Filed 1/12/18 In re L.R. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


In re L.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. H044481
(Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 10JD020432)

SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN’S SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

I. INTRODUCTION
D.J. appeals from the juvenile court’s orders granting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and terminating his legal guardianship over L.R., the child at issue in this juvenile dependency matter.
D.J. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating his legal guardianship, in that: (1) the juvenile court improperly relied on a social worker’s belief that D.J. had not internalized parenting and self-discipline skills; and (2) terminating the legal guardianship and offering reunification services to the child’s biological father was not in the child’s best interests. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Initial Proceedings
On December 13, 2010, the Santa Clara Department of Family and Children’s Services (the Department) filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (a) [serious physical harm] and (b) [failure to protect] alleging that the child, then six years old, came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
The child had been placed in protective custody after the mother, K.S., had hit him three times on the cheek, causing a large bruise. The mother had been violent with the maternal grandmother, with whom the mother lived, in front of the child. The whereabouts of the father, D.A., were unknown.
The mother had also assaulted her boyfriend, D.J., in front of the child. D.J. was the father of the child’s half-sibling, J.J., who was about 18 months old. The physical altercations between the mother and D.J. had caused the child emotional distress. The mother had previously received voluntary family maintenance services and informal supervision services due to her issues with violence.
At the detention hearing held on December 14, 2010, the juvenile court found the Department had made a prima facie showing that the child came within section 300 and that removal of the child was necessary to protect the child. The mother and D.J. were ordered to have supervised visitation with the child, and the mother was referred to various services.
A first amended petition was filed on February 7, 2011, after the father was located in Idaho. The petition added that the father had “had little contact with the child for most of the child’s life.”
B. Jurisdiction/Disposition
The Department filed a jurisdiction/disposition report dated January 6, 2011, recommending the juvenile court sustain the allegations of the petition and offer reunification services to the mother and D.J., with whom the child had been placed (as a non-relative extended family member).
The jurisdiction/disposition report detailed 27 referrals going back to April 2005. The report listed two criminal convictions for the mother: a 2008 disturbing the peace and a 2009 battery. The father had 15 criminal convictions. D.J. had no criminal history.
D.J. had acknowledged he should have done more to protect the children from the mother’s violence. He wanted the mother to get help so that they could get back together as a family. If the mother did not reunify with the child, D.J. was willing to adopt the child or become the child’s legal guardian.
In an addendum report, the Department recommended that the father be offered visitation so he could develop a relationship with the child. The Department also reported that D.J. had recently obtained a restraining order against the mother.
After the mother and the father both submitted the matter on the Department’s report, the juvenile court found the allegations of the section 300 petition true. The juvenile court ordered the child remain placed with D.J. and ordered reunification services for the mother. The juvenile court denied reunification services for the father pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (a) but ordered that the father have monthly supervised visitation with the child and participate in services to support the parent-child relationship for visitation purposes.
C. Review Hearings and Permanency Planning
In a March 24, 2011 interim review report, the Department described the child as “doing very well in his placement” with D.J. The mother was visiting with the child regularly and had been participating in services. D.J. was participating in services as part of the informal supervision ordered in J.J.’s case. (See fn. 2, supra.)
The Department filed another interim review report dated May 26, 2011. The child was still living with D.J., who was “struggling with the demands of being a single parent” and was receiving in-home parenting services. He was working on having a safe home, developing coping skills so he would not yell at the children, providing the children with emotional support around them missing their mother, and having more structure. D.J. had also begun individual therapy.
The father had traveled from Idaho to visit with the child in March and May 2011. The child warmed up quickly to the father and appeared comfortable with him. The social worker believed that the visits could progress to being unsupervised.
In a report prepared for the six-month review hearing, the Department noted that D.J. had shown agitation and had “vented” about how he was being treated by the Department and others. He had been verbally aggressive towards the child, rather than using the coping skills he was taught. D.J. was unhappy that the child had been ordered to complete a Children’s Health Council Assessment, because the appointments were causing the child to miss school. D.J. had also expressed concerns about the child’s visits with the father.
The father had visited with the child over three days in August 2011. The visits had been unsupervised and had lasted for six to eight hours each. The child reported that he was having fun with the father.
At the six-month review hearing held on September 15, 2011, the juvenile court ordered continued reunification services for the mother and ordered the child to remain placed with D.J. The juvenile court also granted D.J.’s request to be appointed the child’s de facto parent.
In its 12-month review report, the Department noted that the child had completed the Children’s Health Council Assessment and had been diagnosed with a developmental coordination disorder. The child needed occupational therapy, academic support, and therapeutic services. The mother continued to engage in services but continued to display “poor coping skills and a low frustration tolerance in visits.”
In October 2011, the father had reported having financial difficulty that affected his ability to travel to California to visit with the child. The father had written the child five letters but had not provided the social worker with any information about any planned visits.
At the 12-month review hearing held on February 15, 2012, the juvenile court ordered that the mother continue to receive reunification services and that the child remain placed with D.J.
The Department’s 18-month review report, dated June 4, 2012, recommended the juvenile court terminate the mother’s reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing, with a proposed permanent plan of legal guardianship with D.J. The social worker opined that it would be detrimental to return the child to the mother, who had “required intensive therapeutic visits” and was not ready to begin unsupervised visits.
The father and his family had visited with the child over three days in March 2012. The child had appeared to enjoy the visits.
The juvenile court adopted the Department’s recommendations at a hearing on June 20, 2012, terminating the mother’s reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing.
At the October 1, 2012 permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court dismissed the dependency petition and ordered a legal guardianship for the child, appointing D.J. as the child’s legal guardian. The mother was granted supervised visitation with the child a minimum of once a week, and the father was granted unsupervised visitation at least once a month.
D. Reinstatement of Dependency
On August 7, 2014, the Department filed a section 388 petition, asking the juvenile court to reinstate the dependency petition. The Department alleged that D.J. had been allowing the mother to live in the home and have unsupervised contact with the child, who was then almost 10 years old. The mother had been arrested in May 2014 for a probation violation and for perpetrating violence against D.J. in front of the children. Petitions had been filed on behalf of J.J. and the child’s infant half-sister, E.J.
In its section 388 report, the Department recommended the child continue to reside with D.J., but also recommended that D.J. be referred to a domestic violence assessment, individual counseling, Parenting Without Violence, a psychological evaluation, and drug testing.
The child told the social worker that he wanted to continue to live with D.J. The child did not like when D.J. yelled at him and “put him on time out,” but he denied that D.J. had hit him. The child thought D.J. could learn to stop yelling and to “stop being mean.”
The father had not seen the child in a year and a half. There also had not been any phone contact since December 2013. The father had again reported the he could not afford to regularly visit the child. He was now a single father with two boys. He wanted the child to come live with him in Idaho. The child did not want to live with the father, however.
On September 23, 2014, the juvenile court granted the Department’s section 388 petition, reinstated the dependency, and set a review hearing. In a subsequently-filed review report, the Department noted that D.J. was receptive to its recommendations for parenting classes, anger management classes, and individual counseling, and that D.J. also wanted couples counseling with the mother.
E. Review Hearings
The Department filed a status review report for the May 13, 2015 review hearing. The Department recommended that legal guardianship remain the permanent plan and that the child remain placed with D.J. The social worker was concerned that D.J. was struggling with “setting appropriate boundaries and limits” with the mother. In March 2015, the mother had entered his home to see the child and J.J. D.J. had also been allowing the mother to have phone contact with the child.
The next status review report was dated November 9, 2015. The Department recommended the child remain in a legal guardianship with D.J., but the social worker noted that D.J. had admitted to using physical discipline with the child.
In a status review report dated May 19, 2016, the Department reported that D.J. had been working with a parent coach. The parent coach noticed that D.J. treated the child differently from J.J., in that he would use “a more irritated tone of voice” with the child and hold the child “to a higher standard.” D.J. had “minimized the situation” when the parent coach tried to discuss it with him. D.J. was overheard making the statement, “He’s not my fucking kid” with respect to the child, but he also claimed that he loved the child. The child was heard stating that D.J. spanks him “all the time.” D.J. was willing to take action to address his anger issues and to engage in family therapy with the child.
F. Section 387 Petition
On September 29, 2016, the Department filed a section 387 (supplemental) petition. The Department alleged that a more restrictive placement was necessary because the child was at substantial risk of harm in D.J.’s care due to physical, verbal, and emotional abuse, despite the services he had been provided. The child was 12 years old at the time the section 387 petition was filed.
The child and J.J. had been temporarily placed with J.J.’s paternal grandparents, and the Department requested a protective custody warrant issue for removal of the child from D.J.’s home. In a declaration, the social worker reported that D.J. had struck the child on the head in August 2016. D.J. had also thrown a tennis ball at the child in anger. He had spanked the child, and he had yelled and cursed at the child. D.J. understood that his behavior was “inappropriate and harmful” but seemed unable to control himself. The child was exhibiting signs of trauma.
At the October 3, 2016 initial hearing on the section 387 petition, the juvenile court ordered the child detained and temporarily removed from D.J.’s custody. The juvenile court ordered D.J. to have visitation with the child.
In a jurisdiction/disposition report dated October 24, 2016, the Department recommended the juvenile court sustain the section 387 petition and order that D.J. receive “services to enhance visitation” with the child so that the child could be returned to D.J.’s care at some point. D.J. had acknowledged that he needed to change his behaviors “for the emotional well-being of the children.” He was “motivated to work on his anger issues and have the child returned to his care.” D.J. had already begun engaging with services, which included a Conflict and Accountability program, individual counseling, and family counseling.
The father had recently moved to Oregon. He was interested in “building upon his relationship” with the child, but he had not been in regular contact with the child.
The child and J.J. remained placed with J.J.’s paternal grandparents, who were not able to provide a permanent placement, and the Department was reviewing other placement options. The child’s half-sister, E.J., was in a separate concurrent foster home.
At the December 1, 2016 jurisdiction hearing, D.J. submitted on the Department’s report.
G. Section 388 Petition to Terminate Legal Guardianship
On December 28, 2016, the Department filed a section 388 petition seeking to terminate D.J.’s legal guardianship of the child. The Department asserted that despite its intervention, D.J. had been unable to maintain the child’s safety in his care. Additionally, the father had expressed a strong interest in parenting the child, and termination of the legal guardianship would allow the Department to offer reunification services to the father.
Prior to the hearing on the section 388 petition, J.J.’s paternal grandparents requested that both the child and J.J. be removed from their home because the children had been “physically aggressive towards [one] other” and the child had been defiant. The children were both placed in a foster home.
In a disposition report dated January 18, 2017, the Department recommended that the juvenile court order six months of reunification services for the father. The father was still in Oregon and wanted the child to live with him. He was willing to cooperate with the Department and participate in services.
D.J. had been participating in services and was an active participant in the Conflict and Accountability class. His visits with the child had gone well: he had engaged with the child in doing homework, playing games, and having meals. D.J. had been able to “regulate hi[s] emotions” during the visits.
At a hearing on January 18, 2017, pursuant to the Department’s request, the juvenile court dismissed the section 387 petition.
H. Contested Hearing
A hearing on the section 388 petition began on February 21, 2017. The parties agreed that there had been a change of circumstances and that the only issue was whether the proposed termination of legal guardianship would be in the child’s best interest.
1. Testimony of the Father
The father confirmed he was residing in Oregon. He wanted the child to be placed in his custody. He had 50 percent custody of his two other sons, who were ages five and seven. A social worker from the Department had come to his house to talk about the child coming to live with him. They talked about where the child would attend school and the services (such as therapy) that he and the child would need to participate in. The father understood that the child would need therapeutic support. He was under the impression that the child’s issues involved chewing on his collar and asking questions, but not violence. He was not aware that the child had a psychological diagnosis.
The father acknowledged he had not seen the child in about five years. At one point, the father had been visiting from Idaho about every six months, for a few days at a time, but after his divorce he could not afford trips to California. The father had initially maintained telephone contact and written a few letters, but after he lost his phone and got busy, he stopped calling the child.
The father claimed he did not know of the child’s existence until he was served with child support papers, which was when the child was about a year and a half old. He met the child when the child was three years old, and spent some time with the child after that: about three weeks total before the dependency case was filed.
If offered reunification services, the father planned to visit the child on the weekends. He knew the child did not want to visit with him and had been refusing to talk to him on the phone, but he was hoping the child would change his mind.
2. Testimony of Social Worker Shaheed
Michael Shaheed was assigned to the case on November 1, 2016. He had contacted the child, the child’s Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), J.J.’s paternal grandparents, the maternal grandmother, the mother, the father, D.J., and other family members. He had also reviewed reports written by prior social workers. He had traveled to Oregon for a home visit with the father and had observed visits between the child and D.J. as well as the child and the mother.
Shaheed did not believe that the child could be safely returned to D.J.’s home. Even with support and supervision, D.J. was unable to “regulate his emotions” during visits with the child—specifically, during two recent visits in February 2017. D.J. had completed the Conflict and Accountability class prior to those visits, and thus Shaheed was not convinced that D.J. was able to implement the skills he had learned. D.J. had not shown he was able to “internalize” and “use” the services. Providing reunification services to D.J. would not be in the child’s best interest because “it might give [the child] the thought or idea that he’s going back to [D.J.]” and if reunification did not occur, “it would be more devastating for [the child].”
Shaheed acknowledged that the child wanted to be placed with D.J. again. The child had explained that he was “used to . . . the yelling and the corporal punishment.” Shaheed was concerned that the child would think “that those kind of behaviors are normal.” Shaheed believed that although separating from D.J. would be difficult for the child, services would help the child to “process through that separation.” Shaheed acknowledged that it would also be difficult for the child to separate from J.J., but he believed that “with enough services and time,” the child would come to an understanding.
The child’s diagnoses included Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. He was on the autism spectrum. He also had a “siblings relational problem” and had distraction problems at school. The child had a tendency to “get defiant” in family settings and had shown physical aggression towards J.J., although not towards other children.
The child recalled his past visits with the father and described them as “good.” However, the child was resistant to talking to the father and moving to Oregon. Shaheed planned to continue to attempt to facilitate phone calls and FaceTime or Skype to alleviate the child’s fears. The child was “talking about the situation” in therapy.
Shaheed recommended the child’s new permanent plan be a planned permanent living arrangement (PPLA) with a goal of reunification with the father. If reunification was successful, the child would be placed with the father on family maintenance services. Shaheed had told the father that the child had been aggressive towards J.J. and that he could “get defiant in family settings.” Shaheed understood that the father did not yet have all “the details” about the child’s problems, including the child’s autism spectrum diagnosis. Shaheed also acknowledged that the father’s excuses for not communicating with the child were not valid. However, Shaheed believed that the father’s home was appropriate, that the father genuinely wanted the child to live with him, and that the father would be able to follow through with services for the child.
D.J. was in the process of completing a psychological evaluation in conjunction with J.J.’s case. The evaluation would help the Department understand D.J.’s needs “and what services would benefit him.” There was a “strong possibility” that D.J. would reunify with J.J. J.J. was “an easier child to manage,” and D.J.’s anger was more triggered by the child. Also, D.J. had demonstrated it was challenging for him to manage more than one child.
D.J. was participating in family therapy with the child. If D.J.’s legal guardianship of the child was terminated, the Department would still offer him visitation with the child.
3. Testimony of D.J.
D.J. wanted to remain the child’s legal guardian and wanted the juvenile court to provide him with reunification services. He loved the child, knew the child wanted to live with him, and was committed to providing for the child’s needs, including his emotional needs.
The child had lived with D.J. for almost his entire life. The child called D.J. “Dad,” and D.J. called the child “[m]y son” or “[m]y oldest son.” D.J. believed that reunification services were in the child’s best interests.
D.J. had recently completed an anger management class and had learned “to think differently” during challenging situations. If the child talked back to him, D.J. would now understand that the child was frustrated and needed to be heard. D.J. would respond by giving the child attention and “validating his feelings.” D.J. had used the techniques he had learned during visits with the child.
D.J. was participating in family therapy and individual therapy. He felt that he would be able to parent the child and J.J. differently now because he could empathize with them. He had gotten positive feedback from the visitation supervisor.
D.J. believed that the stress of E.J.’s case had been the catalyst for the Department’s decision to remove the child and J.J. from his care. D.J. acknowledged that he had been “quicker to anger” with the child and J.J. and had yelled at them. On two occasions about a year apart, he had “swatted” the child on the top of his head. D.J. had taken responsibility for his yelling by describing his own behavior as “unacceptable” and talking to the child about “alternative ways” for him to have handled the situations.
4. Testimony of Therapist Sarah Haggis
Sarah Haggis, a licensed marriage and family therapist, was found qualified as an expert in “trauma assessment of minors” and “family dynamics” in dependency cases. She had reviewed the Department’s reports, interviewed the foster parent, met with the child and J.J., spoken with the CASA, observed visits between D.J. and the child and J.J., spoken with the family therapist, spoken with the father, and participated in a family team meeting.
Haggis believed that D.J. should receive reunification services. She had observed a visit during which the child had been defiant after D.J. had tried to set limits for the child. D.J. tried different strategies and struggled to address the child’s defiance, but he remained “cohesive and grounded.” D.J. had not yelled; he had used a “firm and directive voice.” During another visit, D.J. and the child were “very connected.”
Haggis was concerned about the child possibly “moving away from what he knows as family and how he will make sense of that.” She believed the child might regress and further solidify the “maladaptive coping strategy” he had developed over years of trauma. She was “uncomfortable” with the father’s belief that the child would benefit from “a fresh start.”
The child had referred to D.J. as “his dad, his father” and indicated he did not want to have anything to do with the father. The child also wanted to stay connected to D.J.’s parents, who he considered to be his grandparents. He also wanted to stay connected to his mother, aunt, and maternal grandfather, and he wanted to continue at his same school. The child also wanted to stay with J.J.
Haggis acknowledged that the child had sometimes tried to “dominate” J.J. by hitting him. She believed that the services in place would help that to change. She believed that D.J. was “making a lot of progress” with the child and J.J. in family therapy.
Haggis clarified she was not advocating for the child to be returned to D.J.’s custody at that time; she did not believe it was in the child’s best interest.
5. Arguments, Findings, and Orders
Counsel for the Department argued that termination of the guardianship would be in the child’s best interest. Counsel argued that D.J. was “minimizing and not taking accountability for what he put [the child] through” and blaming his actions on his frustrations with E.J.’s case. Counsel argued that providing more services to D.J. would not be in the child’s best interest because he had already received “extensive services.” Because the two experts had agreed that the child could not be safely returned to D.J.’s home at that time, “the only legal option” was termination of his guardianship.
Counsel for the Department urged the juvenile court to order a PPLA with the goal of reunification with the father. Counsel acknowledged that the father should have done more to maintain a relationship with the child but argued that the father was now the child’s “best hope for a stable future.”
The father’s attorney argued that the father had always made it clear that the child could come live with him and that he deserved a chance to show he was “a fit and willing father.” He urged the juvenile court to give the father six months of reunification services to allow the child an opportunity to develop a healthy relationship with the father and the father’s children.
The child’s attorney noted that the child’s “stated interest” was to be returned to D.J.’s home right away. The child’s attorney believed that it was in the child’s best interest “to eventually be returned” to D.J. He asserted that from the child’s perspective, “family” meant D.J. and D.J.’s parents, and that the goal of the dependency system was to keep families intact if possible. He urged the juvenile court to consider the “psychological component” of who a child considers to a parent. He argued that the law allowed D.J. to receive reunification services. He asserted that the family therapy was helping the child, J.J., and D.J. to heal and come together “as a healthy family” and that the child should not be taken out of that process. The risks of attempting to reunify with the father were “just too great.”
D.J.’s attorney urged the juvenile court to deny the section 388 petition, maintain the legal guardianship, and order reunification services for D.J. and the child. She argued that the law permitted the juvenile court to maintain the child in foster care while ordering reunification services and the legal guardianship. D.J.’s attorney asked the juvenile court to consider the child’s wishes. She reminded the juvenile court that D.J. had completed an anger management class and testified about what he had learned from the class. She argued that D.J. had implemented that knowledge during recent visits. She quoted from the family therapist’s report, which reflected that the separation was putting a “strain” on the child, J.J., and D.J., and that D.J. had shown a commitment to improving his behavior. She argued it was not “realistic” to think that the child could reunify with the father in six months.
On March 14, 2017, at the conclusion of the contested hearing, the juvenile court granted the Department’s section 388 petition, terminated D.J.’s legal guardianship, and ordered reunification services for the father.
The juvenile court found that the Department had proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination of the legal guardianship was in the child’s best interest. The court noted that for three years, D.J. had received services to assist him in keeping the child in his home, but that a safety issue had arisen requiring the child to be placed in foster care. The court found that the main concern was the “historical stress dynamics” between the child and D.J. and between the child and J.J. These dynamics and their “potential for harm” had been present even with short, supervised visits and even after D.J. had participated in therapy and completed the Conflict and Accountability program. There was an “appreciable risk” that the past dynamics would recur if the child and J.J. were both returned to D.J.’s home.
The juvenile court addressed the concerns raised about the proposed plan of offering reunification services to the father. The court found there were “legitimate concerns” about how the child would fare if he had reduced contact with J.J. and other family members, and if he had to move and change schools. The court found that there was a relatively low probability that the child would be returned to D.J., and a greater potential that the child would reunify with the father. Although the father had minimal contact with the child and the child was resistant to reunifying with him, it was more likely that the child’s “history of trauma” would end if the plan was changed from a legal guardianship with D.J. to reunification with the father.
The juvenile court set an interim review date of June 12, 2017 and a six-month review date of September 11, 2017.
III. DISCUSSION
D.J. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating his guardianship, in that: (1) the juvenile court improperly relied on a social worker’s belief that D.J. had not internalized the parenting and self-discipline skills he had been taught; and (2) terminating the legal guardianship and ordering reunification services for the father was not in the child’s best interests.
A. Legal Principles
After the juvenile court orders a legal guardianship, a party may seek to terminate the guardianship by filing a section 388 petition. (In re Carlos E. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1418.) The petitioning party must show that changing the prior order is “in the best interest of the dependent child.” (§ 388, subd. (b)(1).)
“Before the [section 388] hearing takes place, the court must order the child social services department to prepare a report evaluating whether the minor could safely remain in the guardian’s care if maintenance services were provided. [Citation.]” (B.B. v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 563, 569 (B.B.) see § 366.3, subd. (b)(2).) In requiring such an assessment, the Legislature has “recognized that if the juvenile court’s initial choice for a permanent plan of guardianship fails to serve a child’s best interests, before moving to a less stable placement, the court should consider whether there is a way to preserve the guardianship,” such as by providing services to the legal guardian. (In re Jessica C. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 474, 484.)
At the section 388 hearing on termination of a legal guardianship, the petitioner “must show by a preponderance of the evidence termination of the guardianship serves the best interests of the child. [Citations.] Thereafter, the court has three options: it may grant the petition to terminate the guardianship, deny the petition, or deny the petition and order services to maintain the guardianship. [Citation.]” (B.B., supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 569-570; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.740(c).) In addition, the juvenile may order reunification services for a parent who was “initially bypassed for services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b).” (In re S.H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1554.)
The determination of whether to grant a section 388 petition is “committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and the trial court’s ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established. [Citations.]” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 (Stephanie M.).) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 318-319.)
B. Analysis
D.J. first contends that the testimony of Shaheed (the social worker) does not support the trial court’s factual findings. As D.J. notes and as reflected above, Shaheed testified that, in his opinion, D.J. would not be able to implement the skills he had learned. D.J. had not shown he was able to “internalize” and “use” the services. D.J. asserts that such a “subjective belief” is insufficient to support a finding that the legal guardianship could not be maintained with reunification services.
D.J. cites to cases in which a social worker testified that a parent was unable to internalize proper parenting skills. For instance, in In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282 (Jasmine G.), the court held that “a social worker’s belief that [the] parents had not sufficiently ‘internalized’ parenting skills” did not constitute “clear and convincing evidence of substantial danger.” (Id. at p. 289.) Likewise, in Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738 (Blanca P.), the court found that “the opinion of the mother’s social worker and a therapist that she has not ‘internalized’ what she has learned in parenting classes” was insufficient to support a finding that it would be detrimental to return the child to the mother’s care. (Id. at p. 1751.) Both of those cases are distinguishable from the instant case, however. Here, both the social worker and the therapist (Haggis) testified that returning the child to D.J.’s home would not be in the child’s best interest. In Jasmine G., “[o]ne therapist opined it was totally safe to return the child and the other simply had ‘no recommendation’ . . . .” (Jasmine G., supra, at p. 289.) And here, there was no dispute that D.J. had put the child at risk of physical and emotional harm, whereas in Blanca P. the juvenile court had erred by assuming, without proof, that the father had committed child molestation. (Blanca P., supra, at p. 1747.)
D.J. next contends that denying reunification services to D.J. and providing them to the father was not in the child’s best interests. He cites to In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55 for the proposition that a child’s best interest is served when the child’s “opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult” is maximized. (Id. at p. 66.) He also relies on Haggis’s testimony that the child’s proposed reunification with the father would possibly be detrimental for the child and her testimony that D.J. was “making a lot of progress” in family therapy. D.J. also asserts that by terminating the legal guardianship, he was cut out of the child’s life, which “contravened [the child’s] need for stability and continuity.”
The juvenile court’s announced findings show that in determining whether termination of the legal guardianship was in the child’s best interest, the court considered D.J.’s “current efforts, fitness and history; the seriousness of the problem that led to [reinstatement of] the dependency; the strength of the . . . caretaker-child bonds; and the child’s need for stability and continuity. [Citations.]” (In re A.G. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 276, 281 (A.G.).) The juvenile court considered that a safety issue had arisen even though D.J. had received services for three years. The juvenile court found that the same “historical stress dynamics” existed even during short, supervised visits and even after D.J. had participated in therapy and completed the Conflict and Accountability program. The juvenile court also found there was an “appreciable risk” that the past dynamics would recur if the child and J.J. were both returned to D.J.’s home, and that there was a relatively low probability that the child would be returned to D.J. with more services. (See A.G., supra, at p. 281 [“A best interests finding also requires a likelihood that reunification services will succeed.”].) These findings were supported by Shaheed’s testimony about how D.J. was unable to “regulate his emotions” during visits with the child even after his completion of the Conflict and Accountability class. And, although the juvenile court acknowledged there were “legitimate concerns” about how the child would fare if he was to reunify with the father, it found a greater likelihood that the child’s “history of trauma” would end if the child were to reunify with the father. This finding was supported by the evidence that the child had positive recall of his past visits with the father and the evidence that the child was “talking about the situation” in therapy despite indicating initial opposition to reunifying with the father.
It was the juvenile court’s function to assess the evidence and weigh all the relevant factors regarding the child’s best interest, and this court “ ‘ “has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ [Citations.]” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 319.) Although another court might reasonably have reached a different conclusion, the juvenile court’s application of the law to the facts in this case did not “ ‘ “exceed[] the bounds of reason.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 318-319.) Moreover, we conclude only that it was not an abuse of discretion to grant the section 388 petition under the circumstances that existed at the time of the hearing. Dependency proceedings are ongoing, and the juvenile court retains the ability to respond to new information, including information brought before it in the context of additional section 388 petitions. (See Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 879.) Accordingly, nothing in this opinion precludes any party from bringing a new section 388 petition alleging changed circumstances or new evidence showing that a modification of the juvenile court’s orders would be in the child’s best interest.
IV. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s March 14, 2017 orders are affirmed.






___________________________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.






WE CONCUR:






__________________________
ELIA, ACTING P.J.






__________________________
MIHARA, J.