Filed 1/8/18 P. v. Harper CA5




NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DOMINIC TARYLL HARPER,

Defendant and Appellant.

F073402

(Super. Ct. No. VCF309344)


OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Joseph A. Kalashian, Judge.
Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Jamie A. Scheidegger, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Following an incident of domestic violence with his wife, appellant Dominic Taryll Harper pled no contest to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2); corporal injury to a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 3 & 4); assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 5 & 6); felony evading (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 7); felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 8); and carrying a loaded firearm (§ 25850, subd. (a); count 9). His plea included firearm and great bodily injury enhancements, and an admission of a prior prison term. He received an aggregated prison sentence of 10 years.
At sentencing, the trial court continued a criminal protective order that had been previously imposed at the start of this action. The order protected appellant’s wife and two additional victims, Krystal R. and Alexander S. On appeal, appellant contends that the protective order must be stricken as to Krystal and Alexander. He asserts that the trial court had no authorization to continue the order postconviction for these two victims. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On November 15, 2014, witnesses, including Krystal and Alexander, saw appellant involved in an argument with his wife. At some point, appellant reversed his automobile while his wife stood next to the car. Appellant drove a back tire over his wife’s foot and pinned her foot under a front tire. Witnesses tried to lift the vehicle off of his wife, and appellant drove forward, rolling again over his wife’s foot. Appellant exited the vehicle with a handgun and fired multiple shots indiscriminately at people who had gathered. Appellant’s wife got into the vehicle, and appellant drove away. A nearby police officer heard the gunshots and drove to the scene just in time to pursue appellant. Appellant drove at a high rate of speed, running through several red lights and a stop sign. He crashed into a tree and he was taken into custody.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Properly Extended The Protective Order.
When these criminal charges were initiated against appellant, the trial court imposed a criminal protective order pursuant to section 136.2. The order covered Krystal and Alexander, in addition to appellant’s wife. At sentencing, following appellant’s change of plea, the trial court continued this protective order. Appellant agrees that the protective order is proper regarding his wife. He argues, however, that section 136.2 does not authorize a continued protective order for Krystal and Alexander. We disagree.
A. Standard of review.
Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo appellate review. (People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1181.) “When interpreting a statute, we view the statutory enactment as a whole; consider the plain, commonsense meaning of the language used in the statute; and seek to effectuate the legislative intent evinced by the statute.” (People v. Beckemeyer (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 461, 465 (Beckemeyer).)
B. Analysis.
Section 136.2 authorizes a trial court to issue a protective order to protect a victim or witness in a criminal matter during the pendency of a criminal action. (§ 136.2, subd. (a)(1); Beckemeyer, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 465.) “Thus, once the defendant is found guilty and sentenced, the court’s authority to issue a protective order under section 136.2, subdivision (a) generally ceases. [Citations.]” (Beckemeyer, supra, at p. 465.)
However, effective January 1, 2012, the Legislature added subdivision (i)(1) to the statutory scheme, which requires trial courts to consider issuing a protective order restraining a criminal defendant, for a period of “up to 10 years,” from having “any contact with the victim.” (§ 136.2, subd. (i)(1); Stats. 2011, ch. 155, § 1.) This provision applies when a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence, among other listed offenses. (Beckemeyer, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 465.) We find Beckemeyer instructive.
In Beckemeyer, the defendant was convicted of the attempted murder of his girlfriend and assault with a deadly weapon on her son. The defendant hit the woman with his fists, knocked her down, banged her head on the floor, and tried to choke her. (Beckemeyer, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 463-464.) When the woman’s son appeared, the defendant hit him, knocked him down, and struck him with a rock and cane. The defendant then attacked the woman again, knocking her down, banging her head on a drill press, and jerking her neck. (Id. at p. 464.) The trial court issued a postconviction protective order under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), restraining the defendant from having contact with the girlfriend and her son for 10 years. (Beckemeyer, supra, at p. 464.) On appeal, the defendant contended the protective order was invalid as to the son because he was not a victim of domestic violence. (Id. at p. 466.) The Court of Appeal upheld the protective order because (1) the crime committed against the girlfriend satisfied the requirement of a domestic violence crime, and (2) the son qualified as a victim because section 136 defines victim broadly to include any person against whom there is reason to believe a crime has been committed. (Beckemeyer, supra, at p. 466.) “Because defendant was convicted of committing a crime against [the son] during the domestic violence incident, [the son] readily falls within the definition of victim.” (Ibid.)
Here, appellant was convicted of committing a crime of domestic violence against his wife. During that crime, appellant indiscriminately fired his handgun at onlookers, including Krystal and Alexander, who were the named victims in counts 5 and 6 for assault with a firearm. Because appellant was convicted of committing crimes against Krystal and Alexander during the domestic violence incident, these individuals fall within the definition of victim sufficient to qualify for a continued protective order. (Beckemeyer, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.)
We reject appellant’s claim that Beckemeyer is distinguishable. The crimes against Krystal and Alexander did not occur separate from the domestic violence, as appellant argues, but were part of the same incident. Indeed, similar to Beckemeyer, Krystal and Alexander became involved in this incident because appellant first argued with and then injured his wife. The crimes against Krystal and Alexander were connected with his acts of domestic violence.
A “ ‘victim’ is broadly defined in section 136 as any person against whom there is reason to believe a crime has been committed.” (Beckemeyer, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.) “When enacting section 136.2(i)(1) to permit 10-year postconviction protective orders in domestic violence cases, the Legislature was aware of this broad definition of victim generally applicable to section 136.2 protective orders, and it did not enact a provision narrowing its scope for purposes of a postconviction domestic violence protective order. [Citation.]” (Beckemeyer, supra, at p. 466.)
Based on this record, Krystal and Alexander were victims within the meaning of section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1). Accordingly, the trial court was authorized to continue the protective order postconviction for them.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

LEVY, Acting P.J.
WE CONCUR:



FRANSON, J.



MEEHAN, J.