Filed 1/26/18 M.B. v. Superior CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

M.B. et al. Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES BUREAU et al., Real Parties in Interest.	A152742 (Alameda County Super. Ct. Nos. JD-026913-01, JD‑026914-01, JD-026915-01
G.P., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES BUREAU et al., Real Parties in Interest.	A152883 (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. JD-026911-01

M.B. (Mother), along with fathers G.P. and R.G., petition for extraordinary relief under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, asking us to set aside the juvenile court’s orders terminating family reunification services and scheduling a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and implementation of a permanent plan for the parties’ four children. Mother is the mother of three of the children, R.G.-B., E.G.-B., and G.P.-B. G.P. is the father of the two younger children, L.A. and G.P.-B. R.G. is the father of the two older children R.G.‑B. and E.G.-B. The parents contend that (1) substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s orders terminating reunification services, (2) substantial evidence does not support the court’s findings that reasonable services were offered, and (3) the court abused its discretion with respect to its visitation orders. We find the parents’ arguments unavailing and deny their petitions.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY[2]

I.Preliminary Proceedings

On June 29, 2016, L.A. (age three at the time) was taken to San Leandro Hospital with serious physical trauma. She was subsequently transferred to UCSF Benioff Children’s Hospital Oakland. Her exams revealed she had suffered significant injuries, including a subdural hematoma. She also had old bruises to the front and back of her body, as well as additional injuries. She spent a total of eight days in the hospital.

“On June 30, 2016, minors R.G.-B. (age [six]), E.G.-B. (age [five]) and G.P.-B. (age [two]) were placed in protective custody by the Oakland Police Department. Law enforcement determined Mother was not able to provide proper care for the children after the minors witnessed the physical abuse of their half sibling L.A. . . . by Mother and their stepfather, G.P. Additionally, the home where the minors lived was deemed ‘filthy,’ in that there was limited food available and much of the food was stale or too old to eat. The home had a distinctive urine smell, and garbage and dirty clothes were found throughout the residence. [It was determined that] L.A. was the subject of physical abuse, including an intracranial injury, cerebral hemorrhage, symmetric bruising on both arms, a bruise inside the ear, acute rib fracture, substantial bruising of the hip, blood in the rectum, and trauma to the lower torso. The [Alameda County Social Services Bureau (Agency)] filed its petition under section 300 on July 5, 2016.

“Mother denied allegations of physical abuse towards the three minors in this case, as well as L.A. She represented that on June 29, 2016, L.A. fell down the stairs and Mother took her to the hospital. She admitted the home was messy and unkempt, but this situation was the result of a remodeling in the home. Regarding L.A.’s fall, Mother stated that on June 29, she was home with the children. She went to the bathroom and when she returned to the area where the minors were located, she noticed L.A. had pushed her toy stroller outside the front door and slipped down the stairs. The other bruises observed on L.A. were caused by prior falls and slow healing.” (Fn. omitted.)

G.P is the father of L.A. He did not have contact with his daughter for the first two and one-half years of her life because her biological mother prevented him. He went to court and obtained custody of L.A. around September or October 2015.

“G.P. lived with Mother. He acknowledged the home was messy when the authorities came, but stated the condition was caused by repair work being done. He did affirm he had a substance abuse problem but had been ‘clean’ for the past three years. He also stated he and Mother ‘collect’ recycling, which they keep in bags, and people ‘come in and out’ of the home for the ‘recycling.’ Father also indicated L.A. is a concern after she fell from her bunk bed.

“On June 30, 2016, R.G.-B. was questioned by the staff at Child Abuse Listening, Interviewing and Coordination Center (CALICO). The minor stated he sleeps on the top bunk and that L.A. sleeps on the lower bunk. The minor did not see L.A. fall down the stairs. He also indicated L.A. occasionally sleepwalks, falls, and vomits in the home. He recalled L.A. had fallen from his mom’s bed and passed out. At the time of this fall, Mother was in the kitchen speaking with a man about getting ‘ice.’ R.G.-B. stated his mom and ‘uncle’ sell ‘ice’ night and day, with the cash from the sales placed in boxes in the home. The minor described ‘ice’ as small and white in little bags kept in the garage. On at least one instance, ‘robbers’ came to the home looking for the white powder. He has seen physical abuse toward L.A., as well as assault between his mother and father.

“On the same day, E.G.-B. was also interviewed. While she said she was 5, in fact, she was 3. She stated three separate times during the interview that Mother hit L.A. with her foot to the child’s head. She also saw Mother hit L.A. in the stomach and chest.

“The Agency on this day also spoke with Dr. Crawford at Children’s Hospital in Alameda County. He stated that L.A.’s intracranial injury and cerebral hemorrhage were not consistent with a child falling. Instead, the hemorrhage was more consistent with the extreme shaking of the child. The symmetric bruises on L.A.’s arms were like fingerprints where the child had been lifted and held. The doctor said the bruise inside L.A.’s ear was uncommon and a point of concern. Her recent rib fracture was consistent with being punched, kicked, or knelt on by a heavier person. The bruising he saw on the child’s hip was also not compatible with falling. Finally, Dr. Crawford stated that additional injuries he had diagnosed, which included a broken pelvis ball socket, bleeding in the rectal area, and bleeding around the brain, were not caused by slipping down the stairs or falling off a bed.

“On July 1, 2016, the Agency completed its review of the conditions at the home. While Mother claimed the conditions were the result of home remodeling, the report indicated the house was filthy, smelled, and presented hazardous conditions. There was garbage piled throughout the home. Dirty clothes were lying on the floor in various places. The door to a bathroom had a hole in it, as if it had been kicked in. Finally, there was very little food in the refrigerator; what was there was too old to eat. Flies were observed around the food in the open areas of the home.

“On July 5, 2016, the Agency filed its petition under section 300, subdivisions (b), (g), and (j). [That same day, the Agency also filed a dependency petition as to L.A.]

“Mother and a minor, R.G.-B., were the subjects of a previous case, which was open from January 13, 2014, to March 31, 2014. Its current status is informal family maintenance. The origin of the matter was a report that R.G.-B. was found walking the streets of Oakland at the age of two wearing no clothes, with a blanket covering his body. When the police contacted Mother after they found the child, she stated she left R.G.-B. home with his grandfather, but that caretaker had to leave to go for dialysis treatment. Hence the child was unattended. Mother indicated this had happened in the past, but viewed this as not a serious problem for the minor. The Agency closed the case when it was reported Mother went to Mexico with the children. The Agency was not aware she had returned to California.

“On July 6, 2016, the court detained all the minors.

“According to its statutory obligations, the Agency prepared a jurisdiction report for the hearing set for July 20, 2016. The report requested the minors be declared dependents and that the court grant a continuance of 30 days for the disposition of the matter. On July 7, 2016, Mother was arrested and charged with child corporal punishment, a felony violation of Penal Code section 273d, subdivision (a). As a result of the arrest, a protective order was issued.

“L.A. was interviewed by the staff at CALICO on July 7, 2016. The child indicated she got her injuries from a fall, but then indicated she had injuries from Mother kicking her. Mother eventually admitted hitting the minors in this case, as well as L.A., but only on the bottom with her hand. She denied she caused the bruising observed by the staff at Children’s Hospital. She also denied she and G.P. engaged in domestic violence. Any injuries to L.A. were possibly caused by the maternal grandparents when L.A. visited them.

“G.P. advised representatives of the Agency he had seen Mother discipline R.G.‑B. and E.G.-B., but not L.A. When L.A. first came to live with him and Mother, she was timid and ‘malnourished.’ Since he works Monday through Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., G.P. leaves the children with Mother. He acknowledged that L.A. had fallen from the top bunk in the home a few weeks earlier, but she seemed okay at the time and went back to bed. She did have a bruise on her left leg and shoulder. G.P. indicated that the day Mother took L.A. to the hospital, she called him around 11:00 a.m., asking him to come to the hospital. Mother told him L.A. had fallen outside the home and hit her head on the concrete.”

During an interview with social workers on July 13, 2016, G.P. shared that Mother had spent two days in jail after her arrest. He provided $2,000 to bail her out. When the petition’s allegations regarding L.A.’s injuries were read to him, he stated that he could not imagine Mother had committed the abuse but wanted to know what had happened to his daughter. He stated that if Mother was responsible for the injuries then he would end their relationship. When contacted on September 12, 2016, G.P. indicated that he and Mother were still living together and in a relationship.

“The biological father of R.G.-B. and E.G.-B., R.G., spoke with staff of the Agency on July 15, 2016. R.G. lived in Michoacán, Mexico, in July 2016 when the dependency court became involved in this matter. He indicated these two minors go between Mexico and the United States regularly. They had been in Mexico as recently as May 2016. The children were afraid to return to Mother in the United States because she ‘hits them . . . all the time.’ This parent noticed the bruising on the two minors’ bodies and asked Mother about his concerns; she advised it was ‘none of his business.’ Mother also told R.G. the children are hers and ‘she can do what she wants.’ ”

On September 27, 2016, the juvenile court denied G.P.’s request for the Agency to be granted discretion to allow supervised visits with L.A.

On November 8, 2016, the juvenile court found the petition’s allegations as to L.A. to be true. The child was ordered removed from G.P’s custody and placed in an out‑of-home placement. The Agency was ordered to provide reunification services to G.P. and to L.A’s mother, and both parents were granted supervised visitation.[3]

“On December 13, 2016, the dependency court admitted the Agency’s reports [as to the other three minors]. The matter was submitted. The court found the amended petition true and declared the minors dependents of the court. The court further found that reasonable services had been offered, and placed the minors out of the home.”

On December 15, 2016, Mother filed a notice of appeal from the portion of the trial court’s order requiring supervised visitation.

On December 21, 2016, the Agency filed an amended section 300 petition as to Mother’s three children.

On May 8, 2017, the juvenile court granted the Agency’s ex parte application requesting permission for R.G.-B. and E.G-B. to travel to Mexico with their caregiver to visit family, which would also allow the children an opportunity to visit with their father, R.G. The order was reissued on June 2, 2017.

On May 25, 2017, the Agency filed a status review report as to Mother’s children. The Agency recommended that the children remain dependents of the court and in their out-of-home placements. The Agency also requested that family reunification services be continued to all parents. The social worker had made a referral for Mother to obtain a psychological evaluation, requesting a Spanish-speaking evaluator. Mother was taking anger management classes, and was consistently attending therapy to address the removal of her children. However, the issue of the abuse to L.A. had not often been discussed in depth at therapy. Mother reportedly would maintain that she did not hurt the child and then would refuse to talk about it.

R.G. told the social worker he had already begun therapy with a psychologist and had enrolled in parenting classes. The psychologist stated to the social worker that she had met with R.G. once and they were to begin meeting twice a week. R.G. later said he went to four or five sessions but stopped, reportedly because he feared for his life after receiving letters threatening him if he continued to try to reunify with his children. The social worker asked for copies of these letters, but he had not followed up or contacted her again. She also was unable to confirm whether he had attended the additional sessions with the psychologist.

The agency reported that G.P. was in partial compliance with his case plan. While he had engaged in services, including therapy, he continued to be in a relationship with Mother and live with her even though the restraining order prohibits contact between Mother and L.A. He still had not accepted that L.A. suffered nonaccidental and severe trauma while in Mother’s care. He was visiting his two children weekly and was appropriately engaged during the visits.

On March 21, 2017, L.A. was removed from her foster home after it was determined that the foster parent was physically abusing her.

II.Six-Month Review Hearings

In a status review report filed April 4, 2017, the Agency reported that G.P. was attending weekly individual therapy and had been extremely consistent in attending his scheduled appointments. He had also completed 15 parenting classes. He began supervised visitation with L.A. in December 2016 and was engaging appropriately with her during visits. However, he continued to be in a relationship and live with Mother. He had not demonstrated he was able to be protective of L.A. and follow the conditions of the restraining order. The Agency concluded it would be detrimental to return L.A. to G.P. because he needed to demonstrate that he could protect her from her abuser.

On April 13, 2017, the juvenile court held the six-month review hearing for L.A. The court found that G.P. had made partial progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating out-of-home placement, and found the Agency provided reasonable services.

On May 31, 2017, we filed our opinion affirming the juvenile court’s order for supervised visitation as to Mother. (In re R.G.-B., supra, A150086.)

On June 6, 2017, the six-month review hearing was conducted for Mother’s three children. Minor’s counsel submitted to the Agency’s recommendations, stating that she would like to see additional sibling visitation. G.P. also submitted, with his counsel stating that he wanted to reunify with both of his children and would be working on getting housing separate from Mother. Mother also submitted.

R.G.’s counsel stated agreement with the continuation of services and requested that his children be allowed to spend the night at his house during their visit to Mexico. R.G. reported that he had received threatening anonymous letters to the effect that if he continued to try to reunify with his children “it would not go well for him.” The court found supervised visitation in Mexico with the caregiver during the day would be sufficient. The court explained that the children had not been with R.G. for a while and that “baby steps are in order given some comments especially that [R.G.-B.] had made six months ago,” referring to the fact that the minor had described seeing R.G. hit his mother in the past.

At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court indicated that it had considered all sibling issues and the safety of the children. Reasonable services had been offered or provided, and Mother and G.P. had made partial progress, while R.G. had made minimal progress. The court found that return of the children to any of the parents would create a substantial risk of detriment and that their out-of-home placement continued to be necessary and appropriate.

III.12-Month Review Hearings

On August 18, 2017, the Agency filed a status review report as to L.A. The Agency recommended that family reunification services be terminated as to G.P. and that a section 366.26 hearing be set to free L.A. for adoption.

On August 21, 2017, the Agency filed a status review report as to Mother’s three children recommending that the minors remain dependents of the court and in their out‑of-home placements. It also requested that reunification services to all three parents be terminated and that a section 366.26 hearing be set to free the children for adoption. It was noted that Mother and G.P. had recently become parents of a baby boy. As of August 2, 2017, they were reportedly still living together. G.P. had been having therapeutic visitation with L.A. and G.P.-B since May 5, 2017.

On October 13, 2107, the Agency filed an addendum report. Reportedly, Mother and G.P. were no longer living together.

The 12-month contested review hearings for both dependency proceedings were held on October 16 and 17, 2017. The Agency again requested that family reunification services be terminated and that a section 366.26 hearing be set to free the children for adoption.

As to the case involving Mother’s three children, the social worker testified that Mother had been complying with her individual therapy; however, she had not addressed the abuse to L.A. There still was an active restraining order against Mother with respect to L.A. Mother would be completing her anger management class at the end of the month. However, she had not complied with the requirement to undergo psychological testing. A Spanish-speaking person was available initially to do the testing, but Mother waited approximately a month and a half after getting the Agency’s referral. By the time she contacted the provider that person was no longer working there. On cross‑examination, the social worker indicated that she had made the initial referral six months after she was assigned to the case and did not make another referral for testing until September 29, 2017. The reason for the delay of the initial referral was that psychological testing was not part of Mother’s original case plan. The requirement was added after the social worker and her supervisor decided to explore whether there were cognitive or reasoning issues as to why Mother did not understand the severity of the abuse to L.A. and the severity of the case. Eventually, Mother was provided with a referral to an independent psychologist and she had started testing the Friday before the hearing.

As of August 2017, Mother and G.P. reported that they were no longer in a relationship. However, G.P. had confirmed they were still living together as late as August 2, 2017. The social worker testified that termination of services was being recommended because Mother continued to deny that there was any abuse to L.A., and because visitation had not progressed beyond once-a-week supervised visitation. Visitation had not progressed because Mother’s failure to acknowledge her past abuse would be a concern if visitation were to be unsupervised. However, the visits had gone well. Mother was very attentive to her children and the support counselor summarized that mother had done well in meeting her goals during visitation. There were no reports of any harmful behavior or inappropriate interaction between Mother and her children. However, the Agency was unable to fully assess her protective capacity towards her children because the visitation was conducted in a controlled environment.

As to G.P., he had completed all of the services that had been recommended to him, including going to weekly therapy, in which he was making progress, and attending a parenting class. However, he was still in denial as to the abuse to L.A. The issue had been addressed in therapy, but G.P. continued to view her injuries as accidental. As of September 2017, G.P. had started to make more of an effort to look at the doctors’ reports and work with his therapist on exactly what happened. He had been visiting his children very consistently and had just recently began therapeutic visits. The Agency recommended termination of reunification services based on his inability to acknowledge the abuse to his child and the identity of her abuser. Also, his visitation had been strictly supervised and he had not made progress. There had been ongoing concerns because he had continued to live in the same home as Mother, and it was hard to recommend reunification while he lived in the same home as the person who had abused his child. He had reportedly been trying to locate new housing but had not followed through, though he did move at the end of August 2017.

As to R.G., he was not participating in counseling or domestic violence classes. He said he had completed four to five classes for domestic violence, but had not provided any verification to the social worker. He also was not going to counseling, and told the social worker that he stopped participation in services because he was fearful to continue. In June 2017, he said he would reengage in services, but the social worker never received any type of verification to that effect.

R.G. had visited his children when they were in Mexico with their caretaker for a month, but had not had any other visits. The visits reportedly went well and the children said they enjoyed spending time with him and wanted to see him again. He did not agree with an offer to arrange for visitation at the border in San Diego because it was too far away from his farm. The Agency had offered to assist him with transportation to the border, but he declined. R.G. would have been willing to see his children if they had been brought directly to him. The Agency recommended termination of reunification services because R.G. was not participating in any of the services offered to him, had not been in consistent communication with the Agency, and had not made any attempt to visit the children outside of their scheduled family trip.

On cross-examination, the social worker testified that she first reached R.G. by phone in February 2017. Prior to that, she had made calls and had sent him letters in English, though she did not know if he could read English. R.G. does not speak English. The first letter was sent in December 2016, setting forth the expectations of his case plan. She later spoke with a therapist who said that she had met with him one time. The therapist had agreed to keep the social worker updated on his progress. No updates were ever received.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found there was not a substantial probability any of the children would be returned within 18 months because the parents had not made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to removal. Mother and G.P had not addressed the abuse suffered by L.A. at the hands of Mother. As to R.G., he had “taken himself off the map” by not maintaining contact with the Agency. The court found that reasonable services had been offered or provided. Reunification services were ordered terminated and the parents were ordered to return for the section 366.26 hearing.

At the 12-month contested hearing in the case of L.A., it was noted that the 18‑month date following the date of removal would occur in December 2017. The Agency’s report stated that G.P. had moved out of Mother’s home to an apartment in Hayward. He expressed regret for not moving out sooner, indicating that he struggled to leave because she was pregnant with his son and he felt he was making a choice between his children. He still had trouble accepting that Mother had caused L.A.’s injuries and acknowledged that he took too long to take the necessary steps to separate himself from Mother.

At the hearing, the social worker testified that G.P. had completed a parenting class and was participating in individual therapy. He had been consistently attending therapy and as of August 2017 he had attended 44 sessions. His therapy was to address why L.A. was removed from his care and the severe injuries that she sustained, as well as to give him emotional support. These issues had not all been addressed, as only recently was he starting to consider the idea that L.A. could have been severely physically abused by Mother. Throughout the case, G.P. had stated that he felt the injury was accidental and that he wanted to wait until the criminal matter was resolved to find out if Mother was the person who harmed L.A.

In May 2017, he began engaging in therapeutic visitation with L.A. and her half brother G.P.-B. His visits are supervised because up until a month before the hearing, G.P. was residing with Mother and the agency had concerns as to whether he would comply with the restraining order prohibiting contact between Mother and L.A. He did work with parent advocates who helped him put in applications for housing for the past six months. He indicated that he was currently renting a room in an apartment in Hayward. The social worker had not seen a lease. Even though he stated that he was separated from Mother, the social worker had concerns that they could potentially get back together. It had been difficult for him to leave because of the new baby.

The social worker recommended termination of family reunification services because during the past 12 months G.P. had not accepted that L.A.’s injuries were nonaccidental, even though the specialist at the hospital found that the severe injuries she had cannot be explained by falling. Also, he had continued to reside with Mother, in spite of his professed desire to reunify with his child. Visitation had remained supervised because of concerns about his capacity to ensure that L.A. had no contact with Mother. The social worker did not believe there was a likelihood that L.A. could be returned to G.P.’s custody by December 2017.

L.A. appears to have suffered emotional trauma from her injuries. She has talked about being hit by Mother many times during her individual therapy, as well as with her foster parent. She has woken up from having nightmares, crying and upset, and talking about being hit by Mother. The nightmares had been happening a few times a week, but they had decreased. She had therapeutic visits with her father. Initially, she did not engage right away with G.P. and exhibited symptoms of hypervigilance, but as the visits have progressed those symptoms have decreased and there is more interaction between L.A. and her father. There is an increase in the bond attachment and she is more willing to accept his affection. He is attentive to her and comforts her without any prompts from the clinician. She has brought up being hit by Mother during these therapeutic visitations with him.

At the hearing, G.P. testified that he only began getting clarity around the severity of injuries to L.A. during the past month. Prior to that, he had mixed emotions because he found it impossible to believe that somebody close to him would harm his child. He wanted to move out because the relationship with Mother was over and he had clarity regarding his daughter’s injuries. The relationship with Mother ended about five months prior to the hearing. He was currently living in an apartment with a roommate. On one occasion during a visit with L.A., the child said that Mother had hit her. With the therapist’s help, they talked about it and he told her he loved her and is there to protect her.

On October 17, 2017, the juvenile court ordered the termination of G.P.’s reunification services as to L.A. and set a section 366.26 hearing. The court found G.P. was “starting to make progress” in resolving the problems that led to removal, but concluded he had not done enough. The court was concerned that G.P. could return to living with Mother. And while he had participated in therapy, “the focus of the therapy that he received was on himself and not [L.A.]” The court fund there was no substantial probability of return by the 18-month deadline. Mother, G.P., and R.G. all subsequently filed notices of intent to seek a writ.

DISCUSSION

I.Standard of Review

A reviewing court must uphold a juvenile court’s findings and orders if they are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1036–1037.) Evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value satisfies the substantial evidence standard. (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.) Determinations of the credibility of witnesses and resolutions of conflicts in the evidence are for the juvenile court to resolve; we do not revisit these matters on review. (In re Tanis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1226–1227.) We must draw all inferences in support of the juvenile court’s findings and view the record in the light most favorable to the court’s orders. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 423.) Consequently, the petitioner bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)

II. Matter of L.A. (A152883)

G.P. contends the record does not support the juvenile court’s finding that the Agency provided him with reasonable reunification services in this case. A finding that reasonable services have been provided is appropriate when the record “show[s] that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .” (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414 (Riva M.).) “ ‘The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’ ” (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1426 (Tracy J.).)

G.P. specifically faults the court’s unwillingness to order unsupervised visitation. He argues that because no one offered to move his visits to either an observed or an unsupervised setting, the Agency was unable to make an assessment of his protectiveness to inform their decision to terminate services. He also asserts it is disingenuous to continue to refuse him unsupervised visits because he has not acknowledged who abused his child. The refusal is especially wrong, he argues, given that there were no allegations in the petition that he committed physical abuse. We are not persuaded.

Visitation is an essential component of a reunification plan. (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580.) A court defines the rights of the parents to visitation by balancing the interests of the parents in visitation with the best interests of the child. (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) During the reunification period, visitation must be as frequent as possible, “consistent with the well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A); see Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972.) The court may limit a parent’s contact with a child upon finding that such limitation is in the child’s best interest. (In re Cheryl H. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1133.)

We first note that it appears the issue is waived as there is nothing in the record demonstrating that G.P. ever asked for any modification to the juvenile court’s visitation orders. A party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court. (Civ. Code, §§ 3515, 3516; see In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885.) Forfeiture, also referred to as “waiver,” applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of the proceedings. (In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1037–1038; Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1149; In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1152; see Riva M., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at pp. 411–412.)

Moreover, were we to reach the merits of G.P.’s argument, on this record we would not find he was denied acceptable visitation with L.A. As a threshold matter, we note that we do not apply a substantial evidence review to a juvenile court’s decision to maintain a specific visitation status. Instead, we apply the abuse of discretion standard because the court did not deny all visitation, but rather exercised its discretion to maintain the same level of supervised visitation. (See In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356.)

A claim that the juvenile court essentially colluded with social workers in limiting visitation in order to sabotage a parent’s reunification prospects is a serious allegation. However, there is nothing in this record to show the Agency limited visitation with the intent to affect the existing parent-child relationship. The Agency’s concerns were primarily based on the fact that G.P. did not demonstrate he could protect his child, given that he continued to maintain a relationship with Mother while there was a restraining order prohibiting contact between Mother and L.A. The Agency was also concerned about his frequent expressions of doubt as to whether Mother was, in fact, responsible for L.A.’s injuries. In light of the G.P.’s apparent inability to process the circumstances of the serious abuse Mother inflicted on L.A., the juvenile court soundly exercised its discretion. There is nothing in the record that leads us to believe that the court’s decision to maintain supervised visitation was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (See In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)

G.P. also argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it failed to order the continuation of services to the 18-month hearing. He asserts there was a substantial probability that he could be reunited with L.A. if he had been granted unsupervised visits. He notes it is uncontroverted that he engaged in his case plan and had left Mother and secured his own residence. He asks that we order the court to continue services for six more months.

The fact that G.P. made substantive progress in his case plan during the year leading up to the 12-month review hearing does not mandate returning the minor to his custody. As explained by the court in In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131: “[S]imply complying with the reunification plan by attending the required therapy sessions and visiting the children is to be considered by the court; but it is not determinative. The court must also consider the parents’ progress and their capacity to meet the objectives of the plan; otherwise the reasons for removing the children out-of-home will not have been ameliorated.” (Id. at p. 1143.)

Here, the 18-month period in this case expired in December 2017, which was only two months after the 12-month hearing was held. At an 18-month hearing, if a child is not returned to his or her parents, the juvenile court must develop a permanent plan for that child. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) For children who are in a sibling group including a child the age of G.P.-B., court-ordered reunification services may be extended up to a maximum period of 18 months if the court finds at the 12-month review hearing “that there is a substantial probability that the [children] will be returned” to parental custody or that reasonable services have not been provided. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3).) The 18‑month period commences on the date the minor originally is removed from parental custody. (Ibid.) Here, the children were removed from G.P.’s custody on June 30, 2016. At the time of the contested “12-month” hearing, 16 months had elapsed since removal.

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that L.A. was unlikely to be returned to G.P. before the expiration of the 18-month period. In assessing the risk of safely returning a child to a parent’s custody, the court may consider whether the parent requesting the return of the children maintains relationships with persons who pose a risk of detriment to the child. (See generally Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705, 708.)

As detailed above, G.P. continued to have difficulties processing the circumstances of L.A.’s injuries and separating himself from the perpetrator. He remained with Mother for over a year after this dependency was initiated, even though he was informed at the outset that his daughter’s severe injuries were nonaccidental and that Mother was responsible for them. He had been living apart from Mother for only a few months by the time of the 12-month hearing. The court also concluded that parts of his testimony concerning his awakening as to Mother’s abusive behavior were “clearly lacking in credibility,” a determination that we do not review on appeal. (See, e.g., In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) In sum, we find no error in the court’s decision to terminate G.P’s reunification services and set the matter for a permanency hearing.

III. Matter of R.G-B. et al. (A152742)

A. Petition of R.G.

For reasons that are unexplained, R.G.’s petition seeks relief from the October 17, 2017 order as to R.G.-B. only, and not to E.G-B. R.G. first contends that the juvenile court committed reversible error when it failed to place the minor with him at the 12‑month review hearing, claiming substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that placement with him posed a substantial risk of detriment to R.G.‑B.

The purpose of reunification services is to reunify the family. In fact, the dependency statutes presume that a dependent child will be returned to parental custody at each review hearing unless the juvenile court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that returning the child would be detrimental. Subdivision (f)(1) of section 366.21 provides that at the 12-month review hearing, the court must return the minor to the parent’s physical custody unless it finds by “a preponderance of the evidence” that return would be detrimental to the minor. If the court concludes return would be detrimental, it may continue the case for an additional six months (but in no case longer than 18 months after the date the child was taken from his parent’s physical custody) if it finds a substantial probability that “the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)

R.G. first contends “there was no evidence in the record that [he] could not meet the minor’s basic needs.” He notes that he previously had provided the Agency with an approved home study from Desarrollo Integral de la Familia (DIF), and claims there was no evidence that his circumstances had changed significantly since that time. He argues there was insufficient evidence of any current risk of domestic violence, though he acknowledges his son reported such violence had occurred in the past. He also admits that he had not engaged in a domestic violence prevention program.

R.G. also asserts there was no significant evidence of emotional risk to R.G.-B. if he were to be placed with him. He notes, however, that separation from siblings can be considered in determining detriment, and that R.G.-B. had expressed he would “not feel good” if he had to leave his mother and siblings. The Agency indicated in the 12-month status review report that R.G.-B. and his sister had adjusted very well to their placement with their aunt and cousins. While the minor enjoyed the time he spent with R.G. and wanted to see him again, it is reasonable to conclude that placement with R.G. in Mexico would be detrimental to the minor because it would foreclose contact with his Mother and his siblings.

The evidence summarized above also shows that R.G. was minimally engaged in reunification services and maintained inconsistent contact with the Agency throughout this dependency. He also failed to maintain consistent and regular contact with his children and make progress in his case plan. In light of his minimal efforts to participate in services and his evident lack of progress, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that R.G.-B. would suffer detriment if placed in the physical custody of R.G.

R.G. further asserts his lack of consistent communication did not establish a substantial risk of detriment. He attributes his lack of contact to economic difficulties and notes that findings of detriment should not be based on poverty-related circumstances. He also asserts concerns about monitoring the minor could have been addressed by requesting courtesy supervision by DIF. However, the allegations concerning his economic difficulties are not substantiated in the record. We note that at the same time he asserts poverty, he also asserts that his circumstances have not significantly changed since the time of DIF’s positive home evaluation. It is also unclear to this court how poverty would explain his complete failure to maintain telephone contact or contact by mail with the Agency or his children. Reportedly, he had not had any phone contact with his children after they returned from their trip to Mexico.

R.G. also claims the juvenile court erred in terminating his reunification services, asserting that the agency failed to provide reasonable services. He notes that some of the letters sent by the Agency were in English, and that does not speak English. And while the social worker did later reach him by telephone with the assistance of a Spanish‑language interpreter, he complains that the Agency did not provide him with any referrals or support in identifying service providers in his area.

The social worker mailed a letter in English to R.G. in December 2016. She first spoke with him by telephone in February 2017 using a Spanish-language interpreter. At the time she spoke to him, he told her that he had already signed up for a domestic violence class. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that he understood or obtained a translation the written information that the Agency initially sent to him. Further, as he apparently already knew where to locate domestic violence classes and, on his own, had obtained a therapist, we disagree with his contention that the Agency erred in failing to provide him with referrals. Instead, the evidence supports the conclusion that he availed himself of services but thereafter ceased to participate in them. The social worker testified that he told her in April 2017 that he was no longer attending domestic violence classes. This failure is his responsibility, not the Agency’s. In particular, once he told the social worker that he was no longer attending classes, the Agency cannot reasonably be faulted for declining to undertake further efforts to find a provider for him. As he himself notes, “[r]eunification services are voluntary; they cannot be forced onto parents who are unwilling or indifferent.”

In sum, the record indicates that even when R.G. obtained services, he declined to take advantage of them. He attended only one visit with a therapist, and did not attend any domestic violence classes. Thus, there is little or no evidence in the record that he had made any progress in his case plan. Based on the home study that is contained in the record, he had made contact with DIF and was clearly on notice that he needed to access services. The record’s silence on this and other matters does not constitute evidence the agency failed to make reasonable efforts to maintain contact with him or assist him in accessing services, as his arguments suggest.

The test for determining whether the services provided were reasonable is “not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547; see Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164, 1166 [reasonableness of agency’s reunification efforts are judged according to the circumstances of the case].) The Agency’s obligation is to make a good faith effort to develop and implement a family reunification plan, if appropriate. (In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 697.) In light of the fact that he contacted DIF directly and obtained services relatively early in this dependency proceeding, it is not reasonable for him to complain that the Agency failed to provide him with services. There also was substantial evidence of R.G.’s failure to stay in communication with the Agency. Under these circumstances, we will not upset the juvenile court’s finding that the services the Agency offered were reasonable.

R.G. asserts his lack of communication and fear of participating in his case plan services did not absolve the Agency of a duty to provide reasonable support services. He does not acknowledge, however, that he failed to provide the Agency with copies of any of the threatening letters he said he received. Additionally, apart from one counseling session with a therapist, there was no documentation that he availed himself of services that he was offered. When evaluating the reasonableness of reunification services, we consider not only the agency’s efforts to assist father in obtaining services, but also father’s efforts to avail himself of services. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1365.) He was on notice of the pendency of the dependency proceedings, had made contact with DIF, and could have contacted DIF directly to get services resumed.

Finally, R.G. faults the Agency for failing to provide reasonable visitation services and asserts the court abused its discretion in failing to make a specific visitation order. He claims the court improperly delegated to the Agency the discretion as to whether visits would occur and that its failure to order that visits take place in Mexico rendered the visitation order illusory and an abuse of discretion.

We note that just prior to the minors’ trip to Mexico, the Agency was concerned due to R.G.’s lack of contact, which prevented social workers from assessing how the children would fare in his care. This, along with the fact that the children had not been with R.G. for some time, combined with R.G.-B.’s allegations of his father’s domestic abuse, are what caused the court to deny his request for overnight visits during the children’s time in Mexico. There is no evidence of a positive change in circumstances after that time. It is undisputed that after he did have visitation during the caretaker’s vacation in Mexico, he failed to telephone his children.

Moreover, the Agency offered to take the children to San Diego and to provide R.G. with transportation to the border to visit them, but he refused. His argument that the Agency was required to transport the children from the Bay Area to his residence in Mexico is not well taken, especially in light of his failure to maintain regular telephone contact with the Agency or his children and to avail himself of reunification services. He also provides no authority for the proposition that the social worker wrongly understood that the Agency could not facilitate visitation within Mexico. It is reasonable to assume either the Agency did not have the financial resources to conduct visitation in Mexico, or did not have jurisdiction to conduct supervised visitation outside of the United States.

“A court may not delegate its discretion to determine whether any visitation will occur, but it may delegate decisions such as the time, place and manner of visitation.” (In re Randalynne G. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1164, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1294–1295.) “[T]the ministerial tasks of overseeing visitation as defined by the juvenile court ‘can, and should, be delegated to the entity best able to perform them, here the department of social services.’ [Citation.] ‘Such matters as time, place and manner of visitation do not affect the defined right of a parent to see his or her child and thus do not infringe upon the judicial function.’ ” (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374.) “[T]he frequency and length of visits are simply aspects of the time, place and manner of visitation. Accordingly, the juvenile court may grant to the county agency the discretion to determine the frequency and length of visitation ordered by the court.” (Id. at pp. 1376–1377.) We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in delegating to the Agency the ability to determine the location and frequency of visits.

B. Petition of G.P.

G.P. asserts the record does not support the juvenile court’s finding that the Agency provided him with reasonable reunification services in this case based solely on the court’s unwillingness to order unsupervised visitation. His arguments are virtually identical to the arguments he advanced in his petition concerning his daughter L.A. While there was no restraining order against Mother for G.P.-B., the same concerns regarding G.P.’s inability to understand the culpability of Mother for the abuse she had inflicted on L.A. informed the court’s decisions as to his younger son. For the reasons discussed above, we find no abuse of discretion as to the court’s decision with respect to G.P.-B.

G.P. also asserts the court abused its discretion when it failed to continue reunification services to the 18-month hearing. As we noted in our discussion of the petition regarding L.A., the 18-month deadline was only two months away, yet G.P. had only recently acknowledged the possibility that Mother had abused L.A. While G.P. was engaged in his case plan, based on all the circumstances we have discussed above it is clear that the court reasonably concluded that he would not be reunified with G.P.-B. by the 18-month deadline.

C. Petition of Mother

Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding the Agency provided reasonable services after it failed to provide her with a psychiatric evaluation in Spanish. As noted above, the Agency added a psychiatric evaluation to Mother’s case plan before the six-month hearing to address the social workers’ suspicion that she may have psychological issues that impede her ability to process the harm she had inflicted on L.A. She was given a referral in May 2017, but by the time she made contact, the provider no longer had a Spanish-speaking practitioner. The social worker did not learn of this until July 2017 when she met with Mother. At that time, the social worker could not find a provider with a Spanish-speaking evaluator. A second referral was not made until September 2017. Because the Agency did offer her a proper referral at the outset, we are not persuaded that the Agency was derelict in any way.

Mother offers that she was in the late stages of pregnancy as an explanation for why she did not set an appointment after receiving the first referral. She also appears to fault the Agency for not following up sooner with her. However, the event that precipitated her delayed evaluation was caused by her own conduct in failing to contact the provider immediately after receiving the referral (it appears she did not call the provider until July 2017) or in letting the social worker know in a timely manner that her pregnancy had prevented her from following through. There is also no evidence that the Agency had any control over the provider’s scheduling policies and practices. Although in an ideal world a Spanish-speaking evaluator would have been available at all times, the record contains substantial evidence that under the circumstances here, including Mother’s delay in scheduling an appointment, the Agency offered her reasonable services.

Like G.P., Mother also claims the juvenile court erred in failing to move supervised visitation to unsupervised in order to determine her protective capacity. In addition to noting that visitation had gone well, she attempts to sidestep her failure to accept her role in L.A.’s abuse by noting that she was “in the middle of a criminal case in the matter and had the complete right not to make incriminating statements.” However, there is no evidence in the record that she ever invoked her right against self‑incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Further, she neglects to mention that use immunity is available to parents, such as she, who are proceeding simultaneously in criminal and juvenile courts for child abuse. (In re Jessica B. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 504, 521; see In re Lamonica H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 634, 650 [“[W]e find any admissions [the father] makes during the course of treatment ordered as part of the reunification plan would be immune from use in criminal proceedings which might be brought against him.”].) For these reasons, and the reasons stated above with respect to G.P., we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order the Agency to move from supervised visitation.

DISPOSITION

The petitions for extraordinary writ are denied on the merits. Our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

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