Stanman v. City of Los Angeles

Filed 10/18/06 Stanman v. City of Los Angeles CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mel Red Recana, Judge. Affirmed.

Philip D. Dapeer for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Laurie Rittenberg, Assistant City Attorney and Michael D. Nagle, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent.

_____________________________

This is an appeal from an order of dismissal following a bifurcated trial on statute of limitations grounds. The owner of a taxicab company brought this action against a city for refusal to grant appellant’s franchise to operate taxicabs in the city. After the first phase of trial on the respondent’s statute of limitations defense, the court announced a tentative ruling in favor of the appellant. At the beginning of the second phase, which was on the merits, the court announced its final decision on the statute of limitations issue, holding that appellant’s claim was barred. Appellant claims this was error and seeks reversal. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Appellant Ronald Stanman loaned money to Alan J. Schultz, Harriet Schultz, and Anything Yellow, Inc. to enable them to acquire a City of Los Angeles (City) franchise license to operate a taxicab company. Stanman’s loan was protected by a security interest in the cab company, Anything Yellow. The loan went into default, and in August 1996, Stanman foreclosed his security interest in Anything Yellow. He was awarded the entire stock of the company.

Under the terms of Anything Yellow’s taxicab franchise license, Stanman had to apply to City to have the license changed to recognize him as the new responsible party. While his application was pending, taxicab drivers who had been working for Anything Yellow came forward claiming that Schultz had sold them shares in the company. They asked City to refuse to recognize Stanman as the new responsible person unless he compensated them for their investments. City delayed acting on Stanman’s application, then made its consent to transfer contingent upon Stanman compensating the taxicab drivers for their loss. In May 1997, City’s Board of Transportation Commissioners suspended operating rights of 100 of Anything Yellow’s 400 vehicles as discipline for failure to comply with City’s requests.

In June 1997, several of the taxicab drivers sued Stanman, seeking declaratory relief and recovery of money they had paid for shares in Anything Yellow. The action was dismissed in January 2004 for failure to prosecute. In a related case, Stanman sued Schultz for declaratory relief. In March 1998, the trial court held that the taxicab drivers were defrauded by Schultz. But since Schultz did not gain prior approval of City to transfer or issue new shares in Anything Yellow, as required under the franchise agreement, the taxicab driver investors obtained no “right, title, claim or interest” in Anything Yellow. The result was a judgment in favor of Stanman.

Stanman brought this action against City for breach of a written taxicab franchise agreement. Stanman alleged he suffered financial injury when City unlawfully reduced the number of his operable taxicabs from 400 to 300. Addressing City’s statute of limitations defense first, the trial court initially and tentatively ruled in favor of Stanman, but it later revisited the issue and found that Stanman’s case was barred by the statute of limitations. The order states: “Upon consent of both parties that no judgment need be entered for Defendant and against Plaintiff and that a dismissal shall suffice, the entire action is dismissed with prejudice.” Stanman filed a timely appeal from the order of dismissal.

DISCUSSION

Stanman claims the court erred in reconsidering its initial ruling on the statute of limitations issue and then ruling that the action is barred. He mischaracterizes the trial court’s ruling. The trial was bifurcated, with the statute of limitations defense tried first. At the conclusion of this phase, the trial court announced a tentative ruling that the action was not barred. Under California Rules of Court, rule 232(a), a “tentative decision shall not constitute a judgment and shall not be binding on the court.” It is clear that the trial court intended to leave the issue of statute of limitations open for further review. The court stated: “I will find for now--I said for now--that the statute had not run against plaintiff Stanman and that we go to trial. Nevertheless, at the end of the trial when we have more facts, then I’m not going to stop the City attorney from saying I’d like to be heard again on this issue of the statute of limitations.”

The court’s authority to reopen discussion on the issue in a later proceeding is expressly authorized by California Rules of Court, rule 232, which recognizes that a court may “subsequently modif[y] or change[] its announced tentative decision.” More specifically, California Rules of Court, rule 232.5 explains that in a bifurcated trial, the judge conducting the separate trial may announce a tentative decision on the issue tried and then “proceed with the trial of subsequent issues“ before actually issuing a statement of decision on the previously tried issue. That is what happened in this case. The court never issued a statement of decision in favor of Stanman.

Stanman also argues that City’s memorandum of points and authorities submitted to the court after the first phase of the trial should be considered as “some sort of a motion for reconsideration,” and therefore barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 1008.[1] In LeFrancois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, our Supreme Court held that section 1008 limits a litigant’s right to renew motions to the court so as to eliminate the unnecessary flood of repetitive court filings; it does not limit the court’s inherent authority, on its own motion, to reconsider an order. (Id. at p. 1106.) “If a court believes one of its prior interim orders was erroneous, it should be able to correct that error no matter how it came to acquire that belief.” (Id. at p. 1108.) The LeFrancois court concluded that while the defendant’s second motion for summary judgment violated sections 437c, subdivision (f)(2), and 1008, “nothing prohibits the court from reconsidering its previous ruling on its own motion.” (Id. at p. 1109.) Here, the court reconsidered its tentative ruling on the statute of limitations issue sua sponte. City’s memorandum of points and authorities was presented to the court upon the trial judge’s request; it was not a motion for reconsideration pursuant to section 1008.

In his brief on appeal, Stanman asserts his action was not barred by the statute of limitations, but he presents no argument or authority to support this claim. “‘An issue merely raised by a party without any argument or authority is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion.’” (Roe v. McDonald’s Corp. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114, citing People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282.)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

EPSTEIN, P. J.

We concur:

MANELLA, J.

SUZUKAWA, J.

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[1] All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.