Filed 12/21/17 Yates v. Williams CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


DORIS YATES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
PATRICE WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.

A147662

(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. HG15792401)


Appellant Patrice Williams appeals from a December 17, 2015, order granting respondent Doris Yates’ request for a civil harassment restraining order protecting her from Williams. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 527.6.) On appeal Williams challenges the substantive basis for the issuance of the restraining order. Finding no merit to her arguments, we affirm.
FACTS
On November 6, 2015, Yates, in propria persona, filed a Judicial Council form CH-100, requesting the issuance of a civil harassment restraining order prohibiting Williams from coming near, or contacting her. Yates was an instructor at a local university and Williams had been a former student in a class taught by Yates in the fall of 2014. Yates alleged Williams had harassed her on several dates in December 2014 and certain dates in 2015, the last date being October 17, 2015. Yates further alleged that the stress of the “harassment” had adversely impacted her ability to recover from a recent illness.
Yates described the nature of the harassment in the following manner: On December 3, 2014, Williams sent Yates “a sexually explicit email” via the university email system. Thereafter, Williams sent Yates more emails in December 2014, and made several attempts to contact Yates via social media (LinkedIn and Face Book) and came to her university office. Additionally, on February 28, 2015, Yates received a broadcast email, sent to several persons, from a friend of Williams. The email reported that Williams had attempted suicide based, in part, on “a former professor at her current school having messed her up both personally and academically.” Yates filed a claim with the university’s office of the associate vice president for “risk management & internal control/title IX,” charging that Williams was sexually harassing her in violation of the university’s “Executive Order 1096,” which enacted a system-wide policy prohibiting discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.
On April 14, 2015, the university’s risk management investigator issued a report regarding an investigation of Yates’ claim of sexual harassment against Williams. The university’s investigation focused on Williams’ December 2014 emails, other written and in-person contacts during that month, the February 28, 2015 broadcast email, and Yates’ additional complaints that on December 9, 2014, Williams was seen pacing near Yates’ university office and dropping a red envelope on Yates’ office floor; and at the beginning of “Winter 2015 quarter,” Yates continued to receive random hang-up telephone calls including one on Christmas day. The university investigator reviewed evidence provided by Yates and Williams, “accommodation information from Accessibility Services, UPD and Oakland Police Reports,” and interviews with persons Yates provided as witnesses. Based on all the evidence, the university investigator made the following findings: “(1) Williams admitted she sent the email on December 3, 2014. She further acknowledged that she had personal feelings for [Yates] but did not acknowledge that the email was received as inappropriate and unwanted. (2) Williams admit[ed] to bringing a card to [Yates’] office. (3) It is probable that Williams called on two occasions as well as sent [Yates] a Face Book friend request on December 12, 2014. (4) Williams sent [Yates] a Link[edIn] network request on December 8, 2014. (5) [The investigator] was unable to verify [Yates’] receipt of random calls and voice message at the beginning of the quarter but it is probable that Williams made the calls. (6) Williams admit[ted] to coming to [Yates’] office ‘to apolog[ize]’ on February 5, 2015, and (7) the [broadcast] email of February 28, 201[5] did not include factual information and was an attempt to contact [Yates] by Williams.” The investigator further found, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that Yates’ sexual harassment claim against Williams had been substantiated and Williams had violated the university’s Executive Order 1096. According to Yates, the university sanctioned Williams and told her she was not to have any contact with Yates “whatsoever.”
Yates further alleged in her petition that Williams had violated the university’s sanctions order by continuing to contact Yates. In her petition, Yates specifically complained that on October 17, 2015, she received at her home residence an affidavit Williams sent by certified mail through the use of a process server. The proof of service attached to the document identified the enclosure as “4 Page Legal Affidavit by Patrice Williams,” albeit the document was actually a sworn statement made by Angela B. Belvin. The document was titled, “GENERAL AFFIDAVIT,” with a subject line reading: “Subject: In Relevance To Dr. Doris Yates, PH.D.” The body of the document consisted of a “Statement of Facts:” in which Belvin described in a “stream of consciousness” manner certain incidents that occurred between Yates and Williams during the months of December 2014 and February 2015. Belvin asserted in various portions of the statement that Yates’s allegations made against Williams were false and that Yates had unfairly initiated a formal complaint against Williams in an attempt to get Williams suspended from school, and Yates’ conduct had made Williams suicidal throughout the month of February 2015.
In response to Yates’ petition, Williams denied she had harassed, molested, or stalked Yates, and, she alleged that Yates was complaining about incidents that took place “over a year ago,” for which Williams had been sanctioned by the university, and, therefore, no injunctive relief was necessary. Williams did not agree with the university sanctions order and she wanted to appeal the decision. Because she did not know how to execute her appellate rights, she asked her friend, Angela Belvin, to prepare an affidavit to be filed as an appeal and arranged for a process server to serve the affidavit by certified mail at Yates’ home residence. According to Williams, the affidavit did not harass or threaten Yates in any way. Williams further asserted Yates had not demonstrated how her receipt of the affidavit would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress or actually caused her substantial emotional distress, and Williams did not mean to cause Yates any harm. Williams attached to her response, a letter she sent to the process server. In that letter Williams indicated that, “[a]lthough this is not an active court case,” she needed a process server to serve the affidavit by certified mail because Williams was “NOT able to do this” herself.
On December 17, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on Yates’ petition. Yates appeared, in propria persona, and Williams appeared and was represented by counsel. Yates informed the court that Williams had violated the university’s sanctions order on two occasions in the following manner: (1) on April 28, 2015, Williams sent Yates another LinkedIn request, which email Yates sent directly to the university’s risk management officer on campus; and (2) on October 17, 2015, Williams sent an affidavit by certified mail to Yates’ home address. The university held a hearing to address Yates’ new complaint, but no decision had been rendered by the university. Additionally, Yates read into the record a “Victim Impact Statement,” in which she stated: “I am fearful of Ms. Williams, as to when and where she will show. . . . I do not leave my house unless I have things that I must do, because I don’t know whether she’s going to show up at my front door. I don’t know whether she’s going to send something through the mail. I just don’t know. So I am very fearful of her.” Williams’ counsel argued that Williams had not sent an email to Yates in violation of the university’s sanctions order, noting that Yates had not produced any documentary proof of the April 28 email. Williams’ counsel also argued that although Williams had admittedly sent an affidavit by certified mail to Yates’ home address, the document did not include any “name calling or epithets,” and it was sent “to say that [Williams] was sorry for what had happened. Now, it was clumsy. She admitted at the disciplinary hearing that she shouldn’t have done that. But . . . again, . . . her intent was not to harass” Yates.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated: “I guess the trouble that I have is that just, nothing seems to be hitting home in terms of you’re not to contact. If there were an appeal going on, and if it were necessary for the other party to be served with some document, I could see this. But – this is not an act to serve any purpose, any legitimate purpose at all. The school has attempted things, and she has exercised her right, which is her right, to contest those charges.” Finding that Yates was entitled to relief, the court issued a three-year restraining order (Judicial Council from CH-130), precluding Williams from harassing Yates, or contacting her, either directly or indirectly, in any way, and requiring Williams to stay at least 100 yards away from Yates, her home, and her vehicle. The court informed the parties, however, that the order did not prevent Williams from attending the university. When Yates complained that Williams “took the orders from the campus a notch higher when she sent a certified document to [her] home,” the court replied that Williams’ conduct of sending the document to Yates’ home was the reason the court was granting a restraining order. The court’s minute order specifically noted that, “Peaceful written contact through a lawyer or a process server or other person for service of legal papers related to a court case is allowed and does not violate these orders.”
DISCUSSION
Section 527.6 was enacted “ ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment. [Citation.]” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412.) “A person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in” section 527.6. (Id., subd. (a)(1).) “ ‘Harassment’ ” is defined as “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subds. (b)(3), (i).) “ ‘Course of conduct’ is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile, or computer email.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court may issue an injunction under section 527.6 on “clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists[.]” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) However, the court need not make express findings, but rather, “ ‘the granting of the injunction itself necessarily implies that the trial court found that [the respondent] knowingly and willfully engaged in a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed [the petitioner], and that [the petitioner] actually suffered substantial emotional distress.’ ” (Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 77, 88-89, quoting from Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1112 (Ensworth).)
On appeal of the grant of a section 527.6 restraining order, “[w]e review issuance of [the] protective order for abuse of discretion, and the factual findings necessary to support the protective order are reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citations.] ‘We resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of respondent, the prevailing party, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the trial court’s findings.’ [Citation.]” (Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226; see Ensworth, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1111, fn. 2 [“[w]here the trial court has determined that a party has met the ‘clear and convincing’ burden, that heavy evidentiary standard then disappears;” “ ‘[o]n appeal, the usual rule of conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to the respondent’s evidence, however slight, and disregarding appellant’s evidence, however strong’ ”].)
In her opening appellate brief, Williams challenges the issuance of the section 526.7 restraining order on two grounds: (1) Yates failed to meet her burden of proving that the legal affidavit sent by Williams caused Yates “severe emotional distress;” and (2) the “filing [of] a legal action or appeal does not constitute harassment.” She expands on the latter argument, in her reply brief, by arguing that she had the right to appeal the university’s sanctions order, and to effectuate that appeal, she had the right and responsibility to serve Yates with an affidavit by legal process at her home residence on October 17, 2015. We see no merit to either contention.
As to Williams’ first contention, the trial court could reasonably infer Yates suffered substantial emotional distress based on her testimony at the hearing as to the impact of the harassing conduct, which was not limited to the last act of harassment (receipt of legal affidavit) that precipitated the filing of the request for an injunction. (See Ensworth, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp.1110-1111 [trial court could infer petitioner suffered substantial emotional distress based on nature of harassment even though there was no direct oral testimony of petitioner’s emotional distress].) The trial court judge “observed [Yates] and heard [her] testimony and [was], as a result, in a far better position than we to judge the severity of [Yates’] emotional distress.” (Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397; see Ensworth, supra, at p. 1110 [trial court may draw “[i[nferences . . . from the demeanor of witnesses and their manner of testifying”].)
As to Williams’ second contention, the trial court expressly recognized that Williams was entitled to serve Yates with legal documents relating to an appeal of the university’s sanctions order. (See § 527.6, subd. (b)(1) [“[c]onstitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct’ ”].) Williams contends she was exercising her right to appeal the university’s sanctions order when she arranged for a process server to serve the October 17, 2015 affidavit by certified mail at Yates’ home address. However, the trial court was entitled to and apparently did find that at the time Williams sent the affidavit there was no ongoing appeal that necessitated the service of the affidavit on Yates. And, thus, the court reasonably found Williams’ act of sending the affidavit had no legitimate purpose, but rather constituted an act to contact Yates in contravention of the university’s sanctions order prohibiting such contact. By her appellate contention, Williams is attempting “to reargue . . . those factual issues decided adversely to” her, which is “contrary to established precepts of appellate review.” (Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 398-399.)
Because Williams’ claims of error fail, we uphold the injunction issued on December 17, 2015, pursuant to section 527.6.
DISPOSITION
The injunction issued on December 17, 2015, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, is affirmed. Respondent Doris Yates is awarded costs on appeal.


_________________________
Jenkins, J.


We concur:


_________________________
Pollak, Acting P. J.


_________________________
Siggins, J.





Yates v. Williams, A147662