Filed 10/17/17 In re Angel M. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Roderick W. Shelton, Judge. Affirmed.

Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting, Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Angel M.[1] appeals the juvenile court's dispositional order declaring him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and placing him on probation after the court sustained allegations that he committed petty theft. (Pen. Code, § 484.) Angel's sole contention is that the juvenile court abused its discretion by imposing a probation condition prohibiting him from contacting one of his co-offenders, and denying without explanation his request that the condition prohibit "negative contact" with that co-offender.[2]

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2015, 14-year-old Angel was caught shoplifting at a department store. He carried two clothing items out of the store without paying for them. His co-offender, Diego, concealed additional items in Diego's backpack. Another co-offender, Mason, hid stolen clothing in a shopping bag Angel had gotten at another store. The District Attorney alleged Angel committed petty theft, and the juvenile court found true the allegations. It accepted the People's aiding and abetting theory that Angel provided the shopping bag Mason used to conceal the stolen clothing.

The probation officer recommended the following probation condition: "The minor shall not knowingly have any direct or indirect contact with co-offender(s) Mason [ ] and Diego [ ] in this matter, or any of their family members. The minor shall not knowingly contact Mason [ ] and Diego [ ] either directly or indirectly in any way, including but not limited to, in person, by telephone, by texting, in writing, by public or private mail, by email or fax, or by any other electronic means." The probation officer stated in the probation report, "It is hoped [Angel] has learned from this experience and will take necessary steps to avoid further criminal behavior."

At the subsequent disposition hearing, Angel's counsel requested the court modify the probation condition to allow him to have "indirect contact" with Diego and "no negative contact" with Mason: "I would ask that Angel be allowed to have indirect contact with Diego. Mason is a very good friend to Angel as well as a very good influence on [him]. I know they were involved in this incident together; however, Mason does a lot of community service. He has encouraged Angel to do community service with him. He just recently got a job, and for that reason we would ask that Mason and Angel be allowed to have no negative contact."

The court denied the request without elaboration. At the end of the hearing, the court admonished Angel: "t really is going to be in your best interest if you can do everything we tell you to do in six months because then I may, not guaranteed, I may then dismiss and seal your record in six months. If not, you have a year to do that."

We review probation conditions for abuse of discretion. ([i]In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754.) The juvenile court has broad discretion in imposing any and all reasonable probation conditions it determines are " 'fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the [minor] enhanced.' " (In re J.E. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 795, 799; citing Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b).)

" '[T]he power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.' " (In re J.B., supra, at p. 754.) Juveniles are " 'more in need of guidance and supervision than adults.' " (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910.) Therefore, when the state asserts jurisdiction over a minor, it acts as the child's parent thereby occupying a unique role in caring for the minor's well-being. (Id. at

pp. 909-910.)

A juvenile probation condition is invalid if it: " ' "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality." ' " (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) All three prongs must be satisfied to find the condition invalid. (Ibid.) Thus, even if a probation condition has no relationship to the defendant's convicted crime and involves non-criminal conduct, "the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality." (Id. at p. 380.)

We reject Angel's argument that the court abused its discretion by imposing the probation condition at issue here. Mason and Angel were caught shoplifting together. The probation condition is directly related to the crime, and is reasonable. Although Angel having contact with Mason is not a crime in itself, the purpose of the condition is to prevent them from engaging in any future criminal activities together. The factors set forth in Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379 are not met; therefore, the condition is not invalid.

Although Angel argues the court erred by not explaining its reasons for rejecting his proposed modification of the probation condition, he cites no authority stating the juvenile court was required to explain its rejection of his request for "no negative contact" with Mason. By his failing to do so, we may treat the issue as forfeited because it is unsupported by authority. (In re Vanessa M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1131.) In any event, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that permitting that modification of the probation condition would render the condition difficult to monitor and would undermine Angel's rehabilitation. The court's decision to follow the probation department's recommendation and impose the condition will foster Angel's rehabilitation.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

O'ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.