Filed 1/4/18 P. v. Crenshaw CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHANCY ROMANE CRENSHAW,

Defendant and Appellant.
D071336



(Super. Ct. Nos. JCF28970,
JCF33790, JCF34282)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Christopher J. Plourd, Judge. Affirmed.
Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Chancy Romane Crenshaw's appointed counsel has filed a brief presenting no argument for reversal, and inviting this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). After having independently reviewed the entire record for error as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and Wende, we affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The trial court found Crenshaw to be in violation of her probation in three cases pending in Imperial County Superior Court (case Nos. JCF28970, JCF33790, and JCF34282).
A. Case No. JFC28970
On June 14, 2012, a felony complaint was filed against Crenshaw alleging one count of grand theft of personal property with value exceeding $950, in violation of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (a) (count 1).
Almost a year later, in May 2013, Crenshaw entered a no contest plea to the charged offense. In exchange, the People dismissed charges in another pending matter (in case No. JCF28527). In addition, Crenshaw's probation in another case, case No. JCF22438, was terminated by the court as unsuccessful.
On June 20, 2013, in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the court sentenced Crenshaw to the upper term of three years, suspended, subject to successful completion of five years of formal probation. A restitution hearing was set for a later time, but the probation officer estimated the amount of restitution to be greater than $17,000. The court ordered Crenshaw to pay $4,000 toward the restitution to the probation department by June 24, 2013.
On September 3, 2013, the probation department filed a Petition for Revocation of Probation alleging that Crenshaw had failed to comply with her terms of probation because she had failed to make a restitution payment in the amount of $4,000, as ordered by the court.
On October 28, 2013, the September 2013 petition was withdrawn after Crenshaw presented a receipt showing that she had made a payment of $4,000 to the probation department.
In early December 2013, the probation department filed another Petition for Revocation of Probation, alleging that Crenshaw had failed to comply with her terms of probation because the check she had provided for the $4,000 payment had been returned due to insufficient funds.
On December 27, 2013, Crenshaw admitted the violation. The trial court revoked Crenshaw's probation but reinstated it on the same terms and conditions, on the condition that Crenshaw serve 90 days in jail.
Two years later, in mid-December 2015, the probation department filed another Petition for Revocation of Probation alleging that Crenshaw had failed to report to her probation officer on the first of each month as she had been directed to do, and alleging that Crenshaw had last reported to her probation officer in person on May 8, 2015.
On December 28, 2015, Crenshaw's attorney reported to the court that she had been advised that Crenshaw was not present before the court because she was receiving treatment at a cancer center. The trial court continued the matter on that date, and several times thereafter, due to Crenshaw's cancer treatments.
On June 10, 2016, the probation department filed yet another Petition for Revocation of Probation, this time alleging that Crenshaw had failed to comply with her terms of probation because she had not reported to her probation officer or advised her probation officer of her contact information, and she had not paid the $4,000 toward restitution as of October 28, 2013, as had been ordered by the court on September 25, 2013.
As we explain further, this matter, together with the two other pending cases, came before the court for a revocation hearing on August 19, 2016.
B. Case Nos. JCF33790 and JCF34282
On September 16, 2014, the People filed a felony complaint against Crenshaw in case No. JCF33790, alleging that on or about January 24, 2013, Crenshaw committed grand theft of personal property with a value exceeding $950 from Cumberland Farms, in violation of section 487, subdivision (a) (count 1), and on or about that same date, she obtained money by false pretenses, in violation of section 532, subdivision (a) (count 2).
A few months later, on January 8, 2015, the People filed a felony complaint against Crenshaw in case No. JCF34282, alleging that on or about April 22, 2013, Crenshaw obtained money by false pretenses, in violation of section 532, subdivision (a) (count 1) and that on or about that same date, she committed grand theft of personal property with a value exceeding $950 from a Valero Gas Station, in violation of section 487, subdivision (a) (count 2).
On January 12, 2015, Crenshaw entered no contest pleas with respect to count 1 in case No. JCF33790 and count 1 in case No. JCF34282. The People dismissed count 2 in both cases. On the People's motion, the court also dismissed case No. JCF33789,
with a Harvey waiver for restitution, as well as case No. BCM29944. As to both cases, the parties agreed that Crenshaw would be given five years formal probation and would serve 150 days in jail. The sentences on the two cases would run concurrently.
After a number of continuances, all of the matters came on for sentencing on June 24, 2015. In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court placed Crenshaw on formal probation for a period of five years, and ordered her to serve 150 days in local custody, with the sentences to run concurrently. The court also ordered Crenshaw to pay restitution to the victims in the amount of $1,974.73 to 7-11 Stores and in the amount of $1,007.88 to Cumberland Farms Convenience Store, to be paid through monthly payments to the probation department.
 
After the court pronounced the sentence and Crenshaw accepted the conditions of probation, the court ordered her to self-surrender at the Imperial County Jail to commence her term of custody by June 29, 2015 at 4:00 p.m. Addressing Crenshaw, the court stated: "In the event, Ms. Crenshaw, if something comes up, health issues, transportation issues, you need to contact your attorney. You don't show up, then we're going to have some problems. We'll have to bring you back to court because the jail will notify the Court very quickly. So make sure that you report on Monday the 29th no later than 4:00 o'clock."
The trial court set a hearing for July 8, 2015 to calculate Crenshaw's credits. At that hearing, defense counsel advised the court that Crenshaw was not present for the hearing, and was "apparently not in custody." On August 17, 2015, the probation department filed a Petition for Revocation of Probation on the ground that Crenshaw had failed to comply with her terms of probation because she had failed to self-surrender on June 29, 2015 and had failed to make the monthly restitution payments as ordered. The record is unclear as to how this Petition for Revocation of Probation was addressed.
On June 10, 2016, the probation department filed another Petition for Revocation of Probation, and again alleged that Crenshaw had failed to comply with the terms of her probation because she had failed to self-surrender on June 29, 2015, and had failed to make monthly restitution payments as ordered by the court. The Petition also indicated that Crenshaw's whereabouts had been unknown for approximately one year, until she was arrested on June 5, 2016.
C. The probation revocation hearing with respect to case Nos. JFC28970, JCF33790 and JCF34282

In August 2016, the court held a probation revocation hearing with respect to all three cases. Imperial County Probation Officer Jacqueline Cordova testified. Cordova had been assigned to case No. JFC28970 in July 2013. At that time, she met Crenshaw, read her the conditions of probation, and advised Crenshaw that she was required to report to Cordova on the first of each month. Crenshaw satisfied this reporting requirement, with a few missed reports due to medical issues, through May 8, 2015. After that date, she did not report to probation.
On or about July 8, 2015, Cordova was assigned to case Nos. JCF33790 and JCF34282, as well. Cordova confirmed that Crenshaw was not in custody, and also determined that Crenshaw had paid a total of $2,700 in restitution payments, the last of which had been made on October 28, 2013.
At the end of December 2015, Crenshaw called Cordova and indicated that she was, at that time, hospitalized at Eisenhower Hospital. Cordova asked Crenshaw to sign a release of records so that Cordova could confirm that Crenshaw had been hospitalized. Cordova gave Crenshaw three days to sign a release of records. Cordova never received anything from the hospital and did not hear from Crenshaw again until Cordova confirmed that Crenshaw had been taken into custody on June 5, 2016.
In response to the evidence presented at the hearing, defense counsel argued that Crenshaw's failure to self-surrender for custody was not a violation of probation because the court's order that Crenshaw report on a date certain was not actually a condition of probation. Counsel argued that although the order for Crenshaw to serve 150 days in local custody was a condition of probation, the order to report on a date-certain was made after the sentence had been imposed and Crenshaw had accepted the conditions of probation.
The People argued that Crenshaw was in violation of her probation because she had failed to report to her probation officer, had failed to pay the restitution as required, and had also failed to obey the court's order that she self-surrender on June 29, 2015.
The court considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel and found that Crenshaw had violated probation by failing to comply with the court's order to self-surrender. The court reasoned that one of the conditions of probation was that she not violate any laws, and that violating a court order constituted a violation of the law. The court also found that Crenshaw had violated probation by not notifying her probation officer regarding her contact information and by failing to report as directed, as alleged with respect to case No. JCF33790. However, with respect to the allegations in all three cases that Crenshaw failed to pay restitution, the court did not find the failure to pay to be a violation of probation because there was no evidence as to her ability to pay. The court also determined that the allegation that Crenshaw had not followed standard terms and conditions and reasonable orders of the probation officer to be too vague to support a true finding.
The court sentenced Crenshaw with respect to all three cases on September 13, 2016. Defense counsel noted that although case Nos. JCF33790 and JCF34282 were filed after case No. JFC28970, the incidents forming the bases of the charges in cases JCF33790 and JCF34282 preceded the incident forming the basis of the charges in case JFC28970. This meant that Crenshaw had been charged with nothing new as of 2013. Her attorney also noted that she had successfully reported to probation for a period of two years, from May 2013 through May 2015, but that once she was sentenced to 150 days custody in June 2015, she "had trouble forcing herself to go into the county jail to do that" and she stopped reporting. However, by the time of the hearing, she had served more than her 150-day sentence. Counsel pointed out that Crenshaw's failure to report was really only her second violation as to one of her cases, and that the first violation was the failure to pay restitution, not having committed a new offense. Defense counsel argued that Crenshaw would now be successful on probation, given that she had served the 150 days in custody.
The court disagreed with defense counsel's assessment of the matter, and determined that Crenshaw was not amendable to probationary supervision. The court found that Crenshaw had repeatedly "misrepresent[ed] all the facts and circumstances regarding what she's doing, how she's doing it, and so forth . . . ." The court simply did not believe that Crenshaw would "follow the probationary conditions." The court therefore denied Crenshaw probation, and sentenced Crenshaw to the previously suspended upper term of three years in county jail with respect to case No. JFC28970. The court determined that Crenshaw was entitled to 397 total days of credit. The court also sentenced Crenshaw to the middle term of two years with respect to case No. JCF34282 and the middle term of two years with respect to case No. JCF33790, both to run concurrently with each other, and with case No. JFC28970, with credits for 201 total days.
Crenshaw timely filed notices of appeal from the judgments in all three cases.
III.
DISCUSSION
Crenshaw's appellate counsel has filed a brief, pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, in which counsel raises no issues on appeal and requests that we independently review the record. Counsel has identified the following issue as one that "might arguably support the appeal" (Anders, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 744):
"Did the court lack jurisdiction to find that the defendant's failure to self-surrender on June 29, 2015 constituted a probation violation since the surrender date was not included as a probation condition? (Pen. Code § 1203.2, subd. (a), People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 447)."

We offered Crenshaw the opportunity to file a brief on her own behalf. Our letter to Crenshaw was returned as undeliverable.
A review of the record pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, including the issues referred to by appellate counsel, has disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AARON, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

HUFFMAN, J.