Filed 12/11/17 In re C.W. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re C.W. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.W.,

Defendant and Appellant.


E067974

(Super.Ct.Nos. J256726 &
J266232)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G. Pace, Judge. Affirmed.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
E.H. (Mother) and S.W. (Father) have a history of abusing drugs and failing to meet the medical needs of their toddler son that led to the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) removing their children from their home. Father appeals from the juvenile court’s order summarily denying his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. Father contends the juvenile court erred in summarily denying his petition because he had made a prima facie showing his circumstances had changed and his request was in the best interest of the children. We find no error and affirm the order denying Father’s section 388 petition.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family came to the attention of CFS in April 2014, after a referral was received alleging both Mother and her infant son, C.W., had tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana at the time of C.W.’s birth. Mother had limited prenatal care and a seizure disorder. Mother indicated she had a prescription for medical marijuana due to being shot on two separate occasions. Father was legally blind, and had a history of abusing drugs. Both parents also had a criminal history involving drugs and theft-related offenses. CFS received a second referral, stating C.W. had surgery to remove congenital cataracts and his parents failed to follow through with after care appointments.
Due to the positive drug test at birth, the parents’ substance abuse histories, and the parents’ failure to follow through with C.W.’s medical needs, then five-month-old C.W. was placed in protective custody on September 26, 2014. And, on September 30, 2014, a petition was filed on behalf of C.W. pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect).
At the October 1, 2014 detention hearing, C.W. was formally removed from parental custody and placed in a foster home. The parents were provided with visitation and ordered to drug test.
CFS recommended the allegations in the petition be found true and the parents be provided with reunification services. The parents denied failing to follow up on C.W.’s medical needs. They stated that after C.W.’s eye surgery, they took him for a follow-up appointment but left due to concerns about C.W. being left in the waiting room without an eye patch with prolonged exposure to light, and the doctor’s assistant’s failure to wash his hands when dealing with C.W.’s eye patch. C.W. needed glasses to strengthen his eyes. However, Father disagreed, stating C.W. did not need glasses right away. Father explained that he knew C.W. did not need glasses right away because he dealt with the same eye disorder for himself and his other children.
Father also denied having a substance abuse problem and stated he had not smoked marijuana since 2011, when he went to prison for possession of marijuana for sale. Father, however, failed to submit to the court-ordered drug test on October 1, 2014. Father was given an on-demand drug test on October 8, 2014, but again failed to drug test. When asked why he failed to test, Father did not have an answer. Additionally, Father had an extensive criminal history dating back to 1988, including charges for possession of a controlled substance (1988 and 1992), under the influence of a controlled substance (1991), theft of personal property (1995), robbery (1999), robbery in the second degree (2001), possession of marijuana for sale (2008 and 2011), and inflicting corporal injury on a spouse (2010). The police report for the 2008 charge indicated a large quantity of marijuana was found at the property consistent with being packaged for sale, in addition to a firearm, ammunition, a scale, and packaging material.
C.W. was assessed for glasses and his prescription was being processed. He appeared to be developmentally, mentally, and emotionally on target for his age. C.W. was doing well in his placement, although there was a concern that the parents sabotaged his placement after calling in a referral following a visit. The parents claimed C.W. had a black eye, scratches on his legs, and had lost weight. An investigation determined the allegations were unfounded. On October 21, 2014, the foster mother filed a seven-day notice to remove C.W. from her care due to Mother’s complaints.
The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on November 18, 2014. After the parents waived their constitutional rights, the juvenile court found the allegations in the petition true as amended and declared C.W. a dependent of the court. The parents were provided with reunification services and ordered to participate.
On February 6, 2015, Father was arrested and held for being under the influence of a controlled substance. Father entered a plea of not guilty and the case was dismissed. On March 6, 2015, Father was charged with felony vandalism. Father pled nolo contendere to misdemeanor vandalism and was granted summary probation for three years. Father was also ordered to stay away from two females listed in the order.
In May 2015, CFS recommended that C.W. remain in out-of-home placement with Ms. M. and that services continue for the parents. Father was compliant with his services, which were being provided in-home due to his disability. Father had completed a parenting program and counseling, and continued to participate in random drug testing and narcotics anonymous/alcoholics anonymous meetings. Father also began engaging in an outpatient substance abuse program. The parents married on February 20, 2015, and were expecting a baby girl in June or July 2015. The parents believed they had benefited from their services. However, they did not feel they had done anything wrong with their son to necessitate removal. The social worker remained concerned about the parents’ inability to refrain from breaking the law. The social worker also believed Father may suffer from mental health issues as evidenced by police incident reports. The police incident reports reflected numerous calls made by Father during one night complaining incoherently about people banging on his walls and trying to enter his home.
The parents visited with C.W. two times per week for one hour, and the visits went well. The parents were attentive to C.W.’s needs during visits. The social worker recommended transitioning to unsupervised visits two times per week for two hours. C.W. continued to be developmentally on target and did not display any issues with his mental and emotional functioning.
By June 30, 2015, the parents continued to participate in an outpatient substance abuse treatment program and they were testing negative for drugs. CFS agreed to allow the parents a two-week trial visit with C.W. and then return C.W. to their care on family maintenance services. Mother gave birth to a baby girl and there was no referral and no concerns regarding this child.
The parties engaged in mediation and agreed to start unsupervised visits for four hours, twice a week. The six-month review hearing was continued to determine how visits were proceeding. Father was ordered to undergo a psychological evaluation.
By August 25, 2015, Father had completed the court-ordered psychological evaluation. The psychologist concluded Father did not appear to be truthful and was not an accurate historian. Given his presentations in the interview, the psychologist was unable to address Father’s ability to care for the children. Since the last court hearing, the parents had completed their outpatient substance abuse program and continued to test negative for drugs. The unsupervised visits were deemed appropriate and CFS recommended that C.W. be returned to his parents’ care.
At the August 25, 2015 hearing, C.W. was returned to the custody of his parents on family maintenance services.
On February 25, 2016, CFS recommended that C.W. remain in his parents’ custody, and the dependency be continued. Since the last court hearing, the parents continued to randomly drug test. They were compliant with the testing except when out of town or not being recognized as in the dependency system.
A concern arose involving Mother, after she tested positive for methamphetamine on October 20 and December 16, 2015. A confirmation test was conducted confirming the results. Mother missed two tests in between the first and last positive test. Mother was questioned and stated she was prescribed a lot of medication after having dental surgery and that must have been the reason for her positive test. Father tested negative for the most part, but tested positive for opiates on January 21, 2016. Father stated he fell off a ladder and was unconscious on January 20, 2016, after which he was given pain medication. Father’s most recent tests for drugs were negative. The parents showed a commitment to both of their children and were following up with C.W.’s medical needs, and there were no other concerns with the family.
At a review hearing on February 25, 2016, C.W.’s counsel requested removal of C.W. The matter was set contested on behalf of C.W., and both parents were ordered to drug test.
In April 2016, CFS reported that Father had tested negative for all substances on February 25, 2016. Mother tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamine. The social worker had observed the family three or four times during unannounced visits to their home, as well as visits at the CFS office. C.W. appeared well cared for with no signs of abuse or neglect. The parents had appropriate provisions in place for C.W. and there was no indication Mother was using drugs.
At a hearing on April 14, 2016, C.W. remained with his parents on family maintenance. The parents were ordered to drug and alcohol test that day.
On July 6, 2016, a section 387 supplemental petition was filed on behalf of C.W. based on the parents’ issues with substance abuse and domestic violence, Mother’s arrest and incarceration on charges of child endangerment, and Father leaving C.W. in the custody of Mother who failed to protect him. A section 300 petition was also filed on behalf of C.W.’s sister pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect), (g) (no provision for support), and (j) (abuse of sibling).
CFS received a referral alleging Mother had been arrested for child endangerment due to having her children in the front seat of her car with no car seats. At the time, C.W. was two years old and his sister was 12 months old. When interviewed, Mother stated she did not hurt her children and just drove up the street. Mother also stated she did not know the location of Father. When Mother was booked into jail, a methamphetamine pipe, methamphetamine, and marijuana wax were found hidden on her body. Father contacted the social worker the day after the children were removed, wanting to know their location and how he could get them back. Father reported he was no longer with Mother, he did not like her behavior, and that they had separated. Father denied knowing Mother was using drugs again and denied using drugs himself. Mother was arrested in 2016 for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, which Father stated was false. Father denied Mother had hit him during their argument.
The detention hearing was held on July 12, 2016. The court found a prima facie case for detention outside of the home and ordered the children placed in foster care.
CFS recommended the allegations in the petitions be found true, no reunification services be provided to the parents, and a section 366.26 hearing be set. C.W.’s sister had been placed in the home of Mrs. M., and C.W. had been placed in the home of his former foster mother. CFS was making efforts to have the children placed together. The children were adjusting well to their placements.
In December 2015, Father was charged with being under the influence of a controlled substance. He failed to appear for his court hearing and was later incarcerated. On April 20, 2016, he pled not guilty, and at the time of the report he had a pending pretrial hearing. Father never disclosed his arrest to CFS despite having an open dependency case for C.W.
On January 20, 2016, unbeknownst to CFS, Mother was arrested and charged with inflicting corporal injury on a spouse and great bodily injury under domestic violence. According to the police reports, Mother and Father were out when Father had too many drinks. Mother returned home, and Father arrived later, at which point a physical altercation took place. Police were called and found Father with severe swelling and lacerations on his face. He was transported to the hospital and Mother was arrested. On June 10, 2016, Mother pled guilty to inflicting corporal injury on a spouse. On June 4, 2016, Father made another domestic violence report. Mother and Father were driving when they got into an altercation. Father called police stating his girlfriend (Mother) hit him on the head with an object and left. Father was located and observed to have a laceration above his eye. His speech was slurred and he had a slight odor of alcohol on his breath. Father reported he believed Mother hit him in the face with a tire iron during an argument. Father was transported to the hospital.
Father stated Mother had “ ‘issues’ ” but would not go into specifics as to why the two were no longer living together. It was only after the new petition was filed that CFS was aware the parents were no longer together. For months when Father was asked if Mother was using methamphetamine, he would adamantly deny it. When asked again why he was not with Mother, he stated she was doing “ ‘weird stuff’ ” but would not elaborate. After the current detention, Father continued to deny domestic violence and knowledge of Mother using drugs. He believed he was fully capable of caring for his children and wanted them back in his home.
In August 2016, CFS reported that Father continued to call CFS and the foster mother repeatedly about the same issues regarding placement of the children. Father blamed removal of the children on Mother and did not take responsibility for his own actions. The social worker confirmed with C.W.’s eye doctor that while in parental care, the parents failed to follow up on his visual impairment needs. Due to the parents’ lack of follow-up, C.W. was suffering from pressure in his right eye. C.W. would require surgery to relieve the pressure in his eye.
At the August 25, 2016 hearing, the court found the allegations in the petitions true. The parents were denied reunification services and a section 366.26 hearing was set.
CFS recommended the children be placed in a planned permanent living arrangement due to no prospective adoptive parents being identified. C.W. underwent surgery to correct his vision impairment and had done well. C.W. apparently ate better after his surgery since he could clearly see his food. He was meeting most of his developmental milestones but was behind in a few of his developmental needs and was referred to the Inland Regional Center. C.W.’s sister also received treatment for her eye problems, but otherwise was healthy. She appeared to be meeting her developmental milestones and was reported to be a happy child. The parents continued to visit one time a month for two hours and there were no issues noted. The children were appropriate children for adoption once adoptive parents were found.
The December 14, 2016 section 366.26 hearing was continued in the best interest of the children to assess a maternal aunt seeking placement.
On January 12, 2017, CFS updated the court regarding the relative assessment. The maternal aunt’s home was assessed and after noting some issues to be corrected, it was recommended that the children be placed together with the maternal aunt.
On February 7, 2017, Father filed a section 388 petition seeking return of the children to him under a plan of family maintenance or reinstating reunification services. In support of his request, Father asserted that he had completed parenting and domestic violence programs, as well as individual counseling. As to the best interest of the children, Father’s petition stated: “Father has maintained regular contact with the Minors. Additionally, Father loves his children very much, and can provide them with a safe, stable home. Additionally, the Minors appear to be in two separate placements at the moment, with a permanency hearing approaching.” Attached to the petition was a monthly progress report from Asante Family Agency (Asante) indicating Father’s participation in eight in-home therapy sessions between August 22, 2016 and November 28, 2016; a termination report from Asante indicating the completion of 12 classes of parenting education from August 22, 2016 through November 28, 2106; and, a monthly progress report from Asante indicating the completion of 12 sessions of domestic violence classes from August 22, 2016 through November 28, 2016.
The court summarily denied Father’s section 388 petition on February 8, 2017. The court indicated that Father’s circumstances may be changing but are not changed and that his request was not in the children’s best interest.
On February 22, 2017, CFS notified the court that placement of the children with the maternal aunt could not occur because an undisclosed individual was living at the home that had not been assessed. Father and the maternal aunt claimed the individual was not residing with the maternal aunt. However, the individual listed the maternal aunt’s address as her own. Additionally, the social worker was informed by the foster family worker that the maternal aunt was the caretaker for Father, and the social worker was concerned the parents would have unapproved access to the children. When the social worker made an unannounced visit to discuss the issue with the maternal aunt, the home was found to be so crammed full of items that the social worker could not access the garage or either of the closets. The rooms were packed full of various items, leaving very little room for little children to play. Furthermore, it appeared Mother and Father were back together and attempting to have joint visits, which had not been approved by the social worker. Father also continued to call the social worker numerous times a week regarding the placement of the children and returning the children to his care.
On March 17, 2017, Father filed a timely notice of appeal as to the denial of his section 388 petition.
III
DISCUSSION
Father argues the juvenile court erred in summarily denying his section 388 petition because his petition with supporting attachments showed a prima facie case for changed circumstances and best interest of the children. We disagree.
Under section 388, a juvenile court order may be changed or set aside “if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child.” (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806 (Zachary G.).) To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition, the parent must make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interest of the child. (Ibid.) “[I]f the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing on the petition.” (Ibid.; § 388, subd. (d) [“If it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change of order, . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held . . . .”].) The prima facie requirement is not met “unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.” (Zachary G., at p. 806.) In determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing, the juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. (In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258.)
“After the termination of reunification services, a parent’s interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child is no longer paramount. [Citation.] Rather, at this point, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability. [Citation.] In fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interest of the child [citation]; such presumption obviously applies with even greater strength when the permanent plan is adoption rather than foster care.” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 464 (Angel B.).)
“This determination [is] committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and the trial court’s ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established. [Citations.] As one court has stated, when a court has made a custody determination in a dependency proceeding, ‘ “a reviewing court will not disturb that decision unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations].” ’ [Citations.] And we have recently warned: ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 (Stephanie M.).) “The denial of a section 388 motion rarely merits reversal as an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685-686; accord, In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 522.)
Citing In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407 (Jeremy W.), civil cases and criminal cases, Father argues at length that the summary denial of his section 388 petition is subject to de novo review because it affects his procedural due process right to a full and fair hearing, and when determining whether to hold a hearing, the juvenile court is not deciding the facts, but deciding questions of law. Father also asserts that, even if the inquiry is not solely a question of law, then the issue is a mixed question of law and fact and should be reviewed de novo. We find Father’s contentions unavailing.
The court in Jeremy W., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, in dicta, suggested that a de novo standard of review applies but acknowledged that section 388 gives the trial “court discretion whether to provide a hearing on a petition alleging changed circumstances. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1413.) Nowhere does the court in Jeremy W. indicate the standard of review on an appeal from the denial of a section 388 petition is de novo. Rather, the court explicitly states the standard of review is abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 1413, 1416.) If the Jeremy court had applied a de novo standard of review, it would have decided the merits of the mother’s petition itself. This it did not do. Rather, it reversed and remanded the matter with directions that the juvenile court conduct a hearing on the section 388 petition and determine whether the mother had met her burden of proof. Furthermore, even if the court in Jeremy W. had applied a de novo standard of review, the decision in Stephanie M. postdated that decision, applied the abuse of discretion standard of review, and, contrary to Jeremy W., is binding on this court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) Thus, the correct appellate standard of review for the denial of a section 388 petition is abuse of discretion.
Our courts have consistently applied the abuse of discretion standard of review where there is a summary denial of section 388 petition. (See Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319; In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415-416; In re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62; In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1160; In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358; In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250; Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 805, 808.) We therefore review the juvenile court’s order denying the hearing for abuse of discretion. As previously stated, under this standard of review, we will not disturb the decision of the trial court unless the trial court exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination. (Stephanie M., at p. 318.)
Father contends the juvenile court should have held a hearing on his section 388 petition because he established a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interest of the children. Father alleged his changed circumstances consisted of completing a 12-week parenting program, a 12-week domestic violence program, and individual counseling. In his brief, Father also argues, as changed circumstances, that he had stable housing, he was not residing with Mother, he was regularly visiting the children, and he was cooperating with CFS. We need not decide whether the juvenile court erred in finding there was no prima facie showing of changed circumstances because Father failed to make a prima facie showing that granting the section 388 petition and providing family maintenance services or further reunification services was in the best interest of the children.
Parent and child share a fundamental interest in reuniting up to the point at which reunification efforts cease. (In re R.H. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 678, 697, disapproved on another ground in John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 98-100.) By the point of a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a child’s permanent plan, however, the interest of the parent and the child have diverged. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 254.) Therefore, after reunification efforts have terminated or bypassed, the court’s focus shifts from family reunification toward promoting the child’s needs for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) This is a difficult burden to meet when reunification services have been bypassed or terminated. This is because, “[a]fter the termination of reunification services [or bypassing of services], a parent’s interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child is no longer paramount. [Citation.]” (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.) In fact, there is a rebuttable presumption continued foster care is in the child’s best interest. (Ibid.) Such presumption applies with even greater strength when adoption is the permanent plan. (Ibid.) “A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child.” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.)
At the time Father filed his section 388 petition in February 2017, approximately six months after his services were terminated and bypassed in C.W.’s sister’s case, and shortly before the section 366.26 hearing, the children’s interest in stability were the juvenile court’s foremost concern, outweighing any interest in reunification. The prospect of allowing Father reunification services or family maintenance services to see if Father would and could do what he was required to do to regain custody would not have promoted stability for the children, and thus would not have promoted the children’s best interest. (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.)
The parents’ substance abuse issues and their failure to care for C.W.’s eye care needs resulted in the initial dependency proceedings in September 2014. C.W. was five months old when he was initially removed from parental custody. A year and 10 months later, the same concerns existed and resulted in the removal of C.W. and his sister in July 2016, this time with the addition of domestic violence issues. As with the initial dependency, Father failed to take responsibility for placing the children at risk, while knowing about Mother’s substance abuse.
Furthermore, although Father consistently visited the children and the visits were appropriate, there was no evidence that Father’s bond with the children outweighed any attachment they had with their caretakers. Despite Father’s assertion that C.W. had been in his placement for only six months, after C.W.’s second removal, C.W. was placed back in the same foster home. C.W., therefore, had been with his caretaker for a total of about 16 months. At the time of Father’s section 388 petition, C.W. was two years, 10 months old, and thus had spent a majority of his short life in the care of his foster mother. C.W.’s sister was just over a year old when she was removed from parental custody. C.W.’s sister remained in the same placement for approximately seven months at the time Father filed his section 388 petition, and was adjusting and developing appropriately. Granting reunification or family maintenance services to Father would only prolong the children’s adoption in a stable and loving home. Father received over a year and a half of services, designed to ameliorate the issues that led to the initial dependency, only to require CFS’s intervention again, this time as to both children and with the added domestic violence issues.
Moreover, Father had a long history of abusing drugs and violating criminal laws. As recently as December 2015, Father was charged with being under the influence of a controlled substance. He had also tested positive for opiates in January 2016. Father had only recently begun to make efforts to combat his drug problem and demonstrate his sobriety. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that, under such circumstances and in light of Father’s history of abusing drugs, Father had not made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances or that reinstating reunification services would have promoted stability for the children and be in their best interest. (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.)
In Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 454, the court rejected the mother’s contention the juvenile court erred in denying her section 388 petition without holding a hearing. The mother in Angel B. had a long history of drug abuse, unsuccessful rehabilitation attempts, and failure to reunify with another child. After the mother was denied reunification services, she began to improve, enrolling in a treatment program, testing clean for four months, completing various classes, and obtaining employment. Regular visits with her child also went well. (Id. at p. 459.) Nevertheless, when she filed her section 388 petition for reunification services, the court summarily denied her petition without a hearing. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court refusing to hold a hearing. (Id. at p. 462.)
The appellate court in Angel B. acknowledged the petition showed the mother was doing well, “in the sense that she has remained sober, completed various classes, obtained employment, and visited regularly with [the child].” (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 464-465.) The court also assumed for purposes of the appeal “that this time her resolve is different, and that she will, in fact, be able to remain sober, remain employed, become self-supporting and obtain housing.” (Id. at p. 465, italics omitted.) Nevertheless, the court concluded “such facts are not legally sufficient to require a hearing on her section 388 petition.” (Ibid.) The court explained: “[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that, in the absence of continuing reunification services, stability in an existing placement is in the best interest of the child, particularly when such placement is leading to adoption by the long-term caretakers. [Citation.] To rebut that presumption, a parent must make some factual showing that the best interest of the child would be served by modification.” (Ibid.) The mother in Angel B. did not make such a showing. Nor does Father here.
Father’s section 388 petition asserted merely that he believed granting his section 388 petition was in the children’s best interest because he had maintained regular contact with the children, he loved the children very much, and he could provide them with a safe, stable home. Other than the statement Father visited the children regularly, Father’s allegations are conclusory, not a factual showing that granting reunification or family maintenance services would promote the children’s best interest. (In re Ramone R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348, 1349 [“allegations of her [section 388] petition were to be liberally construed, but conclusory claims are insufficient to require a hearing”].) Father’s petition offered no evidence of the nature of his bond with the children or that the children wanted to live with Father. (See Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 465 [the mother’s petition, denied without a hearing, stated that she had bonded with the child, who was happy to see her and reached for her on their visits].) We conclude Father failed to make a prima facie showing that the children’s best interest would be served by placing them with Father on family maintenance services or reinstating Father’s reunification services. The juvenile court therefore did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying Father’s section 388 petition without a hearing.
IV
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order summarily denying Father’s section 388 petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:



RAMIREZ
P. J.



McKINSTER
J.