Filed 12/19/17 Rodriguez v. De Leon CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE


SUBEIDA RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MELVIN EMILIO DE LEON,
Defendant and Appellant.

A149560

(San Francisco County
Super. Ct. No. FDV-16-812606)


In August 2016, the trial court issued a restraining order protecting plaintiff and respondent Subeida Rodriguez (respondent) from defendant and appellant Melvin Emilio de Leon (appellant). Appellant, who appeared pro per, contends the order must be reversed because he did not understand the nature of the proceedings below. We reject the claim.
In July 2016, respondent filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order against her husband, appellant, from whom she had been separated since May 2015. In a declaration, respondent described four incidents in June and July 2016 during which appellant followed her, yelled at her, and harassed her at her home, at her place of employment, on the street, and at church. After the third incident she obtained an emergency protective order, but appellant said he did not care when she informed him of the order during the fourth incident.
Appellant did not file a response to respondent’s request for a restraining order, but he appeared in pro per at the hearing on the request. Both parties had the assistance of interpreters. Appellant declined the trial court’s offer to continue the matter to provide him an opportunity to consult with an attorney and/or file a response. At the hearing, respondent, who also appeared in pro per, affirmed the truth of her declaration and further explained, “I need this restraining order because I feel like I am being harassed by him. He won’t stop. . . . I want to feel safe in my church, in the street, at work.” She also said she gave appellant a “divorce petition” two days before the hearing.
The trial court then proceeded to ask appellant “whether you have any objection to the Court’s ordering the restraints that have been requested by [respondent] today.” Appellant answered, “No. I don’t have any complaint about this.” He then asserted, “But actually what she’s saying is not true.” He proceeded to make some comments about their church and to claim “[s]ince we got married in 2012 I’ve actually had to be going to a psychologist because of the poor treatment she gave me.” He also commented, “I don’t have any problem that she separates to me.” Then the trial court asked, “So, you are not objecting to the request [respondent] is making; am I right?” Appellant responded, “Yeah. Correct.”
After some further back-and-forth, the trial court issued a five-year restraining order, including among other things a 100-yard stay-away order (reduced to 10-yards at “church-related functions”).
On appeal, appellant argues his response to the trial court’s questioning “clearly indicated that he believed this hearing was regarding the parallel and still pending dissolution proceedings (which his answer indicated he wanted to conclude), not a hearing about a restraining order.” He contends the order should be reversed and remanded for a new hearing because he did not understand the nature of the proceedings below. Our review is guided by the fundamental proposition that the trial court’s decision “is presumed correct, and a party attacking the judgment, or any part of it, must affirmatively demonstrate prejudicial error.” (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 881.)
At the outset, appellant cites no statutory or case authority that a pro per litigant’s confusion about proceedings provides a ground for reversal, absent some impropriety by the trial court or procedural irregularity. But we need not consider whether appellant’s alleged grounds constitute a proper ground for reversal, nor what standards would guide such a determination, because appellant has not demonstrated he misunderstood the proceedings below. Respondent’s request was made on form DV-100, which is prominently entitled “Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order.” At the hearing, the phrase “restraining order” was used three times before appellant was questioned, and the only reference to the dissolution proceedings was respondent’s comment that she had sought a divorce three days earlier. Appellant said he had no objections to the “restraints” requested by respondent, and he expressed no confusion nor raised any objection as the trial court discussed the particularities of the stay-away requirement and the duration of the restraining order.
It is true appellant’s response to the trial court’s questioning addressed the merits of his relationship with respondent and he said he did not “have any problem that she separates to me.” But it is not surprising appellant would address the overall relationship, given that respondent’s request was based on appellant’s refusal to come to terms with the end of their marriage. Appellant’s comments do not show he misunderstood the nature of the proceeding, in light of the clarity of respondent’s written request and the unambiguous statements made by respondent and the trial court at the hearing. Appellant has shown no basis to reverse the trial court’s order.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent.






SIMONS, J.



We concur.




JONES, P.J.




NEEDHAM, J.