Filed 1/2/18 In re J.M. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re J.M. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.N.,

Defendant and Appellant.


E068471

(Super.Ct.Nos. J266215 &
J266216)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes, Judge. Affirmed.
Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, Dawn M. Martin, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant J.N. (Grandmother) filed a request to change a court order. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388.) The juvenile court summarily denied Grandmother’s request. Grandmother contends the juvenile court erred by summarily denying her request. We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FAMILY
J.C. is male and was born in 2011. J.M. is female and was born in 2014. J.C. and J.M. (collectively, the children) share the same mother, A.C. (Mother). J.R.M. (Father) is the presumed father of J.C. and J.M. J.C.’s biological father is R.D. Grandmother is the children’s maternal grandmother.
B. BACKGROUND
1. 1999
In 1999, Grandmother took her 11-year-old son M.D. to Arizona to visit relatives without informing M.D.’s father. M.D.’s stepmother called the police alleging Grandmother kidnapped M.D. When Grandmother was arrested, she asked the officer to leave M.D. with Grandmother’s husband (Husband). The officer denied Grandmother’s request because Husband was a registered sex offender on parole. Grandmother said it was not a problem because Husband’s offense “was ‘only for little girls.’ ” The officer again denied the request because Husband was not permitted to be in the company of a child while unsupervised.
M.D. was detained because his father could not be immediately located. Ultimately, M.D. was placed in his father’s custody, and his father dropped the charges against Grandmother. As a result of M.D. being in his father’s custody, the dependency case was closed.
2. 2002 and 2003
Mother has other children who are not the subject of the instant case. Three of Mother’s other children are: (1) K.C., a male born in 1996 (Son1); (2) D.M., a male born in 2001 (Son2); and (3) K.M., a female born in 2002 (Daughter1). In 2002 and 2003, Mother and the three children lived in Grandmother’s home. Mother’s brothers, M.D. (Uncle1) and D.C. (Uncle2; collectively the Uncles), visited Grandmother’s home on weekends. The Uncles were in high school.
In December 2002, Son1 had open sores on his face, one of which looked like a cigarette burn. Son1 said he ran into Mother’s cigarette. Son1 said he feared the Uncles because they fondled his genitals and buttocks. Son1 said Uncle2 used his penis and a golf club to sodomize Son1, and the sodomy occurred on more than one occasion. Son1 said Uncle1 grabbed Son1’s penis on more than 10 occasions, struck Son1 with a baseball bat, kicked Son1’s face, and exposed his penis while standing behind Son1. Son1 said both uncles punched Son1’s penis, buttocks, arms, and legs. Son1 told Grandmother about the incidents; the Uncles were grounded as a result.
Grandmother told plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the Department) that “she is in the home ‘twenty-four seven’ and she did not believe the molestation [of Son1] had occurred.” In regard to the Uncles’ acts of violence against Son1, Grandmother said Son1 “was making a big deal out of nothing . . . and has no reason to be fearful of his maternal uncles.” Mother and Daughter1 tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of Daughter1’s birth, and Mother admitted abusing methamphetamines when she felt angry or depressed. On December 27, 2002, Mother tested positive for methamphetamines. Grandmother did “not believe that [M]other ha[d] a problem with methamphetamine.”
In February 2003, the juvenile court found true the allegations that (1) Mother suffered from chronic substance abuse that affected her ability to parent; (2) Son1 was struck multiple times by the Uncles; and (3) Son1 was sodomized and fondled by the Uncles on multiple occasions. The court ordered Son1 removed from Mother’s custody. Son1 was placed with his father, and his dependency case was dismissed.
In October 2003, Mother gave birth to a daughter, S.M. (Daughter2). In April 2005, Mother’s parental rights to Son2, Daughter1, and Daughter2 were terminated. In 2005, a Department social worker spoke to Grandmother about Son1 suffering sexual abuse. Grandmother said Son1 had lied. The Department concluded Grandmother would not be further considered as a potential adoptive home for Son2, Daughter1, and Daughter2 because she “would not protect the children from sexual abuse” and would not protect them from their parents’ drug abuse.
In 2005, Mother’s daughter S.C. (Daughter3) was detained. Mother’s parental rights to Daughter3 were terminated in 2006. In 2007, Daughter3 was adopted.
3. 2013 and 2014
J.C. was born in 2011. In 2013, Grandmother became J.C.’s guardian due to Mother being “in and out of prison.” The guardianship was granted by the probate court. J.M. was born in January 2014. Grandmother did not become J.M.’s guardian because Mother was not in prison when J.M. was born.
In January 2014, J.C. was removed from Grandmother’s custody and J.M. was removed from Mother’s custody. J.C. was removed from Grandmother’s custody due to Grandmother permitting J.C. to have unsupervised contact with Mother, and due to Grandmother permitting Uncle1 and Uncle2 to have access to the children. The children were placed in the custody of Father. Grandmother’s guardianship of J.C. was terminated. The 2014 dependency case was dismissed with Father having physical custody of the children, and Mother being granted supervised visits with the children.
C. DETENTION
In June 2016, Mother told Grandmother that Father was abusing methamphetamines, and Father told Grandmother that Mother was abusing methamphetamines. Additionally, Father was abusing alcohol and Mother stopped taking her medications for her bipolar disorder. J.C. told Grandmother that his parents fought and he hid under the table. Mother said Father struck Mother’s head with a pan. When law enforcement visited Mother and Father’s home, they found hypodermic needles, syringes, illegal pills, a scale, and three bottles of synthetic urine, all of which were within the children’s reach.
The Department detained the children. When the children were detained, the Department informed Grandmother that the children could not be placed with her due to (1) Grandmother’s 2014 failure to protect J.C. from Mother’s drug abuse; (2) Grandmother’s continued denial that Son1 was sexually abused in 2002; and (3) Grandmother’s continued contact with Uncle1. The Department social worker noted that Uncle1 was living with Grandmother, and had been living with her for approximately one month. A paternal aunt expressed concern that Grandmother enables Mother’s and Father’s poor behavior and makes excuses for their poor decisions. The Department placed the children in a foster home.
D. JURISDICTION
The juvenile court found true the allegation that Mother failed to benefit from prior reunification services designed to resolve substance abuse and sexual abuse issues, which resulted in the termination of her reunification services and parental rights for Son1, Son2, Daughter1, Daughter2, and Daughter3, and that similar conditions existed placing J.C. and J.M. at risk for severe neglect and sexual abuse. (§ 300, subd. (j).)
E. DE FACTO PARENT REQUEST AND DISPOSITION
Grandmother requested de facto parent status. The Department opposed Grandmother’s request for de facto parent status. The Department asserted that in 2013, when Grandmother was J.C.’s guardian, the Department told Grandmother that Mother and Father could only have supervised visits with J.C., but Grandmother repeatedly let J.C. be with Mother and Father unsupervised. The Department recommended that Grandmother’s guardianship be terminated; that request was granted by the dependency court in 2014.
In 2016, Grandmother suspected Mother and Father were abusing drugs. Additionally, Grandmother knew Mother was living with the children in violation of the 2014 court order, but did not inform authorities. The Department asserted Grandmother displayed similar behavior when she failed to protect Son1 from the sexual abuse inflicted by the Uncles. The Department asserted Grandmother’s de facto parent request should be denied.
In August 2016, the Department denied approval of Grandmother’s home for placement of the children. The Department recommended the children not be placed with Grandmother, but that Grandmother be granted supervised visits with the children.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered the children continue to be removed from their parents’ custody. The children were staying in a foster home. The juvenile court found Grandmother’s home was assessed by the Department “and it is not in the best interests of the children to place [them in her home] due to not being approved by the relative placement unit and her current and previous lack of protection of the children and their half-siblings [Daughter1, Son2 and Son1].”
Grandmother withdrew, without prejudice, her request for de facto parent status. Grandmother explained she had an upcoming administrative hearing concerning placement of the children, and preferred to have that resolved prior to the de facto parent request.
F. ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
Grandmother appealed the Department’s decision to not approve her home for placement of the children. The appeal was heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ). (§ 10950.) At the hearing, the Department explained that Grandmother’s home was not approved due to (1) Grandmother’s actions relating to Uncle1 in 1999, which included leaving Uncle1 alone with a registered sex offender; and (2) Grandmother’s guardianship of J.C. being terminated in 2014.
The Department argued that the instant case included a finding that the children’s half-sibling, Son1, was sexually abused by Uncle1 on multiple occasions. Additionally, the Department argued it did not place the children with Grandmother when they were detained in 2016 due to Grandmother (1) failing to protect the children from Mother’s and Father’s drug abuse, (2) failing to protect the children from Mother’s and Father’s domestic violence, and (3) believing Son1 lied about being sexually abused.
Grandmother asserted she was no longer married to Husband, i.e., the registered sex offender. Grandmother again asserted that the Uncles did not sexually abuse Son1. In regard to the violence against Son1, Grandmother explained “that children sometimes engage in rough play.” In regard to protecting the children from their parents, Grandmother said she would not permit the children to see their parents when their parents were intoxicated. Grandmother said J.C. had been living with Grandmother “almost his entire life.” Grandmother asserted that, in June 2016, she reported the parents’ behavior, which led to the instant dependency case.
The ALJ found (1) a referral for caretaker absence was sustained against Grandmother in 1999 after she was arrested in connection with taking Uncle1 to Arizona and no adult was immediately available to care for Uncle1; (2) in 2013, Grandmother was J.C.’s guardian and that guardianship was terminated in 2014; (3) after the guardianship was terminated, Grandmother was permitted to have unsupervised contact with the children; (4) in June 2016, Grandmother reported that the children were in danger due to the parents’ drug use and domestic violence; and (5) J.C. spent the majority of his life in Grandmother’s care.
The ALJ concluded that the 1999 incident was 17 years in the past and did not prove Grandmother was unsuitable to be the children’s caregiver. The ALJ concluded no reason was given for the 2014 termination of Grandmother’s guardianship, and while the 2014 evidence showed Grandmother “could have been more proactive in her protection efforts,” it did not show Grandmother was presently an unsuitable caregiver.
The ALJ concluded Grandmother had the present ability to be a suitable caregiver based upon (1) Grandmother having cared for J.C. for the majority of his life; (2) Grandmother being permitted to have unsupervised contact with the children following the termination of the guardianship in 2014; and (3) Grandmother reporting the parents’ behavior, leading to the instant dependency case.
In January 2017, the ALJ ruled that the Department failed to prove Grandmother was an unsuitable caregiver. The ALJ ordered the Department to rescind its August 2016 denial of home approval and to continue assessing Grandmother’s home. On March 1, the Department sent Grandmother a notice that the denial of the home approval had been rescinded and that her home had been approved as a possible placement for the children.
G. FOSTER HOMES
In January 2017, the children’s foster parents gave notice that they could no longer care for J.C. due to his behavior. On March 2, the children were moved to a different foster home.
H. REQUEST TO CHANGE A COURT ORDER
On March 29, Grandmother filed a request to change a court order. (§ 388.) Grandmother requested the court change its November 2016 disposition order that the children be maintained in foster care. Grandmother asserted circumstances changed in that the Department approved her home for possible placement of the children. Grandmother requested the juvenile court order the children be placed in her care.
In a declaration attached to the request, Grandmother’s attorney declared the Department did not contact Grandmother when the children were moved to their new foster home in March 2017. He additionally declared that the court had ordered Grandmother receive two visits per month with the children, but those visits had been denied to Grandmother beginning in February 2017. Further, the attorney declared that Grandmother believed Mother had been sentenced to prison for a term of more than two years. Attached as exhibits to the attorney’s declaration were (1) the ALJ’s 16-page decision, and (2) the Department’s notice to Grandmother that her home had been approved for possible placement of the children.
I. OPPOSITION
The Department opposed Grandmother’s request. The Department asserted the children were adjusting well to their new foster home. The Department explained that J.C. was exhibiting behavioral issues at school; J.C. was displaying sexualized behavior. When the prior foster mother changed J.M.’s diaper, she closed her legs and asked the foster mother not to hurt her. During a Department interview with Grandmother, Grandmother said her sons, Uncle1 and Uncle2, are allowed in her home and that Son1’s sexual abuse allegations were untrue. The Department argued that Grandmother was unable to protect the children from the risk of harm posed by their parents and the Uncles.
J. SIX-MONTH REVIEW
In May 2017, the children were in their foster placement. J.C. was bonding with his biological father during joint therapy sessions and visits. J.C. also saw a therapist who specialized in sexual abuse, due to J.C., who was approximately six years old, being seen masturbating.
K. HEARING
At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court said it would address Grandmother’s request to change a court order (§ 388). Grandmother’s attorney requested to present Grandmother’s testimony. The juvenile court said, “Just give me a few minutes to call some other cases. I have not decided if I am going to allow the hearing yet because I have a concern about the protective issues, you know, that permeates from the past until today. So I just want to review something before I do that.”
Mother’s attorney said, “Just for the record, your Honor, Mother totally objects to the grandmother’s petition. She says that she still calls [Son1] a liar. That’s where it stands.”
After hearing unrelated matters, the juvenile court returned to the instant case. The court said, “I did find and review what I was looking for in the case. [¶] I have two concerns in the case. And, obviously, the past is the past. That is a concern. But in as much as the way I read the entire report, I don’t see any substantial change to the grandmother’s attitude of failure to protect the minors.
“And there are two reasons for that. One is the denial of what happened. Because I guess the criminal court found those [sexual abuse] allegations [concerning Son1] not true; however, this Court did find those allegations true. I know there are different standards. So that gives me great concern that we have these protection issues.”
The court continued, “I know [Grandmother is] in a tough spot there with competing interests between her different kids and grand kids [sic]. [¶] That also—apparently, my reading of the report says that the further protective issue is that while the parents are living[,] in the recent case[,] with Grandma, a lot of crazy stuff is going on that leads to this removal. And that’s happening with everybody in the house. She’s tolerating that for a significant period of time, which again speaks to her ability to not protect the smaller ones from the bigger ones.
“And so we have, in my mind, these ongoing issues. And they’re very difficult in family situations to try to balance everything out, but at the end of the day, I have to look at where the kids are safest. [¶] And so I don’t find that it’s in the best interest to change and grant the 388. So I will deny it for that purpose.”
DISCUSSION
A. SUMMARY DENIAL
Grandmother contends the juvenile court erred by summarily denying her request to change a court order. (§ 388.)
Any person having an interest in a dependent child “may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) “If it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change of order . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held.” (§ 388, subd. (d).)
“Section 388 thus gives the court two choices: (1) summarily deny the petition or (2) hold a hearing. [Citations.] In order to avoid summary denial, the petitioner must make a ‘prima facie’ showing of ‘facts which will sustain a favorable decision if the evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is credited.’ ” (In re Lesly G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.) “[T]he petitioner must make a prima facie showing of a change of circumstances and that the proposed change of order is in the best interest of the child. [Citation.] The petition should be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency. [Citation.] A summary denial of a section 388 petition is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (In re D.R. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 480, 487.)
“The factors to be considered in evaluating the child’s best interests under section 388 are: (1) the seriousness of the problem that led to the dependency and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of the child’s bond with his or her new caretakers compared with the strength of the child’s bond with the [party requesting the change]; and (3) the degree to which the problem leading to the dependency may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.” (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 224.)
Grandmother’s request to change a court order was made on a Judicial Council JV-180 form. In the section that asks why the requested change is in the children’s best interests, Grandmother referred the juvenile court to her attorney’s declaration. In the declaration, Grandmother’s attorney declared (1) Grandmother was the children’s guardian from January through April 2014; (2) in 2016, Grandmother tried to protect the children from their parents’ poor conduct; (3) Grandmother reported the parents’ conduct to authorities, thereby initiating the instant case; (4) after the children were detained, Grandmother requested the children be placed with her; (5) after the placement was denied, Grandmother appealed the denial; (6) Grandmother prevailed in her appeal and was given the Department’s approval for placement; (7) in March 2017, the children were moved to a new foster home; (8) the Department did not contact Grandmother about placement of the children in March 2017; (9) Grandmother was granted visitation with the children twice per month; and (10) Grandmother had been denied visits since February 24, 2017.
Grandmother’s request did not discuss why it would be in the children’s best interests for them to be placed with Grandmother. Grandmother does not explain the seriousness of the problem that led to the children’s dependency. She does not explain what the children have suffered or what their current needs may be in healing from those experiences. Grandmother does not discuss the children’s bond with their foster family. Grandmother does not discuss her bond with the children. Grandmother does not explain how the problems leading to the dependency have been or may be resolved or why the children would be better protected from those problems in her care. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying Grandmother’s petition because Grandmother failed to make a prima facie showing that the requested change would promote the children’s best interests.
Grandmother contends a best interest showing is implied in her moving papers. Grandmother asserts evidence in the case showed that the children loved Grandmother, J.C. was bonded to Grandmother, and the Department had to move the children to a new foster home due to J.C.’s behavioral issues. Grandmother contends she explained to the social worker why the requested change served the children’s best interests. Grandmother cites to (1) the 2016 detention report; (2) Grandmother’s de facto parent request; (3) the juvenile court’s March 2017 placement order for the children; (4) Father’s testimony at the 2016 jurisdiction hearing; and (5) Grandmother’s juvenile court attorney’s declaration.
In Grandmother’s request, in regard to the children’s best interests, she referred the juvenile court only to her attorney’s declaration—not the various other documents cited in support of her appellate argument. As explained ante, the declaration did not set forth a prima facie case concerning best interests. Because Grandmother did not provide the juvenile court with a prima facie case concerning the children’s best interests, the juvenile court acted within the bounds of reason by summarily denying her request.
Further, Grandmother’s reliance on appeal on evidence that the children loved Grandmother and were bonded with Grandmother does not equate with a prima facie showing that the children’s best interests would be promoted by being placed with Grandmother. As explained ante, the children’s bond with Grandmother is only one factor in the best interests analysis. (In re Ernesto R., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 224.)
Grandmother contends the juvenile court erred by summarily denying her request because the factual issue of whether Son1 was sexually abused by the Uncles is unresolved. Grandmother asserts collateral estoppel does not apply because (1) the issue was not litigated—the jurisdictional allegation was sustained at a settlement conference; and (2) Grandmother was not a party to Son1’s case. As explained ante, the juvenile court acted within the bounds of reason by summarily denying Grandmother’s request because Grandmother failed to make a prima facie showing for the best interests factor. Accordingly, we do not address whether collateral estoppel applies to the sexual abuse finding because discussing the issue will not provide Grandmother with any relief. (See generally In re Carmaleta B. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 482, 493 [applicability of collateral estoppel in dependency proceedings]; In re Donovan L., Jr. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1084 [same]; In re Albert G. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 132, 135 [issue is moot when no relief can be granted].)
B. SECTION 361.3
1. LAW
Section 361.3, subdivision (a), provides, “In any case in which a child is removed from the physical custody of his or her parents pursuant to Section 361, preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a relative of the child for placement of the child with the relative, regardless of the relative’s immigration status. In determining whether placement with a relative is appropriate, the county social worker and court shall consider, but shall not be limited to, consideration of all the following factors:
“(1) The best interest of the child, including special physical, psychological, educational, medical, or emotional needs.
“(2) The wishes of the parent, the relative, and child, if appropriate.
“(3) The provisions of Part 6 (commencing with Section 7950) of Division 12 of the Family Code regarding relative placement.
“(4) Placement of siblings and half siblings in the same home, unless that placement is found to be contrary to the safety and well-being of any of the siblings, as provided in Section 16002.
“(5) The good moral character of the relative and any other adult living in the home, including whether any individual residing in the home has a prior history of violent criminal acts or has been responsible for acts of child abuse or neglect.
“(6) The nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the relative, and the relative's desire to care for, and to provide legal permanency for, the child if reunification is unsuccessful.
“(7) The ability of the relative to do the following:
“(A) Provide a safe, secure, and stable environment for the child.
“(B) Exercise proper and effective care and control of the child.
“(C) Provide a home and the necessities of life for the child.
“(D) Protect the child from his or her parents.
“(E) Facilitate court-ordered reunification efforts with the parents.
“(F) Facilitate visitation with the child's other relatives.
“(G) Facilitate implementation of all elements of the case plan.
“(H)(i) Provide legal permanence for the child if reunification fails.
“(ii) However, any finding made with respect to the factor considered pursuant to this subparagraph and pursuant to subparagraph (G) shall not be the sole basis for precluding preferential placement with a relative.
“(I) Arrange for appropriate and safe child care, as necessary.
“(8)(A) The safety of the relative's home. For a relative to be considered appropriate to receive placement of a child under this section on an emergency basis, the relative's home shall first be assessed pursuant to the process and standards described in subdivision (d) of Section 309.”
Section 361.3 is triggered when a relative requests placement of a child. (§ 361.3, subd. (a); In re Isabella G. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 708, 722.) Thus, a request to change a court order (§ 388) is not required to trigger a relative placement evaluation (§ 361.3). (Isabella G., at p. 722.) If a relative uses a request to change a court order (§ 388) as the vehicle for obtaining placement of a child, then the juvenile court should apply the section 361.3 statutory criteria when deciding the issue of placement, rather than “the generalized best interest showing required under section 388.” (Isabella G., at p. 722, fn. 11.)
2. ANALYSIS
Grandmother asserts the juvenile court erred by applying the section 388 best interests test rather than the statutory criteria of section 361.3.
Grandmother filed a section 388 request and failed to establish a prima facie case under section 388, as set forth ante. On appeal, Grandmother is faulting the juvenile court for not applying the section 361.3 criteria; however, Grandmother did not argue the section 361.3 criteria in her written request to change a court order (§ 388).
On appeal, Grandmother does not reconcile (1) the required criteria for a prima facie showing under section 388, with (2) the statutory criteria under section 361.3. For example, Grandmother does not explain (a) if a section 388 request for relative placement must set forth a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and best interests as required by section 388; (b) if a section 388 request for relative placement need only make a prima facie showing of the section 361.3 factors; or (c) if a section 388 request for relative placement must make a prima facie showing of both the section 388 factors and the section 361.3 factors.
Because Grandmother is asserting the juvenile court should have discussed the section 361.3 factors, we infer that she believes either section 361.3 applies exclusively, or section 361.3 and section 388 apply conjointly. However, Grandmother does not explain how she established a prima facie case under section 361.3. Rather, she faults the juvenile court for not applying the section 361.3 criteria. Accordingly, we are left in the following position: (1) we are not making any conclusions concerning how sections 388 and 361.3 interact when a relative is establishing a prima facie case; (2) we are not making any conclusions concerning whether Grandmother established a prima facie case under section 361.3; rather, (3) we are analyzing whether the juvenile court considered the section 361.3 criteria.
In denying Grandmother’s request, the juvenile court said, “[M]y reading of the report says that the further protective issue is that while the parents are living[,] in the recent case[,] with Grandma, a lot of crazy stuff is going on that leads to this removal. And that’s happening with everybody in the house. She’s tolerating that for a significant period of time, which again speaks to her ability to not protect the smaller ones from the bigger ones.
“And so we have, in my mind, these ongoing issues. And they’re very difficult in family situations to try to balance everything out, but at the end of the day, I have to look at where the kids are safest. [¶] And so I don’t find that it’s in the best interest to change and grant the 388. So I will deny it for that purpose.”
The seventh factor in section 361.3 requires the court to consider whether the relative can “[p]rovide a safe, secure, and stable environment for the child” and “[p]rotect the child from his or her parents.” (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(7).) The eighth factor is “[t]he safety of the relative’s home.” (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(8)(A).)
The juvenile court’s statements can be understood as concluding, under the seventh and eighth factors of a section 361.3 analysis, that Grandmother cannot (1) provide a safe, secure, and stable environment because there was “a lot of crazy stuff” happening in which Grandmother had some involvement, in other words, Grandmother’s living situation is chaotic rather than safe and stable; and (2) Grandmother cannot protect the children from their parents, e.g., Grandmother is unable to “protect the smaller [grandchildren] from the bigger ones,” i.e., the parents. The juvenile court also discussed the request not being in the children’s best interests, which is part of a section 361.3 analysis and a section 388 analysis. (§§ 361.3, subd. (a)(1) & 388, subd. (d).)
Based upon this record, it has not been shown that the juvenile court failed to consider the section 361.3 factors. Grandmother did not present a specific argument about the section 361.3 factors, so there was no reason for the juvenile court to provide a lengthy discussion about the section 361.3 factors when summarily denying Grandmother’s request. In sum, we conclude the juvenile court did not err.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


MILLER
J.


We concur:


McKINSTER
Acting P. J.


FIELDS
J.