Filed 1/24/18 Nicole V. v. Superior Court CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO


NICOLE V. et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY,
Respondent;
ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.



A152889

(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. JD027367)


Nicole V. and Nathanial H. (when referred to collectively, petitioners) have filed separate petitions for an extraordinary writ, as authorized by California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, to set aside the order of respondent court that set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 at which their parental rights may be terminated with respect to their infant son Levi. (Subsequent statutory references are to this code.) Their sole contention is that substantial evidence does not support the finding of respondent court that adequate reunification services were offered by real party in interest Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency). Apart from information required to establish the general context, we summarize only those parts of the record necessary to resolve the precise issue presented.
Barely a week after his premature birth, Levi was detained and placed in the care of the Agency, which filed a petition in which it was alleged that he was at substantial risk of harm due to each petitioner’s “long history of methamphetamine addiction.” Petitioners submitted on the social worker’s report, following which respondent court sustained the allegations of the petition as amended. Levi was declared a dependent child, and his custody entrusted to the Agency. The Agency was ordered to provide the reunification services specified in the case plan, and petitioners were admonished about the limited duration of the services. (See § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B) [six months].) All of this occurred in October and November 2016.
In April 2017, the Agency recommended that reunification services be terminated because each petitioner “does not have stable housing . . . is currently unemployed” and “has not engaged in substance abuse treatment.” The Agency also recommended that with the termination of services, respondent court should set the hearing at which parental rights could be terminated. Petitioners requested a contested hearing, Nicole’s counsel telling respondent court “we’re having a problem with services in this matter.”
The contested six-month review hearing was held in July, August, September, October and November. Exhibits and testimony was received in evidence. Neither Nicole nor Nathanial testified. Respondent court then made the ruling on reunification services that is the subject of petitioners’ challenges.
The guiding legal principles are well established.
“The court shall not order that a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 be held unless there is clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parent . . . .” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(C)(ii).)
“[W]henever a child is removed from a parent’s . . . custody, the juvenile court shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the child’s mother . . . .” (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) “It is difficult, if not impossible, to exaggerate the importance of reunification in the dependency system. With but few exceptions, whenever a minor is removed from parental custody, the juvenile court is required to provide services to the parent for the purpose of facilitating reunification of the family. [Citation.] Each reunification plan must be appropriate to the parent’s circumstances. [Citation.] The plan should be specific and internally consistent, with the overall goal of resumption of a family relationship. [Citations.] The agency must make reasonable efforts to provide suitable services, ‘in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of success.’ [Citation.]” (In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 678.)
But the reunification services offered have only to be reasonable; perfection is neither expected nor required. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 425; Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) “In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) The reasonableness of reunification services is to be determined in light of all relevant circumstances, which include “the mental condition of the parent, her insight into the family’s problems, and her willingness to accept and participate in appropriate services.” (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.) Because “ ‘the focus of reunification services is to remedy those problems which led to the removal of the children’ ” (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598), “ ‘the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .’ ” (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 691.)
Moreover, at this stage of the dependency proceedings, petitioners are not permitted to expand their attack to include the case plan itself (V.C. v. Superior Court (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 521, 527–528), but can only attack the adequacy of the services offered to implement that plan. With regard to the adequacy of reunification services, “our sole task on review is to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided or offered.” (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.)
The case plan provided for reunification services for Nicole, Nathanial, and Levi. Nicole argues the services provided or offered to her were not adequate. Nathanial argues the services offered or provided to him and Levi were not adequate.
The arguments provided by Nicole and Nathanial are virtually identical. Nicole filed her petition first. Her analysis was then adopted by Nathanial, who expanded it to encompass both parents and Levi. Because Nathanial’s is thus more inclusive, we quote it in full, deleting only the record references, a footnote, and citation to a single statute:
“This case originated primarily as a result of the parents’ substance abuse. Consequently, the bulk of the Agency’s reunification efforts centered on engaging Mother and Father in substance abuse treatment. Every reunification case plan, however, must be updated ‘as the service needs of the child and family dictate.’ Here, the case evolved over time to also involve serious medical concerns for the minor, many of which required specialized training to deal with. Despite this, the willingness of Mother and Father to engage in training, and an acknowledgement by the court that the parents should be trained in how to care for their son, the Agency did little by way of providing or facilitating the necessary training. Mother was simply directed by the [case] worker to Nancy Roth (public health nurse), who in turn told Mother to contact the hospital. As the minor’s various medical needs clearly posed a significant barrier to reunification, the Agency could and should have attempted to specifically set up and refer the parents to the minor’s medical providers for training or at the very least referred the parents for a specialized parenting program geared towards families with special needs children.
“The Agency likewise should have provided housing assistance and referrals to Father. Although housing instability was not an issue directly identified in the petition, it was known to the Agency since the inception of the case that the parents were essentially homeless and a goal of obtaining and maintaining stable housing was included in Father’s case plan. Despite this, the record reflects only one referral to a housing resource outside the residential treatment context. No other efforts—for example, assistance with deposit or first month’s rent, or follow up on the one referral that was made—appear to have been made to assist the parents in this regard even though Father’s lack of stable housing was specifically noted to impact his ability to meet his other case plan goals, and further even though the minor’s increasing medical needs arguably rendered the need for stable housing even more urgent in this case.
“Finally, the Agency failed in providing reasonable services by not referring the parents to the SEED (Services to Enhance Early Development) program when specifically requested to do so. The program was identified as a beneficial resource for the parents, yet the record is devoid of any effort by the Agency to make the appropriate referrals as well as any explanation as to why the referrals were not made.”
Petitioners’ arguments are not persuasive, particularly as they make no mention of respondent court’s very detailed findings of the service issue. Those findings deserve extensive quotation:
“The Agency has complied with the case plan by making reasonable efforts to return this child to a safe home and to complete the necessary steps to finalize his permanent placement. I find that the social worker has solicited and integrated into the case plan the in-put of the child, the child’s family and other interested parties. I also find that reasonable services have been offered or provided. Here’s where I have comments:
“Regarding reasonable services and the implementation of those services, the standard is not whether the services were the best that might be provided in an ideal world. Here they were not. The standard is whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances. Under the circumstances presented in this case the services and attempts to implement those services were reasonable.
“A good-faith effort to develop and implement a Family Reunification plan was necessary and exhibited in this case. I find that the Agency met its burden in this regard. Levi was removed from his parents on October 13th, 2016. Among other challenges, it had been reported that each parent suffered a substantial history of methamphetamine abuse. Levi’s mother tested positive for methamphetamine at his birth. Levi was born addicted to methamphetamine. He is a medically fragile child and experienced episodes of respiratory issues during the first six months of his life.
“Days after Levi was born the child welfare worker met with the mother and father and provided them with information and a referral to Cherry Hill, a local detoxification program. The mother was also referred to Project Pride, another local residential treatment program.
“Within approximately one month I believe of Levi being removed from the home, the mother had twice rejected an opportunity to enter an inpatient program, one that would have helped her address her serious history of drug abuse. Around this time in November both parents were referred to the family drug court.
“In December, the mother said she would enter a residential program and might have a 30-day blackout period upon entering. Ultimately, the mother did not enter a program that month. In December, the father claimed he also was trying to get into a program. That program was Havens for Heroes; but when the child welfare worker asked for information regarding the identification of his contact at the program so she could provide additional support, the father would not provide it.
“In January the parents were provided information on several other drug programs and were also directed to a parent advocate program to support recovery efforts and case plan compliance. By February of 2017, the parents remained together as a couple. They claimed they wanted to reunify with their child; but by that time neither parent had meaningfully addressed their substance abuse history despite being offered . . . services and opportunities by the Social Services Agency.
“At the end of February, the mother had been terminated from the Terra Firma substance abuse program. This is not a residential program. This is an outpatient program that would have provided group counseling and drug testing. The mother was terminated because she had excessive absences. She did not provide verification of Narcotics Anonymous meetings and had given positive drug tests that revealed extremely high levels of meth. The mother did not communicate with the program and missed the meetings scheduled to address her performance at Terra Firma. Also in our evidence the mother told Terra Firma she had been cleared to switch to a different program called Options. This, however, was not true.
“By April of 2017 and despite now referrals to multiple community programs, neither parent had done anything to address their substance abuse. The mother had been directed to five different programs. The father had been provided information about Havens for Heroes, the program that he said he wanted to attend and also Cherry Hill and the East Bay Community Recovery Project. The child welfare worker followed up to see if the mother was connecting with services and to ensure that services were being offered by the providers.
“It was interesting for the Court to note that the mother had little discernible problem contacting the child welfare worker when she needed something, for example, for receiving transportation passes or to make it by the child welfare office in order to pick them up. She was able to make a significant number of visits with her child and from this I see that the parents had the capacity to connect with services and complete classes if they were willing to try. In fact, to their credit the parents did attend parenting classes at the parent education program to which they were directed.
“By June, the parents had inconsistency in attending visits with Levi resulting in that program terminating services for the family. Those visits were occurring at The Gathering Place and The Gathering Place said it would re-consider a new referral if the parents demonstrated consistency in visits elsewhere. So The Gathering Place wanted to see some progress by the parents using some different visitation provider before they would consider a re-referral of the parents to The Gathering Place. So the Agency then set up visits through a different program called Triumph Ministries, where over the next few months the visits continued to lack consistency. So by July the parents had a
well-established pattern of ignoring repeated referrals, missed appointments and minimal case plan compliance.
“In addition to the Agency’s efforts, community providers as well including Terra Firma continually tried to reach the parents to extend services. By August the parents had stopped communicating with the Agency. The father had been discontinued from his parenting class for failing to consistently attend. This recitation tracks some of the evidence that I have received that point to this conclusion.
“I don’t see any effort by the parents to follow through on any of the services that have been proposed or the referrals that were made. Despite their housing instability, the parents were able to muster resources, to attend visits, pick up transportation assistance and complete a parenting program, as to the mother. They communicated with people who they wanted information from. They even called or said they called various programs to make arrangements to enter them.
“For these reasons and others, the implementation argument is not persuasive. The barrier for these parents connecting to services is not a question of their capacity but of their respective willingness to engage in case plan activities or services, especially the residential drug treatment that topped the Agency’s list of priorities for these parents’ reunification plan.
“Here the Agency did far more than just mail the list of service providers. In our case, the Agency immediately identified residential drug treatment as a priority. The parents said they knew what programs they wanted to enter and the mother repeatedly failed to take advantage of beds made available at her chosen program and then stretched the process out over a period of time to ultimately never enter the program; so the Agency responded by providing additional program information and a referral to family drug court, a referral to the parent advocate for additional support and repeated attempts to invite the parents to come in for case plan meetings or to take advantage of referrals to group counseling and testing and offered a string of letters that offer information about other programs which the Agency sent despite the parents’ decision to end communication with the Agency.
“Also, the parents had opportunities to visit with the child, to be advised of the child’s medical needs, to speak to the public health nurse and attend medical appointments. The public health nurse Ms. Roth told the parents they could themselves go down to the hospital to be trained on how to care for their child’s special needs. Could more have been done? Absolutely. That’s true in most cases . . . . But on balance and relying mostly on reports that documented well the Agency’s efforts, I can find that services provided to these parents were reasonable. I will decline the invitation to tack on additional time for the parents to receive services. It is not warranted on this record.
“I have considered the extent to which the parents have availed themselves of services provided to alleviate or mitigate the causes necessitating Levi’s out-of-home placement to date and the parents have both shown minimal progress.”
Neither Nicole nor Nathanial make the least effort to demonstrate that any of these findings are inaccurate. On page 29 of her opposition to the petitions, the county counsel, representing the Agency, pointedly states: “the parents overplay how the lack of specialized training was a barrier to reunification. Truthfully, it was the parents’ complete lack of engagement with substance abuse treatment that was the barrier to reunification.” Because that treatment was in the form of residential programs, this defeats petitioners’ primary argument about housing.
Nor can Nicole and Nathanial draw our attention away from their own failings and omissions. “ ‘It is . . . well established that “[r]eunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent.” ’ ” (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233.) “[N]o interest is well served by compelling . . . parents to shoulder responsibilities they are unwilling to accept or unable to discharge.” (Id. at p. 1234.) The Agency is not required to “ ‘take the parent by the hand and escort him or her’ ” through the reunification process. (In re Christina L., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 414.) The parents must communicate with the Agency and participate in that process.
(In re Raymond R. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 436, 441.) When parents put themselves “out of the reach of any meaningful rehabilitative [reunification] services . . . , no more was
required.” (In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1111.)
The petitions are denied on their merits, and this opinion is final forthwith. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
 

_________________________
Richman, J.


We concur:


_________________________
Kline, P.J.


_________________________
Miller, J.

























A152889; N.H. v. Sup. Ct.