Filed 12/11/17 In re N.C. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



In re N.C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.
D072410


(Super. Ct. No. J519519A-B)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Ronald L. Johnson, Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Diego Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.

Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Paula J. Roach, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
D.C. appeals the juvenile court's denial of her motion for nonsuit seeking dismissal of the petitions filed by the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) on behalf of her minor children, N.C. and H.C., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). D.C. also challenges the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings that N.C. and H.C. are minors described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and the court's conclusion that a 52-week child abuse course offered as part of D.C.'s reunification plan is appropriate to address the concerns that brought her family into the dependency system. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Agency became involved with D.C. and her family in December 2015 after D.C.'s husband, William C., who is also the minors' father, discharged a gun in the family's home and the bullet hit D.C. in the leg. The minors were not home when the incident occurred. The police officer who investigated the shooting concluded William had fired the gun accidentally and reported that both D.C and William denied "any type of argument or foul play."
In January 2016, D.C. told the Agency's social worker, investigating a referral about the shooting, that she was not sure the shooting was accidental. William had recently told D.C. that he wished the bullet would have gone through her head and that he wished their daughter, 12-year-old N.C., was dead. D.C. also told the social worker that five years earlier William had held a gun to her head in front of the two children. N.C. told the social worker that William had threatened to shoot her and her mother. Ten-year-old H.C. also told social workers he heard William threaten to shoot his mother and sister. William denied threatening D.C. or the children. In February, D.C. signed a safety plan with the Agency agreeing to move out of the family's house. D.C. also initiated divorce and custody proceedings in family court.
In April 2016, the Agency received a referral that D.C. was suicidal after William was awarded unsupervised contact with the children in the family court proceeding. D.C. told the investigating social worker she had told William that if she could not have the minors, no one would, and that she was going to drive off a cliff with the minors in the car. William confirmed D.C. had made these statements. William also told the social worker that N.C. was acting out during visits, including trying to bite him and touching her groin in an inappropriate manner. William expressed concern that the children knew too much about the divorce and were being negatively affected by D.C.'s statements to them.
In the same time frame, D.C. told the Agency's social workers she would not follow the family court's order granting William unsupervised contact with the children. D.C. also reported H.C. was wetting his pants frequently and needed to wear diapers at night. D.C. blamed H.C.'s regression (H.C. had incontinence issues in the past) on having to see William. In June, D.C. took the minors to see a therapist who reported to the Agency that the minors appeared to be "traumatized and scared." The therapist said that H.C. drew pictures of William firing a gun at D.C. and that when she asked N.C. about visits with her father, N.C. "shut down" and "put her face on the desk like she was disassociating for 15 minutes."
In November 2016, the Agency received another referral, this time alleging H.C. had written a letter saying he did not want to visit William because William had threatened to kill him, D.C., N.C., and their pet cats. H.C. also stated that when he sees his paternal grandparents "it feels like we are going to get kidnapped." Over the next two months, Agency social workers conducted further interviews with each family member.
The minors were interviewed with D.C. present. N.C. read from her journal to the social worker. N.C. said she never wanted to see her father again, that William only wanted to buy her and H.C.'s love, and that William spoke poorly of D.C. to the minors. H.C. made similar statements and told the social worker he did not feel safe with William. The social worker reported that during the interviews, she had to remind D.C. not to engage the minors in conversations about the family court case and to refrain from interrupting the minors while they were speaking.
In January, William told the Agency's social worker that D.C. told the family court judge that H.C. was afraid his father was going to kidnap him and his sister. William said the allegation was laughable and when the social worker tried to discuss the issue, William told her he didn't care and that the Agency was in his way in the family court case.
In mid-February, N.C. was treated for constipation, but the treating physician's notes also indicated N.C. was diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, depression and anxiety, and her treatment plan included individual therapy and several mental health medications.
Then, on February 23, 2017, D.C. brought H.C. to the emergency room because H.C. was suicidal. H.C. told the hospital's social worker that if he had to visit his father he would stab himself with a pencil. The hospital's social worker was also concerned with H.C.'s infantile behavior, noting he was wearing a diaper and talking in a baby voice. The medical staff at the hospital noted H.C. was withdrawn, exhibited a depressed mood, and expressed suicidal ideation. H.C. was placed on a psychiatric hold.
When the Agency's social worker met with H.C. at the hospital the following day, H.C. told her he had "dead thoughts" in his head, which he described as thoughts that he and his sister were dead and wishing that he was dead. H.C. also told the social worker that William was planning to shoot them. The social worker reported that when she spoke with D.C. in private, D.C. stated that she had brought H.C. to the hospital in an effort to get full custody of the minors in the family court proceeding. D.C. admitted that she had told the minors that their father was going to kill them. The social worker reported that D.C. was unwilling to consider the impact her actions were having on the minors and was fixated on preventing them from seeing William. According to D.C., after a psychiatric evaluation, H.C. was released from the hospital the day after he was admitted.
On March 1, 2017, the Agency received a referral alleging N.C. was sexually abused by William. D.C. told the social worker she believed William or another family member was molesting N.C. because N.C. had been touching her private parts frequently and putting her finger into her rectum. D.C. brought N.C. to the hospital for a sexual abuse physical examination. The hospital's social worker reported that while she was in the waiting room, N.C. had her hand down her pants and appeared to be touching her vaginal area. When N.C. was taken to the exam room, D.C. told the examiner that N.C. was nonverbal and could not speak. The examination did not reveal any evidence of sexual abuse and a consulting physician suggested N.C. might be touching herself to sooth because of stress.
The two hospital visits prompted the Agency to intensify its ongoing investigation of the family. D.C. met with the Agency's social worker on March 7, 2017, and admitted she had told the minors that she believed William was going to kill them and that she wanted to prevent William from having any contact with the minors. D.C. also repeated that she believed William was sexually abusing N.C. because N.C. "won't tell her what is going on at the father's house." The social worker discussed the impact D.C.'s statements were having on the minors. D.C. stated she understood, but then stated that the minors' anxiety was about having to visit William and downplayed the impact of her own behavior. William denied abusing N.C. or threatening to harm the minors or D.C. He also told the Agency's social worker he had no knowledge of H.C.'s suicidal or self-harming behavior.
As it continued the investigation of the family, the Agency's social worker also conducted interviews with Dr. Linda Altes, who was conducting psychological evaluations for each family member for the family court matter; H.C.'s elementary school social worker, Ala Naaman; N.C.'s middle school social worker, Andrew Carlon; the minors' pediatrician, Dr. Erfani; and the minors' family court attorney, Darlene Anderson. Dr. Altes reported that at a recent visit with N.C., N.C. laid "in a fetal position under the chair in the waiting room," and when she called N.C. to "her office, she crawled in on all fours" then stayed on the floor during the visit "appearing like a baby and refusing to answer any questions." Dr. Altes stated both minors "looked stressed to the max" and that N.C. was withdrawing as a result of the conflict and hostility between her parents. Dr. Altes also told the Agency's social worker that she could not "believe that leaving the children in the mother's care would be positive."
Naaman stated that D.C. had stopped the therapy that H.C. had been receiving because D.C. was not pleased with the care. Naaman stated H.C. was doing better in school, but that H.C. told Naaman that his maternal grandparents told him that William had shot his mother on purpose and that William wanted to kill H.C. Naaman also stated that D.C. reported to her in January that H.C. was suicidal because he had to visit William. Naaman also observed pencil tip marks on H.C.'s leg. When D.C. told Naaman again in February that H.C. was having suicidal thoughts and wanted to stab himself with a knife, Naaman advised D.C. to take H.C. to the hospital. Naaman stated that H.C. was being negatively impacted by D.C.'s behavior, explaining H.C. "doesn't know what or who he wants and feels guilty about it" and H.C. feels he "has to take a side." Naaman also stated that D.C. wanted Naaman to help her "prove she should have full custody."
Dr. Erfani stated she had known the minors most of their lives, that the minors had recently come to appointments "scratched up," and that it was "clear the siblings are acting out with each other." Dr. Erfani said H.C.'s incontinence was a longstanding issue, but that the problem had been exacerbated by the custody battle. Dr. Erfani also reported both children acted inappropriately for their ages. Dr. Erfani stated there was so much emotional turmoil that N.C. was "shutting down," that both minors seemed troubled, and that Dr. Erfani could not trust D.C. because of her strong animosity toward William. Dr. Erfani stated she worked with many families over the years, but had "never seen a custody battle impact children" the way it was impacting N.C. and H.C. Dr. Erfani also reported that D.C. had asked Dr. Erfani to help her gain full custody.
Carlon told the Agency's social worker that N.C. was "selectively mute and only talks when she trusts people." Like the other individuals involved with the family that were interviewed by the Agency, Carlon was concerned with D.C.'s constant disparagement of William to the minors, particularly concerning the shooting, and noted it was "coaching behavior" and that D.C. was trying to force N.C. to say negative things about her father. Carlon also stated that N.C.'s withdrawing behavior occurred primarily when she was with D.C., noting that both N.C. and H.C. behave younger than is age appropriate in D.C.'s presence, including N.C. acting like a toddler and H.C. rolling on the ground like an infant.
The minors' attorney in the family court matter, Anderson, also expressed grave concern about the parents' behavior and its impact on the minors. Anderson said she was concerned about D.C.'s mental health and also said that N.C.'s school psychologist told her that N.C. seemed to be sick all the time, was missing school frequently, was very immature for her age, on a lot of medication, and that D.C. was pushing for N.C. to be diagnosed as autistic. Anderson told the Agency's social worker that she was worried about the health of the minors and asked the Agency to "please pull these kids[.] I don't see a future with mom and I don't[] know if I can trust the dad."
On April 18, 2017, the Agency received a police report that law enforcement had been called to D.C.'s house because D.C. alleged William had hit H.C. on the hands with a belt for wetting the bed. William denied hitting H.C. and explained that he had been play fighting with his son. H.C. ultimately admitted to the police officer that William had not hit him as D.C. asserted.
On April 27, 2017, the Agency filed petitions on behalf of both minors under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), alleging N.C. and H.C. were at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness based on their parents' "ongoing marital discord" and the trauma the minors had already experienced as a result. The petitions alleged the minors believed William "wants to kill them" and D.C. "continually reminds the children that the father wants them dead and is practicing shooting guns to kill them."
The detention report filed by the Agency the following day outlined the history of the case and requested the minors be detained and placed with an approved relative, at Polinsky Children's Center, or a licensed foster home, and that the parents be provided supervised visitation. At the April 28, 2017 detention hearing, D.C. asked for a one-day continuance because she had retained private counsel who was not present. The court appointed counsel for William and found the Agency had made a prima facie showing the minors were described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and that the Agency had made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the minors from D.C.'s home. The court ordered the minors detained with liberal supervised visitation and continued the detention hearing to May 1, 2017.
At the continued hearing, the court reiterated its prior findings and orders. The Agency's counsel reported that the minors had been placed with their paternal aunt. The court admonished D.C. and William that they were forbidden from discussing the dependency proceeding or their family court matter with the minors and set the jurisdiction hearing for May 19, 2017.
In mid-May the Agency's social worker conducted additional interviews with each family member. N.C. was reserved and was not willing to talk to the social worker without H.C. present. Even with H.C. present, N.C. would not respond to questions about her parents. H.C. told the social worker that he was living with his aunt because he and his sister did not want to live with their parents, and that they liked living with their aunt because she was nice to them. H.C. told the social worker he liked visiting with his father, but also that William told H.C. that D.C. was a bad parent. When asked where they would like to live, both minors told the social worker they wanted to stay with their aunt. H.C. said he was happy in her home. The social worker reported that both children were doing better in school since their removal from D.C.'s care. Both, however, also shut down in uncomfortable situations and used a baby voice to communicate.
When William was asked by the social worker why he thought the minors were taken into protective custody, William said that it was because of the family court matter and because the minors were refusing to talk as a result of D.C.'s actions. William blamed D.C. for the minors' behavioral issues and stated that since the minors had been placed with his sister, he had already seen improvement. William also showed the social workers videos he had taken of the minors stating that D.C. had told them what to say in their family court interviews. William told the Agency's social worker he did not talk negatively about D.C. in the minors' presence, except to defend himself. He denied that he shot D.C. on purpose and denied telling the minors that he wanted to kill D.C.
In her interview, despite her earlier admissions, D.C. now denied making disparaging remarks about William to the minors. Instead she stated the minors had only heard negative things about their father in the context of the family court proceedings. D.C. said the minors were traumatized by the shooting even though they were not present when it happened because they saw the scar that it left on her leg. D.C. admitted that at a recent visit with the minors, she had threatened H.C. that she would not visit him again if he cried. D.C. told the social worker she wanted the minors removed from their paternal aunt's home. She stated that "[i]f they can't be with me then no one in the family should have them." She also stated she did not care if it would be difficult for the minors to be placed with strangers.
In its report for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the Agency recommended the minors continue to be detained with their paternal aunt and that the parents be provided with reunification services. The Agency also referred the minors to individual therapy. At the May 19, 2017 hearing, both parents set the matter for trial. The minors began individual counseling on June 21, 2017.
The jurisdiction and disposition hearing took place on June 27, 2017. The court accepted the Agency's reports into evidence and the family's social worker testified about the history of the case, including the physical and emotional toll the parents' behavior had taken on the minors. She testified that the 52-week child abuse course recommended by the Agency for D.C. was appropriate and covered all types of abuse, not just physical. The social worker also testified that the minors' behavioral issues continued to improve in their aunt's home and that both parents' visitation was going well.
After the social worker's testimony, D.C.'s attorney moved for nonsuit, asserting the case did not fall under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) because there was no evidence the minors suffered serious physical harm at the hands of their parents. Counsel for the Agency and the minors reiterated the significant physical and mental issues the minors experienced as a result of the custody battle in the family court matter. The Agency's attorney asserted the case was highly unusual in that the family law proceedings had "essentially resulted in a serious risk of physical harm to the children that are before the Court." The attorney also asserted the Agency had worked with the family for over a year to eliminate the risk of harm to the minors, but the parents had been unwilling or unable to change their dangerous behavior. The minors' attorney expressed agreement with the Agency's counsel, noting all of the professionals involved in the case expressed concern for the physical well-being of the minors if placed in D.C.'s care. The court denied D.C.'s motion for nonsuit, concluding the allegations in the petitions were "within the purview of [section] 300[, subdivision] (b) as a risk of physical harm."
D.C.'s counsel called the Agency's social worker back to the stand. The social worker testified that both children had individualized education plans prior to their parents' separation and that H.C. had bladder control problems since he was a toddler. The social worker stated she believed D.C. was beginning to accept the impact her actions had on the minors, which the social worker considered progress, but that D.C. continued to struggle to not say inappropriate things to the minors about William.
In closing statements, counsel for the Agency and the minors argued jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) was appropriate. Counsel for William and D.C. both asked the court not to order they attend the 52-week child abuse class recommended by the Agency. D.C.'s counsel requested individual therapy for both parents instead of the group abuse class. William's attorney agreed jurisdiction was appropriate, but argued the petitions should be amended to focus primarily on D.C.'s behavior.
After argument, the juvenile court stated its findings "by clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial risk of injury to the children pursuant to [section] 300[, subdivision] (b)." The court ordered the minors placed with a suitable relative, at the Agency's discretion but not either parent, and continued the visitation orders already in place. The court also ordered both parents to undergo a psychological evaluation and ordered that both attend the 52-week child abuse class recommended by the Agency. D.C. timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
D.C. asserts the juvenile court erred in finding the petitions filed by the Agency stated a cause of action. Alternatively, she asserts that insufficient evidence supported the court's jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). D.C. also argues jurisdiction was not required because she had ameliorated the problems that brought the minors into the dependency system by the time of the jurisdictional hearing. Finally, D.C. argues that the 52-week child abuse course ordered by the juvenile court was not designed to address the specific needs of the family.
I
Adequacy of the Petitions and Jurisdictional Findings Under Section 300 Subdivision (b)(1)
A
"To state a cause of action, a dependency petition must contain the 'code section and the subdivision under which the proceedings are instituted,' as well as 'an allegation pursuant to that section' (§ 332, subd. (c)) and a 'concise statement of facts, separately stated, to support the conclusion that the child upon whose behalf the petition is being brought is a person within the definition of each of the sections and subdivisions under which the proceedings are being instituted.' (§ 332, subd. (f).) 'This does not require the pleader to regurgitate the contents of the social worker's report into a petition, it merely requires the pleading of essential facts establishing at least one ground of juvenile court jurisdiction.' (In re Alysha S. [(1996)] 51 Cal.App.4th [393,] 399-400.)" (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 410.)
" '[Notice] of the allegations upon which the deprivation of custody is predicated is fundamental to due process. [Citations.] Accordingly, a parent must be given notice of the specific factual allegations against him or her with sufficient particularity to permit him or her to properly meet the charge.' " (In re Fred J. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 168, 175, italics omitted.) If a parent believes the allegations of the petition do not state a cause of action sufficient under the law, the parent may challenge the pleading by filing a motion similar to a demurrer. (Id. at p. 176.) The reviewing court construes the pleaded facts in favor of the petition to determine whether the social services agency pleaded sufficient grounds to bring the child within the provisions of section 300. (In re Kaylee H. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 92, 108 (Kaylee H.).)
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) provides, in relevant part: "A child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court: [¶] . . . [¶] (b)(1) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse." Jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1) is appropriate where the evidence shows (1) the parent is unable to adequately protect or supervise the child, (2) which causes (3) serious physical harm or illness to the child, or a substantial risk of such harm or illness. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629.)
Jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) may continue "only so long as is necessary to protect the child from [the] risk of suffering physical harm or illness." (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) Thus, a jurisdictional finding must be supported by evidence that the minor is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. "[E]vidence of past events may have some probative value in considering current conditions. But under section 300, subdivision (b) this is only true if circumstances existing at the time of the hearing make it likely the children will suffer the same type of 'serious physical harm or illness' in the future." (In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 388 (Janet T.), italics omitted, fns. omitted.) " '[P]revious acts of neglect, standing alone, do not establish a substantial risk of harm; there must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe they will reoccur.' " (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1394, italics omitted.)
" 'On appeal, the "substantial evidence" test is the appropriate standard of review for both the jurisdictional and dispositional findings.' " (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022.) " 'In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible.' [Citation.] ' "If the evidence so viewed is sufficient as a matter of law, the judgment must be affirmed . . . ." ' [Citation.]" (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.)
B
In response to D.C.'s assertion that the petitions failed to state a cause of action, the Agency asserts the adequacy of the petitions is irrelevant because the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence. We agree with this proposition. However, even if it were not applicable, the petitions here were sufficiently pleaded. In addition to stating that the minors were traumatized by their parents' conduct, each petition stated that D.C. "continually reminds the children that the father wants them dead and is practicing shooting guns to kill them" and that D.C. stated that "she would kill the [minors] rather than giv[e] them up." The petitions also outlined the harm the children had suffered, including H.C.'s suicidal ideations, N.C.'s refusal to speak, and both minors' other regressive and disturbing behaviors. This information was sufficient to provide adequate notice to D.C. of the conduct that resulted in the removal of the minors from D.C.'s care.
D.C. relies on three cases, Kaylee H., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th 92, In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, and Janet T., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 377, to contend the petitions were insufficient because they did not show a continued risk of harm to the minors. Kaylee H. concerned the juvenile court's authority under section 331 where a guardianship had been previously established in probate court, and its holdings are irrelevant here. (Kaylee H., at pp. 97, 103-104.) Nicholas B. and Janet T. concerned conduct that was not tied to any risk of harm to the minors at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. (See Nicholas B., at pp. 1135-1136 [one isolated incident of physical abuse, coupled with failure of parents to reunify with teenage son during voluntary involvement with Agency not sufficient to show risk of physical harm]; Janet T., at pp. 389-390 [allegation mother failed to ensure minors attended school and bald allegation mother had " 'mental and emotional problems' " were insufficient to support jurisdictional finding].) Unlike these cases, and as discussed in the following paragraphs, the petitions here clearly identified D.C.'s harmful conduct, the physical and emotional harm it had caused the minors, and the risk that the harm to N.C. and H.C. would continue or worsen if they were placed in D.C.'s care.
C
D.C. next contends insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings because there was no evidence the minors suffered physical harm or were at risk of future physical harm as a result of D.C.'s actions. We acknowledge this case is unusual both in the type of physical harm experienced by the minors and in the type of conduct that resulted in the harm. However, we reject D.C.'s assertion the evidence was insufficient evidence to support the court's jurisdictional findings. We agree with the Agency that the "evidence of physical harm and illness the children had suffered, and the risk they would suffer more serious physical harm or illness is not overwhelming . . . ." However, it is sufficient to affirm the juvenile court's findings the minors were described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
Specifically, despite the Agency's involvement with the family since early 2016, at the time the petitions were filed, H.C. was exhibiting serious self-harming behavior, stabbing himself with a pencil, and was making suicidal statements. His existing incontinence was worsening and he was exhibiting other infantile behavior. Similarly, N.C. exhibited increased physical illness and negative mental health symptoms, including regressive and sexual behaviors, and was falling behind in school as a result of the deterioration of her physical and mental health. There was also evidence the minors were showing increased aggression towards each other. Although the minors did, as D.C. asserts, have underlying developmental and emotional concerns, the many professionals involved in the case uniformly attributed the minors worsening physical and emotional condition to D.C.'s conduct. This evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's findings that the minors had suffered actual, serious physical harm and were at continued risk of future harm.
D
D.C.'s final argument concerning the jurisdictional findings is that any risk of harm to the minors that did exist had been ameliorated by the time of the jurisdictional hearing on June 27, 2017. While there was evidence that the minors' well-being was improving in their aunt's care and D.C. was working on controlling her own behavior, the totality of the evidence before the juvenile court supported its findings that the risk of harm remained. As the Agency points out, D.C. admitted she was unable to stop making disparaging comments about William and needed to end phone calls with the minors quickly to avoid making such comments.
In her last interview with the social worker before the trial, there was some evidence that D.C. was starting to recognize the problem with her behavior, but she continued to assert that she needed to warn the minors about William's use of guns and at times continued to deny her conduct was harmful to the minors. Similarly, D.C. continued to prioritize her own anger at William over the minors' best interests, demanding the minors be removed from their paternal aunt's home and placed with strangers even if it would be harmful to them.
D.C. also admitted to threatening H.C. that she would withhold visits if he did not stop crying. The paternal aunt reported similar threats at another visit and H.C. refused to see D.C. in June. At a visit with only N.C. a few weeks before the hearing, D.C. made inappropriate comments to N.C. about the proceeding and had to be redirected by Agency staff supervising the visit. While the minors' mental health and well-being was improving, there was evidence that D.C. continued to struggle with the behaviors that resulted in removal. This evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court's findings that the risk to the minors continued to exist at the time of trial.
II
Reasonable Reunification Services
D.C. lastly argues that the reunification plan adopted by the juvenile court is not adequate because the child abuse course she was ordered to attend does not address the concerns at issue in her case. She asserts the service is not tailored to her case because there is no evidence she physically abused the minors. Rather, "this is a case of emotional . . . abuse of the children."
In determining the sufficiency of reunification services, the role of the appellate court is to decide "whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided or offered." (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) A service plan must take into account the specific needs of the family. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) The standard is not that the best possible services were provided, but that reasonable services were provided under the circumstances. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
We reject D.C.'s assertion that insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's findings that participation in the abuse course was an adequate method to address her issues. There was evidence before the court that the course included all types of abuse, including the emotional abuse at issue here, and that its objective was to educate parents on the impact of their behaviors on their children. Further, there was no evidence before the court that the individual therapy D.C. contends is more appropriate would provide this same critical information or education. Substantial evidence supported the court's findings that the child abuse course is appropriate to address the concerns in this case.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.


HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:




BENKE, Acting P. J.




HUFFMAN, J.