Filed 1/31/18 In re C.G. CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Hillary F. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order reducing her visits with her minor son C.G. She contends the juvenile court abused its discretion. We affirm the order.

BACKGROUND

We will discuss only the facts relevant to the visitation issue Mother raises on appeal.[1]

C.G. was detained in July 2015, when respondent Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition,[2] alleging then five-year-old C.G. was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or neglect. C.G.’s parents were separated. Mother, who was allowed only supervised visits with C.G., lived in Charleston, Oregon, while Father, who maintained legal and physical custody of C.G., lived in Eureka. The Department’s petition alleged Father did not supervise C.G. adequately; failed to supervise or protect C.G. from custodians with whom he had been left; and was unable to provide for his son’s regular care. According to the petition, Father allowed Mother ongoing unsupervised visits with G.G. although only supervised contact was permitted. He had a history of substance abuse and recently relapsed. He also could not protect C.G. from unsafe adults.

At the August 2015 jurisdiction hearing, Mother submitted to the court’s jurisdiction. Father also submitted subject to amendments to the petition. The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petition as amended.

Prior to the September 2015 disposition hearing, Mother requested C.G. be placed with her. At the hearing, Mother testified that four months earlier before she relocated to Oregon, she lived in Eureka, where she had been for most of C.G.’s life. She acknowledged her past drug addiction. While she stopped using drugs when pregnant with C.G., she relapsed when C.G. was about six-months old and made her way through various drug and counseling programs not always to completion. When C.G. was around 18 months old, Father began to allow Mother regular, unsupervised visits. It was her understanding that any court orders limiting her visits with C.G. or requiring her to stay away from him were expired. During their visits, they took walks in the woods, picnicked, and did nature hunts. C.G. called her “mom” and “mommy.” She admitted that on occasion she was “dirty” when she received C.G. for a visit. She testified, however, that she sobered up when she became pregnant with her four-month old daughter and C.G.’s half-sister, J.F., who lived with her in Oregon, and that she has been clean and sober for over a year. Mother said she would be willing to do whatever necessary to get custody of C.G.

The social worker assigned to C.G.’s case expressed concerns about Mother’s ability to remain sober given her substance abuse history and lack of participation in any support programs. The Department could not recommend C.G. be placed with her.

At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, C.G. was declared a dependent of the juvenile court. The court found that placement with Mother would be detrimental to C.G, vested the Department with his care and custody, and authorized his placement in a foster home. The court further ordered the Department to provide family reunification services. Mother was offered eight hours of supervised visits with C.G. per month.

By the March 2016 six-month review, Mother had shown steady progress on her case plan, even from Oregon. In its report, the Department described Mother as “stable” and without a need for further alcohol and other drug treatment. She tested negative for all substances. She had enrolled in services, including narcotics anonymous and a parenting program. Out of eight possible visits with C.G., she made seven. At those visits, Mother demonstrated “appropriate parenting techniques and skills” with C.G. She was “appropriate, loving and caring.” But it was difficult for Mother to focus on C.G. when his half-sister was also present, making C.G.’s return to her “premature.” Also, C.G. could not be placed with Mother because the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) process was not complete.

At the six-month review, the juvenile court found Mother had complied with her case plan and was making minimal progress towards addressing the causes for C.G.’s foster care placement. The court also found Mother was actively involved in case plan development including plans for C.G.’s permanent placement. Reunification services were to be continued. The court kept Mother’s visitation at eight supervised hours per month and authorized the social worker to allow unsupervised visits.

At the June 2016 interim review, Mother’s progress continued. The Department reported that she continued to be engaged in her case plan services and objectives. Mother had surrendered on two warrants since C.G. was detained in order to resolve outstanding criminal matters. Her visits with C.G. improved. She “interacted positively” with her son and was better able to provide equal attention to both C.G. and his half-sister during visits. Mother and the two children appeared to “have a strong bond.” Because the visits were “appropriate and of quality,” the Department was going to allow unsupervised visits. But an update in the report indicated that ICPC placement was denied because it appeared Mother could not financially support two children. So, Mother found a job. At the conclusion of the interim review hearing, the court approved an expedited ICPC process.

By the October 2016 twelve-month review, Mother’s steady progress had waned. The Department’s twelve-month report showed that Mother tested positive on her most recent drug test. While she completed her parenting course, Mother stopped attending counseling sessions. Her ill health issues impeded her ability to engage in other services. The job Mother said she found was never verified and never materialized. Mother had not looked for work and had no intention of doing so. She planned to rely on public aid to support C.G. Her latest visits with C.G. also raised significant concerns. During an unsupervised visit, Mother allowed C.G. to communicate with Father, even though she was aware that Father’s visits were considered detrimental to the child. Following that visit, the report states C.G. wet his bed, wet himself at daycare, exposed himself, and kicked and pushed other children at daycare. The Department saw no substantial probability that more time would result in C.G.’s reunification with Mother. The Department recommended reunification services be terminated, more time be given to allow his foster parents to consider guardianship or adoption, and a section 366.26 hearing be set to select a permanent plan.

Other reports told of problems during unsupervised visits. C.G.’s foster parents since October 2015 submitted a report asking the Department to “consider going back to supervised visits, if any are required, for both Mother’s and C.G.’s safety.” In addition to C.G.’s contact with Father and the behavioral problems that followed, the foster parents reported other incidents they learned occurred during C.G.’s unsupervised visits. On one visit, one of Mother’s teenage brothers had bent C.G.’s fingers back and insulted him. During another visit, Mother purportedly allowed C.G. and J.F. to ride without restraints on the floorboard of her friend’s truck since she did not have her own car or car seats for the children. C.G. was also worried about a “bad man” who Mother said followed her from Oregon to Eureka, stole her car and phone and broke her window. In their view, C.G.’s visits with Mother were not beneficial. The report from the court-appointed special advocate (CASA) echoed the foster parents’ comments. The CASA recommended Mother’s visits be supervised, reunification services be terminated, and a section 366.26 hearing set.

Mother had recently moved back to Eureka and testified at the twelve-month hearing. She acknowledged her one-time drug relapse. When she was asked about C.G.’s communication with Father, she explained that Father had texted her while C.G. was playing with her phone. C.G. saw his picture with the text, and she read him Father’s message (“Tell my son I love him to the moon and back.”). C.G. never talked to him, and she told Father to not send her messages. She also acknowledged that C.G. (but not J.F.) rode on the floor of a vehicle, but it was because her car had been stolen and his car seat along with it. She said she had enrolled in services since returning to Eureka but acknowledged she had never previously completed a drug treatment program.

At the end of the twelve-month hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing with a permanent plan of adoption. The court specifically declined to find that C.G.’s acting out was due to his unsupervised visits with Mother, but stated that Mother “ha[d] left it too late” and waited too long to engage in services in light of her drug addiction. Mother was given twice weekly visitation with two hours for each visit. The court permitted the Department to file a motion to limit or end the visits if circumstances changed.

Several reports were submitted for the February 2017 section 366.26 hearing. The Department reported that at C.G.’s November 2016 Child Family Team meeting, participants said C.G. “was doing much better with his behaviors at home and at school since the visitation scheduled was reduced from 4 hours per week, to 8 hours every two weeks.”[3] There was no evidence that visits with his mother were followed by the same problematic behavior as before but it was noted that “after visits he has a hard time listening to adults.” Mother’s recent visits with C.G. “[s]ince the Court’s intervention” had been “overall positive” and Mother was found to be “appropriate and loving.” C.G. enjoyed the visits with Mother and her family and expressed his love for Mother and his desire to see her more.

The Department also reported C.G.’s foster parents were interested in becoming C.G.’s guardians and were open to adoption but could not yet commit. Both the Department’s section 366.26 report and its adoption addendum assessment reported the foster parents’ concerns about C.G.’s past aggressive and sexualized behavior and their desire for progress. The adoption assessment addendum further explained that his foster parents “fe[lt] they need more time with less visits from the mother in order to make a final commitment to adoption.” As to visitation, the addendum stated that Mother “has not been able to show that she is capable of maintaining appropriate boundaries at times” and that the visits “appear[] to be confusing for [C.G.].” The Department recommended a permanent plan of guardianship with dependency.

The CASA disagreed with the Department’s guardianship recommendation and advocated to end Mother’s visits altogether and to continue the section 366.26 hearing four months to allow C.G.’s foster parents to see whether C.G.’s behavior would change without visitation. Based on the CASA’s review of notes from C.G.’s Child Family Team meetings, the CASA report noted “a pattern of problems with [C.G.’s] mental health that seems to be related to his visits.” At C.G.’s October 2016 Child Family Team meeting, the Intensive Home Based Services (IHBS) worker who spent a lot of time with C.G. at school and home stated that on days following visits with his mother, C.G. “always has significant behavior issues in the classroom.” The IBHS worker’s concern remained the same at C.G.’s January 2017 Child Team Meeting. At that same meeting, the foster mother reported “a lot of unprovoked aggression after the visits.” In summary, the CASA observed, “Even the supervised visits with [Mother] are followed by erratic physical and emotional behavior by [C.G.] . . . . The environment his mother provides for these visits has shown at times her lack of consideration for his emotional needs, such as allowing her brother . . . to cause [C.G.] physical discomfort, residing in a trailer that is not suitable for him to be in, consorting with relatives who have their own issues with our legal system, scaring him by telling him that aliens are real and he could be abducted while outside at night.”

Following the CASA report, the Department filed a second addendum expressing concerns about Mother’s visitation. The Department noted recent Child Family Team meetings where “there has been agreement that after visits with his mother, [C.G.] has more acting out behaviors and is more emotional. The mental health team has expressed concern that visitation between [C.G.] and his mother is preventing him from making progress with his mental health goals.” The Department recommended changing Mother’s visitation to one monthly supervised visit for three to four hours. The Department continued to recommend guardianship with dependency.

At the section 366.26 hearing, Mother argued against reduction of her visitation schedule. The court admitted into evidence the logs of all of C.G.’s contacts, services, and visits from January 9, 2017, through February 3, 2017, which included summaries of his supervised visits with Mother. C.G.’s counsel pressed the court regarding the ongoing concern that C.G.’s mental health needs would not be met if Mother’s visitation was allowed at the same level. The minor’s counsel highlighted for the court examples in the visit logs where Mother was inappropriate with C.G. in some way. The Department stated that if the court looked through the visit logs “that the quality of the mother’s visits overall [was] very positive.” Mother’s counsel also argued that the visits between Mother and C.G. have been “good” and “positive” and found the recommendation to reduce visits “surprising.” Mother provided examples from the visit logs of high-quality visits (e.g., snuggling, making food together, taking walks together, appropriate discipline). The court took the matter under submission.

In March 2017, The court set the permanent plan of guardianship in place with a goal towards C.G.’s adoption. The court reduced Mother’s visits to one supervised visit of three to four hours per month. With the goal of adoption in place, the court explained that “continuing visitation is . . . detrimental to the goal [of adoption] in this case.” The court noted that both parents had the full time period allowed for reunification and that it was now time “to focus fully on [C.G.] and his emotional health which clearly needs to be addressed substantially if he is going to have any permanent placement.” Mother appeals the court’s order.

DISCUSSION

Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its discretion under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C) when it reduced her visits with C.G. We disagree.

When legal guardianship is ordered for a child, under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C), the juvenile court “shall also make an order for visitation with the parents . . . unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(C).) The juvenile court has the power and responsibility to regulate and define a parent’s right to visit his or her children who have been removed from parental custody. (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1373.) “The definition of such a right necessarily involves a balancing of the interests of the parent in visitation with the best interests of the child” and the court “may . . . impose any other conditions or requirements to further define the right to visitation in light of the particular circumstances of the case before it.” (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) “[D]ependency law affords the juvenile court great discretion in deciding issues related to parent-child visitation, which discretion we will not disturb on appeal unless the juvenile court has exceeded the bounds of reason.” (In re. S.H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557–1558 (S.H.).) In this case, we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion in reducing Mother’s visitation with C.G.

As an initial matter, there is no violation of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C)’s visitation order requirement. When the juvenile court ordered guardianship for C.G., it also ordered Mother be given one supervised visit with C.G. each month for three to four hours. In doing so, it fulfilled its obligation of making a visitation order per section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C).

The reduction in frequency of Mother’s visits with C.G. from approximately 16 hours per month to three to four hours did not amount to an abuse of the court’s discretion either. Our decision in In re S.H., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, is instructive. There, the mother argued that the juvenile court erred by limiting her visits with her 16-month-old dependent child to twice a year. (Id. at p. 1557.) We first noted that when a permanent plan of guardianship has been put in place, “ ‘the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are [sic] no longer paramount . . . [and] ‘the focus shifts to the need of the child for permanency and stability.” ’ [Citations.] Accordingly, the court must turn its focus to the child’s best interest, rather than the parent’s, in deciding issues that may arise.” (Id. at p. 1559.) At the time the court reduced the mother’s visits, we observed that the mother had bypassed reunification services and a permanent plan of guardianship had been ordered. (Id. at p. 1548.) When it ordered decreased visits, we said the court in S.H. was properly focused on the minor’s interest in deepening her attachment to her new caregivers (her third set) without unnecessary disruption from the mother who reportedly opposed the placements and was hostile towards the caregivers. (Id. at p. 1549.) We therefore concluded the juvenile court acted reasonably when it reduced the mother’s visitation. (Ibid.)

So, too, here. By the February 2017 section 366.26 hearing, Mother had been given a reasonable period of time to reunify with C.G., who had been under the court’s jurisdiction since September 2015. When the court saw no prospect for reunification, “the child’s interest in permanency and stability [took] priority.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) Thus, the court appropriately shifted its focus to C.G. and his needs for a permanent placement following appointment of his foster parents as his guardians. C.G.’s foster parents were open to adopting C.G. but needed to spend more time with C.G. and to have him visit Mother less in order to help their decision-making. In their view, C.G.’s visits with Mother were not healthy and were followed by “unprovoked aggression” and behavioral outbursts. The adverse effects of visitation were also noted by C.G.’s IBHS worker who spent significant time with C.G. both at school and at home and observed “significant behavior issues” on days following visits with Mother. Based on these reports, the CASA recommended terminating all visitation with Mother entirely. As in S.H., by reducing Mother’s visitation at the time it appointed C.G.’s guardians, the juvenile court here reasonably sought to advance C.G.’s permanent placement goal of adoption without the disruptions associated with Mother’s visits. It did not abuse its discretion in doing so.

Mother advances several reasons why it was in C.G.’s best interests to maintain the frequency of her visitation but none compel a different result. Mother emphasizes evidence showing the bond C.G. had with her and his half-sister. We do not dispute their bond or the many positive aspects to C.G.’s visits with Mother, but it is not our role to reweigh the evidence. We are required to view the evidence most favorably in support of the trial court’s order. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52–53.) The juvenile court acted well within the bounds of discretion in decreasing Mother’s visitation when the focus of the dependency shifted from Mother’s interest in reunification to C.G.’s need for permanency and stability.

Mother also contends it was in C.G.’s best interests to maintain frequent, lengthy visits with her because his placement with his foster parents was insecure and they could not commit to C.G.’s adoption. The uncertainty of C.G.’s adoption by his foster parents did not make the court’s order reducing visits with Mother unreasonable. Given Mother’s reunification services had been terminated, the need to address C.G.’s emotional health was paramount in order to secure a permanent placement. The juvenile court’s order reducing Mother’s visits, thereby allowing C.G. to spend more time with his foster parents without the behavioral concerns connected to his visits with Mother, was reasonably aimed at giving C.G. the best opportunity for a permanent placement.

Further, Mother’s efforts to distinguish S.H., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th

1542, are unavailing. The factual distinctions Mother raises (e.g., the age difference between C.G. and S.H. and S.H.’s mother’s hostility towards the minor’s caregivers) miss the point of our decision. That is, once the focus of the dependency proceedings has shifted from the parent’s interest in reunification to the child’s need for permanency and stability, it is entirely appropriate for visitation to decrease to promote permanency with the appointed guardians. (Id. at p. 1559.) With permanent plans ordered and guardians appointed for both C.G. and S.H., the focus of their dependencies had shifted and reasonably warranted decreased visits from their respective mothers. The age differences between C.G. and S.H. or the greater volatility of S.H.’s parents relative to Mother are irrelevant.

Finally, Mother invokes the “beneficial relationship” exception as grounds to maintain her visitation schedule. This exception applies when the juvenile court determines that terminating a parent’s rights would be detrimental to the child because the parent has maintained regular visitation or the child would benefit from the continuing relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Since Mother’s parental rights were not terminated by the court’s order, the exception is inapplicable. Mother acknowledges this “exception is not at issue here” and the court was not required to engage in any analysis of the exception. We do not need to consider it.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

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Siggins, J.

We concur:

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Pollak, Acting P.J.

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Jenkins, J.

In re C.G., A150938