Filed 9/18/17 In re D.S. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gary Moorhead, Judge. Appeal dismissed.

Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.

Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen, and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.

D.S. was a nonminor dependent who seemed to be on the road to success. In her last year in the nonminor dependent program, however, she, as the trial court described it, “went from [a] smiling, engaging self-advocate to a withdrawn and depressed young woman.” Approximately six months before her 21st birthday, D.S. decided to drop out of the nonminor dependent program. On appeal, she contends she dropped out because her social worker provided inadequate services, leaving her feeling overwhelmed with her work and school obligations. In particular, her social worker failed to advise her she could have cut back on either school or work and still have maintained eligibility for funding. She also contends the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to provide her counsel with notice that nonparticipation in her case plan had rendered her ineligible for continued funding.^[1]

On December 30, 2016, after a contested review hearing, the court found reasonable services had been provided, notwithstanding the personality conflict between D.S. and her social worker. At that hearing, the court chided SSA as “remiss” for failing to notify D.S.’s counsel that she was dropping out of the foster care system, but found it to be harmless given D.S.’s “adamant position about wanting out of the system.” The court also noted D.S., at 20 years old, could have contacted her attorney on her own. In January 2017, D.S. turned 21 years old. On January 3, 2017, the court terminated jurisdiction because D.S. had aged out.

SSA has moved to dismiss this appeal on the ground we are unable to provide relief because D.S. is over 21 years old. D.S. acknowledges “there is no statutory authority to allow the court to reinstate its jurisdiction” over D.S. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 303, subd. (a), 11403, subd. (a).) Undeterred, she argues that she “is not asking this Court to reinstate her dependency. Rather, she is asking this Court to require SSA to provide her with the services which were not provided to her during her dependency.” In other words, she argues SSA should be required to “foot the bill for such services.” She relies on the maxim that “[f]or every wrong there is a remedy.” (Civ. Code, § 3523.)

However, D.S. offers no statutory, contractual, or common law basis for imposing such liability on SSA. This appeal is from an order of the juvenile court finding that the “[s]ervices offered to the non minor were reasonable.” It is unclear what the consequences (to D.S.) would be if the decision had been that the services offered were unreasonable. Presumably, if SSA had recommended earlier in D.S.’s nonminor dependency proceedings that her dependency should be terminated for failure to satisfy the conditions for federal funding, a finding that reasonable services had not been offered may have resulted in the denial of the recommended termination. But here, D.S. is age ineligible for the nonminor dependency program and the court lacks jurisdiction to oversee SSA were it to provide additional services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 303, subd. (a) [“The court may retain jurisdiction over any person who is found to be . . . a dependent child of the juvenile court until the . . . dependent child attains the age of 21 years”].) And if the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to oversee the requested additional services, then who?

Finally, we have found nothing in the record showing that the court was ever requested to order additional services beyond D.S.’s 21st birthday. To the contrary, D.S.’s counsel argued on December 23, 2016, “I’m not sure why county counsel keeps reiterating we are asking for funding. At no time in our documents in submitted or elicited during testimony has — our office requested funding and requested that this court order funding. What we have requested and continue to request are two things: [¶] One, that the court find [D.S.] was eligible to — under [section] 11403 of the Welfare and Institutions Code; [¶] And two that social services failed to provide reasonable services to” D.S.

D.S. continued this theme in her opposition to the motion to dismiss this appeal, stating, “Nor is [D.S.] necessarily seeking ‘funding’ from SSA, and certainly not from the juvenile court. Rather, [D.S.] is asking this Court to fashion a remedy whereby she can derive the benefit of services which, due to her social worker’s inadequacies, were not provided to her while she was a nonminor dependent. Consequently, the means by which SSA would be expected to pay for those services is something to be decided by this Court in conjunction with the appeal.” In other words, without suggesting how we are to “fashion a remedy” we are asked to do so, never having asked for that remedy in the trial court. Thus, despite her protestations to the contrary, D.S. is asking that we order SSA to fund further services. In effect, she asks us to rule that because substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding of reasonable services, she is entitled to convert a reversal of the court’s finding into a claim for damages.^[2]

D.S.’s claim in this particular case can survive, if at all, only as a claim for benefits as a nonminor dependent under the Welfare and Institutions Code. Because she has aged out of that system, however, we are unable to provide any relief, and thus the case has become moot. (In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1054 [“An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief”].) Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

DISPOSITION

Respondent’s request to take judicial notice of “All-County Letter…11-61, issued on November 4, 2011 by the California Department of Social Services” is granted. Respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted. The appeal is dismissed.

IKOLA, J.

WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, ACTING P. J.

FYBEL, J.