In re Mary C.

Filed 9/29/06 In re Mary C. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Robert W. Nagby, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Joseph C.

Neil R. Trop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Bonnie C.

Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors.

INTRODUCTION

At a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,^[1] the court terminated Joseph C.’s (father) and Bonnie C.’s (mother) parental rights as to five children: Mary C. (age eight), Michael C. (age seven), Francisca C. (age five), Isabella C. (age three), and Olivia C. (age one) (collectively, the children).^[2]

Father contends the court failed to read the preliminary adoption assessment and, therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support the adoptability finding. Mother contends that the evidence supporting adoptability was insufficient because the background checks of the prospective adoptive parents were not complete. Mother further contends that there was insufficient evidence of Mary’s and Michael’s wishes regarding adoption, and that the beneficial relationship between mother and the children (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) or the sibling relationships (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E)) preclude adoption.^[3] We reject these contentions and affirm.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Background

In August 2004, mother and the children were living at the home of Terry W., the children’s maternal grandmother. A social worker with the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) found the home “filthy,” with “clothes and trash observed all over the house.” The social worker saw three of the children that day. They “appeared disheveled and dirty and were only partially dressed.” Mother had a black eye and fading bruises. Terry W. said she and mother fight and admitted slapping mother. Mother admitted using methamphetamine three times in the last six months, and once two days before the social worker’s visit.

Mother and father are married but separated. Father’s mother is Maria G. Maria G.and her husband live in Anaheim, and are licensed foster care providers. (The G.’s are eventually identified as prospective adoptive parents of the children.) Mother arranged to move out of Terry W.’s house and into the G. home with her children. The social worker gave mother a referral for a counseling and substance abuse program in Anaheim and advised her to make an appointment.

Less than two weeks later, mother and the children left the G. home to live with a maternal aunt in Lake Elsinore. The new home was initially described by a social worker as “somewhat dirty,” but having no safety hazards. The condition of the home thereafter deteriorated over the next two months, such that the social worked described it as “filthy with numerous safety hazards.” The social worker referred mother to drug tests on five dates in September 2005. Mother failed to test on each of the scheduled dates. On October 21, 2005, mother tested negative for controlled substances. She was, in the social worker’s view, “evasive and minimally compliant with the recommendations and referrals” given to her.

On September 29, 2004, DPSS filed an “out of custody” juvenile dependency petition concerning the children pursuant to section 300. An amended petition was filed on November 23, 2004. At a jurisdiction/disposition hearing held on November 23, 2004, the court found true the allegations made under section 300, subdivision (b),^[4] that: (1) mother abused controlled substances, limiting her ability to provide for the children and creating a detrimental home environment; (2) DPSS attempted to provide services to mother to prevent court intervention, but mother did not enroll in substance abuse treatment and missed numerous drug tests, placing the children at substantial risk of physical harm or injury; and (3) father, whose whereabouts were unknown, failed to provide the children with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment. The court further found true the allegation made under section 300, subdivision (g),^[5] that the father’s whereabouts are unknown and he has failed to provide care and support for the children.

The court ordered that the children remain in mother’s custody subject to supervision of the social worker, and that she be provided with, and participate in, family maintenance services. Mother’s case plan required her to participate in counseling, a parenting education course, a substance abuse treatment program, and random drug testing. Services were not provided for father.

In January 2005, mother and the children moved back to Terry W.’s house. “The home was dirty and unkempt as evidenced by dirty dishes in the sink with caked on food, clothes thrown on the floor throughout the whole house, leftover food on the kitchen table, computer and electrical parts in reach of the children. There was also no bedding for any of the children.” The social worker observed three-year-old Francisca and two-year-old Isabella in a car without car seats.

On January 19, 2005, a “Teaching and Home Demonstration worker” reported that mother appeared to be under the influence of a controlled substance. The social worker requested that mother drug test that day. Mother did not show up for the drug test.

On January 20, 2005, DPSS detained the children and placed them in foster care. According to the social worker’s detention report: “There is a need for continued detention of the children as [mother] continues to place the children’s safety at risk. She has been observed driving the younger children in a vehicle without carseats [sic]. She has failed to comply with her case plan in that she has not attended a substance abuse program nor submitted to random drug tests as required. She continues to maintain a dirty and unkempt home to the degree that i[t] poses a hazard to the well being of the children. She failed to take the children to the doctor as requested and she has failed to ensure that Mary . . . and Michael attend school regularly.”

Terry W. indicated that she would be able to care for the children, but DPSS concluded that she would “not be appropriate to care for the children due to the condition of the house and her failure to cooperate with [DPSS].” Telephone calls to Maria G. were not returned. DPSS placed the two older children, Mary and Michael, in one foster home; the three younger children were placed in a separate foster home.

On January 24, 2005, DPSS filed a supplemental petition pursuant to section 387. The petition alleged: mother had failed to benefit from the family maintenance plan; she did not participate in any aspect of her plan; she failed to drug test when she was observed to “possibly be under the influence“; she created an unsafe environment by failing to provide car seats for the children; the home was in poor condition with trash and clothes left out in the open; electrical equipment was left within reach of the children; the children were dirty and had lice; and five-month-old Olivia was left in the care of a friend without adequate provision for diapers or milk.

The court found probable cause for the detention and ordered that the children be removed from mother’s custody. The court further ordered that services be provided to mother, that the minors be placed together, and that supervised visits between mother and the children take place at least once each week. Two days after the hearing, the children were placed together in a single foster home.

In a jurisdiction/disposition report, the social worker stated: “[Mother] is a single mother of five young children with little to no support from the father of the children or any other relatives. She also has a serious substance abuse problem, which she failed to address in an appropriate and timely manner. [Mother] lacks insight as to how her substance abuse issues affects her judgments and her ability to maintain the safety and well being of her children. [Mother] also appears to lack the knowledge to ensure that her children[‘s] medical, educational, and mental health needs are addressed. Furthermore, [mother] has failed to provide the children with stability by failing to provide a residence that is safe and clean.” The social worker also reported that mother “is bonded with her children and wants to reunify with her children. The children want to return to their mother and appeared to be bonded with her.”

Mother had supervised visits each week. At the last visit before the social worker’s jurisdiction/disposition report, the visit was extended from one hour to two hours “due to the children crying and wanting to stay with their mother.”

On February 8, 2005, Maria G.informed the social worker that “she is currently not interested in” having the children placed with her.

At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing held on February 16, 2005, the court ordered that DPSS continue to have custody of the children, and that they be placed with a relative or in foster care. Specifically, the court stated that if the children are released to Terry W., then mother would be permitted to reside in Terry W.’s home, provided she is complying with her plan, is drug free, and drug tests when instructed to do so. DPSS is to provide services to mother; and mother was ordered to participate in counseling and educational programs. The court denied services for father, whose whereabouts were unknown.

Following the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, DPSS rejected placement of the children with Terry W. when she tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine. The children continued to be placed together in foster care. In February 2005, a substance abuse counselor terminated mother’s participation in the substance abuse program because of lack of attendance. Mother reenrolled in the program in April, and was discharged a week later “for failing to attend as well as being inappropriate during group sessions.” Mother enrolled in another substance abuse program in July, but left the program when she was “given a consequence for smoking.” The program supervisor noted that mother had made “[n]o progress towards a positive lifestyle.” Between January 2005 and July 2005, mother failed to attend each of 12 scheduled drug test appointments.

The children had weekly supervised visits with mother. Mother missed a few visits and was late for the other visits. During one visit, mother was on her cell phone during the entire visit.

According to the social worker’s August 2005 status review report, mother “has had ample opportunity to make progress on her case plan but she failed to do so. She has made several comments indicating that she does not understand why she has to complete these classes because she is not a risk to her children. It appears that [mother] is not taking responsibility for her actions as she continues to deny that she has a substance abuse problem, which is evidenced by the fact that she failed to continually drug test and was discharged from her outpatient substance abuse program on two separate occasions.”

DPSS recommended that services be terminated for mother and that the court set a hearing to be held pursuant to section 366.26. At the time set for the six-month review hearing, the court continued the hearing and directed DPSS to prepare and submit an addendum report concerning “sibling group issues.” The requested addendum report states: “The children are all bonded and have lived with each other since birth. It would be detrimental to the children’s well being for them to be separated from one another. The younger children depend on the support and love from their oldest sister, Mary . . . who would be devastated if she were not placed with any of her siblings. In addition, Mary and Michael both indicate that they want to be placed together with the rest of their siblings whether it would be a permanent foster or adoptive home. For these reasons, [DPSS] is respectfully recommending that the children be considered as a sibling group.”

The addendum report further noted that mother had not contacted DPSS since leaving her substance abuse program the previous month. Nor had she contacted DPSS to schedule visits with the children.

At the six-month review hearing, the court found “that it would be detrimental to break these children’s sibling ties, and it is appropriate to maintain them together. . . . It does appear that the children wish to stay together as well. Based on each of these factors, the Court does find that the children . . . would constitute a sibling group.” The court also found that mother had failed to make substantive progress in the completion of her plan and that there was no substantial probability that the children would be returned to the care of a parent if given additional services. The court terminated services and set a hearing pursuant to section 366.26.

Efforts to locate adoptive parents for the five children were initially unsuccessful. In December 2005, a social worker contacted Maria G., who said “she was not committed to adoption at this time.” A meeting was scheduled with Maria G.”to discuss the permanent plan for her grandchildren.” The social worker’s phone calls to confirm this appointment were not returned. Maria G.later explained that a family emergency prevented her from returning the calls. The meeting was rescheduled for January 17, 2006.

Prior to the meeting between the social worker and Maria G., DPSS filed a “[section] 366.26 WIC Report.” This report, filed January 3, 2006, stated that the children are residing in a foster home. The report states that Terry W. is interested in adopting the children, and that there has been “significant interest in the children when their profile was placed on a secure adoption website.” The report also indicated that the children may be placed with Maria G.

On January 17, 2006, Maria G.met with the social worker and “agreed that adoption was in the best interest of the children.” The children were placed with the G.’s on January 26, 2006.

A “Status Review Report,” filed February 10, 2006, includes a preliminary assessment of the prospective adoptive parents. The preliminary assessment provides a social history of the G.’s, and states that the prospective adoptive parents are fully aware of the children’s needs and of the legal and financial rights and responsibilities that come with adoption. Regarding background checks, the preliminary assessment states: “The results of DOJ, Child Abuse Central Index, and FBI for the adoptive parent are pending. However, Relative Assessment Unit has completed a back ground [sic] check on the adoptive paretns [sic]. . . . [The] CWS search indicated no history for the adoptive parent.”

According to the preliminary assessment, Maria G.”has had [a] relationship with her five grandchildren since their birth and loves them very much.” It further states: “The adoptive parents have a loving relationship with the children. They love them and care for them deeply and are determine[d] to provide them with a stable and a loving home. The adoptive mother is the biological paternal grandmother. She said that she is so happy to finally have her grandchildren placed with her and her husband.”

Regarding the children’s wishes, the assessment stated that the two older children, Mary and Michael, have said “that they love being with the adoptive parents and wish to live with them forever. The three younger children are too young to verbalize their feelings, however[,] they appear to be very attached and bonded with the adoptive parents.”

DPSS filed an addendum report on February 17, 2006, stating that the “children are doing well in their prospective adoptive parent’s home.” The report reiterated the statement in the preliminary adoption assessment that “both Michael and Mary . . . have stated that they would like to remain in this home.”

At the section 366.26 hearing held on February 22, 2006, DPSS’s counsel stated that it would submit the matter based on the January 3, 2006, report, the February 10, 2006, status review report, and the February 17, 2006, addendum. There was no objection to any of these reports, and no evidence or argument presented by either parent. Indeed, when asked whether the parents were submitting on the reports and recommendations of DPSS’s counsel, the counsel for each parent replied, “no comment.” The court terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights as to the children and ordered the children placed for adoption.

ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of Evidence of Adoptability

Father contends that the court failed to read the February 10, 2006, review report, containing the preliminary adoption assessment. Without the preliminary assessment, he argues, there is no substantial evidence to support adoption. Both parents contend that, even if the preliminary adoption assessment was considered, the evidence was insufficient to support adoptability. We reject both arguments.

We uphold the juvenile court’s finding if the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence that the children were likely to be adopted. (In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1153-1154.) “’”’Clear and convincing’ evidence requires a finding of high probability. The evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citations.]”’ [Citations.]” (In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1205.) Still, we “’presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.’” (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732.)

1. The Court’s Consideration of the Preliminary Adoption Assessment

Father contends that the court failed to read and consider the information in the preliminary adoption assessment, and that the reports the court did read did not contain substantial evidence of the children’s adoptability. The argument is based upon father’s reading of the transcript of the section 366.26 hearing. At the outset of the hearing, counsel for DPSS stated that it would submit based upon the January 3, 2006, “[section] 366.26 WIC Report,” the February 10, 2006, status review report, and the February 17, 2006, addendum. The court then indicated that it had the January 3, 2006, report and the addendum filed on February 17, 2006, but did not have the February 10, 2006, report, which contained the preliminary adoption assessment. The following colloquy then took place:

“[DPSS COUNSEL]: The one [report] the Court is missing, apparently, is the review report of February 10th, and the only reason I am submitting that is because it has the preliminary adoptive assessment attached.

“THE COURT: Is there a reason we have a review report in this matter? I know we have a review today. Typically, there is a stipulation to utilize the [section 366.26] report as the review report.

“[DPSS COUNSEL]: I’m not quite sure why we have a separate report at this time.

“THE COURT: The reason I’m asking is it appears to read the same as the [section 366.26] report.

“[DPSS COUNSEL]: Largely, it does, your Honor.

“THE COURT: Except it has them placed at a different spot. Let me see.

“Does the prospective adoptive parent live in Anaheim?

“[DPSS COUNSEL]: Yes.

“THE COURT: As to notice?

“[DPSS COUNSEL]: Your Honor, the Court dispensed with further statutory notice back on January 19th. I did submit proof of mailed notice.

“THE COURT: Is father in custody?

“[DPSS COUNSEL]: No, your Honor.

“THE COURT: The Court, at this time, finds that notice has been given as required by law; has read and considered each of the reports indicated by the County Counsel.” (Italics added.)

This colloquy shows that the court did not have the February 10, 2006, report at the beginning of the hearing. There then follows some discussion about whether there was a need for a “review report”; the court then tells counsel that “it appears to read the same as the [section 366.26] report.” The “it” in this sentence appears to refer to the previously missing status review report. (The February 10, 2006, review report does duplicate much of the information contained in the January 3, 2006, report.) The court’s statement that the report “has them placed at a different spot,” further indicates that the court has the report before it at the time the statement is made. (The January 3, 2006, report indicates that children are in a certain foster home; the February 10, 2006, report states that they are placed with the G.’s in Anaheim.) It is not clear from the transcript how or precisely when during this discussion the court obtained the report. Perhaps DPSS counsel provided the court with a copy of the document at the outset as she spoke about the reason for submitting it; perhaps it was given to the court by a clerk. In any event, it is apparent that the court did have possession of the report. Nor does the transcript indicate if, when, or for how long any pauses in the proceeding occurred while the court read the report. We note that the substance of the preliminary adoption assessment consists of less than four double-spaced pages and could be easily read within one or two minutes. By the conclusion of the colloquy, the court states that it “has read and considered each of the reports indicated by the County Counsel.” There is no basis to conclude that the court’s statement is incorrect. Accordingly, we reject father’s contention that the court did not read the report, including the attached preliminary adoption assessment.

2. Sufficiency of the Preliminary Adoption Assessment

Both parents contend that there was insufficient evidence of adoptability because the preliminary adoption assessment was inadequate and the record indicates a lack of commitment on the part of the G.’s to adopt the children. Preliminarily, we note that to the extent the parents are asserting that the preliminary assessment was deficient or failed to comply with statutory requirements, the parents forfeited the argument by failing to raise the issue before the trial court. (See In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 200, fn. 12.) To the extent that the parents are challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s adoptability finding and are relying upon inadequacies in the preliminary adoption assessment to support that challenge, the argument is not forfeited. (See In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 622.) With respect to this latter argument, we look to the totality of the evidence bearing upon adoptability; any deficiencies in the preliminary adoption assessment “will go to the weight of the evidence and may ultimately prove insignificant.” (In re John F. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1378.)

“The juvenile court may terminate parental rights only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the child will be adopted within a reasonable time.” (In re Jerome D., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1204.) “In making this determination, the juvenile court must focus on the child, and whether the child’s age, physical condition, and emotional state may make it difficult to find an adoptive family.” (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 400.) “[I]t is not necessary that the minor already be in a potential adoptive home or that there be a proposed adoptive parent ‘waiting in the wings.’ [Citations.]” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) “Usually, the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.” (Id. at pp. 1649-1650.)

There is ample evidence here to support the court’s adoptability finding. The children are young, ranging in age (at the time of the hearing) from one year old to eight years old. The section 366.26 WIC Report includes an assessment of each child’s medical, developmental, scholastic, mental, and emotional status. (See § 366.21, subd. (i).) According to the report, with the exception of three children being treated for bronchitis and one for a cold, each child was in good physical health; the children are reaching their developmental milestones; and the two school age children are both doing “well in school.” Although the two older children are seeing a therapist, no problems or issues are reported concerning the mental or emotional status of the children. “Francisca appears to be a happy child . . . [and] mentally and emotionally healthy.” “Isabella is a friendly child who smiles and enjoys receiving a lot of attention. She appears to be happy.” Other than the difficulty of placing a sibling group of five children, there is nothing in the record to indicate any substantial issue concerning the adoptability of the children.

Regarding any difficulty in placing the five children together, the social worker initially reported that there was “significant interest in the children when their profile was placed on a secure adoption website.” Ultimately, the G.’s agreed to adopt the children, stating that they “love [the children] and care for them deeply and are determine[d] to provide them with a stable and a loving home.”

Father argues that such statements by the G.’s are “far from convincing.” He points to the grandmother’s prior unwillingness to have the children placed with them, the grandmother’s failure to return calls from the social worker, and the short period of time between their placement in grandmother’s home and the section 366.26 hearing. Such arguments might have been appropriately made to the trial court. The belated change of heart by the G.’s and the depth of their commitment could certainly have been questioned at the hearing. Neither father nor mother, however, chose to question the social worker about the preliminary assessment. Nor was any argument presented that the statements attributed to the G.’s in the preliminary adoption assessment should not be credited, or that the G.’s were unqualified or lacked the commitment necessary to be adopting parents. Even if the evidence in the record could suggest a lack of commitment on the part of the G.’s, we must reject the suggestion. Under the substantial evidence standard of review, we must view the evidence, including the preliminary adoption assessment, in the light most favorable to the judgment. (See In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52.) We do not judge the effect or value of the evidence, or reweigh the evidence. (Ibid.) Based on this standard, we reject father’s arguments.

Mother focuses on the statement in the preliminary adoption assessment that “[t]he results of DOJ, Child Abuse Central Index, and FBI for the adoptive parent are pending.” Mother argues that if the final background check results render the prospective adoptive parents ineligible, “it may not be possible to find another suitable home where all five children can live together.” As with father’s concerns about the strength of the G.’s’ commitment to adopt, this argument would have been proper before the trial court. As stated above, any deficiency in the preliminary adoption assessment goes to the weight of the evidence. (In re John F., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1378; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 413.) In light of the otherwise ample evidence supporting adoptability of the children, the court could have reasonably concluded that the failure to have the final results on the background checks was not determinative of adoptability. That is, even if the results of the background checks prevented adoption by the G.’s, the court could have reasonably concluded from other evidence that the children were adoptable.

B. Beneficial Relationship Exception to Adoption

Mother argues that the court erred in failing to find an exception to the termination of parental rights under what is commonly referred to as the beneficial relationship exception. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) This exception applies where “[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Ibid.) The parents have the burden of proving that the beneficial relationship exception applies. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1463(e)(3).)

“The juvenile court does not have a sua sponte duty to determine whether an exception to adoption applies.” (In re Rachel M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1295.) A parent who fails to raise an exception to the termination of parental rights below, waives the right to raise the issue on appeal. (Ibid.; In re Erik P., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 402-403.) This rule was explained in Erik P.: “The application of any of the exceptions enumerated in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) depends entirely on a detailed analysis of the relevant facts by the juvenile court. [Citations.] If a parent fails to raise one of the exceptions at the hearing, not only does this deprive the juvenile court of the ability to evaluate the critical facts and make the necessary findings, but it also deprives this court of a sufficient factual record from which to conclude whether the trial court’s determination is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Allowing [a parent] to raise the exception for the first time on appeal would be inconsistent with this court’s role of reviewing orders terminating parental rights for the sufficiency of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 403.)

Neither mother nor father raised this exception (or any argument against the termination of parental rights) before the trial court. Accordingly, they have forfeited the argument on appeal.

C. Consideration of the Children’s Wishes

Subdivision (h)(1) of section 366.26 provides: “At all proceedings under this section, the court shall consider the wishes of the child and shall act in the best interests of the child.” (See also § 366.21, subd. (i) [adoption assessment must generally include a statement from the minor concerning placement and the adoption].) This subdivision imposes “a mandatory duty on the courts to ‘consider the child’s wishes to the extent ascertainable’ prior to entering an order terminating parental rights . . . .” (In re Leo M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1591.) Mother contends there is insufficient evidence the court considered the children’s wishes before terminating her parental rights. We disagree.

Under section 366.26, subdivision (h), direct expression of the children’s wishes or formal testimony is not required. (In re Leo M., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1590.) Evidence of their wishes may be supplied through the reports prepared for the hearing. (Id. at p. 1591; In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 820.) Their wishes need not be expressly stated, but can be inferred from other evidence in reports. (In re Leo M., supra, at p. 1593.) Finally, the evidence of the children’s wishes need not indicate that they are aware that the proceeding involves the termination of parental rights. (Ibid.)

Here, the section 366.26 WIC Report states that “[t]he two older children have stated several times that they would like to live with the maternal grandmother [Terry W.].” The social worker told them that living with Terry W. was “very unlikely, but they may go and live with their other grandmother, [Maria G.].” Thereafter, the children were placed with the G.’s The preliminary adoption assessment states that the two older children have said “that they love being with the adoptive parents and wish to live with them forever. The three younger children are too young to verbalize their feelings, however[,] they appear to be very attached and bonded with the adoptive parents.” From these statements, the court could reasonably conclude that the children -- or at least the children who could verbalize their feelings -- understood that a decision about a permanent home for them was in the offing. The court could further conclude that, while living in the foster home, they desired to live with Terry W.; but when placed in the G. home, they decided they wanted to live there forever. The statements included in the reports considered by the court thus provide substantial evidence of the children’s wishes.

D. Sibling Relationship Exception to Adoption

Mother argues that if any one of the children is not adoptable, then the siblings are also unadoptable because they have a bonded relationship with each other. Mother’s argument is premised upon the assumption that this court will find that the juvenile court erred in terminating mother’s parental rights as to at least one of the children. Because we find no such error, mother’s argument is moot.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

/s/ King

J.

We concur:

/s/ Hollenhorst

Acting P.J.

/s/ Richli

J.

Publication courtesy of California pro bono legal advice.

Analysis and review provided by La Mesa Property line Lawyers.

^[1] All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless others indicated.

^[2] The stated ages are the children’s ages as of the date of the hearing held pursuant to section 366.26.

^[3] The children, through their appellate counsel, request that this court affirm the trial court’s orders.

^[4] Section 300, subdivision (b), provides for juvenile court jurisdiction when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.”

^[5] Section 300, subdivision (g), provides, in part: “The child has been left without any provision for support; . . . or a relative or other adult custodian with whom the child resides or has been left is unwilling or unable to provide care or support for the child, the whereabouts of the parent are unknown, and reasonable efforts to locate the parent have been unsuccessful.”