Filed 12/12/17 In re G.S. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



In re G.S. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.
D072158


(Super. Ct. No. SJ13326A-D)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Garry G. Haehnle and Michael J. Popkins, Judges. Appeal dismissed.

Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
M.S. (Father) appeals from a dispositional order, challenging the juvenile court's failure to detain his children, G.S., A.S., C.S., and Cu.S. (together, the children) with a relative on an emergency basis pending the dispositional hearing. He concedes the appeal is moot, but requests we exercise our discretion to clarify a point of law, which, as it turns out, is undisputed. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Several violent incidents between Father and the children's mother, J.S., occurred in the presence of the children, who began manifesting extreme behaviors at school, including explosive outbursts, physical aggression, and/or unusual fear or sadness.
The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed petitions on behalf of the children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging they were at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to periodic exposure to domestic violence. At the detention hearing, the court removed the children from parental custody and vested their placement and care with the Agency. The court ordered the children detained at Polinsky Children's Center (PCC), an approved foster home, or the home of an approved relative or nonrelative extended family member.
The Agency placed the children with their grandparents in the grandparents' home for about two weeks. When the grandparents were unable to handle the children's extreme behaviors, they requested the children be placed elsewhere. The Agency next placed the children in an aunt's home for a few days, but she and her spouse were likewise unable to handle the children. The Agency temporarily placed the children at PCC.
While the children were at PCC, the paternal great-aunt (great-aunt) expressed her willingness to move from Northern California to the parents' San Diego home (family home) and care for the children there. Father's and minors' counsel requested the children's placement with great-aunt, and the court ordered the Agency to complete an emergency assessment of her. The Agency proceeded to inspect the family home, interview great-aunt, and conduct a background check. The Agency learned that great-aunt did not lease or own the family home, did not understand the extent of the children's behaviors and protective issues, and appeared to lack sufficient financial resources to support herself and the children. Great-aunt also suffered from some "mental health issues." The Agency reported to the court that it was continuing to assess great-aunt, but was unable to approve her based on its current information.
The parties filed briefs regarding whether the juvenile court had the ability to detain a child in an unapproved relative's home; the Agency posited that the court had no such authority. At a special hearing, the court (Judge Haehnle) agreed with the Agency, finding that the Agency had not yet completed its assessment of great-aunt and the court did not have authority to "override" the Agency's placement decision. Judge Haehnle also indicated that placing the children with great-aunt would not be in their best interests given the children's behavioral problems and history of failed relative placements. The court set a special hearing to monitor the Agency's progress toward completing its assessment.
By the time of the follow-up special hearing, the Agency completed its emergency assessment, which echoed and amplified its earlier concerns. The Agency recommended against detaining the children with great-aunt. Minors' counsel presented additional legal authority to support the court's ability to temporarily detain the children with great-aunt over the Agency's objection. The court (Judge Popkins) found that the court had the authority to detain the children with great-aunt if necessary, but it would not do so based on its belief that it was in the children's best interests to remain in their current placements. At the time, the two older children were placed together in a licensed group home where they could receive therapeutic services, and the two younger children were placed together in a licensed foster home.
Subsequently, the court held contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearings, made true findings on the petitions' allegations, and placed the children in a licensed group home and/or foster home. Father filed a timely appeal from the dispositional order.
DISCUSSION
Father contends the court erred in not placing the children with great-aunt pending the dispositional hearing based on its mistaken view that it lacked authority to overrule the Agency's decision. Father concedes the issue has been rendered moot by subsequent events, but requests that we address the scope of a juvenile court's authority to detain children with unapproved relatives because it is an issue that is likely to recur and is of continuing public interest. The Agency urges us to dismiss the appeal as moot because the challenged decision was an interim order and is unlikely to recur. In any event, the Agency contends that it properly assessed great-aunt as an unsuitable placement option.
"An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief." (In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1054; In re Sabrina H. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1414 [dispositional order rendered detention order moot].) Here, as Father concedes, subsequent events have rendered the emergency placement issue moot, and Father is no longer seeking the children's placement with great-aunt. It is impossible for this court to grant Father any effective relief.
Nevertheless, "a reviewing court may exercise its inherent discretion to resolve an issue rendered moot by subsequent events if the question to be decided is of continuing public importance and is a question capable of repetition, yet evading review." (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404.) Regarding "when an appellate court may proceed to decide an otherwise moot appeal, the common thread running through the cases is that doing so is appropriate only if a ruling on the merits will affect future proceedings between the parties or will have some precedential consequence in future litigation generally." (In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 654 (David B.). Issues that are essentially factual in nature are unlikely to be of continuing public importance. (Ibid.)
Here, we are not persuaded that Father presents a question that is likely to recur or is of continuing public importance. The juvenile court ultimately decided that it had the ability to detain the children with great-aunt over the Agency's objection, but found such a placement was not in the children's best interests. Moreover, on appeal the Agency has reversed its position and now agrees that a court may detain a child with a relative on an emergency basis without final Agency approval as long as the court considers the Agency's recommendation and home assessment. The legal issue presented for our review is therefore unlikely to recur, or in an appropriate case could be reviewed via extraordinary writ. (Melinda K. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157 [petition for writ of mandate affords a parent meaningful appellate review of a juvenile court's finding that may ultimately have a significant effect on the dependency proceedings but is not itself appealable].) At this juncture, reviewing the propriety of the court's fact-specific temporary placement decision will not affect future proceedings between the parties nor is it likely to provide guidance for future disputes generally. (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 654.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.


DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:




HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.




O'ROURKE, J.