no application here.

Castleman involved the interpretation of a federal statute (18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(9)) that forbids the possession of firearms by a person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” Another federal statute (18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)) provides that such a crime must include “the use or attempted use of physical force.” In Castleman, the United States Supreme Court concluded that, for purposes of these statutes, “physical force” does not require violent contact, only “offensive touching.” (United States v. Castleman, supra, 572 U.S. at pp. ___ [188 L.Ed.2d at pp. 433-438].)

Obviously, Castleman has nothing to do with this case, as nothing in that decision precluded the California Legislature from defining “domestic violence” for purposes of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act as including nonviolent, noncriminal conduct that does not involve any offensive touching. Accordingly, Eric’s reliance on Castleman is misplaced.

Eric next contends the Judicial Council form (DV-130) the courts must use for a domestic violence restraining order issued after a hearing (see § 6221, subd. (c)) violates the Fourteenth Amendment and is a forbidden bill of attainder because the form does not give the court a choice as to whether to forbid the subject of an order from owning or possessing firearms. Because Eric has not supported this point with citation to any pertinent authority, we need not consider it further. (Allen v. City of Sacramento, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)

In a related vein, Eric contends the State of California has violated principles of state sovereignty and comity because by subjecting him to a restraining order that restrains him from harassing, stalking, or threatening his wife, the state has effectively prohibited him from owning or possessing firearms throughout the United States. (See BMW of North America v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559, 560 [134 L.Ed.2d 809, 817] [case syllabus] [“[p]rinciples of state sovereignty and comity forbid a State to enact policies for the entire Nation, or to impose its own policy choice on neighboring States”].) Eric is mistaken. There is a federal law -- namely, 18 United States Code section 922(g) -- that makes it unlawful for anyone who is subject to a court order that: (1) “was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate,” (2) “restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person,” and (3) “by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner . . . that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury” “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” But the mere fact that the restriction of that federal law is triggered by a domestic violence restraining order issued by a state court does not support Eric’s argument that the state has violated principles of state sovereignty and comity here by issuing the order. Thus, contrary to Eric’s argument, the State of California is not “unconstitutionally depriving [him] of [his] Second Amendment right in the other 49 states.”

To the extent Eric contends the restraining order improperly bars him from engaging in interstate commerce by “restrict[ing] [his] ability to earn a living in the other 49 states, using [his] highly advanced technical skill set that requires the ability to carry a firearm,” we point out again that any effect the restraining order has beyond the bounds of California is a result of federal law, not California law.

DISPOSITION

The domestic violence restraining order is affirmed.

/s/

Robie, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/

Butz, J.

/s/

Duarte, J.