Filed 12/21/17 In re Christopher C. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re CHRISTOPHER C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GUILLERMO C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F075325

(Super. Ct. Nos. 517639, 517640)


OPINION

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Ann Q. Ameral, Judge.
David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Carrie M. Stephens, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Guillermo C. (father), the noncustodial parent of 10-year-old Christopher C. and eight-year-old Lizbeth C. (collectively, the children), who resides in Mexico, appeals the juvenile court’s January 25, 2017, order terminating his reunification services at the six month review hearing. Because substantial evidence supports the court’s determination that father was provided reasonable reunification services, we affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Proceedings in Calaveras County
The underlying dependency proceedings originated in Calaveras County. On January 12, 2016, the Calaveras County Health and Human Services Agency filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 dependency petition in which the following was alleged: On January 9, 2016, the children, along with their then two-year-old half sister, Leslie M., were willfully and negligently left home alone, without adequate supervision, by their mother, Elizabeth T. (mother). Lizbeth was reportedly caring for both her younger half-sister, Leslie, and her older brother, Christopher, who has severe autism. Leslie’s father also disclosed knowledge of mother leaving the three children in the family home on numerous occasions without adequate supervision.
The detention report filed on January 13, 2016, stated that father reportedly lived in Mexico and that the social worker would contact the Mexican Consulate to try to provide him with notice of the petition.
On January 13, 2016, the juvenile court ordered the children detained and set a jurisdiction hearing for January 19, 2016. The children were placed with their maternal grandparents.
On January 19, 2016, the juvenile court found the children came within the court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect), and set a disposition hearing for February 16, 2016.
The disposition report filed on February 11, 2016, recommended transferring the children’s case to Stanislaus County, where mother resided, and offering mother reunification services. Regarding father, the disposition report stated he was “a thirty-two year old Mexican male who lives and works in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico” with “no immediate intention to return to the United States.” The report also contained a mailing address for father.
On February 16, 2016, the juvenile court continued the disposition hearing to June 21, 2016, to allow time for service on father pursuant to the Hague Convention.
An addendum report filed on June 9, 2016, stated that the social worker spoke to father by phone on June 7, 2016, and that “[father] reported he received all the court documents [the social services agency had] sent him.” Father also asked about the children and “reported that he would love to visit his children” but “explained there are legal and immigration barriers keeping him from coming to visit his children.” He also inquired about having the children visit him in Mexico.
On June 21, 2016, counsel for the social services agency advised the court that although the social worker had spoken with father and father had actual notice of the dependency proceedings, he had yet to be served pursuant to the Hague Convention. Accordingly, the court continued the disposition hearing to July 19, 2016.
At the July 19, 2016, disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered that the children’s case be transferred to Stanislaus County to facilitate mother’s reunification services.
Proceedings in Stanislaus County
At a transfer-in hearing on August 8, 2016, father appeared for the first time in the dependency proceedings, appearing telephonically and communicating through a Spanish language interpreter. The juvenile court appointed counsel to represent father and continued the transfer-in hearing to September 6, 2016.
On August 31, 2016, the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) filed an acceptance-of-transfer report, recommending that the children be adjudged dependents of the juvenile court and that father be granted reunification services. The report contained the following information concerning father:
“Calaveras County Child Welfare had limited contact with [father] and it does not appear he was offered any reunification services. Since the case was received by Stanislaus County Child Welfare, the undersigned has contacted [father] and he has reported he is interested in reunification services. [Father] reported that it has been several years since he last saw the children and unfortunately, he has not been able to maintain a relationship with them. [Father] has been provided pictures of the children and he has had telephone contact with them as well. The Mexican Consulate has since been contacted and they will be in contact with [father] in regards to setting up services near his residence.”
The report also set forth a proposed case plan for father, requiring him to: (1) complete an assessment through the Mexican Consulate; (2) complete individual counseling focusing “on issues pertaining to raising a child with disabilities, reconnecting with children after an extended period of time, and other issues as deemed appropriate”; (3) complete a domestic violence assessment; and (4) participate in random drug testing. The plan provided that the counseling and domestic violence assessment be obtained from “Sierra Vista Child and Family Services or another program approved of by the social worker.”
The delivered service log attached to the acceptance-of-transfer report reflected that the social worker spoke with father on August 11, 2016. At that time, father reported it had been “six years since he had any form of communication with the children.” Father told the social worker “he was willing to participate in services and would ultimately like to reunify with the children.”
When the social worker asked how he had come to be in Mexico, father stated he had been “deported several years ago after he was arrested for a domestic violence incident with the mother.” However, father “denied ‘putting hands’ on [mother] and further reported [mother] called the police and lied to them.”
The delivered service log further reflected that on August 12, 2016, the social worker facilitated a three-way phone call between father and the children.
The delivered service log also contained detailed information regarding the social worker’s efforts to communicate with the Mexican Consulate about obtaining reunification services for father supervised by the agency known as Desarrollo Integral de la Familia (DIF) in Mexico.
At the transfer-in hearing on September 6, 2016, the juvenile court conducted the following inquiry concerning the agency’s efforts to obtain services for father in Mexico:
“THE COURT: And do we know whether there has been communication with DIF … in Mexico?
“[AGENCY’S COUNSEL]: So the Consulate has informed us—[an employee] from the Mexican Consulate said that somebody from DIF is supposed to be contacting the father. I don’t know if that has yet occurred, but that is the process.
“THE COURT: And, [father], have you been in communication with anyone from DIF?
“THE FATHER: No, they agreed to call me and get together with me, but up until now they have not called me. I got a message from the Consulate in Sacramento, and they said they were going to get together with me, but they haven’t.
“THE COURT: All right. I am hopeful, sir, that someone from DIF will be calling you soon. [¶] Do you have a telephone number for the DIF where you are located?
“THE FATHER: No. Since they agreed to let me know, I haven’t been able to be in contact with him.
“[AGENCY’S COUNSEL]: Then [the social worker] will provide the telephone number to the father.
“THE COURT: And once the social worker gives you the phone number, [father], I would urge you to contact them as well to have services started. [¶] Okay?
“THE FATHER: That’s fine. Fine.”
The juvenile court then adopted the agency’s recommendations, approving the proposed case plan for father and ordering the agency to provide him with reunification services. The court further stated, “The minute order will reflect that reunification services were not originally offered to the father in Calaveras County, although, they should have been.” The court then set a six-month review hearing for January 13, 2017.
On January 3, 2017, the agency filed a report for the six-month review hearing and in support of a modification petition, filed the following day, seeking early termination of father’s reunification services pursuant to section 388.
In support of the recommendation, the report stated that father had not seen the children in over six years and had made no effort to contact the agency to inquire as to their well-being. The report further stated that the social worker had not had any contact with father to verify if he was participating in any services through the Mexican Consulate, although she had sent him monthly letters that included copies of his case plan. The report also stated that the social worker had attempted to contact the Mexican Consulate for updated information regarding any progress father had made with his case plan, but she had not yet heard back from the Mexican Consulate.
On January 13, 2017, father’s counsel requested a continuance of the six-month review hearing and section 388 petition hearing, explaining:
“I’m having difficulty reaching my client to be able to verify some of the information. I don’t have information—according to the report, there is no information from Mexico regarding progress and services, and I wanted to try to verify information so I could state an opinion or his position on the record.”
The juvenile court responded: “I think it would be appropriate to grant a short continuance in order for [father’s counsel] to communicate with her client to see if, in fact, he may be involved with services through [DIF] in Mexico.” Counsel for the agency interjected that the telephone number the agency had for father was no longer a working number and the agency had not had any success in getting in touch with father either. Father’s counsel then asked whether, since the filing of the six-month review report, there had been “any information” or had “Mexico responded?” The agency’s counsel replied, “We requested again and still no response. I’m waiting to hear back.”
The juvenile court thereafter continued the hearing to January 25, 2017. On that date, father’s counsel advised the court she had been unable to contact father and the agency had indicated to her that it had not received any additional information about father. Consequently, father’s counsel objected but presented no evidence in opposition to the agency’s section 388 petition to terminate father’s reunification services. The court subsequently granted the petition, stating:
“The Court finds that the inaction of the father makes it highly unlikely that he would be able to reunify with the children if additional time were granted since he has done absolutely nothing, and that the granting of the motion would be in the children’s best interests because it would assist in permanency for the children; so it is granted. [¶] The Court does find, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that reasonable services were either offered or provided to the father.”
DISCUSSION
Father contends the juvenile court erred in terminating his reunification services at the six-month review hearing because the court’s finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to him is unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
A. Legal Background
“[T]he Legislature provides that services for a deported parent include ‘[r]easonable efforts to assist parents who have been deported to contact child welfare authorities in their country of origin, to identify any available services that would substantially comply with case plan requirements, to document the parents’ participation in those services, and to accept reports from local child welfare authorities as to the parents’ living situation, progress, and participation in services.’ (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1)(E).)” (In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1003.)
The agency’s request for early termination of father’s reunification services was implicitly made under section 388, subdivision (c)(1)(B). That subdivision allows the agency to petition for termination of reunification services before the six-month review hearing if “[t]he action or inaction of the parent … creates a substantial likelihood that reunification will not occur, including, but not limited to, the parent’s … failure to visit the child, or the failure of the parent … to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan.” (§ 388, subd. (c)(1)(B).) Prior to the early termination of reunification services under section 388, subdivision (c), the juvenile court must find that the agency provided reasonable services. (In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 122.)
“When a finding that reunification services were adequate is challenged on appeal, we review it for substantial evidence.” (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971 (Alvin R.).) “[T]his court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the [agency]. We must indulge in all reasonable and legitimate inferences to uphold the judgment. [Citation.] ‘If there is any substantial evidence to support the findings of a juvenile court, a reviewing court is without power to weigh or evaluate the findings.’ ” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1361-1362 (Ronell A.).)
“ ‘The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’ ” (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598-599.) “Services will be found reasonable if the [agency] has ‘identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult .…’ ” (Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 972-973.) In assessing the reasonableness of reunification services, the juvenile court evaluates not only the agency’s efforts to assist the parent in accessing the services, but also the parent’s efforts to avail himself or herself of the services. (Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1365.)
B. Analysis
The record discloses substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s reasonable services determination. Although the juvenile court in Calaveras County failed to offer father services, the records from that county indicate that father was on actual notice of the dependency proceedings as early as February 2016, when the social services agency obtained an address for father in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico and began sending him documents there. Father subsequently confirmed in June 2016, that he had received all the court documents sent to him by the Calaveras County social services agency. The original dependency petition contains a clear warning to parents that “Your parental rights may be permanently terminated” and “To protect your rights, you must appear in court and answer this petition.”
Shortly after the juvenile court in Calaveras County ordered the case transferred to Stanislaus County, the agency made phone contact with father, set up a phone visit between him and the children, and began communicating with the Mexican Consulate to request DIF services to be provided in accordance with father’s case plan. Though concentrated in August 2016, the agency’s efforts to assist father access DIF services in Mexico were significant as they resulted in the Mexican Consulate advising the agency it would have someone from DIF contact father, which appears, in fact, to have happened. Father’s statements at the September 6, 2016, transfer-in hearing confirmed that someone connected with the Mexican agency made contact with him and reportedly left a message about arranging an in-person meeting.
Although father’s statements implied the Mexican agency failed to follow up on this initial contact with him, father was clearly on notice that establishing contact with DIF was imperative to accessing services as the juvenile court urged father to contact DIF directly to begin services and father assented. The record, as father points out, is silent as to whether the social worker present at the transfer-in hearing gave father the phone number for the local DIF office as the agency’s counsel stated she would. However, the record’s silence on this and other matters does not constitute evidence the agency failed to make reasonable efforts to maintain contact with father or assist him in accessing DIF services, as father’s arguments suggests.
As indicated earlier, when evaluating the reasonableness of reunification services, we consider not only the agency’s efforts to assist father in obtaining services, but also father’s efforts to avail himself of services. (Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1365.) In light of the juvenile court’s statement urging father to contact DIF directly to get services started as well as the fact father had long been on notice of the pendency of the dependency proceedings, it was not reasonable for father simply to wait for someone from DIF to contact him. The record, however, discloses no evidence father made any subsequent efforts to communicate with the agency for any reason, let alone to request local contact information for DIF if father did fail to obtain the number from the social worker at the time of the transfer-in hearing, a matter on which, as just discussed, the record is silent.
Furthermore, the record reflects that not only did father fail to communicate with the agency during the five-month period between the transfer-in hearing when services were ordered, and the six-month review hearing when they were terminated, but also father failed to maintain contact with his own attorney. Thus, by the time of six-month review hearing at which father failed to appear, neither the agency nor father’s counsel had been able to reach father by phone, and the agency indicated the phone number father had previously provided was no longer a working number.
In light of the agency’s concentrated efforts to assist father in accessing DIF services, which led to someone connected with the Mexican agency initiating contact with father, and father’s failure thereafter to communicate with the agency, we will not upset the juvenile court’s finding that, under the circumstances of this case, the services the agency offered were reasonable.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services to father is affirmed.