Filed 10/23/17 Mariage of Smith CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In 2001, Marta Smith obtained a default marital dissolution judgment against Gary David Smith. That judgment confirmed a property, located in Mountain View, California (Mountain View Property), to Gary as his separate property. In 2016, Gary requested that Marta sign paperwork to transfer the Mountain View Property into his name. She refused. Gary subsequently filed a motion to enforce the parties’ 2001 marital dissolution judgment. Marta objected to Gary’s motion because she claimed a community property interest in the Mountain View Property, which was never adjudicated. The trial court granted Gary’s motion and concluded that the marital dissolution judgment awarded the Mountain View Property to Gary as his separate property. We agree and affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Marta and Gary married in 1996. The parties separated within a few years. During the course of their marriage, the parties purchased three properties: the Mountain View Property; a property located in Tahoe City, California (Tahoe City Property); and a property located in Millbrae, California (Millbrae Property). Marta signed an interspousal transfer deed quitclaiming her interest in the Tahoe City Property at the time it was acquired.

In March 2001, Marta filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. The petition identified the Mountain View Property, the Millbrae Property, and the Tahoe City Property, and requested they be confirmed to Gary as his separate property. The petition further stated there were no community and quasi-community assets and debts subject to disposition. Marta also submitted a declaration declaring all of the information in her petition was true and correct and again confirming there were no community or quasi-community assets or debts for disposition. Marta requested the court enter a default judgment based on her petition. In May 2001, the court entered a default judgment against Gary. The court confirmed the three properties to Gary as set forth in Marta’s petition. In 2002, Marta signed a quitclaim deed confirming the Millbrae Property to Gary as his sole and separate property pursuant to the marital dissolution judgment. However, no paperwork was completed with regard to the Mountain View Property.

In 2016, Gary decided to sell the Mountain View Property. He was informed by the title company that Marta was still on title, and he asked Marta to sign the necessary documents to transfer title to his name. In response, Marta claimed she had an ongoing community property interest in the Mountain View Property and the other two properties, and offered to relinquish her interest for $350,000.

Gary subsequently filed a motion seeking enforcement of the judgment and requesting either Marta or the court clerk sign an interspousal transfer deed and any other documents needed to confirm the Mountain View Property as his separate property. In response, Marta again asserted she had an ongoing community property interest in the Mountain View Property, which was never adjudicated and to which she was entitled. The trial court rejected Marta’s argument and held that the Mountain View Property “was adjudicated. It was given to [Gary] as a separate property in the judgment. It’s adjudicated.” The court granted Gary’s motion and ordered the clerk to sign the interspousal transfer deed. Marta filed a notice of appeal from this order.

Marta also filed a separate motion asserting a community property interest in the three properties and seeking division of those interests as unadjudicated real property. The trial court denied her motion. Marta did not appeal from that order.[1]

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

We review questions of statutory interpretation do novo. (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724.) “ ‘In doing so, “ ‘our fundamental task is “to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.” ’ ” [Citation.] As always, we start with the language of the statute, “giv[ing] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute’s purpose.” ’ ” (Coker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 667, 674, quoting Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.)

B. Applicability of Family Code Section 2556

Marta argues she is entitled to relief under Family Code section 2556 because neither her petition nor the judgment mentions any community property interest in the Mountain View Property. As a result, her community property interest was not before the court, not litigated, and not addressed by the judgment. We disagree.

Family Code section 2556 provides “[a] party may file a postjudgment motion . . . in order to obtain adjudication of any community estate asset or liability omitted or not adjudicated by the judgment.” Section 2556 “does not authorize a ‘modification’ of the prior property division judgment or otherwise allow the court to act on community estate assets . . . already disposed of by a prior judgment.” (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2017) ¶ 17:347, p. 17-122.)

The key issue here is whether the 2001 marital dissolution judgment adjudicated the entire Mountain View Property or omitted some portion of that asset. (See In re Marriage of Simundza (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1517.) “[T]he ‘same rules apply in ascertaining the meaning of a court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning of any other writing.’ ” (Estate of Careaga (1964) 61 Cal.2d 471, 475, quoting Los Angeles Local etc. Board v. Stan’s Drive-Ins, Inc. (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 89, 94.) The language of a writing governs its interpretation, “ ‘if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.’ ” (Ibid.) The parties’ marital dissolution judgment states, the “1085 Judson Drive Mountain View, Ca 94040” property is “confirmed to Respondent.” The language is clear and concise. It identifies the entire Mountain View Property by address, and does not identify any contingencies or other issues that would suggest the property was only partially adjudicated. The plain language of the order awarded the entire Mountain View Property to Gary, and any associated interests were fully adjudicated by that distribution. (Civ. Code, § 1644 [words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary sense “rather than according to their strict legal meaning”]; Maggio v. Windward Capital Management Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215 [if contract language is clear and explicit, it governs].)

Nor does Marta identify what portion of the Mountain View Property was not awarded to Gary. Instead, the gist of her argument is that her community property interest in the Mountain View Property should be considered unadjudicated because the court incorrectly confirmed that interest to Gary as his separate property. Neither party cites, and we are unaware of, any case adopting such an interpretation of Family Code section 2556.

In re Marriage of Thorne & Raccina (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 492 is instructive. In that case, the parties entered into a stipulated marital dissolution judgment, which provided the wife with a percentage of the husband’s military pension at a lower rate than provided by California law. (Id. at pp. 495–496.) The wife sought to set aside or modify the judgment upon learning the judgment did not represent her full community property share of the pension. (Id. at p. 498.) The wife argued “ ‘that by not providing [her] total community property share of the military retirement, the asset has been partially omitted and, therefore, the Court has jurisdiction to set aside that part that is incorrect and provide a fair and equitable judgment.’ ” (Ibid.) The court rejected this argument, noting the judgment allocated a fixed pension amount and the whole pension was considered. (Id. at p. 502.) As a result, the court concluded, “the words of the judgment expressly divide [the husband’s] entire pension” and there was “nothing left to divide.” (Ibid.)

Misclassification of the parties’ interests in the Mountain View Property does not constitute an omitted or unadjudicated asset within the meaning of Family Code section 2556. The language of section 2556 is unambiguous, and only applies when an “asset” has not been “previously adjudicated.” (Ibid.) The Mountain View Property, however, was previously adjudicated—it was confirmed to Gary as his separate property. (See Black’s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 50, col. 1 [defining “adjudicate” as “[t]o rule on judicially”]; Riverside County Sheriff’s Dept. v. Stiglitz (2014) 60 Cal.4th 624, 630 [“ ‘ “When interpreting statutes, we begin with the plain, commonsense meaning of the language used by the Legislature. [Citation.] If the language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.” ’ ”].) Section 2556 does not apply when a party believes an asset or liability has been incorrectly confirmed to one spouse. Instead, it applies only when that asset or liability has not been addressed at all. (Cf. Brunson v. Brunson (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 786, 788 [held that “mere mention” of military pension was “not an adjudication of property rights”].) “ ‘[T]he crucial question is whether the benefits were actually litigated and divided in the previous proceeding.’ ” (In re Marriage of Thorne & Raccina, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 501.) The judgment in this matter does not merely mention the Mountain View Property. It identified and awarded the Mountain View Property to Gary as his separate property.[2]

Marta also argues the trial court could not have awarded her community property interest to Gary as his separate property because her petition was insufficient to constitute a transmutation under Family Code section 852, subdivision (a). However, the court did, in fact, award all interest in the Mountain View Property to Gary. (See In re Marriage of Simundza, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520 [spouse’s entitlement to community property may be altered “ ‘through judicial decree or by an agreement between the parties’ ”].) If the trial court improperly transmuted her community property interest in the Mountain View Property, then Marta was required to contest the validity of the judgment. A final judgment of property division can be set aside only by (1) a timely appeal; (2) a set-aside motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b); or (3) a set-aside motion pursuant to Family Code sections 2121 and 2122 after the time for Code of Civil Procedure section 473 relief expires. (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2017) ¶ 17:340, pp. 17-118 to 17-119.) Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) provides a six-month limitations period to set aside a judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Likewise, Family Code section 2122, subdivision (e) provides a one-year limitations period to set aside a judgment for mistake of law or fact. Marta did not raise a challenge to the judgment within the relevant statute of limitations, and these limitations periods have long since expired.[3]

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Respondent Gary David Smith may recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

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Margulies, J.

We concur:

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Humes, P.J.

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Banke, J.