Filed 12/12/17 Christina R. v. Superior Court CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CHRISTINA R.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF STANISLAUS COUNTY,

Respondent;

STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY,

Real Party in Interest.




F076199

(Super. Ct. Nos. 517877, 515527, 515528, 515529, 515718)


OPINION

THE COURT*
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ review. Rubén A. Villalobos, Judge.
David M. Meyers, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Carrie Stephens, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
-ooOoo-
Christina R. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26 hearing as to her 15-year-old daughter, V.G., and four sons, Noel, George, Jr., Nathaniel and Fabian, now 13, 11, seven and four years old, respectively. She contends there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual abuse) and (j) (abuse of sibling) and its dispositional orders removing the children from her custody and denying her reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3) and (10). We deny the petition.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mother and George G. (father) are the parents of six sons, ranging in age from four to 19 years of age. They also have a daughter, V.G., who is now 15. The family has a long history of child neglect as well as physical and sexual abuse, dating back to 2003 and involving multiple juvenile dependency proceedings. The current case was initiated by the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) in February 2017. Since the family’s child welfare history is germane, we begin our summary of the case there.
The family first came to the agency’s attention in 2003 when father sexually molested mother’s younger sister. That same year, the agency substantiated a report that mother exposed the children to their maternal grandfather who sexually abused his own children, including mother. Mother accepted voluntary family maintenance services, including drug treatment for her methamphetamine use, but did not utilize the services. The agency closed the case in May 2004 despite her lack of progress because the children were stable.
The agency continued to receive reports over the years of drug use, domestic violence and child abuse and neglect. In April 2009, then six-year-old V.G. reported father took her into the bedroom while mother was at work and described in graphic detail how he sexually molested her. The agency was unable to substantiate her allegations but offered the parents voluntary family maintenance services to address their other issues. When the parents failed to utilize the services, the agency took the children into protective custody and filed an original petition under section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect).
In October 2009, V.G., while being examined at a clinic for a vaginal discharge, reported that father penetrated her vagina and rectum. She was formally interviewed and described in detail the circumstances in which the molestation occurred and the manner in which father molested her. She stated that mother walked in on one of those occasions and took her briefly to her maternal grandmother’s home. The maternal grandmother said she suspected father was molesting V.G. and believed that mother was aware of the sexual abuse.
In January 2010, after completing its investigation, the agency filed a subsequent petition (§ 342) based on the allegations of sexual molestation. The juvenile court did not find the allegations true but added sexual abuse counseling to the parents’ reunification plans. At the 12-month review hearing, the court terminated father’s reunification services and ordered his contact with the children to be supervised and agency-approved. In April, mother gave birth to Nathaniel and the agency took him into protective custody.
Father eventually moved back into the family home in violation of the juvenile court’s order. In December 2010, the court terminated mother’s reunification services, established a legal guardianship for then 12-year-old Isaac and 11-year-old Joseph, who are not subjects of this writ petition, eight-year-old V.G., six-year-old Noel, and four-year-old George, Jr. with relatives and dismissed dependency.
In September 2012, the legal guardians were arrested for felony child abuse for physically abusing and torturing the children. The agency filed a dependency petition alleging multiple statutory grounds for removal, including cruelty. The juvenile court terminated the guardianship, reinstated dependency and ordered the children into long-term foster care. However, they did not do well in that setting; several were acting out sexually and one of them was stealing. Meanwhile, mother was attempting to regain custody of them. In January 2014, the juvenile court reopened family reunification and provided therapeutic visits and family counseling.
In July 2014, at a post-permanency plan review hearing (§ 366.3), the agency proposed that the juvenile court return the children to parental custody and terminate its jurisdiction. However, before the court hearing, father hit Isaac, who punched father and ran away. In addition, the children did not have adequate clothing and the parents were relying on the agency for financial help. The court continued the hearing to December 2014. Meanwhile, the parents were uncooperative with the agency, refusing to keep their home clean and attend Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous (AA/NA) meetings. In addition, one of the children ran to a neighbor’s house because he believed father was going to beat him, and V.G. was seen with fingerprint-shaped bruises, the origin of which she would not disclose. The juvenile court dismissed its dependency jurisdiction in December 2014.
The agency continued to receive reports concerning the family over the next three years. V.G. reported father purchased marijuana and alcohol for Isaac and Joseph. Isaac and Joseph stated they wanted to return to foster care rather than stay with mother, who was reportedly homeless. In 2015, Isaac stated he wanted to jump off a bridge because father pushed and punched him. In 2016, the agency received reports of physical altercations between the parents and teenagers, including punching and slapping in the face.
These proceedings were initiated in February 2017 after then 14-year-old V.G. disclosed that father watched her and masturbated while she showered. Emergency response social worker Adriana Ocampo attempted immediately to speak to the parents in person at their home. She left a business card asking them to contact her after no one would answer the door. Mother, angry that Ocampo tried to contact her, telephoned her and said she could not talk that day because she was trying to get V.G. to return home. Mother was vulgar and yelled. Shortly after, mother accidentally called Ocampo’s phone number and Ocampo heard her tell V.G. to “fix all of this with the social worker because all of this is happening due to what you reported.” V.G. then called Ocampo, stating she would not talk to her. V.G. was also upset and yelled and cursed at Ocampo.
The following day, detective John Locke told Ocampo he spoke to V.G. by telephone and she told him that father masturbated while he watched her shower. She begged him to believe her.
Ocampo met with several of the children at their schools. Twelve-year-old Noel stated that Isaac saw father watching V.G. shower a year before. Isaac told mother but she did not believe him or do anything about it. Noel was afraid to disclose any more information, fearing the agency would place him in foster care where he would be abused again.
Seventeen-year-old Joseph disclosed that V.G. recently told him and Isaac about father masturbating and watching her shower. She also said father continued to molest and rape her. Joseph had seen father kissing V.G.’s chest and caught father and V.G. lying in bed with the door closed. He said father constantly allowed V.G. to get her way and V.G. and mother fought over father. Joseph said he, Isaac and V.G. confronted their parents over the allegations of sexual abuse and mother told them she was going to choose father over them. They also begged mother to kick father out of the house but she refused.
Joseph was also concerned that his parents were using drugs because he found a “dope” pipe in the home. He said mother was home when Ocampo attempted to talk to them the day before but actively avoided her because mother knew the agency would remove them. He did not believe his parents were properly caring for his siblings because they were often hungry and wore clothes that were dirty, too small or inappropriate for the weather. Mother inappropriately disciplined them and often got into physical fights with V.G. over what appeared to be jealousy over father. Joseph said he had been staying at his girlfriend’s house because the environment at home was so “toxic.”
Later that day, the juvenile court issued a protective warrant for the children. When Ocampo and police officers went to the house to serve the warrant, only Joseph was home. Mother left with the other children.
Ocampo and the officers entered and assessed the home. There was a strong smell of marijuana and urine. The house was cluttered, the carpets were stained and discolored with food and dirt and the walls were streaked with unidentifiable substances. Joseph called V.G. and she agreed to return home for an interview. V.G. confirmed the sexual abuse but did not want to discuss it. She refused to be taken into protective custody and ran away. The parents also returned to the house and Ocampo took the four younger children into protective custody.
The agency filed a dependency petition on behalf of Joseph, V.G., Noel, George, Nathaniel, and Fabian under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual abuse) and (j) (abuse of sibling) and placed them in four different foster homes.
The juvenile court ordered the children detained pursuant to the petition and ordered closely monitored visits. The court ordered the parents not to discuss the case with V.G., who was still on a runaway status. The agency provided the parents referrals for clinical assessments, parenting classes, codependency, individual and couples counseling and hair follicle testing.
On February 28, 2017, V.G. participated in a child abuse interview. She recounted to the officer conducting the interview how father masturbated while watching her through their glass-enclosed shower. Sometimes they made eye contact but father continued masturbating. She said father’s “jacking off” hurt her and she often ran away because of what he was doing to her. She confronted him about his inappropriate behavior and he apologized but did not stop. She also confronted mother but mother made herself a victim of the situation instead of protecting V.G.
In its jurisdictional and dispositional reports, the agency recommended the juvenile court exercise its dependency jurisdiction and deny both parents reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3) and (10). The agency also reported that the parents had not utilized the service referrals or submitted to a hair follicle test. In addition, V.G. had recanted her statements made to her brothers, the detective, Ocampo and the child abuse interviewer. The agency opined that her concern for her siblings may have motivated her to recant.
On May 4, 2017, the agency submitted the child abuse interview as a written transcript and as a DVD, which was viewed in court. Afterwards, V.G., called by mother’s attorney, testified that her statements about father were not true. She made those statements because she was mad at her parents, and wanted to be heard. She did not want to go home but stay in foster care because she got along with people who were in her same situation.
The juvenile court sustained the petition in its entirety after a slight modification. In ruling, the court stated it believed V.G.’s interview statements and not her testimony. The court believed she recanted out of guilt because her little brothers wanted to go home.
On August 23, 2017, the juvenile court conducted a contested dispositional hearing. By that time, Joseph had turned 18 and the court granted county counsel’s motion to dismiss his case. V.G. was placed in a group home.
Father testified, disputing all the allegations in the original petition. He did not participate in a substance abuse assessment or submit to a hair follicle test because they were not court-ordered. He wanted the children returned to his custody and was willing to participate in services except drug treatment, which he did not believe he needed, and sexual abuse counseling as a perpetrator. He said he had been clean for four years and did not consider himself a perpetrator of sexual abuse but rather a victim. He graduated from a parenting class on August 17, 2017, and completed three individual parenting sessions. He attended AA/NA meetings every other day for four years. After the children were removed in 2009, he participated in parenting classes and individual, family and domestic violence counseling. After dependency was terminated in 2014, he continued to participate in family and individual therapy.
Mother testified she also declined to participate in a substance abuse assessment and hair follicle testing because they were not court-ordered. She did not believe that father sexually abused the children and did not intend to separate from him. Mother affirmed father’s testimony that they participated in counseling after the children were returned to them in 2014. She would continue to participate in services if the children were returned to her.
The juvenile court found the children could not be returned to parental custody without placing them at a substantial risk of detriment and ordered them removed. The court also denied the parents reunification services as recommended and set a section 366.26 hearing.


DISCUSSION
The juvenile court’s judgment is presumed to be correct on appeal, and it is the burden of the party challenging it to affirmatively demonstrate prejudicial error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) An appellant’s failure in a civil action to set forth a legal argument supported by authority is deemed to be without foundation and to have been abandoned. (Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119.) Likewise, a failure to present arguments with adequate references to the record on appeal and citation to legal authority can result in forfeiture of any contentions that could have been raised on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C); Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) Further, it is well established that an appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped claims or to make arguments for parties. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.)
On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders, we review the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports them. In so doing, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings and orders; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we defer to the court on issues of fact and credibility. (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.)
We may affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the child if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) Similarly, we affirm the denial of reunification services if substantial evidence supports one basis for a denial of services order. (In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401.)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) and its dispositional orders removing the children from mother’s custody and denying her reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10).
Jurisdictional Finding
A juvenile court may determine that a child is subject to it’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that “[t]he child had suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent … to adequately supervise or protect the child.” In deciding whether a child is at risk under section 300, subdivision (b), the juvenile court may consider the totality of the circumstances. (In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1440.)
Here, father’s ongoing sexual molestation and rape of V.G. more than justified the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding mother failed to protect the children. The entire family was aware of the situation, including mother, but she refused to intervene, even telling the children she would choose father over them. Further, there was evidence mother and father were using drugs based on the “dope” pipe the older children saw and neglecting the younger children by not providing them proper clothing and adequate food.
Dispositional Orders
The juvenile court “has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order” accordingly. (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.) Among the permissible dispositional choices is to remove the child from the parent’s custody. (§ 361.) To justify removal, the juvenile court must have clear and convincing evidence: (1) that there is a substantial danger to the child’s physical well-being; and (2) that there is no reasonable way to protect the child in the parent’s home. (Id., subd. (c)(1).)
If the juvenile court removes a child from parental custody, it must order reunification services for the parent unless any of the exceptional circumstances listed in section 361.5, subdivision (b) applies. (§ 361.5, subds. (a) & (b)(1)-(16).) Here, the juvenile court denied mother reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3) and (10). Subdivision (b)(10) authorizes the juvenile court to deny a parent reunification services if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that it terminated reunification services for any sibling or half sibling (collectively, the sibling) of the child because the parent failed to reunify with the sibling after the sibling had been removed from that parent, and, according to the findings of the court, the parent failed to subsequently make a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of the sibling from that parent.
Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s removal order but fails to support her contention by argument or citation to authority.
Similarly, she contends, without argument or authority, section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) does not apply in her case because the children were returned to her custody after reunification services were terminated.
We conclude mother abandoned her claims that the juvenile court’s removal and denial of services orders were error. However, to avoid a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we address the merits and conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s orders.
The record is replete with evidence the children could not be returned to mother’s custody without placing them at risk of substantial danger, stemming from father’s ongoing sexual molestation of V.G. First, there is mother’s denial. She refused to believe father was molesting V.G., despite strong evidence to the contrary, and she had no intention of separating from him, even as a precaution to protect V.G. Further, there were secondary effects of the molestation that endangered all the children. V.G. ran away to escape her situation and the others were being emotionally scarred, having to live in an environment where molestation was occurring and condoned. In addition, there were physical altercations between the parents and the children, involving slapping and pushing, undoubtedly triggered in part by mother’s jealousy of V.G. and the children’s resentment of mother’s passivity.
Moreover, there were no reasonable alternatives available to protect the children short of removing them. Mother had already received family maintenance services multiple times without success.
The record also supports the juvenile court’s order denying mother reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10). In April 2009, the juvenile court removed V.G., Noel and George, mainly because of mother’s drug use and domestic violence. However, the court also removed them because mother exposed them to her father, a sexual abuser, and neglected them by failing to provide them adequate food. After mother failed to reunify with the children, the court terminated her reunification services in December 2010. In the years that followed, mother continued to neglect the children and expose them to sexual abuse, albeit a different abuser. Thus, the elements of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) were met.
As to mother’s contention subdivision (b)(10) of section 361.5 does not apply to her, we find no exception for a parent who regained custody of the children subsequent to the termination of reunification services and, as we have stated, mother provides us no such authority. Further, the interpretation mother urges would be contrary to the legislative intent of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10); i.e., “to promote the interests of children, and conserve limited resources, by not ordering services when parents have demonstrated in prior proceedings that they would be fruitless.” (In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 108.)
We find no error.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. This court’s opinion is final forthwith as to this court pursuant to rule 8.490(b)(2)(A) of the California Rules of Court.