Filed 11/21/17 Estate of Smith CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


Estate of JERLYN L. SMITH, Deceased.

VAN OSMOND SMITH,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
DELLESIA ONIFADE,
Objector and Respondent.

A149258

(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. P16-01049)


Petitioner Van Osmond Smith (appellant) appeals in propria persona from an order dismissing his petition to admit his mother’s will into probate, name him as executor of his mother’s estate, and appoint him as successor trustee of his mother’s trust. The court dismissed the petition on the ground the matter should have been pursued as a motion or objection in prior actions in which appellant’s sister had been appointed executor and confirmed as trustee. We find no error and shall affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jerlyn L. Smith (decedent) died on April 12, 2015. She was not married at the time of her death. Decedent had four children—Jesse Smith, Jr., John Smith, Dellesia Smith Onifade (Onifade), and appellant.
An unsigned, uncertified document in the record on appeal purports to establish the Jerlyn L. Smith Trust (trust). As set forth in the trust, decedent was the initial trustee and the beneficiary of the trust during her lifetime. Onifade, decedent’s daughter, is the sole successor beneficiary named in the trust. The trust designates Onifade and then appellant as successor trustees, although the trust specifies that there shall be only one successor trustee at a time in the order listed.
The record on appeal also contains an unsigned copy of decedent’s last will and testament (will). The will contains a pour-over provision giving the residue of the decedent’s estate to the trust. The will nominates Onifade and then appellant as executors of the will, with the specification that there shall only be one executor at a time in the order listed.
On July 22, 2015, Onifade filed a petition to confirm the terms of the trust and appoint a trustee in case number P15-01047. As reflected in Onifade’s petition, she was unable to locate a signed trust instrument but alleged that the unsigned trust instrument was executed by the decedent in March 2003. She further alleged the trust had not been revoked or amended during the decedent’s lifetime. She claimed to have become the successor trustee under the terms of the trust as of the date of the decedent’s death. Onifade sought an order confirming that the unsigned trust submitted to the court contained the true and correct terms of the decedent’s trust, and she sought to be confirmed as the sole trustee. In a declaration opposing Onifade’s petition, appellant claimed to have been managing the decedent’s properties for over twenty years. He alleged that Onifade changed ownership of the trust properties with a fraudulent document that was not signed or notarized. Following a hearing on March 10, 2016, the court granted Onifade’s petition and confirmed that Onifade was the trustee of the trust. Appellant appealed that order in appellate case number A147963, which was involuntarily dismissed after appellant failed to file an opening brief.
On September 1, 2015, Onifade filed a petition to admit decedent’s unsigned will to probate and to be named executor of decedent’s estate in case number P15-01265. In a declaration submitted by an attorney claiming to have been retained by the decedent in December 2002, the attorney stated that he had been retained to prepare a will and trust for the decedent. According to the attorney, the decedent emphasized that she wished to bequeath her entire estate to her daughter, Onifade, to the exclusion of her three sons, including appellant. At the decedent’s request, the attorney drafted a trust with a standard pour-over will. The attorney delivered the will to the decedent for signature but was not present when the will was executed. In a separate declaration submitted by an employee of an estate planning service, the declarant claimed to have been present when the decedent signed the will. Neither the attorney nor the employee of the estate planning service was aware of any facts to suggest the decedent had ever revoked or modified her will.
Appellant opposed Onifade’s petition to admit the will to probate in case number P15-01265. He claimed to have been the trustee of the trust since November 2012, when the decedent purportedly designated him as successor trustee to fight what he characterized as an illegal foreclosure of an apartment building owned by the decedent. Appellant claimed he had been managing the decedent’s properties for over 20 years, and he alleged that Onifade had illegally transferred properties belonging to the trust into her name before she petitioned to be named the trustee.
A hearing was conducted in case number P15-01265 on November 19, 2015. Appellant was not present even though the hearing was set to allow appellant to pursue his objections. The court granted the petition, admitted the will to probate, and appointed Onifade as executor of the estate. Appellant appealed that order in appellate case number A148837, which was involuntarily dismissed after appellant failed to cure a default for failure to submit a civil case information statement. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(g)(2).)
The subject of this appeal is a new petition filed by appellant in July 2016 in case number P16-01049 seeking to enter the decedent’s will into probate and have appellant designated as executor of the estate. Appellant’s petition attached the same, unsigned trust and will that had been presented to the court by Onifade in case numbers P15-01047 and P15-01265. Appellant alleged that he had been manager of the decedent’s properties since 1998, and he claimed that he had been trustee of the decedent’s trust since November 2012, when the decedent resigned as trustee. Among other things, appellant alleged that Onifade “stole the assets of the trust” by recording an “affidavit of death of trustee” as to three properties owned by the trust on July 21, 2015, the day before Onifade filed her petition to be named as successor trustee. The affidavits did not transfer the properties outside of the trust but merely declared that Onifade became the trustee under the terms of the trust upon the death of decedent. Appellant described the recordation of the affidavits as fraudulent and sought to be named as the sole executor of the decedent’s estate and as successor trustee of the trust.
In opposition to appellant’s petition, Onifade filed a request for judicial notice of the court’s rulings in case numbers P15-01047 and P15-01265. Onifade pointed out that appellant was a party to the earlier proceedings in which she was appointed trustee of the trust and executor of the estate.
In a tentative ruling on appellant’s petition, the court stated: “It appears to the Court that this matter should have been filed as a motion or objection in either P15-01265 or P15-01047, and therefore should be dismissed.” Appellant was directed to address the issue at the hearing on the petition. Following a hearing conducted on August 29, 2016, at which appellant appeared in propria persona, the court ordered the petition dismissed. Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant’s opening brief on appeal consists largely of a series of disjointed, unorganized legal propositions and factual citations. Nevertheless, from what we can gather, the focus of appellant’s argument appears to be on the three affidavits that were recorded on July 21, 2015, as to properties owned by the trust. As noted, the affidavits identified Onifade as the successor trustee of the trust that owned the properties. The affidavits were recorded the day before Onifade filed a petition seeking to be confirmed as successor trustee. Although the precise nature of appellant’s objection is unclear, he seems to believe that the recordation of the affidavits by Onifade before she had been confirmed as successor trustee by the court renders the court’s orders in case numbers P15-01047 and P15-01265 void. Presumably, as a consequence of the allegedly improper action Onifade took in recording the affidavits, appellant believes he should be named the executor of decedent’s estate and the successor trustee of the trust in place of Onifade.
At the outset, we fail to see how appellant was prejudiced by the recordation of the affidavits. Even if it were premature to record affidavits declaring that Onifade was the successor trustee before a court had confirmed her status as successor trustee, the court’s orders appointing Onifade as executor and confirming her status as successor trustee did not turn on the filing of those affidavits. Instead, the court’s orders in the earlier cases turned on evidence of the decedent’s testamentary intent. The recordation of the affidavits had no bearing upon whether the decedent intended Onifade to be the sole beneficiary of the trust, the successor trustee, or the executor of her estate.
More importantly, the issue raised by appellant was properly pursued, if at all, in the earlier cases. Although we lack a proper record to identify the exact legal basis for the court’s ruling, we know that the court premised the dismissal upon the ground that appellant should have pursued his claims in the earlier actions filed by Onifade. In reviewing the court’s ruling, we review the result and not the court’s reasoning; we may affirm if the ruling was correct on any ground. (In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38.) The court’s ruling here is justified by the doctrine of res judicata, which promotes judicial economy by precluding piecemeal litigation that may occur if a single cause of action is split into more than one lawsuit or if a particular issue has already been decided in an earlier lawsuit. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 897.) “As generally understood, ‘[t]he doctrine of res judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy.’ ” (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 252.) “ ‘In its primary aspect,’ commonly known as claim preclusion, it ‘operates as a bar to the maintenance of a second suit between the same parties on the same cause of action.’ ” (Ibid.)
In the earlier cases—P15-01047 and P15-01265—the probate court ruled that Onifade was the executor of the decedent’s estate and the successor trustee of the decedent’s trust. Appellant’s attempt to relitigate those rulings is barred by res judicata principles. Further, appellant cannot avoid the preclusive effect of the earlier rulings by characterizing this action as a collateral attack on those rulings. The affidavits that form the basis for his collateral attack were originally filed in case number P15-01047. Indeed, in both of the earlier actions, he asserted that Onifade had acted improperly in transferring properties to herself, presumably in connection with the affidavits that were recorded as to trust properties before she was confirmed as successor trustee. Thus, the issue he raises in this action was actually litigated in the earlier cases. But even if he did not raise the issue in the earlier cases, he would still be barred from raising it in this action. The res judicata effect of a prior judgment extends to matters that could have been raised but were not. (Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 576.) Consequently, the court properly dismissed appellant’s petition on res judicata grounds.
DISPOSITION
The order of August 29, 2016, dismissing the petition is affirmed. Respondent shall be entitled to recover her costs on appeal.



_________________________
McGuiness, P.J.


We concur:


_________________________
Pollak, J.

_________________________
Jenkins, J.