Filed 1/10/18 In re S.V. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re S.V. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.G. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.


E067882

(Super.Ct.Nos. J268212,
J268213, J268214, J268215,
J268216, J268217 & J268218)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Erin K. Alexander, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Donna B. Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant K.G.
Roni S. Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant M.V.
Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, Pamela J. Walls, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The juvenile court found the seven children of K.G. (Mother) and M.V. (Father) came within the court’s jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (a), (b), (g) & (j).) Mother raises two issues on appeal. First, Mother contends the juvenile court erred by requiring her to cooperate with interviews of the six younger children at the Children’s Assessment Center. Second, Mother contends the juvenile court erred by ordering that visitation with Z.G., the eldest child, is contingent upon Z.G.’s consent to the visits. Father joins in Mother’s contentions. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. BACKGROUND
Mother’s oldest child, Z.G., is male and was born in December 2000. Z.G.’s alleged biological father is T.B. Mother and M.V. (Father) shared six biological children: (1) R.V., a female born in 2003; (2) L.V., a female born in 2005; (3) S.V., a male born in 2007; (4) C.V. a male born in 2010; (5) L.V.2, a male born in 2012; and (6) S.V.2, a male born in 2015. Mother, Father, and the children resided in Apple Valley.
B. DETENTION
On November 9, 2016, Z.G. made a joke about Father’s guitar, which upset Father. Father challenged Z.G. to a fight. Z.G. declined. Father threw a scooter at Z.G. and told him to leave the home. Mother tried to stop Father but was unsuccessful. Z.G. walked to an alcoholics anonymous meeting. A person from the meeting drove Z.G. to a church. Police were contacted.
Z.G. reported that he was “‘kicked out’” of the family home approximately once per week. On those nights he slept in a field near the family’s home. When Father was angry with Z.G., Father cursed at Z.G. and threw objects at Z.G. Z.G. said Father did not behave in a violent manner toward the younger six children because they were his biological children. Z.G. refused to return home because he was scared of Father. Z.G. wanted information on emancipation. Z.G. was placed in foster care.
Two social service practitioners from San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the Department) interviewed Mother. Mother said she had left the home with all seven children four weeks prior and filed documents in family court requesting sole custody of the children. Two weeks after leaving the house, Mother returned to the house and married Father. The wedding occurred in October 2016. Mother did not appear in family court for the custody petition.
Mother said that Father had “not hit her ‘in a very long time,’ ” and had struck Z.G. once with a belt. In regard to the six younger children, Mother explained they were exposed to Father’s anger and violence, which was directed toward Mother and Z.G.; however, Father did not target his six biological children with his anger and violence.
During the Department’s interview of Mother, Father appeared, stopped the interview, and instructed the two Department employees to leave while using profanity and racial slurs. The Department contacted law enforcement. Father was arrested for child endangerment. (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a).) The six younger children did not have any visible marks or bruises, and they appeared to be attached to Mother and Father.
At the detention hearing on November 16, counsel for the six younger children informed the court that Father was no longer living in the family residence. Mother’s attorney said Mother filed for a restraining order. The Department could not confirm the information. The juvenile court ordered Father temporarily removed from the family residence based upon findings of Father posing a substantial danger to the six children’s physical and emotional health. The court ordered a further detention hearing later in the week.
On November 18, when the detention hearing resumed, Z.G.’s attorney said there was an agreement for Z.G. to remain out of the home and for unsupervised visits with Mother. Mother’s attorney showed the Department a copy of the temporary restraining order against Father. The juvenile court ordered unsupervised visits for Z.G. and Mother and granted the Department the authority to permit overnight and weekend visits.
In petitions filed by the Department, it alleged (1) Mother placed Z.G. at substantial risk of serious harm by failing to provide adequate care and supervision (§ 300, subd. (b)); (2) Mother exposed Z.G. to incidents of domestic violence (§ 300, subd. (b)); (3) Mother failed to protect Z.G. when Z.G. was physically abused by Father (§ 300, subd. (b)); (4) Z.G.’s alleged father left him without any provisions for his care (§ 300, subd. (g)); (5) the six children were exposed to domestic violence between Mother and Father, including yelling, profanity, and racial slurs (§ 300, subd. (b)); and (6) Father had a history of substance abuse that impaired his ability to provide adequate care for the six children (§ 300, subd. (b)).
C. DECEMBER 2016
At a hearing on December 9, the juvenile court realized that Father had not been present in court. The court continued the matter so Father could be present for arraignment and to answer questions concerning paternity and Indian heritage. The court asked if there were other issues, and said it was prepared to authorize forensic interviews of the children at the Children’s Assessment Center (CAC).
Mother’s attorney said Mother obtained a permanent restraining order and asked the court to authorize the Department to return Z.G. to Mother’s custody. Z.G. informed the court that he wanted to return home. The court authorized the Department to return Z.G. to Mother’s custody. The court also authorized forensic interviews of the children.
D. JURISDICTION AND DISPOSITION
The family residence consisted of two rooms and a bathroom. Mother informed a Department social services practitioner that “[father] throws things at both her and [Z.G.] and will throw ‘anything nearby’ and stated ‘everybody is always around’ when the [Department employee] asked where the other children are during the altercations.” Mother said the children have heard yelling and profanity from Mother and Father and racial slurs from Father. Mother said, “[Father] hasn’t been to the extreme with the other kids like he has been with [Z.G.], but he’s still said things to them that are hurtful.” For example, when Mother says she will leave Father, then Father threatens to punch the chest of whichever child is close to him at the time.
Mother and Father have been in a relationship for 16 years. Father became angry and violent approximately 12 years ago. Father’s behavior has worsened over the years. In the past four years, it appears to Mother that Father has lost self-control. Father drinks malt liquor and “ ‘he drinks all the time.’ ” Father also smokes marijuana. Mother implied to the Department employee that Mother may not follow the restraining order in the future, in that Mother might permit Father to return to the family home.
Z.G. told a Department social services practitioner that approximately one week before he was placed in foster care, Father was brushing his beard and then Father became upset and used the brush to repeatedly strike Z.G.’s head. Z.G. had blood in his hair as a result of the strikes. Z.G. said he was not taken to the hospital when injured “ ‘because questions are asked.’ ” Z.G. does not have friends due to being homeschooled and not being permitted to leave the house.
All of Mother’s and Father’s school-aged children were homeschooled. Department employees were at the family’s home for two hours. During that time, the Department employees did not hear the children—no laughter, crying, etc. When a Department social worker went to the back room to interview the children, they were “seated in a military fashion at a square table” doing their schoolwork. The social worker asked the children their names, birthdays, what they like to do, what they do not like to do, when they last saw Father, and questions about Z.G. The children responded with their names and birthdays. C.V. said he liked to play. R.V, the eldest female, stopped the younger children from answering other questions.
On January 3, 2017, Mother contacted the Department and suggested overnight visits with Z.G. cease. Mother was concerned that Z.G. was “angry and mean to the family.” On January 18, Father contacted the Department and said he filed for divorce from Mother and that “[Mother] could have the kids.” On January 23, Mother informed the Department that since Z.G. “would not be coming home” she was considering participating in reunification services with Father. Mother said Father had changed his mind about the divorce. On January 24, Z.G. informed the Department that he did not want to return home, he did not want to see Mother, and he was worried for his siblings. Z.G. requested sibling visits. Mother did not want sibling visits to occur without her supervision.
On February 1, Mother signed a form waiving reunification services in relation to Z.G. Z.G. happened to be at the Department when Mother was there to sign the form; the six children were with Mother. Z.G. said it was nice to see his siblings. Mother and the six children would not speak to Z.G., which caused him to be depressed. Mother told a Department employee “she did not think the CAC interviews is something that she would be participating in and did not want to sign a consent for the children to be interviewed.”
On February 3, the Department filed first amended petitions alleging (1) the six younger children were exposed to incidents of domestic violence between Mother and Father (§ 300, subd. (b)); (2) Father had a history of substance abuse, which impaired his ability to provide adequate care for the children (§ 300, subd. (b)); (3) the six children’s half-sibling, Z.G., was physically abused while in Mother’s care, thus placing the six children at risk of similar abuse (§ 300, subd. (j)); and (4) the six children’s half-sibling Z.G. was physically abused by Father, thus placing the six children at risk of similar abuse (§ 300, subd. (j)).
The Department also filed a first amended petition on behalf of Z.G. alleging (1) Mother failed to protect Z.G. from physical abuse by Father, which placed Z.G. at risk of serious physical harm (§ 300, subd. (a)); (2) Mother failed to provide adequate care and supervision for Z.G. by placing him at risk of serious harm (§ 300, subd. (b)); (3) Mother exposed Z.G. to incidents of domestic violence between Mother and Father (§ 300, subd. (b)); (4) Mother failed to protect Z.G. when Z.G. was physically abused by Father (§ 300, subd. (b)); and (5) Z.G.’s father, T.B., left Z.G. without any provisions for Z.G.’s care (§ 300, subd. (g)).
Mother scheduled a hearing for February 21 to terminate the restraining order. On February 6, the juvenile court informed Mother that termination of the restraining order would jeopardize the children’s placement with Mother. Mother said she understood. The court also said, “[T]he Court has authorized CAC interviews which means that those can go forward with or without the mother’s consent if the agency feels that that is necessary or in the children’s best interest.”
The juvenile court held a jurisdiction and disposition hearing on March 2 and 3. Mother and Father testified at the hearing. In closing, Mother’s attorney said, “So the mother wants the Court to know she is willing to comply with all the orders of the Court, but she does object. She does not feel her children are at risk, that they have been physically abused.”
Z.G.’s attorney asked that Z.G. “not be forced to attend” visits with Father. The Department’s attorney said there was an agreement for Father to be found the presumed father of Z.G. As a result, the Department suggested amending the first amended petition concerning Z.G. to add allegations concerning Father. The substance abuse allegation from the younger six children’s petitions was added to the petition for Z.G.
The juvenile court found Father was Z.G.’s presumed father. The juvenile court found all the allegations on Z.G.’s petition to be true. (§ 300, subds. (a), (b) & (g).) As to the younger six children, the juvenile court found true all the allegations in their petitions. (§ 300, subds. (b) & (j).) The juvenile court modified the restraining order to permit Father to visit the children. The court said, “At this point I would be ordering supervised visits with all of the children to include [Z.G.], although he will not be forced to attend. Those will be a minimum of . . . one time a week for two hours.”
In regard to disposition, the court ordered that Z.G. continue to be removed from the home. In making formal orders, the court said, “I will order the visitation. That will be for both parents and [Z.G.] That will be supervised. [Z.G.] not forced to attend. That will be a minimum one time a week for two hours. I will give authority to liberalize as to frequency and duration.”
The court asked the attorney for the six younger children, “Have you talked to [the six children] or have they said anything to you?” The attorney responded, “The problem is . . . whenever I try to attempt to have a conversation, it’s immediately shut down. I am not sure if that’s because they are shy or because . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . they don’t want to talk to strangers. And that’s fine, but without any information I am forced to make inferences, and the inference I make is that counseling may be appropriate to address any potential issues that are out there.” The court said, “Let’s get the interviews done and see if there is anything there.” The court said, “I will order the mother to cooperate with the visitation and the CAC interviews with the children.”
At the end of the hearing, Father said he surrendered his parental rights to Mother and that he would be moving out of state. Father explained, “I don’t want to be part of their lives.” The court responded, “It doesn’t quite work that way, so we are ordering the services. Obviously the Court thinks that it’s better for the children to have their father in their lives.” Father left the courtroom. The court said, “But I will note that the behavior in court seems to be consistent with all the descriptions in the report and the anger management issues that have been described.” During the hearing Father repeatedly interrupted the juvenile court judge while she was speaking, interrupted the attorney for the six minors while he was speaking, exited the courtroom during the proceedings, and returned to the courtroom during the proceedings.
DISCUSSION
A. FORENSIC INTERVIEWS
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by ordering Mother to cooperate with the CAC interviews of the six children.
At the outset, we note that we have found no such order in the written record from March 3, 2017, the date provided on Mother’s notice of appeal. An order, by statutory definition, is “made or entered in writing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1003.) The juvenile court said, “I will order the mother to cooperate with the visitation and the CAC interviews with the children.” We find no written order memorializing the court’s statement. Thus, by statutory definition, there is no such order; there is only a statement by the court. (See Miller v. Stein (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 381, 384 [“an oral order of the court is subject to change prior to its written entry in the official minutes of the court”].)
Despite the lack of a written order, because the case is presumably ongoing in the juvenile court, we will address the issue. “If a child is adjudged a dependent of the court on the ground that the child is a person described by Section 300, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child, including medical treatment, subject to further order of the court.” (§ 362, subd. (a).) “ ‘The goal of both reunification and maintenance services is to address the circumstances which required agency and court intervention into a family’s life.’ ” (In re Calvin P. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 958, 963.) We apply the abuse of discretion standard of review. (In re D.C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 41, 56.)
The family residence consists of two rooms and a bathroom. Mother informed a Department social services practitioner that “father throws things at both her and [Z.G.] and will throw ‘anything nearby’ and stated ‘everybody is always around’ when the [Department employee] asked where the other children are during the altercations.”
Mother said the children have heard yelling and profanity from Mother and Father and racial slurs from Father. Mother said, “‘[Father] hasn’t been to the extreme with the other kids like he has been with [Z.G.], but he’s still said things to them that are hurtful.” For example, when Mother says she will leave Father, Father threatens to punch the chest of whichever child is nearby. The juvenile court found true the allegation that the six younger children were exposed to incidents of domestic violence between Mother and Father. (§ 300, subd. (b).)
On December 1, 2016, a Department social worker went to the family residence and attempted to interview the six younger children. The children provided only their names and birthdays. R.V, the eldest female child, stopped the younger children from answering other questions. When the attorney for the six children attempted to have conversations with the children, the conversations were “immediately shut down.” As a result, the attorney could not effectively advocate for the children’s needs, as he was unclear what services they might require. For example, the attorney said, “I am forced to make inferences, and the inference I make is that counseling may be appropriate to address any potential issues that are out there.” The attorney did not know what exact issues the children were confronting, if any, and did not know what services, if any, would best help the children reunify with Father.
On February 2, 2017, Mother told a Department employee “she did not think the CAC interviews is [sic] something that she would be participating in and did not want to sign a consent for the children to be interviewed.” At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court said it would order “[M]other to cooperate with . . . the CAC interviews with the children.”
The juvenile court found the children witnessed domestic violence. In order for the children to reunify with Father, the domestic violence issues need to be remedied. The children had not spoken openly with their attorney or the Department. As a result, the court and the children’s attorney are only able to guess that counseling might best benefit the children in reunifying with Father.
The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that a specially trained child interviewer at the CAC may have more success in creating a dialogue with the children. A dialogue with the children needs to occur so the court can discover what services the children require in order to be reunified with Father. In sum, the juvenile court did not err by saying it would order Mother to comply with the CAC interviews of the children because the children need to be interviewed to discover what services will best assist the reunification process, and it appears they will require an interviewer specially trained in interviewing children.
Mother contends the juvenile court’s statement concerning the CAC interviews is unreasonable because the children are not victims of physical or sexual abuse and “the order requires [M]other ‘to cooperate’ with possibly unknown and invasive procedures by hospital staff.” The juvenile court directed Mother to cooperate with CAC interviews. In particular, the juvenile court said, “I will order the mother to cooperate with the visitation and the CAC interviews with the children.” The juvenile court did not direct Mother to cooperate with invasive medical procedures. Accordingly, we find Mother’s argument to be unpersuasive.
B. VISITATION
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by ruling that Z.G. could not be forced to attend visits.
Section 361.5, subdivision (a) provides, “Except as provided in subdivision (b) . . . whenever a child is removed from a parent’s or guardian’s custody, the juvenile court shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the child’s mother and statutorily presumed father or guardians.”
Section 361.5., subdivision (b) provides, “Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (14)(A) That the parent or guardian of the child has advised the court that he or she is not interested in receiving family maintenance or family reunification services or having the child returned to or placed in his or her custody and does not wish to receive family maintenance or reunification services.”
Mother signed a waiver of reunification services form (JV-195). On the form, Mother expressed that she did not want “services of any kind” in relation to Z.G.; she did not want to reunify with Z.G.; and did not want Z.G. placed in her custody. As a result of Mother’s waiver, the juvenile court was not required to provide Mother with reunification services in relation to Z.G. (§ 361.5, subds. (a) & (b)(14)(A).) Nevertheless, the juvenile court ordered reunification services for Mother in relation to Z.G.
Section 362.1, subdivision (a)(1)(A), provides, “In order to maintain ties between the parent or guardian and any siblings and the child, and to provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a child to the custody of his or her parent or guardian, or to encourage or suspend sibling interaction, any order placing a child in foster care, and ordering reunification services, shall provide . . . [¶] . . . for visitation between the parent or guardian and the child. Visitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.”
In addition to ordering reunification services for Mother, the juvenile court ordered that Z.G. continue to be removed from Mother and Father. Z.G. was residing in foster care. Thus, there was an order for reunification services and an order for foster care. As a result, the juvenile court was required to order visitation to the extent the visits would not place Z.G. in danger. (§ 361.2, subds. (a) & (b).)
The determination of the right of visitation is part of the judicial function and must be made by the court. (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008-1009.) “The juvenile court cannot impermissibly delegate to the child’s therapist, [the Department] or any third person, unlimited discretion to determine whether visitation is to occur. [Citation.] In no case may a child be allowed to control whether visitation occurs.” (In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505.)
A child’s feelings cannot be controlling on the issue of whether visitation occurs, but the child’s feelings can be considered as one of several factors. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 51 (Julie M.).) “[T]he parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of their children is not to be maintained at the child’s expense; the child’s input and refusal and the possible adverse consequences if a visit is forced against the child’s will are factors to be considered in administering visitation.” (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.)
In sum, when crafting a valid visitation order, “[t]he juvenile court must first determine whether or not visitation should occur . . . and then provide the Department with guidelines as to the prerequisites of visitation or any limitations or required circumstances.” (In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1237.) “We review an order setting visitation terms for abuse of discretion.” (In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356.)
The juvenile court said, “I will order the visitation. That will be for both parents and [Z.G.] That will be supervised. [Z.G.] not forced to attend. That will be a minimum one time a week for two hours.” The juvenile court did not provide any factors, other than Z.G.’s consent, for the Department to consider in administering visitation. The Department suggested making sobriety a factor for Mother and Father, but the court did not expressly adopt that recommendation.
Thus, the only factor controlling whether visits occur is Z.G.’s consent to the visits. The juvenile court abused its discretion by permitting Z.G. to control whether or not visits take place. (See In re Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505 [“In no case may a child be allowed to control whether visitation occurs”].) Accordingly, we will reverse the juvenile court’s visitation order concerning Mother, Father, and Z.G. To the extent a similar order is still needed in the case, the juvenile court must provide factors, in addition to Z.G.’s desire to visit, that are to be used when determining if visitation will occur. (Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 51.)
The Department contends the visitation order was not an abuse of discretion because it was designed to protect Z.G.’s emotional wellbeing. Section 362.1, subdivision (a)(1)(A) provides, “Visitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” The Department’s argument is not persuasive. The Department appears to be asserting that the juvenile court ordered visits a minimum of two hours per week, but at the same time found the visits would be detrimental to Z.G.’s wellbeing. To the extent the juvenile court sought to protect Z.G.’s emotional wellbeing from the potential of upsetting visits, the court could have ordered visits take place in a therapeutic setting—the court did not need to delegate its authority to Z.G. In other words, to the extent the juvenile court found the visits might be detrimental to Z.G., delegating judicial authority to Z.G. was not the solution.
The Department contends Z.G. waived the visitation issue by not objecting in the juvenile court. “[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) “Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule.” (Ibid.)
In Mother’s attorney’s closing argument she said, “So the mother wants the Court to know she is willing to comply with all the orders of the Court, but she does object. She does not feel her children are at risk, that they have been physically abused, and that [Z.G.]—that mother and [Father] have this huge domestic violence issue that puts their children at risk.” It is unclear to what exactly Mother was objecting—the court’s orders, the jurisdictional findings, etc. Assuming, without deciding, that Mother forfeited the issue we nevertheless choose to address the merits of the issue.
An appellate court has discretion to consider forfeited claims. In exercising that discretion, the wellbeing of the child, including permanency and stability must be given paramount importance. (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) Clarifying an alleged improper delegation of authority regarding visitation adds certainty and stability to the child’s visitation. (Id. at p. 1294.)
In the instant case, Z.G. is alone in carrying the burden of deciding whether visitation will occur. The child should not carry that burden alone. By reversing the juvenile court’s visitation order, Z.G. will no longer bear the burden of determining whether visitation occurs. If the visits would jeopardize Z.G.’s safety, such that visits should not take place, then the juvenile court must make that determination (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B)), or, as set forth ante, if the juvenile court believes Z.G.’s wishes should remain a listed factor to be used when determining if visitation takes place, then the juvenile court can add factors in addition to Z.G.’s wishes that must be considered when determining whether visitation will take place (Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 51). By excusing Mother’s assumed forfeiture and addressing the merits of the visitation issue, we seek to correct the delegation of judicial authority to Z.G. In sum, we excuse Mother’s assumed forfeiture.
The Department contends Mother forfeited the visitation issue by failing to include it in her notice of appeal. “The notice of appeal must be liberally construed, and is sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or order being appealed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.405(a)(3).)
In regard to the orders being appealed, Mother’s notice of appeal reads, (1) “March 3, 2017 I appeal the Judge finding the allegations true. I appeal the Judge’s decision to never address or consider the evidence I submitted. I also appeal the Judge’s decision to give authority for [CAC] interviews”; and (2) “March 3, 2017 I appeal the Judge’s decision to give authority for counseling for the [six] children. Also appealing [sic] unannounced visits by [the six younger] children’s lawyer.”
Mother indicated that she was appealing the March 3, 2017, order. The visitation order was entered on March 3, 2017. Because Mother gave notice that she was appealing the March 3 order, and the visitation order is part of the March 3 order, we construe the notice of appeal as including the visitation order. Thus, we find the Department’s argument to be unpersuasive.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the March 3, 2017, order providing for visitation between Z.G., K.G. (Mother), and M.V. (Father) is reversed. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. If a different visitation order for Z.G., K.G., and M.V., has not been entered by the juvenile court while this appellate case proceeded, then the juvenile court is directed to enter a new order either granting or denying visitation (§ 362.1); if Z.G.’s wishes remain a listed factor in the visitation order for determining whether visitation occurs, then other factors for determining whether visitation occurs must also be included in the order (Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 51).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


MILLER
J.


We concur:


McKINSTER
Acting P. J.


CODRINGTON
J.