Filed 12/28/17 In re Joseph P. CA5



NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re JOSEPH P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ASHLEY G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F075490

(Super. Ct. No. JD135252-00)


OPINION

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Raymonda B. Marquez, Judge.
Patricia K. Saucier, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-
Ashley G. (mother) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to her now two-year-old son, Joseph. After reviewing the juvenile court record, mother’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on mother’s behalf. This court granted mother leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
Mother filed a letter but failed to address the termination findings or orders or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (In re Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
Mother gave birth to Joseph in September 2015, while a resident at an inpatient drug treatment facility. Mother told a social worker from the Kern County Department of Human Services (department) that she lost custody of her four older children; three were adopted by their maternal grandmother and the other was placed with the grandmother under a legal guardianship. Mother also stated she had a long history of drug use, mainly methamphetamine and marijuana, and was released from prison on August 20, 2015, on parole. She expected to be discharged from the treatment facility on December 1st. The department considered leaving Joseph in mother’s care but took him into protective custody after she left the facility with him before completing treatment.
In January 2016, the juvenile court exercised its dependency jurisdiction over Joseph, removed him from parental custody, and ordered reunification services for his father. The court denied mother reunification services because of her untreated substance abuse. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10), (11).)
In July 2016, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for Joseph’s father and set a section 366.26 hearing. Mother’s whereabouts were unknown.
The department recommended the juvenile court terminate parental rights and consider a permanent plan of adoption for Joseph with his foster parents. The department reported that mother visited Joseph seven times between October 5 and December 4, 2015. The visits were of fair quality and mother was appropriate.
On November 9, 2016, the juvenile court convened the section 366.26 hearing but continued it until January 4, 2017, because mother was incarcerated and not transported to the hearing.
On December 19, 2016, mother waived her right to personally appear at the section 366.26 hearing. She asked instead to appear by video conference or telephone.
On January 4, 2017, mother appeared by telephone represented by counsel. Her attorney objected to the department’s recommendations but offered no additional evidence. Mother asked why the maternal grandmother was denied placement of Joseph. Her attorney explained that the State of Texas denied the maternal grandmother’s placement request.
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that Joseph was likely to be adopted and that none of the exceptions to adoption applied. The court terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
An appealed from judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is appellant’s burden to raise claims of reversible error or other defect and present argument and authority on each point made. If appellant fails to do so, the appeal may be dismissed. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.)
At a termination hearing, the juvenile court’s focus is on whether it is likely the child will be adopted and if so, order termination of parental rights. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) If, as in this case, the child is likely to be adopted, the juvenile court must terminate parental rights unless the parent proves there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child under any of the circumstances listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B).
Mother does not argue in her letter that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights. Instead, she contends the juvenile court failed to notify her in prison in the “month[s] of October and November” to appear for Joseph’s court date. She believes she should have had the chance to demonstrate the progress she made in her case plan.
We presume mother refers to the section 366.26 hearing scheduled for November 9, 2016, when she claims she was not provided notice. Her claim, however, fails because, according to the record, a social worker met with mother and gave her written notice of that hearing. She was unable to appear because she was incarcerated. Further, the juvenile court continued the section 366.26 hearing to facilitate mother’s appearance and she personally appeared.
We conclude mother failed to raise any arguable issues from the termination hearing that merit briefing and dismiss the appeal.
DISPOSITION
This appeal is dismissed.