Filed 12/19/17 In re Jeremiah R. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re JEREMIAH R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JEREMIAH R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
A150802

(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. JV-025006-03)


Jeremiah R., age 16, appeals from orders of the juvenile court declaring him a ward of the court based on the finding that he committed first degree residential burglary in violation of Penal Code sections 459 and 460. He contends there is no substantial evidence to support the finding that he entered the residence in question with the intent to commit a felony. We disagree and shall affirm the orders.
Background
We adopt the summary of the evidence as stated in the minor’s opening brief.
On September 8, 2016, Tyler L. went home between classes at Albany High School. He lived about a block from the school, and he wanted to use the bathroom at home and drop off some binders. On his way home, Tyler thought he saw Jeremiah R. walking down the street. Tyler knew Jeremiah because Jeremiah was a friend of Tyler’s sister.
After he used the bathroom at his house, Tyler heard a noise coming from his sister’s room. He walked in to see if his sister, Maddie, was there, and instead he saw two people trying to enter through the window. Tyler believed one of them was Jeremiah. He asked the boy what he was doing, and the boy ran away down the alley. There was a second boy at the window who Tyler believed was Jacob K.
Tyler went back to school, where he saw and confronted Jeremiah on the sidewalk in front of the high school. Jeremiah told Tyler to call Tyler’s sister Maddie, with whom Jeremiah had lunch plans that day. Jeremiah left the school, and Tyler reported the incident to the police.
Maddie testified that she was supposed to meet up with Jeremiah that day, but there was no plan to meet up inside her house or for him to go into her bedroom without her.
After Tyler reported the incident to the police, Officer Danny Ho of the Albany Police Department was dispatched to the area of Key Route and Portland in Albany on a report of a residential break-in. On his way to the residence, Officer Ho saw Jeremiah, who had just left the school and who matched the description of the suspect: a black male with dyed red hair, a black shirt, and a gray backpack. Marcos G. was found a few streets away and was also detained by the police. In an in-field show-up later that afternoon, Tyler identified Jeremiah as the person he saw at the window.
Jeremiah testified that he went to Albany that day with his friend Marcos G. to have lunch with Maddie. He knocked on the door of her house, but she was in school. He went to the school to find her. That is when Tyler confronted him.
Following an evidentiary hearing upon the residential burglary allegation in the petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the court sustained the allegation, continued minor as a ward of the court, and placed minor on home supervision. Minor has timely appealed.
Discussion
The minor acknowledges that that there is sufficient evidence to establish that he committed a trespass of the residence but contends there is no evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to commit larceny or any felony, rather than to simply meet with Tyler’s sister Maddie. However, this court’s role in reviewing such a contention is limited. “ ‘ “The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citations.]” ’ In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (In re Cheri T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404.)
Burglary requires entry of the premises with the intent to commit theft or any felony. (Pen. Code, § 459.) “The People must establish that a burglary defendant entered the premises with the intent to commit a felony or theft. Commonly, that intent must be inferred from the circumstances of the charged offense or offenses. [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘While the existence of the specific intent charged at the time of entering a building is necessary to constitute burglary in order to sustain a conviction, this element is rarely susceptible of direct proof and must usually be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The question . . . is whether the evidence, including that of defendant’s conduct during and after his entry, supports a reasonable inference that the intent to commit . . . theft existed at the time he entered the home . . . . [¶] . . . ‘ “ ‘When the evidence justifies a reasonable inference of felonious intent, the verdict may not be disturbed on appeal.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 669-670.)
Despite the facts, as minor argues, that he “had no burglary tools and did not break the window,” and claims to have had “a plausible reason for being on the premises,” other evidence supports the reasonable inference that he was entering the home with the intent to steal. He was discovered breaking open a bedroom window from which the screen had been removed. When confronted by Tyler who demanded to know what he was doing, he did not respond that he expected to meet Tyler’s sister there, but he “bolted.” The sister testified that she had not planned to meet Jeremiah at her house, that she had not told him “he could be at [her] house when [she] was not there,” that she did not “plan to have Jeremiah get inside [her] house through [her] bedroom window,” and that he did not have permission to be in the home. We cannot say that based on this evidence the trier of fact could not reasonably infer that Jeremiah was entering the house intending to commit theft. Indeed, there is no plausible reason why he would have fled when confronted if his intent was merely to meet Tyler’s sister. At a minimum, his flight supports the inference of consciousness of guilt. (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 328-329; People v. Hoang (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 264, 276.) Hence we must affirm the finding of the juvenile court
Disposition
The jurisdictional and disposition orders are affirmed.


Pollak, J.


We concur:

McGuiness, P.J.
Jenkins, J.