Filed 1/10/18 Shetty v. Nationstar Mortgage CA2/5
Prior opinion dated 5/1/17 dismissed
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE


SATISH SHETTY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.
B272283

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC573820)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michael M. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed.
Satish Shetty, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hall Huguenin and Markus D. Self for Defendants and Respondents.

After foreclosure proceedings were initiated against property owners who fell behind on loan payments, the owners assigned their rights to any claims and causes of action relating to the property to plaintiff and appellant Satish Shetty (plaintiff). Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in federal district court against approximately a dozen parties, including defendants and respondents Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. (MERSCORP), U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate Series 2006-6 (U.S. Bank), and Aurora Bank FSB (Aurora) (collectively, defendants). Plaintiff challenged the validity of the loan documents executed by the property owners, plus the proceedings leading up to and including the foreclosure, by claiming the purported lender did not actually fund the loan and transfers of the lender’s interest in the loan were unauthorized. The district court found plaintiff’s allegations were “implausibly pled” and dismissed the bulk of his causes of action. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit in superior court against defendants, nominally alleging different causes of action than those dismissed in the federal case. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, reasoning plaintiff lacked standing and his claims were barred by collateral estoppel. We conclude plaintiff’s causes of action are indeed precluded by the prior ruling in the federal case.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
In 2006, husband and wife Shahwar Khan and Atiya Khan (the Khans) purchased real property in Temecula (the Property). That same year, the Khans borrowed $407,000 from Family Lending Services, Inc. (Family Lending). The Khans’ loan was evidenced by a promissory note (Note), and payment was secured by a Deed of Trust for the Property. MERS, acting as the nominee for Family Lending and its successors and assigns, was the beneficiary under the Deed of Trust. S.P.S. Affiliates was the trustee. The Deed of Trust allowed the Khans to transfer their “rights and benefits” under the instrument to a third party if approved by the lender.
In June 2012, the following documents were recorded: an assignment of MERS’s beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust to Aurora, which was executed by Regina Lashley (Lashley), Vice President of MERS; a Substitution of Trustee naming Integrated Lender Services (Integrated) the new trustee under the Deed of Trust; and a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust, based on a default on the Khans’ loan in the amount of $11,067.17.
Aurora later assigned its beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust to Nationstar. The assignment was executed by Alex Choi, the Assistant Secretary of Nationstar, who executed the assignment as Aurora’s attorney-in-fact. In October 2012, Integrated recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale of the Property.
Several months after that, the Khans transferred the Property by grant deed to Atiya Khan and plaintiff, as joint tenants, for no consideration. The deed stated it “also assign[ed] any and all claims and causes of action arising out of and related to [the Property] to [plaintiff].”
In September 2013, a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded, stating the Property was sold to Nationstar for $467,363.14. A year later, Nationstar sold the Property to a third party.

B. Procedural History
1. The federal court action
In August 2013, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in federal district court against defendants and others, including Family Lending and Integrated. Plaintiff eventually filed a second amended complaint, which became the operative pleading in the case.
Central to plaintiff’s allegations in the second amended complaint were practices in which loan originators sold loans to “securitizers,” that would “package[ ]” the loans into mortgage-backed securities. Plaintiff generally alleged MERS was created to facilitate the multiple transfers required for loan securitization and that lax oversight by MERS created “a reasonable doubt as to the validity of the documents” registered using MERS.
The heart of plaintiff’s complaint was the allegation that Family Lending was not the actual lender of the Khans’ loan because the loan was not funded until it was securitized, that is, pooled with thousands of other loans into a mortgage trust (the 2006-6 Trust) and sold to investors. Plaintiff alleged Family Lending “pledged the debt instruments” pertaining to the Khans’ loan to Lehman Brothers prior to recording the Deed of Trust, and that Family Lending was merely a “conduit” used to securitize the loan. Plaintiff further alleged the Khans’ loan was “never properly securitized.”
In addition, Plaintiff alleged MERS lacked authority to assign the beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust, to substitute a trustee, or to declare the Khans’ loan in default. Plaintiff posited that because Family Lending merged with another company in 2007 to become Standard Pacific Mortgage, Inc. (Standard Pacific), MERS lost authority as of that date to continue serving as the nominee under the Deed of Trust and could not have validly made an assignment to Aurora. Plaintiff averred that Lashley, who had executed the assignment of MERS’ beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust to Aurora, was actually an employee of Aurora. And based on his allegation that the assignment from MERS to Aurora was invalid, plaintiff challenged subsequent events leading up to the foreclosure: Aurora’s substitution of Integrated as trustee, Aurora’s assignment of its beneficial interest to Nationstar, and Integrated’s Notice of Trustee’s Sale. According to plaintiff, irregularities and misrepresentations leading up to foreclosure constituted mortgage fraud and prevented defendants from validly foreclosing on the Property.
Plaintiff asserted 12 causes of action in his second amended complaint based on the aforementioned allegations: negligence (alleged as two separate causes of action), wrongful foreclosure, violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.), cancellation of instruments, quiet title, violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, slander of title, violation of Civil Code section 2934a (which pertains to the substitution of a trustee), and accounting.
Integrated moved to dismiss the nine causes of action in which it was named as a defendant: both negligence causes of action, wrongful foreclosure, violation of the FDCPA, violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, fraudulent misrepresentation, slander of title, violation of Civil Code section 2934a, and accounting. Integrated contended plaintiff lacked standing to assert claims arising from the Deed of Trust and, in any event, Integrated’s conduct as trustee was privileged. Plaintiff did not oppose Integrated’s motion.
The district court rejected Integrated’s contention plaintiff lacked standing, reasoning plaintiff obtained a right to sue when the Khans assigned to him “‘any and all claims and causes of action arising out of or related to the’ [Property].” The district court believed plaintiff would lack standing to challenge “the securitization of the Khans’ loan on the basis that securitization did not comply with the securitization agreements,” but the court was not convinced plaintiff was challenging securitization in that manner.
Although the district court believed plaintiff had standing to sue, it granted Integrated’s motion to dismiss in full and with prejudice. The court dismissed all of plaintiff’s causes of action against Integrated, and the court also dismissed the same causes of action as against all other named defendants. Because issue preclusion principles figure prominently in our resolution of this appeal, we summarize the district court’s findings in detail.
The district court determined plaintiff’s allegations in support of a “theory that the Khans’ loan was defective and nonexistent, and that the subsequent transfers of rights and interests in their mortgage loan were invalid” were “implausibly pled.” The court found it “unclear . . . why Family[ Lending]’s status as the lender of [the] Khans’ loan or its legal interest in the Khans’ loan would be affected by whether it funded [the] Khans’ loan using money obtained from an outside source.” Even assuming the theory had some legal merit, the district court found plaintiff had failed to provide a sufficient factual basis to support it. The court further found it “unclear” what plaintiff meant by his allegation that Family Lending recorded the documents evidencing the Kahns’ loan after “pledg[ing] the debt instruments” to Lehman Brothers or why it mattered. The court accordingly concluded the second amended complaint did “not plausibly allege that Family[ Lending] was inaccurately named as the lender on the Khans’ loan and could not assign its interest in the Khans’ loan . . . .”
The district court also ruled plaintiff failed to “plausibly allege . . . that the subsequent assignments of interests in the Khans’ loan were unauthorized.” The court found plaintiff’s allegation that MERS lacked authority to execute an assignment after Family Lending’s merger was contrary to authority and that “[m]ost of the remaining allegations regarding the subsequent transfers of interests in the Khans’ loan fail because they are conclusory and lack a sufficiently plausible basis.”
After considering the allegations of plaintiff’s second amended complaint generally, the district court evaluated each of plaintiff’s causes of action against Integrated to determine whether they were sufficient to state a claim against Integrated or other defendants.
The district court concluded plaintiff could not maintain his negligence cause of action because financial institutions owe no duty of care to borrowers so long as they are acting in their conventional role as lenders, and plaintiff did not plausibly allege any defendant acted outside that role.
Plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim was deemed meritless because the second amended complaint did not plausibly allege that Family Lending lacked authority to transfer its interest in the Khans’ loan or that subsequent assignments were invalid—and, in any event, plaintiff failed to show prejudice. The court explained that “‘mere irregularities’” in the foreclosure process do not establish prejudice and even if transfers relating to the Khans’ loan “were defective, it [was] difficult to see how the Khans or [plaintiff] were prejudiced by these assignments.” The court observed that plaintiff’s complaint did “not allege that the Khans were not in default at the time of foreclosure.”
The district court determined the second amended complaint failed to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation because plaintiff did not allege fraud with particularity and, to the extent he did plead facts, he failed to plausibly allege the commission of fraud in the original loan or in the subsequent transfers of interests. The court also determined plaintiff could not maintain a slander of title claim because his complaint failed to plausibly allege the defendants lacked authority to assign interests in the Khans’ loan or to record documents relating to such assignments and the foreclosure proceedings.
The district court found plaintiff failed to state a claim for an accounting because the complaint failed to “plausibly allege that the Khans made mortgage payments to Nationstar that were not actually owed to Nationstar” and failed to “articulate[ ] what legal authority entitles [plaintiff] or [the] Khans to any money received from the securitization of the Khans’ loan.”
The district court did not consider the merits of plaintiff’s remaining three causes of action―for cancellation of instruments, quiet title, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff had not asserted those claims against Integrated and they were not, therefore, before the court on Integrated’s motion to dismiss.
In July 2014, the district court ordered plaintiff to provide proof he had served the second amended complaint on the defendants who had not yet appeared in the action. Plaintiff failed to do so. In January 2015, the district court dismissed plaintiff’s claims for cancellation of instruments, quiet title, and unjust enrichment without prejudice.

2. The state court action
One month later, plaintiff filed in superior court the lawsuit that is the subject of this appeal, alleging causes of action for conversion, civil conspiracy, cancellation of written instruments, quiet title, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief. In addition to defendants, plaintiff asserted claims against Family Lending, Standard Pacific, Structured Asset Securities Corporation, Orange Coast Title, and five individuals who had signed or notarized various documents previously described.
Standard Pacific, the successor to Family Lending, demurred to plaintiff’s complaint and argued (1) plaintiff lacked standing, (2) issue preclusion principles barred all of his causes of action, and (3) all of the causes of action failed to state a proper claim for relief on the merits. As to the issue preclusion argument, Standard Pacific maintained the facts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint were “virtually identical” to those alleged in his prior federal complaint, and the question of whether the allegations in the federal complaint stated viable claims was previously litigated and decided against plaintiff.
Plaintiff opposed the demurrer. He noted the district court previously found he had standing and he insisted his complaint did “not challenge [the] securitization of any valid debt instruments . . . .” Plaintiff argued issue preclusion principles did not apply because the causes of action in his state complaint were different from the causes of action the district court considered. Plaintiff further contended the fact that the district court did not dismiss with prejudice his claims for cancellation of written instruments, quiet title, and unjust enrichment demonstrated those claims were valid. Plaintiff also maintained his additional claims for civil conspiracy, conversion, and declaratory relief were viable.
After considering the parties’ written submissions and oral argument, the trial court sustained Standard Pacific’s demurrer. The court was unconvinced by plaintiff’s position that he was not challenging securitization, and the court found plaintiff lacked standing on that basis. Regardless, the court ruled issue preclusion barred plaintiff’s causes of action because the “crux” of his complaint had been previously “rejected on the merits . . . .” The court denied plaintiff leave to amend, and plaintiff did not timely appeal the court’s decision. (Shetty v. Standard Pacific Mortgage, Inc. (May 1, 2017, B272283) [nonpub. opn.] [dismissing plaintiff’s appeal as untimely].)
After the trial court ruled on Standard Pacific’s demurrer, defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. Their motion echoed Standard Pacific’s arguments on demurrer: plaintiff lacked standing, plaintiff’s causes of action were all barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion, and each of plaintiff’s claims individually failed on the merits.
The trial court held a hearing on defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff argued he had standing because his complaint did not challenge the securitization of the Kahns’ loan. He asserted the allegations relating to securitization were made only to show defendants made certain statements to the Securities Exchange Commission, which plaintiff said he was relying on to establish his civil conspiracy cause of action. In plaintiff’s view, the gist of his complaint was that defendants “did not fund the loan” and had “com[e in] after the fact with respect to debt instruments that they are staking a claim to based on documents that they have executed without authority, to themselves, assigning documents to themselves and the [P]roperty for themselves.”
Counsel for defendants responded that plaintiff had “filed this case repeatedly” and “lost repeatedly.” Defendants’ attorney emphasized, in addition, that plaintiff was not the borrower on the Kahns’ loan, he had never lived at the Property, and even assuming there were any irregularities leading to the foreclosure, plaintiff failed to show any prejudice.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied plaintiff leave to amend. The court found, in a written decision substantively identical to the court’s earlier decision sustaining Standard Pacific’s demurrer, plaintiff lacked standing and his causes of action were barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion.

II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the district court’s ruling in the earlier federal action does not bar his subsequent suit in superior court because the prior case involved different causes of action and different defendants. The distinctions plaintiff raises do not defeat defendants’ invocation of the doctrine of issue preclusion. The issues underlying plaintiff’s claims in both suits are identical; those issues were decided adversely to plaintiff in the prior action; and applying issue preclusion principles in this case does not offend “the public policies underlying [issue preclusion]―preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation” (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 343 (Lucido)). Thus, the district court’s resolution of plaintiff’s claims in the prior suit forecloses the claims plaintiff asserts in this one.

A. Standard of Review
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a general demurrer that is brought after the period for filing a demurrer has elapsed. (Alterra Excess and Surplus Insurance Co. v. Snyder (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1400; American Airlines, Inc. v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1110, 1118.) Thus, we consider a trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings by the same standard we apply to a ruling sustaining a demurrer. We review the court’s ruling de novo, considering the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint, which we take as true, and any matters of which the trial court took judicial notice. (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 166.) We will reverse if we determine the complaint “alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any theory.” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.)

B. Issue Preclusion Bars Plaintiff’s Causes of Action
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, prevents a party from relitigating an issue determined in a prior action. (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 (DKN Holdings).) The doctrine applies “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Id. at p. 825.) We review the application of issue preclusion de novo. (Samara v. Matar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 796, 803, review granted May 17, 2017, S240918.)
Plaintiff’s causes of action for conversion, civil conspiracy, cancellation of written instruments, quiet title, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief are therefore precluded to the extent they are based on issues litigated and decided by the federal district court in its decision on Integrated’s motion to dismiss. (See Baker v. Hull (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 221, 226 [quoting the Restatement Second of Judgments for the proposition that an issue is subject to preclusion if “‘submitted and determined on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim’” or “‘based on a failure of pleading’”].) To resolve the matter, we briefly summarize the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint in this action and compare them to the allegations leveled in the previously summarized federal complaint.
Plaintiff’s complaint in this case alleges Family Lending was not the actual lender of the Kahns’ loan because the loan was funded not by Family Lending but by an affiliate of the underwriter for the debt instrument into which the Kahns’ loan was pooled. Plaintiff alleges Family Lending pledged the Note to Lehman Brothers, and that the Note and Deed of Trust were converted into a security, before the loan was actually funded. Plaintiff further alleges that because Family Lending was not the actual lender, defendants MERS, Aurora, and Nationstar never possessed authority to assign interests in the Deed of Trust, substitute a trustee, declare default, or foreclose on the Property. It follows, according to plaintiff’s allegations, that the Kahns’ loan was never “consummate[d],” the Kahns had no obligation to pay it, and there could be no default. Plaintiff’s complaint explicitly maintains he is not challenging the securitization of the Kahns’ loan because his position is that the loan was not validly securitized and therefore “never made it to the pool” to be packaged in the 2006-6 Trust. Plaintiff concedes, however, that the Kahns “did receive some form of funds” from the sale to investors of interests in the 2006-6 Trust.
Plaintiff’s complaint additionally alleges that because Aurora was never validly made a beneficiary of the Deed of Trust, Aurora had no authority to substitute Integrated as trustee or to assign a beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust to Nationstar. As a result, according to plaintiff, Integrated “staged” a trustee sale based on “a non-existent debt” and invalid documentation.
Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy cause of action is based on allegations that when defendants learned the Kahns’ loan was not validly securitized, they engaged in a “cover up action” involving the fabrication, execution, and recording of documents without authority. Plaintiff’s conversion claim arises from allegations that the Note and Deed of Trust were the Khans’ personal property, and defendants unlawfully converted that property into a security without having authority to do so. Based on his allegations that the loan was not funded by Family Lending and transfers of interests were unauthorized, plaintiff seeks to cancel the Note and Deed of Trust, to quiet title, and to obtain restitution. Plaintiff also seeks “declarative relief” in the form of a declaration that defendants have no rights pertaining to the Note, the Deed of Trust, or the Property.
Comparing these allegations to the earlier federal case, we conclude all of plaintiff’s causes of action in this case are precluded. Whether an issue actually litigated and determined in a prior action is “identical” to an issue raised in a later suit depends on “‘whether “identical factual allegations” are at stake in the two proceedings, not whether the ultimate issues or dispositions are the same. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 512 (Hernandez); Goddard v. Security Title Insurance & Guarantee Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 47, 52 [judgment in one suit precludes a subsequent suit where the first suit was dismissed based on “the failure of the facts alleged to establish a cause of action, and the same facts are pleaded in the second action”].) The allegations of plaintiff’s complaint here are fundamentally identical, in all substantive respects, to the second amended complaint in the prior federal action. The gist of plaintiff’s complaint in each action is that Family Lending was not the actual lender of the Khans’ loan―and therefore lacked an interest in the Deed of Trust―because the loan was funded by another source pursuant to its securitization. Based on that common premise, plaintiff similarly alleges MERS had no authority to serve as Family Lending’s nominee under the Deed of Trust and all transactions commenced by MERS, and subsequently commenced by other defendants, were invalid.
Plaintiff contends, however, that the issues in this case differ from those decided in the prior action because the federal court did not dismiss his causes of action for cancellation of instruments, quiet title, and unjust enrichment with prejudice. Plaintiff’s position is contrary to authority. Principles of issue preclusion apply “even if the second suit raises different causes of action.” (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.) In determining whether particular claims are precluded, we look to the issues underlying a party’s particular theories, or causes of action, and not to how those theories are labeled or characterized. The federal district court in the prior action never addressed the viability of plaintiff’s claims for cancellation of written instruments, quiet title, or unjust enrichment because plaintiff failed to serve his complaint on the defendants to whom those causes of action applied. But the court’s failure to consider those specific causes of action does not mean it failed to consider the facts and issues underlying those claims.
Rather, in the prior lawsuit, the district court found plaintiff’s claims were “primarily premised on the theory that the Khans’ loan was defective and nonexistent, and that the subsequent transfers of rights and interests in their mortgage loan were invalid.” The court determined plaintiff’s allegations in support of that theory did not state a valid claim for relief. Plaintiff’s claims in this case are based on the very same allegations. Thus, it is immaterial that plaintiff relies on those allegations to support different causes of action than were dismissed, whether with or without prejudice, in the federal case. The issues underlying the causes of action in this case have already been litigated and decided against plaintiff.
Consider, first, plaintiff’s conspiracy cause of action. It is based on the premise that the Khans’ loan, to quote the federal court in plaintiff’s earlier lawsuit, “was defective and nonexistent, and that the subsequent transfers of rights and interests in their mortgage loan were invalid.” Plaintiff’s allegation that defendants’ conduct was accomplished by means of a conspiracy does not change the key issues on which the viability of the claim depends―issues that were conclusively determined in the prior action. Plaintiff’s conversion claim derives from allegations that Family Lending and others converted the Note and Deed of Trust by securitizing the Khans’ loan without funding it. That claim, too, depends on the allegations, raised in both complaints, that Family Lending was not the true lender. Plaintiff’s cancellation of written instruments, quiet title, and unjust enrichment causes of action are similarly identical in substance. All three claims are based on allegations that the Khans’ loan, and subsequent transfers of interests, were never effective because Family Lending was not the actual lender and later transfers of interest were invalid. And, of course, plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief adds nothing that is not covered by his other causes of action.
Having found the issues underlying plaintiff’s causes of action in this lawsuit to be identical to issues raised in the earlier federal suit, we further conclude these issues were actually litigated and necessarily and finally adjudicated against plaintiff. Considering the “actually litigated” requirement, it is immaterial that plaintiff submitted no opposition to Integrated’s motion to dismiss in the federal action because “‘[i]t is the opportunity to litigate that is important in these cases, not whether the litigant availed himself or herself of the opportunity. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 860, 869; see also Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 511 [“For purposes of collateral estoppel, an issue was actually litigated in a prior proceeding if it was properly raised, submitted for determination, and determined in that proceeding”]; Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 95 [“Absent exceptional circumstances indicating there was no opportunity for a full presentation of the issue in the context of the [prior decision], such a determination meets the ‘actually litigated’ requirement for application of collateral estoppel”].)
The district court “necessarily” decided the issues underlying plaintiff’s complaint in this case because the court’s determination in the prior proceeding served as the analytical predicate for both of the reasons it concluded Integrated was entitled to dismissal. (See Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 342 [issue “‘necessarily decided’” if it is not “‘entirely unnecessary’” to the prior judgment].) And there is no dispute the earlier decision became final.
Plaintiff also contends the trial court’s decision must be reversed because defendants’ attorney lacked authority to represent any defendants other than Nationstar and the trial court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s claims against defendants. Plaintiff reiterates the allegations he made in his motion asking the court to determine whether defendants and their counsel committed fraud on the court. His suppositions are meritless and have no bearing on the adequacy of his claims of error. There is no legal authority, and plaintiff offers none, for the proposition that counsel must provide retainer agreements or some other proof they represent the parties on whose behalf they appear, and the parties’ discovery disputes are irrelevant to a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS


BAKER, J.

We concur:


KRIEGLER, Acting P.J.


RAPHAEL, J.